CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006200500001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 19, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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19 March 1962
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92
19 March
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. France-Algeria. (Page i)
2. Argentina: Strong Peronista electoral showing threatens
stability; reduces government to minority in Chamber of
USSR-Berlin: No Soviet flights scheduled in corridors to
day. (Page iii)
Deputies. page it)
11/1-1
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6. Situation in Laos. (Page iv)
8. Congo: Adoula-Tshombo meeting reportedly under way.
(Page v)
9. Japan: Socialists trying to prevent repayment of US re-
habilitation aid. (Page vi)
10. South Korea: Stability threatened by new law controlling
political activity of members of former civilian govern-
ment. (Page vi)
11. UAR-US: Cairo disseminating anti-US statements. (Page vii)
12. Bulgaria: Cabinet changes victory for pro-Khrushchev
party leadership. (Page viii)
13. Guatemala: Professional and business groups demanding
Ycigoras, resignation. (Page viii)
14. Situation Report: Singapore. (Page ix)
I
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CE BULLETIN
CENTRAL INTELLIGEN
19 March 1962
DAILY BRIEF
*France-Algeria: According to press reports thus far re-
ceived, the OAS seems to be responding to the announcement of
the cease-fire with a strategy of harassing operations- -report-
edly ordered in a radio broadcast by Salan- -instead of risking
an immediate showdown by trying to foment a mass settler upris-
ing or attempting a coup. The reported initial reaction of the
settlers has been generally defiant, and suggests that many of
them are willing to go, along with OAS orders for the 48-hour gen-
eral strike, despite the government's threat to draft personnel for
essential public services. There have been several indications of
support for the "National Committee of French Resistance in Al-
geria,"--formation of which the OAS announced on 17 March. One
of these is the reported statement of several European and pro-
French Moslem members of parliament to resist any "agreement
with the rebels" Another is the reported motion voted by 2,000
reserve officers and non-coms in Algiers to "refuse, regardless
of the consequences, to submit to any other authority except the
'authority of France."'
The risk of assassination by the OAS, particularly during the
first weeks following the cease-fire, will be great for individuals
accepting responsible posts. Furthermore, by stepping up terror-
istic acts against Moslems, the OAS will severely handicap the ef-
forts of infiltrated rebel leaders to restrain urban Moslems from
turning, violently on the settlers.
Another unfavorable omen for the transitional period between
the cease-fire and independence is a reported refusal of coopera-
tion from retired General Pierre Billotte--Billotte, a "leftist
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Gaullist" had been picked by De Gaulle to become French High
Commissioner in Algeria during the transitional period.
De Gaulle's statement on the cease-fire complimented the
j French Army on whose loyalty he depends for implementation
th
t
t
d hi
d
s
a
s opponen
e
of the accord and at the same time remin
he has and will retain French public support for his Algerian
policy. His stress on the role played by French republican in-
stitutions in the victory of "good sense" over "frenzy" is aimed
at neutralizing efforts by the OAS to claim it is fighting the
Gaullist "dictatorship!' De Gaulle's reference to seeking public
approval and national confidence suggests an early date for the
expected referendum in France to legalize the agreements.
PAG leaders in Tunis have publicly warned that the cease-
fire agreement dnac not automatically bring' neace_ and have
M
called on French civil and military authorities to "cease their
' 1
%/
m
li
it
th the CAS Should disorders be severe and urn-
co
p
c
y
wi
this could result in abrogation of the Evian accords.
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*Argentina- information as of 0400 EST) Peronista candi-
dates have made a. strong showing at the expense. of President
Frondizi?s Intransigent Radical, party (UCRI). in. the 18 March
provincial and congressional elections. President Frondizi
fears that this may prompt young officers to take armed action,
Although the chief military target is Peronista. Andres Framini,
now governor-elect of Buenos Aires Province, the second most 25X1
important political post in Argentina, Frondizi's position may
also be at stake.
Otop military leaders had agreed to oust Frondizi and hold
presidential elections within a month.if Framini were elected.
