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25 October 1962 25X1
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25 October 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: Khrushchev statement intended to generate
pressures against US intervention in Cuba. (Page i)
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3. Cuba--Non-Bloc Reactions- Expressions of sup-
port for US position. (Page it)
4. Cuba-UN: Neutrals continue to seek means of lower-
ing tension. (Page iti)
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6. Sino-Indian Border: Fighting continues to spread.
(Page iv)
7. Communist China - France: Chinese Communists
order. 1.08 million tons of French wheat. (Page v)
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Indonesia - Portuguese Timor- Indonesia may have
begun campaign against Timor. (Page vi)
10. Congo: Leopoldville officials seek US help to resolve
Katanga problem. (Page vt t)
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tion in Cuba and oblige the US to ease the quarantine
on shipping. This call for a summit meeting, coupled
with the diversion of Soviet ships away from the quar-
antine zone, underscores Moscow's present intention
to rely on political maneuvers to forestall further US
actions.
In his message to Bertrand Russell, Khrushchev
sought to contrast Soviet and US positions by pledging
that the USSR will do everything in its power to prevent
the outbreak of war. He added that Moscow will avoid
"reckless decisions" and will not allow itself to be "pro-
voked" by US actions.
Khrushchev also sought to enhance the urgency
of
a heads-of -government meeting by warning that if the
US carries out its announced "program of pirate action
the USSR would have no alternative but to "make p
use of
the means of defense against the aggressor:' He said
US "aggression" against Cuba would render a summit
meeting "impossible and useless."
I,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 October 1962
DAILY BRIEF
*USSR: Khrushchev's 24 October statement that
he would consider a "top-level meeting useful" is de-
signed to generate growing pressures on the US which,
Moscow hopes, will deter direct US military interven-
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*Cuba--Non-Bloc Reactions: Official and unoffi-
cial expressions of support, sympathy, or understand-
ing for the US position on Cuba--either overtly or pri-
vately expressed by government leaders--have by now
reached an impressive volume from all parts of the
world. Nations from which such expressions have re-
cently been received are Italy, Switzerland, Portugal,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Iran, India, Thailand, Congo
(Brazzaville), Sudan, Jamaica, and Panama. Among
the very few nations or groups expressing open opposi-
tion to the US stand was the Algerian National Libera-
tion Front, which termed the blockade of Cuba "an in-
tolerable interference in the internal affairs of that
country:'
In response to a US request that governments pre-
vent landings or overflights of Soviet aircraft carrying
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military cargoes to Cuba, the Sudanese Foreign Min-
ister said any Soviet request for military overflights
or for transport flights carrying military equipment
would be denied as would any request for "commer-
cial" flights beyond Khartoum. Libya indicated it
would not grant overflights to Cuba either direct or
via South America. The Moroccan Foreign Secretary
confirmed that a proposed air agreement with the USSR
had not yet been signed and that his government would
"try to do something" The Foreign Minister of Sene-
gal stated that, according to a cabinet decision, Dakar
would be closed for military use by either side.
The favorable reaction of the Argentine military
to the Cuba crisis continues The Ar entine Chief
of Staff informed the US Naval Attache thattwo Fletcher-
j
class destroyers could be provided for Cuban quaran-
tine within three days. With more time, Argentina
would also supply a submarine, a marine battalion with
transport, and other units and men if necessary. The
Commander in Chief of the Air Force has sent mes-
sages to his opposite numbers in other Latin American
air forces and to General LeMay pledging readiness to
participate in any joint measures necessitated by the
Cuban crisis. The Chilean Air Force is reported to
support the US position with enthusiasm. The prelimi-
nary reaction of the other services appears similar.
