CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006100010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved F Teas /1 ? - 0097.W006100010001-2
4
25X1
t;opy IN N 0. c;
/ 4iE5 OF /
25X1 /
TOP SECRET
State Dept. review Q E1or Release 2002/11/19: CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 j Approved Ford ase 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975 06100010001-2 25X1
24 November 1961
I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
25X1
0
4. Dominican Republic: Opposition presses for harsher meas.-
ures against Trujillo supporters; some hostility displayed
toward Balaguer himself. (Page it)
5. Congo: Parliament supports Adoula; Gizenga's influence
appears to be declining. (Page t v)
7. South Korea: Factional conflict in ruling junta may be re-
newed following General Pak's return from visit to Wash-
ington. (Page v)
9. Czechoslovakia: Party boss Novotny's downgrading of former
President Gottwald appears designed to combat factional
strife in Czech party. (Page vi)
10. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page vii)
25X1 EM
j I I
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 In'
A A F I 2002111119 CIA RD079T009 06100010001 2
pprove orb
too= - - 25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 November 1961
25X1
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
j
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 j Approved Fo elease 2002/11/19. CIA-RDP79T009 00610c?O Lib1-2 25X1
*Dominican Republic: President Balaguer's moderate
regime is rea y beginning to run into trouble as the cur-
rent wave of national jubilation subsides. The public con-
tinues to press for vengeance against those who carried out
Trujillo brutalities. The first open display of hostility against
Balaguer since the crisis of last week occurred on 22 Novem-
ber during a demonstration before the presidential palace. The
anti-Balaguer sentiment is being stimulated mainly by the 14 of
June party (PCJ),which, though much smaller than the moderate
National Civic Union, is strong among students and in the cap-
ital city. There are indications of a split in the PCJ between
more moderate leaders and an extremist faction which is re-
portedly considering violent action in an attempt to bring down
the regime.
Balaguer strengthened his regime significantly with the
appointment on 22 November of the Rodriguez Echevarria
s~l
24 Nov 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
25X1
a
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 j Approved Fol ase 2002/11/19: CIA-RDP79T009 06100010001-2
brothers to key military posts. General Rafael Rodriguez
Echevarria, who enhanced his reputation as a decisive
leader and gained the support of the moderate opposition
when he led the brief military action of 19 November against
the Trujillos, assumes the highest post in the regime for a
military officer. As secretary of state for the armed forces,
the 37-year-old air force general becomes first in the con-
stitutional line of succession to the presidency. His brother,
Colonel Pedro Santiago Rodriguez Echevarria, becomes chief
of the air force, the country's dominant military arm. The
respected General Felix Hermida, Jr., newly named secre-
tary of. the interior, will be charged with controlling the po-
lice, whose transfer from military supervision is an element
in Balaguer's democratization. program. By replacing his
minister of labor, Balaguer has removed the last remaining
pro-Trujillo figure from his cabinet.
Balaguer told the American consul general on Wednes-
day that pro-Castro leader Lopez Molina had been deported
the day before. Balaguer had expressed concern over the
number of protests received against Molina's detention, and
felt this might indicate that pro-Communist groups had devel-
oped a more effective organization in the country than he had
realized. He also expressed alarm over the effect of radio-
broadcasts from Cuba calling for a general strike to force
Balaguer's ouster.
Extremist criticism within the Dominican Republic of
US "intervention" in the recent crisis has failed to arouse
significant popular support? Elsewhere, Brazil has been the
only country in the Western Hemisphere, other than Cuba, to
criticize US actions during the crisis even indirectly. On
22 November, the Brazilian delegate in the OAS expressed
his government's "apprehension" over recent events in the
Dominican Republic and urged all OAS members to refrain
from any act that could threaten the principle of noninterven-
tion.. The UN Security Council took no action on Cuba's
24 Nov 61 DAILY BRIEF iii
j
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100010001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 Approved Fo lease 2002/11/19: CIA-RDP79T009 06100010001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
22 November demand.that it condemn US "aggression" in the
Dominican Republic, though council president Zorin may sub-
mit a resolution on this at the count' l session today. 25X
F I
*Congo: The 22 November secret debate of the Congolese
parliament is an indication of Premier Adoula's continuing
hold on the central government. The parliament almost unan-
imously supported Adoula's condemnation of the Congolese
Army's. recent activities in Kindu and. criticized Gizenga's con-
tinued absence from Leopoldville. The standing of Gizenga has
declined still further. Stanleyville commander Lundula seems
to be genuinely behind Adoula, and Interior Minister Gbenye,
a former Gizenga lieutenant, recently intimated
that he was no longer associated with his former
chief.