Frondizi sent an emissary to Ambassador McClintock last night
to request that he try to p uade the military from stepping in
. to negate Framini's victo
. neo-Peronista slate
he emissary stated that Frondizi was determined that the
federal government would take over Buenos Aires Province and
would do, so immediately if there were signs of violence, but he
preferred to await certification of the ballots and then intervene
on grounds that the Peronistas had "incited violence" Frondizi
has begun 'talks with the secretaries of the armed forces to recom-
mend this course of action. Before the elections, well-founded.
rumors were widely publicized that the armed forces would demand
intervention of any province where a Peronista was elected gov-
ernor; at least thr overnorships appear to have been.won on
pears that no party will have a majority. According to press
sources, total national vote by par., ranks the Peronistas first,
Preliminary unofficial returns indicate that the UCRI has
lost control of the 192-man. Chamber of Deputies, which jeop-
ardizes Frondizi's economic reform measures under the US-
backed stabilization program. Returns are too incomplete to
determine the gains of the People's Radical party (UCRP), which
already holds 48 uncontested seats in the lower house, but it ap-
~
followed by the UCRI and the UCRPI
19 Mar 62
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Laoso ouvanna Phouma and Souphannouvong have, taken he
position tha they can make no further adjustments in their pro-
posed coalition slate without another meeting with the Vientiane
leaders. Previously, Souvanna had favored negotiations with West-
ern representatives aimed at reaching common accord on a cabinet
which could then be referred to Vientianehe had said that he would
accept any arrangement suitable to both the West and Pathet Lao
leader Souphannouvong. Aside from Souphannouvong's coolness to
this approach, Souvanna's change in attitude probably stems from
King: Savang's recent public endorsement of the Boun Oum govern-
ment, which Souvanna views as a serious development in Vientiane's
longterm campaign to force him to admit inability to form agovern-
ment-.I
Itirch, a meeting with British Ambassador Addis in Khang Khay on
16 Souvanna and Souphannouvong said that their future bar-
gaining would be based on the principles that the key posts of defense,
interior, and foreign affairs must go to the neutralist center, and
that posts allowed to the two wings --Vientiane and the Pathet Lao--
must correspond in number and importance. Luang Prabang was
considered as a possible site for another "three princes" meeting,
but Souvanna said he would not invite Phoumi until sure of his ac-
Phoumi has been consulting his military and civilian sun-
cetance
.
L, 25X
'
s course of action, but resumption of enemy
porters on Vientiane
shelling of the Nam Tha airstrip in northwester Laos on 18 March
has served to stiff and against Souvanna
19 Mar 62
Map on reverse of page
DAILY BRIEF iv
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19 Max . 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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bassador Gullion is not optimistic, he describes Adoula as
pessimistic and 'tmuleish" and believes that if Tshombe' ad.
Congo- he meetings between Adoula and Tshombe, orig-
inally schedu ed for 15 March, are reportedly under. way. Am -
papers, prospects for a successful meeting "are very dim
heres to the tough position indicated in some of his briefing
ailure of the talks could.have serious consequences.
Ado'i la has become increasingly irritated with the UN Com-
mand for its refusal to support Congo Army operations in
northern Katanga. He informed UN officials on 15 March
that unless the problem of Katanga's secession was solved
by the end of April, he would have to ask the UN to withdraw
and allow the Leopoldville government to use whatever means
it could to deal with the problem. Should the talks breakdown,
Adoula is likely to press for UN assistance or withdrawal and
to seek bilateral aid from Afro-Asian and bloc states.
