SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00369R000200050011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 15, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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15 May 1967
Soviet Policy in the Middle East
1. It is clear from the scale and character of So-
viet activities in the Middle East that Moscow has come
to regard the area as one of priority interest. The
growth of the Soviet presence, however, has been partly
a response to forces operating within the region; it has
not been all of Soviet design..
2. The opportunity offered by the Egyptian interest
in Soviet arms in the mid-50s probably helped to precipi-
tate the important shift that was then developing in So-
viet policy. What was involved was a wholly new appraisal
of the changes taking place in the Third World, develop-
ments that the Soviets had been slow to understand. They
had just come to recognize that the tides of nationalism
running in the Third World had a "revolutionary" potential,
offering opportunities for the injection of Soviet influ-
ence.
3. The Soviets concluded that a policy of associat-
ing the bloc with the new governments and nationalist
movements on. a platform of "national liberation struggle"
offered a way of increasing pressure on the Western powers.
The Soviets assumed that the internal regimes in the newly
independent states, in part because of their association
with the bloc, would inevitably take on a more radical
character. This would intensify their conflict with the
Western. powers, which in turn would mean denial to the
latter of access to strategically critical areas and re-
sources. The Soviet entry into the Middle East was thus
a manifestation of a general policy concept intended to be
applied to the whole of the Third World.
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4. Military considerations certainly figure in the
Soviet desire to contest the Western position in the area,
although these probably do not have much to do with plan-
ning for the contingency of general war. No doubt the
Soviets would like to deny the area to use by US strategic
forces. Propaganda pressures against their presence are
mounted from time to time. But the Soviets must realize
that there is no prospect of effecting such denial by po-
litical means for a long time to come, if ever. Political
harassment will be the most they will be capable of.
5. The Soviets probably do not have in mind the ac-
quisition of military positions or assets of their own
which could be significant in connection. with a general
war. Such assets would not enable them to strike more ef-
fectively at strategic targets critical to them than they
can now. An attempt to acquire a capability for pre-emptive
attack on US strike forces in the area would assume a vast
air and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) effort that would have
to be based in the area itself. Even if it were assumed
that .he Soviets were designing their forces under a doc-
trin cf pre-emption, such a capability in the area seems
likely to remain well beyond their means, both technical
and political. Finally, the Soviet conception of the
course a general war might take, if it came, does not seem
to include extended land or sea campaigns in an area such
as the Middle East.
6. The Soviets may be thinking of their possible in-
volvement in limited conflicts in the region. In princi-
ple, the policy of attempting to displace Western influence
could present such contingencies. Or local conflicts might
occur in which the Soviets would wish to give support to
clients of theirs at some fairly high level of risk short
of actual intervention. Their present activities may point
to an intention, to operate in the Mediterranean. in this
way eventually.
7. If they wish to do so, the Soviets will have to
acquire capabilities that they do not now possess. They
lack limited war forces of a kind that could operate ef-
fectively in the area. They would need a changed statute
for the Dardanelles and a cooperative regime in Turkey,
neither of which seems possible for the foreseeable future.
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They would presumably want air and naval facilities at
some points in. the Mediterranean. basin itself. Not only
is it unlikely that even states friendly to the USSR
would wish to make these available, but it would be ex-
tremely awkward politically for the Soviets to acquire
them. To do so would compromise the "anti-imperialist"
rationale on which Soviet policy operates and would have
negative repercussions throughout the Third World.
8. Insofar as the Soviets have a military interest
in the area, this seems likely for the foreseeable future
to have two aspects. The first is to influence the po-
litical disposition of governments in such a way as to
make the area as inhospitable as possible to military co-
operation with the West, and in particular, to the deploy-
ment of US military power. The second is to establish
relations with governments that make it possible to use
them as proxies for actions directed against Western in-
terests and against regimes unfriendly to the Soviet bloc.
Military and economic aid and the USSR's political back-
ing as a great power are the primary instruments of such
a policy. The relationship developed with the UAR over
the last dozen years probably indicates the pattern that
the Soviets would like to develop generally in the area.
9. Thought of as an area in which and through which
to pursue Soviet interests by proxy, the Middle East re-
tains its historic character as a world crossroads. It
gives access to Africa and has links with Asia. The
radical nationalist movement has been strong there and
its political leaders have been in the forefront of ef-
forts to achieve united action against "Western colonial-
ism and economic exploitation." The political climate is
one in which the Soviet skills at forming fronts for sub-
versive, political, and propaganda actions work to good
effect. Thus the Soviets probably regard the region as
not only of interest in itself but also as a useful base
for support of their general strategy in the Third World.
10. The Soviets have surely given thought to ways in
which they might turn the West's dependence on the region's
oil supplies to their account. But at the present stage,
aspirations to pre-empt or control oil output are not filled
with much promise. The bloc states cannot provide a
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substitute market. To be in a position to manage the
distribution of oil, and perhaps to deny it to the West,
would assume a degree of Soviet control over producing
countries that the USSR no longer exercises even in
Eastern Europe. It seems certain that, whatever po-
litical forces hold power in these countries, they will
continue to be extremely jealous of the disposal of these
national assets. Probably the most the Soviets expect
to be able to do is to encourage and exploit politically
the chronic frictions between producing countries and
Western oil interests. Their acquisition of some con-
cessions and offers of technical assistance may in time
give them a position in the industry that will facilitate
this.
11. Soviet trade with the area has developed over
the years, but has done so unevenly. On the whole, the
Soviets will probably apply strictly economic criteria
to this trade and will not want to or be able to use it
as a means of political leverage. The interests of al-
most all countries of the area will continue to argue
for maintaining extensive trading relationships with the
West. The Soviets will see in the further development
of trade, apart from economic advantage, mainly an op-
portunity to widen their presence and access.
12. In sum, the Soviets see the region as of prime
strategic importance--politically, economically, mili-
tarily--in the long-term contest with the Western powers
to which they are committed. Their primary aim for the
foreseeable future will be, in the degree possible, to
deny the area politically to the West, and in particular
to the US. This emphasis flows from the nature of the
means available to them. To the extent that states and
political forces within the region can be induced to
look to Moscow for political direction, the Western posi-
tion will be increasingly constricted. The alignment of
forces in this area with the bloc would work to Soviet
advantage in the struggle for the Third World as a whole.
Soviet Economic, Political, and Military Activities
13. Since the Egyptian arms agreement in 1955, the
USSR and the'other bloc states have elaborated their ties
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with most of the countries in the Middle East. The main
reliance has been on conventional instruments of influ-
ence--military and economic aid, trade, an active diplo-
macy including numerous exchanges of ceremonial visits,
cooperation in the UN, and propaganda. Subversive tech-
niques and intelligence operations are, of course, every-
where part of the modus operandi of Soviet policy, although
in the Middle East they are now being applied primarily to
advance the USSR's relations with local governments rather
than to win power for Communist parties. (See annex for
Soviet economic and military aid to the Middle East.)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel
Attached for transmission to Senator Jackson
is a background memorandum representing CIA
views on Soviet aims and activities in the
Middle East. The over-all classification is
SECRET.
Any textual material drawn from the
memorandum must be re-phrased or paraphrased
for public use. The precise numbers of Soviet
vessels in the Mediterranean may not be used,
nor may the statement (p. 10, para. 28) on
the types of military equipment being furnished
FORM
US10-101
MAY FORM
AUGN 54 (01 WHICH REPLACES
ED.
ATE)
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