25X1
25X1
24 Nov 61
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 Approved Fo Release 2002/11/19: CIA-RDP79TO09 06100010001-2 j
25X1
V
25X1
25X1
ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction may be re-
tion of several basic problems. The factional conflict in the
assistance from the United States for the solution or ameliora-
South Korea?
j~b initial favorable South Korean reaction
to General Pak Chong-hut's Washington visit has been clouded
by an undertone of concern that he failed to obtain necessary
newea wnen YAK returns to Seoul. on 25 November.
25X1
25X
25X1
25X1
25X1
j
j
j
25X1
24 Nov 61
DAILY BRIEF
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
25X1
11
Ii
Czechoslovakia: Party boss Novotny's report to his party
central committee, published on 21 November, appears de-
signed to combat factional strife in the Czech party. Khru-
shchev's renewed attacks on Stalin apparently have led to a
resurgence of demands in Czechoslovakia for a new assess-
ment of those involved in the trial of former party secretary
Rudolf Slansky, whose execution for excessive nationalism in
1952 is believed by most Czechoslovak party members to have
been carried out on Stalin's orders.
Most of the present top Czechoslovak leaders share some
responsibility for Slansky's execution, In his speech Novotny
justified the execution by reiterating charges against. Slansky
for having ruled by police terror. In an attempt to absolve him-
self of any complicity in Slansky's actions, Novotny for the first
time publicly shifted the blame to Gottwald, heretofore highly
honored former party chairman and President, who died in 1953.
By accusing Gottwald of the personality cult, Novotny has ex-
posed himself to the same charge, since he is the only other
24 Nov 61 DAILY BRIEF
vi
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 A roved For1A Iease 2002/11/19 ? CIA-RDP79T009 06100010001-2
/ pp
jj 25X1
25X1
Czech Communist leader to hold simultaneously the offices
of head of state and head of party.
25X1
25X1
WATCH COMhUTTEE CONCLUSIONS
Co:n the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
Co Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate direct mil-
itary action in the immediate future.
25X1
25X1
access rights may be anticipate
Berlin: =''~he Communists continue their pressure on the
West's position in Berlin. Further harassments against Allied
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
j
Prospects for Ghana: present political situation, loyalty
of army and police, economic problems and prospects, and
Nkrumah.'s policies and probable foreign orientation. U.S.I.B.
SNIE 64.1-61. 4pp. Nov 16'610 25X1
24 Nov 61
DAILY BRIEF vii
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100010001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
ase 2002/11/19: CIA-RDP79T0097 06100010001-2
Reaction to South Korean Leader's Washington Visit
Some press comment in South Korea has made refer-
ency to Pak's failure to secure an American commitment
to specific aid figures and to underwrite the costs of. the
regime's five-year economic development program. Many
lead press stories also noted the omission from joint high-
level statements of any reference to Seoul's long-standing
desire for a status-of -forces agreement. One prominent
newspaper commented that although Pak's pledge to return
the government to civilian hands was "no news to us," his
reiteration of that pledge in Washington "adds greatly to its
weight and verity.
LPak's stopover in Tokyo on 11-12 November to discuss
the normalization of Japanese - South Korean relations with
Prime Minister Ikeda received heavy but cautiously critical
coverage in the South Korean press. South Korean reserva-
tions were heightened when the Japanese press claimed that
Pak had agreed to drop all. financial claims against Japan ex-
cept those that had a legal basis in Japanese law or Diet ac-
tions and had agreed to accept long-term interest-bearing loans
in lieu of grants. While the Pak-Ikeda talks appear to have
achieved the important objective of developing a sense of con-
fidence between the two leaders, South Korean public doubts
and aroused Japanese leftist opposition to a settlement could
be a serious obstacle to an early settlement of differences_ 1
25X1
25X1
24 Nov 61
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 2
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100010001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2
 Approved For4k lease 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T0097 06100010001-2
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100010001-2
 /
Approved For Release P/1 - 009 06100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100010001-2