(Bad` Page 1)
19 Mar 62
DAILY BRIEF
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Japan: 'he Japanese Socialist party is making a .de-
termined effZ rt to block Diet ratification of the agreement
ROME signed on 9 January to repay $490,000,000 to the US for as-
sistance in rehabilitating Japan after World War I I. The
overnment is seeking ratification in the lower house
J Ikeda
g
oryi by 7. April in order, to allow action in.the upper house prior
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to adjournment in early May. The Socialists are claiming
that the assistance was provided without formal agreement,
that there was no understanding for repayment, and that much
of the relief food was either alien to the Japanese diet or con-
sisted of "animal feed" unfit for human consumption. They
are endeavoring, as in the US-Japanese security treaty issue
in 1960, to rally the press and public demonstrations against
"forcible passage" of the measure by the government major-
ity and may boycott legislative deliberations or resort to vio-
lence to prevent it. 'Socialist success in arousing significant 25X1
rasa and ublic su r%-P+ while not considered likel could
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disrupt the tenuous unity within the Liberal-Democratic party
on which Prime Minister Ikeda's position .depen so
South Korea: he law governing future political activity
announced by the unta on 16 March demonstrates. the military
regime's intention to control the participation in politics for
the next six years of persons associated with former civilian
governments. The law provides for the screening of all per-
sons who wish to engage in political activity to determine
their acceptability to the military regime. It is part of a
general scheme to assure the influence of the present ruling
groups over. the civilian administration promised for 1963.
The hostile reaction of the politicians is emphasized .by the
threat of President Yun Po-sun--the only leading political
holdover from the former government- -to resign in .the pro-
test against the regime's move to perpetuate its power. The
junta has failed to win any broad political support, and this
19 Mar 62
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junta and the armed forces in efforts to un.eat the regime
ove could seriously reduce the prospects for restoring effec-
ive cooperation with important political elements and the par-
ticipation of civilians in a future government. Persons barred
from politics may seek alliance with disgruntled factions irk the
UAR-US: The controlled UAR press and MENA, the offi-
cial UAR news agency, gave wide dissemination on 15 March
to two attacks on US policy in.Southeast Asia by the Communist
front Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee (AAPS). The
first of these, by the North Vietnamese "commercial repre-
sentative" in Cairo, charged that the United States is using poi-
sonous gases and bacteriological warfare in South Vietnam.
"American imperialist" intervention was strongly condemned,
and demands were made for the withdrawal of American military
and civilian personnel from South Vietnam. The same media
also broadcast an attack by the acting secretary general of the
AAPS, who is the official Egyptian representative to AAPS. On
14 March, he charged the United States with "armed aggression"
in Laos and demanded the end of "United States armed interfer-
ence" and the withdrawal of SEATO arms and officials. Commu-
nist countries have found the various Afro-Asian front organiza-
tions operating in Cairo useful vehicles for transforming anti-
colonial sentiment into anti-American propaganda.
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Despite their tight grip over their propaganda media, UAR
officials contend. that the AAPS is a private organization whose
statements cannot be controlled. The charges will be picked up 25X1
and replayed by the Arabic press outside the UAR, and may gain
wide credence among important segments of the Middle East 25X
public.
19 Mar 62
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Bulgaria: The appointments of new ministers of defense
and interior, -announced on 16 March represent an important
victory for the pro-Khrushchev leadership of party First
Secretary Todor Zhivkov over the powerful Stalinist faction
in the Bulgarian Communist party. LLast November the party
leadership embarked on a de-Stalinization campaign with the
ouster from the politburo of Vulko Chervenkov, party boss
and premier during the Stalin era. At that time, Chervenkov 25X1
vowed to fight, predicting that the outcome would not become
apparent until the next - t con ress which now is sched-
uled for late August 196211
Guatemala: The Ydigoras regime continues in a precari-
ous position despite the decline in street fighting after the army
took over from the police on 16 March. It will be difficult if
not impossible for Ydigoras to .live down the. police excesses
during the four days of mob violence. Professional and busi-
ness groups have joined in the demand for. his resignation.
