Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050061-8
Body:
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026UII3a0
18 October 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
Q 7/- 10-V7
SUBJECT: Comparison of Indochina NIEs/SNIEs with DCI Statements
Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee
1. According to Mr. Maury's office, the Director of Central
Intelligence has appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
or components thereof and discussed Indochina matters 15 times between
26 January 1959 and 5 May 1971. (One of these appearances was a
double session on 25 and 28 February 1966; if you count this as two
appearances, the total number is 16.) Mr-. Maury's office has furnished
us with the transcripts of the DCI's testimony or copies of his prepared
statement as indicated on Attachment 2 to this memorandum. So far
as we can ascertain, these transcripts are complete with one exception:
the transcript for the 26 February 1969 briefing has a statement clipped
to the inside of the front cover which says that "pages 60- 65 and page
7-A of the transcript have been removed and are being retained in the
files of the Committee on For
e'a
Pages 60-65 occur in the middle of an Indochina discussion
and hence may be relevant, though without seeing them we cannot be
absolutely sure.
2. My colleagues have reviewed both the transcripts and the
output of NIEs and SNIEs comparing each against the other. Their findings
are outlined in attached memorandum (Attachment 1). In
essence what you or your predecessors told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee or its components was in substantial accord with the judgments
extant in the National Intelligence Estimates current with the time these
briefings were given. There is one exception to this generalization
which is explained in the attached memorandum.
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3. From the standpoint of consistency, no harm can be done if
Senator Fulbright's request were answered by giving him back the
record of what you or your predecessors said before his Committee
instead of giving him the estimates he requested. This may be the
best gambit with which to counter his request, at least in the first
instance. There is one briefing, however, which you might want to
consider for purposes of image if not of accuracy; namely, Admiral
Raborn's 28 February 1966 comments, some of which were, to put it
charitably, unprofessional.
4. We will retain the estimates and the material provided by
Mr. Maury's office until this matter is resolved or you direct: otherwise.
Ge ge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
cc: Ex. Dir. -Compt.
Legislative Counsel
D/ONE
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18 October 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver. Jr., SAVA
SUBJECT . ONE Review of CIA Briefings on Indochina for
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959-71
1. With a single exception, the various statements and
transcripts are generally consistent in content and tone with
the numerous SNIEs and NIEs prepared during the 1959-71 period.
2. The exception is not a clearcut case but the differences
may be significant to the Director. In brief: During the March
13, 1970 briefing on Laos -- which ranged over related subjects as
well -- Senator Javits asked the Director if the Agency had "made
an estimate of the consequences of the withdrawal" (of US combat
forces from South Vietnam). The Director's response, though
qualified somewhat, was in the negative. (See pp. 61-62 of the
official transcript.) In our review of related estimates, we
found that SNIE 14.3-70 ("The Outlook from Hanoi: Factors
Affecting North Vietnam's Policy on the War in Vietnam") dated
5 February 1970 -- or a month before the briefing in question
-- did discuss at some length the policy of Vietnamization and
its likely impact on Hanoi's thinking. (See pp. 2-3, 7-10, and
18 of Estimate.)
Some other comments which might be of use to you:
a. Of the testimony prior to 1968, there is very
little of value on Indochina for the Committee Staff to
explore. Exceptions are the 10 October 1963 transcript
on the situation in South Vietnam just prior to Diem's
removal (which accords well with Estimates of the period,
but is hardly meaty enough for appetites whetted by the
"Pentagon Papers"); and the 28 February 1966 transcri;Dt
-- or at least the portion on communist use of Cambodian
soil.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
SECRET declassification
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b. On the other hand, there is much of value in the
testimony offered since the beginning of 1968, except for
the most recent 15 May 1971 transcript which contains little
on the Indochinese problem.
c. I assume that the Committee Staff could supple-
ment all this material with its on voluminous proceedings
(published and unpublished) of October and November 1969
on Thailand and Laos, and other, more recent, testimony
on the war.
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26 January 1959 -- Prepared statement
18 January 1960 -- Prepared Statement
2 May 1961 -- Transcript
6 March 1962 -- Transcript
10 October 1963 -- Transcript
26 January 1965 -- Transcript
25 & 28 February 1966 -- Transcript
3 February 1967 -- Transcript
23 January 1968 -- Prepared Statement & Transcript
26 February 1969 -- Transcript
28 October 1969 -- Transcript
1.3 March 1970 -- Transcript
7 July 1970 -- Transcript
23 March 1971 -- Transcript
5 May 1971 - Transcript
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