CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006000340001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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6 November 1961
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6 November 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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3. USSR: TASS statement implies USSR will continue nuclear
testing. (Page ti)
4. South Vietnam: Moscow and Peiping attempt to generate
international alarm over General Taylor's mission. (.Page i t t)
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8. India: Nehru reportedly instructs his ambassador in Moscow
to protest Soviet nuclear tests. (Page v)
9. Dominican Republic: Ramfis Trujillo pressing for early
relaxation of OAS sanctions. (Page vi)
10. Ecuador: Rioting in provincial city touched off by Pres-
ident Velasco's visit on 3 November. (Page vt t)
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USSR. In the first official reaction to President Kennedy's
2 November statement on US testing plans, a TASS statement
strongly implies that the USSR will continue its tests in the
future on the pretext that the resumption of US tests, particu-
larly if these are conducted in the atmosphere, will place the
Soviet Union at a military disadvantage. This statement, how-
ever, is more cautious than the position Khrushchev is reported
by the Western press to have taken in his talks with Italian Min-
ister Pisanelli on 3 November.-
TASS, quoting "leading circles in the USSR ! 11 charges the
President's statement shows that the US is seeking an "illusory
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superiority in nuclear armaments:? The TASS statement said
that if US tests continue and are resumed in the atmosphere,
the "other side," i.e. the Soviet Union, will "be forced by
circumstances to come to corresponding conclusions for it-
self:1 Noting that the USSR has conducted fewer tests than the
combined total of the US, Britain, and France, the TASS state-
ment asserts that the Soviet Union has a "full moral right to
equalize the situation and not to allow a discrepancy" between
the number of Western and Soviet tests. The statement ignores
the President's offer to conclude a test ban treaty with ade-
quate inspections and controls, and repeats the standard So- 25X1
viet proposal to sign immediately a treaty on general and total
disarmament w 25X1
,hich would discontinue tests permanently.F
Communist China - USSR - South Vietnam: Moscow and
Peiping are attempting to generate internatio 1 alarm over
the possible consequences of General Taylor's mission to
South Vietnam. On 3 November the USSR issued a Foreign
Ministry statement repeating charges of "aggressive US ac-
tions" in South Vietnam- -actions which Moscow claimed are
creating a "threat to peace and security in Southeast Asia:'
Peiping, in a 5 November editorial linking the situations in
Laos and South Vietnam, stated that the "Chinese people can-
not but express their serious concern over the menace to
peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia:'
The Chinese Communist press representative in Geneva
outcome of the general's mission, The Chinese press repre-
is reported to be "noticeably active" in attempting to learn the
V etna
Acan.troops were sent to South i rn.l
thing" if Ame
sentative told
1 would be" terrible
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India: Nehru on 30 October reportedly directed the Indian
ambassador in Moscow to protest to the Soviet Government 25X
against its nuclear testse
Nehru is deeply concerned over
the recent criticism of India in the US, I
and intent on convincing US leaders that India is
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rsuing a "balanced" foreign policy not determined by "two
standards.
ch a balance, however, is likely to require that Indian
criticism of the USSR be kept within bounds.
o Nehru and Menon believe India must
remain on. friendly terms with Khrushchev as the only means
of influencing him toward a moderate course in East-West re=-
lations. Moreover, Nehru feels that Khrushchev's efforts to
restrain Peiping provide the only effective deterr rte, to an
aggressive ghinese Communist policy toward India.
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Dominican Republic: T-General Ramfis Trujillo advised US
Consul ener Hill through a special emissary on 3 November
and again on 4 November that the government would probably not
be able to survive if action were not taken by 10 November. to-
ward a partial lifting of OAS economic sanctions against the
Dominican Republic. These assertions are a continuation of
the pressure by President Balaguer's regime to achieve an
easing of sanctions. They probably also reflect the equally
strong pressures on Ramf is by civilian and military officials
linked to the former dictatorship of Generalissimo Trujillo
who feel. that their survival hinges on Ramfis' retention of
military power,
e major opposition parties, on the other hand, continue
to press for Ramfis' retirement. Hill reports that an impor-
tant segment of public opinion would probably view any easing
of OAS sanctions prior to this development as the loss of the
opposition's principal protection against repressive government
action
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Ecuador: Opposition rioting in the provincial city of
Cuenca was occasioned by President Velasco's visit there on
3 November. The violence in Cuenca, which is symptomatic
of growing public unrest, follows widespread disturbances
exploited by leftist elements in early October in connection
with a general strike attempt. Although Velasco's position
does not seem to be immediately threatened, further dis-
turbances and plotting by both rightist and leftist groups are
likely.
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Political Unrest in Ecuador
The 3 November disturbances marked the fourth day of
unrest in Cuenca and resulted in several deaths and casualties.
The outbreaks are believed to reflect general discontent with
depressed economic conditions and the central government's
inertia and neglect of local areas. The city has been placed
under military rule, as occurred in three other provincial
capitals during rioting in early October.
Velasco's political support has declined rapidly in recent
weeks, partly because of his government's ineptitude in deal-
ing with the declining economic situation, his pro-Cuban for-
eign policies, and dissension within his own heterogeneous
Velasquista political faction. Tension may ease somewhat--
at least temporarily--after the approaching adjournment of
Congress, over which the President retains only a tenuous
control. Velasco's supporters in mid-October resorted to
force in order to disrupt a congressional meeting, which cul-
minated in a shooting fracas. During his first two terms as
President (1934-35 and 1944-47), Velasco's conflicts with the
Congress contributed to his forced removal from office.
Velasco's opposition from both the right and the left has
become increasingly aggressive since the violence of early
October. Velasco has broken with two of his key lieutenants
and previously prominent Velasquista leaders: Vice President
Arosemena, ex officio president of the Senate who charged
Velasco with attempted assassination in connection with the
recent violence in Congress, and Manuel Araujo, the pro-
Communist former minister of government. These two men,
who have presidential ambitions and have sought the leadership
of Communist-leftist groups, have probably drained off a siz-
able portion of Velasco's leftist support within his own party.
Leftist groups now opposing him include the principal student
organization and the Communist-dominated principal labor or-
ganization, which launched the partly successful general strike
effort in early October.
The moderate-rightist opposition recently formed a loose
coalition--the Bureau of Democratic Parties--and has considered
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the alternative of trying to work with the administration to
bring about a reversal of Velasco's pro-Cuban policy and a
crackdown on the radicals. Some military elements, includ-
ing a number of previously top-level officers involuntarily
retired by the President and others on active duty, are also
reportedly organizing for action in the event of a breakdown
of public order or a leftist attempt to seize power. These
officers maintain liaison with the Bureau but apparently are
not actively plotting Velasco's overthrow at present.
Among the negative factors favoring Velasco are the divi-
sion and uncertainty among both his leftist and rightist oppo-
nents on a course of action. For example, the military strongly
distrust Arosemena as a leftist but also consider themselves
the guardian of constitutional order and are keenly aware that
Arosemena holds the legal right of succession if Velasco retires,
voluntarily or otherwise.
In a speech in Cuenca on 3 November, Velasco rejected
opposition demands for his resignation and blamed the Commu-
nists primarily for his current difficulties. A report that the
Cuban charge in Quito has been asked to leave Ecuador suggests
that the pressures on Velasco for a modification of his pro-Cuban
policies may be beginning to have some effect.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U,S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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