S
Anti-Communist opposition parties are fearful of a pro-
Communist takeover unless Ydigoras resigns. quickly in.favor I
of an interim regime in which they and the military will par-
ticipate. These parties--the moderate leftist Revolutionary
party, which has significant popular support; the rightist Na-
tional Liberation Movement-, and the small Christian Democratic
part
241
21
ave been in contact with military
ea ers who--ifthey rema afff-Tinitethe key to the situa-
tion. The military would almost certainly act to remove the
President before permitting an extremist takeover, and some
officers have already been discussing the alternatives of a mil-
itary-civilian regime to replace Ydigoras o
19 Mar 62 DAILY BRIEF
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Situation Re ort--Sin apore: / he moderate leftist. Peo-
ple's Action party (PAP) governor of Lee Kuan Yew has
lost much of its popular support to the extreme leftist oppo-
sition, the Barisan Socialist party (BSP). Communist-ori-
ented BSP leaders, who face almost certain arrest if the
merger of Malaya, Singapore, and British Borneo is carried
out as projected, possibly late this year, have been attempt-
ing to arouse Singapore's overwhelmingly Chinese population
against the merger. The BSP has failed to force Lee's gov-
ernment out by parliamentary means. It is expected now to
turn to demonstrations, strikes, and possibly maser violence
to frustrate the establishment of Greater Malaysi
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%
19 Mar 62
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Congo
Adoula.told Ambassador Gullion on 14 March that "it was
tin'to find out whether Tshombe would or would not inte-
grate Katanga:' He said he was prepared to listen to anything
Tshombe had to say, but said his "art did not exactly flutter"
in anticipation of any positive result
civilian chief in the Congo Gardiner contends he is
not concerned over Adoula's demands that the Katangan is-
sue be settled by late April, and he does not believe Adoula
will really press for a.showdown with the UN. Ambassador
Gullion however, finds Adoula's demands on the UN'"disquiet-
ing.' Adoula may be in serious po--
litica trouble unless he can show parliament some positive
results on the Katangan problem.
While negotiating with.Adoula, Tshombe and Katangan lead-
ers are attempting to weaken Adoula's parliamentary support
and to undercut what control Leopoldville has established in north-
ern Katanga. Tshombe?s Conakat party, through offers of gov
ment posts and .a share in Katangan revenues, is trying to wor
19 Mar 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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ut a reconciliation with Baluba tribal leaders. Gullion does
L _____ _ _L LL .. .. .. Y,. ..,..........,,... 4n n,, .,..oo.r~ h?t Hn rannr$c th?a$
I some Baluba.leaders are obviously tempted.
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Situation Report: Singapore
he Barisan Socialis party (BSP). was the left wing of
the governing People's Action party (PAP) until mid-1961.
It split with Prime Minister Lee over the. terms of the Great-
er Malaysia,merger scheme, which, according to party Sec-
retary General Lim Chin Siong, will lead to the permanent
domination of Singapore by Malaya and of the Chinese com-
munity by the Malays. Under the proposed merger: plan, the
federation government will take over foreign policy, defense,
and internal security ut will leave control over labor and
education to Singapor
hen the BSP left the PAP it carried with it many of
Sing`pore's strongest labor unions, the radical student lead-
ers in the Chinese schools, and nearly half of the PAP assem-
bly members. It had hoped to defeat Lee's government on a
? confidence vote and force new elections, which it expected to
win. Lee, however, deftly parried leftist attacks in the re-
cent legislative session. Gathering support from his rightist
opponents, who were unwilling to see Singapore fall under BSP
control, he obtained approval in principle of .the merger scheme
and, even more important, the passage of a budget which will
provide funds for the government through the middle of 1963
by which time merger presumably will have been accomplishe
Lee's parliamentary successes have left the BSP only popu-
larqfemonstrations and mass violence as means of blocking
the merger. His government, through a combination of firm-
ness and moderation, successfully contained a series of minor
I student demonstrations and labor disputes in December and
January which threatened to spark mass disorder, and, for the
time being, conditions in Singapore are relatively calm. As
plans for merger become more firm, however, and the situa-
tion of the BSP more desperate, more ambitious attempts at
strikes, demonstrations, and mass violence are likely. Ma-
layan Prime Minister Rahman, uncertain of Lee's ability to
maintain control over the Singapore situation until merger is
accomplished, is urgi the earl arrest of the BSP leaders as
a precautionary move`s
19 Mar 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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 Approved Foil
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to. the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief,. Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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