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*Cuba-UN: LIn the United Nations arena, neutral na-
tions during 24 October continued to seek ways of lower-
ing tension over Cuba. A joint UAR-Ghana resolution
requesting Acting Secretary General U Thant to confer
with the principal parties concerned and asking those
parties to refrain from actions which might aggravate
the situation -failed to win widespread support./ During
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he late afternoon, following a USUN briefing of African
nations, the Malayan ambassador stated he saw a signif-
icant change toward greater "realism" in African atti-
tudes. He also reported this would lead to revision of
the UAR-Ghana resolution, of which a second draft was
being prepared. The UN Security Council debate con-
sisted only of several expressions of support for the
United States and a Romanian statement supporting the
Soviet resolution condemning the United States. During
the evening, U Thant addressed appeals to President
Kennedy, Premier Khrushchev, and Cuban leaders. He
requested suspension of the blockade, halting of arms
shipments to Cuba, and a peaceful attitude on the part
of Cuba itself. President Kennedy's reply to U Thant,
despatched in the early morning hours of 25 October,
has as yet elicited no reaction. Neutral representatives
in New York, who consulted with their governments over-
night, are re ortedl lannin to meet again about 0830
or 0900 hours. 25X1
25 Oct 62
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~IA, JAM MU
L AND
Areas in dispute
LOCATION OF
V CURRENT FIGHTING
_...._.,...__. Boundary shown on Indian maps
Boundary shown on recent
Chinese Communist maps
---- Motorable road
------ Motorable road
under construction
---- -- Minor road or trail
I Arot NEWEST ATTACK
NEPAL?-
I N D I A
SIKKIM I
Gahgto'
Jyangtse
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~?
*Sino-Indian Border: Fighting continues to
spread. Chinese Communist troops reportedly
have attacked at two new points, one in the North-
east Frontier region and one in Ladakh. This in-
creases the number of such actions to seven.
New Delhi, maintaining its position that it will
not negotiate while under military pressure, has
rejected Peiping's proposals for a cease-fire and
negotiation unless Chinese troops are first with-
drawn to the positions they occupied before they be-
gan their advance in early September.
Foreign Secretary Desai says the Indians plan
to resist the Chinese advances, harass them during
the winter, and drive them back in the following
"months and years." He told Ambassador Galbraith
that this would require arms on credit and that the
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Indian Government expects to approach the US Gov-
ernment on this subject in the next few days
Moscow as published the u e o e Chi-
nese appeal for negotiations to end the border dis-
pute, and Pravda on 25 October, in the first Soviet j
commentary on the issue, called for a resolution
of the border conflict. Pravda carefully avoided
endorsing either country's position but called atten-
tion to the "constructive" proposals made by Pei-
ping. The editorial attempted to contrast the Bloc's
willingness to settle disputes with US aggressive ac-
(Map)
tions against Cuba.
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'A.
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Communist China - France: Communist China
has contracted to purchase 1.0 million tons of wheat
from France, with partial credits of up to 18 months.
Delivery dates are unspecified.
SI", This purchase, the largest so far from France,
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brings Communist China's total grain contracts with the West in 1962 to more than 6.3 million tons. Total
deliveries in 1962 may now reach last year's high
level of more than 5 million tons.
The regime is still concerned over its food prob- 25X1
lem, despite the appearance of slightly improved har-
vests.
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PORTUGUESE TIMOR
I ND0NE.SIA
ATAURO Salazar
150
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6-
WEST NEW
GUINEA
1
620207
INDONESIA
AUSTRALIA
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25 Oct 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TTT.T.FT 10h,
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Indonesia - Portuguese Timor: Indonesian
charges of unfriendly acts by authorities in Portu-
guese Timor may signal the beginning of a cam-
paign to justify eventual seizure of the territory.
The Indonesian news agency, Antara, charged
on 23 October that Portuguese shore batteries had
been firing on Indonesian coastal shipping and ac-
cused the Portuguese of inciting kidnaping, cattle
stealing, and smuggling in the Indonesian half of the
island. The agency asserted that Portuguese border
guards had killed three Indonesians in the past ten
months.
Portuguese Timor officials have expected an
Indonesian campaign against them following settle-
ment of the West New Guinea problem. __-
In mid-October
a small build-up of Indonesia's force on Timor
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Congo: Leopoldville officials are again urgently
appealing f S help to resolve the Katanga proble 2 Q.
Adoula appears to believe that the West has
softened its stand against Tshombe and does not in-
tend to press him to reintegrate. Adoula will almost
certainly postpone the opening of Parliament if he 25X1
feels he will be over
V
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25 Oct 62 DAILY BRIEF vii
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Approved Forlg'ea
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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