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13 March 1963
0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
0
p
CONTENTS
2. USSR: British and West German ambassadors
in Moscow feel Khrushchev plans no new initi-
atives on major East-West issues for the time
being. (Page.2)
3. Iraq-USSR: Iraqi military wants Soviet-spon-
sored SAM project terminated and missiles and
technicians returned to USSR. (Page 4)
6. Jordan: Government reconsiders its policies
toward neighboring Arab states following Syrian
and Iraqi. coups. (Page 7)
7. Yemen-Aden: British intend to follow tough
line in the event of further UAR-Yemeni. intru-
sions in Aden. .(Page 8)
(Continued)
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13 March 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
(Continued )
9. Israel - Arab States- Arab-Israeli border. ten-
sions. (Page 10)
10. France: Miners' strike may compromise De
Gaulle's national. programs. (Page 11)
11. Notes; Argentina; Guate-
mala. (Page
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1MMMO7M7T7T 2 5 K111 loo,
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He indicated to UK Ambassador Trevelyan that
he felt the US no longer had any genuine interest in
reducing. international tensions and had only entered
into bilateral talks on Berlin, as in some "kind of
game," for internal political reasons.
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time bein
A000110001-3
USSR: (There is further recent evidence that
the Soviet Union does not intend to take any new
initiatives qn the major East-West issues for the
(The new British and West German ambassadors,
after their first conversations with Khrushchev,
each observed that Khrushchev seemed unable to
see his course clearly through many difficulties.
C~, his talks with the ambassadors, Khrushchev
restated the Soviet. position on Berlin and Germany
in general terms but did not mention. Soviet propos-
als for a UN presence in West Berlin
(On. the nuclear test-ban issue, Khrushchev
maintained that Moscow's offer of two or three on-
site inspections a year was not negotiable)
CThe Soviet leader told Trevelyan that the USSR
already had set up one nuclear rocket weapons sys-
tem but was proceeding with a new system which
was very costly. This reflects the. line he took in
his 27 February speech, in which he stated mili-
tary expenditures wopld continue to be a heavy
burden for the USS
R
egarding Cuba, Khrushchev insisted that he,
0
and not President Kennedy, had made the concession
j
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during the crisis. He protested that US. statements
declaring that President Kennedy had not undertaken
any commitments not to invade Cuba were "very
dangerous and could have fatal consequences." From
Khrushchev's references to "criticisms" of his actions
in thi (iihnn affair Trpvnlvnn anrmiaar1 that thp Sn_
viet leader was "nervous about finding himself on the ZOA
spot, betty en Washington on one side and Peiping on
I the other e 1
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(A recommendation to this effect is to be sent to
*Ir -USSR:
are urging that the Soviet-sponsored sur ace-
o-a r missile project be terminated and that b 9th mis-
siles and technicians be sent back to the USSR/q
e efense minister soon. he
project essentially involves Soviet interests and that
Iraq has no need for the missiles. They feel the cost
is a cessive in terms of money and technical person-
nel.
Relations between Iraqi and Soviet technicians at
the missile installation have deteriorated markedly
since the 8 February coup. The Soviets are report-
edly refusing to reveal technical details to the Iraqis.(
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Jordan: The Jordanian Government is recon-
sidering its policies toward neighboring Arab states
since the recent coups in Syria and Iraq)
Despite public statements by officials in the two
revo utionary governments clearly marking Jordan
and Saudi Arabia as countries still to be liberated
from "reactionary" rule, Jordan thus far has adopted
a restrained public attitude t ward them. It promptly
recognized both new regimes
Privately, however, both King Husayn and Prime
Mini Ater Tal are depressed and disturbed. They told
Ambassador Macomber on 10 March that they were
ready to respond in kind "if any further public slurs
are cast on Jordan." The King went so far as to say
that if anyone tried to provoke trouble within Jordan,
his regime would react forcibly against the external
source, of the trouble after suppressing the local up-
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Yemen-Aden; British officials have indicated
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that they intend to pursue a tough line on any further
j
intrusions into Aden Protectorate terr
Egyptian or Yemeni re
ubli
f
itory by
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orces.
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Pilots of the British Hawker Hunters patrolling
the b rder have instructions to attack Egyptian or
Yemeni aircraft over the protectorate but not to
undertake "hot pursuit." Some officials in Aden are
01 pressing the British Government to go further and
sanction retaliatory raids across the border in the 0
event of air attacks from Yemen j
In addition, British authorities apparentl are
relu~tant to y
take steps to prevent the Sharif of
Bayhan from establishing a haven for royalists j
driven from southeastern Yemen by Egyptian and
Yemeni units. As the flow of refugees grows, the
Egyptian and Yemeni commands will be tempted to
strike into the undefined border area, and perhaps
deep into Bayhan, to crush the royalists and pre-
vent their bein rearmed and sent back into Yemen.
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N
11
Israel - Arab States: Recent developments in
the Arab states will tend to raise the temperature
along the Arab-Israeli borders.
Although there is no evidence that the firing by
Syrian border guards on Israeli field workers on 11
March indicates the adoption of a tougher policy to-
.ward Israel by the new Syrian. regime, the Israelis
may nevertheless be more prone to react sharply to
any threat to their borders at this time. Arab state-
ments regarding a Syrian-Iraqi-UAR union, and
particularly Iraqi proposals for a unified military
command, undoubtedly have increased Israel's con-
cern for its long-range security.
Israeli leaders are. also extremely sensitive
about Jordan, and have frequently made clear that
the overthrow of King Husayn's regime would pro-
vole Israeli intervention.
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France: (The 13-day-old coal miners' strike
threatens to provoke a political test of strength
which could jeopardize effecti a implementation of
De Gaulle's national programs.
(Union leaders now reportedly estimate that
funds are available to extend the strike for one or
two months and that further financial aid may be in
prospect. Although national labor leaders and unions
in other sectors of the nationalized industries have
been reserved in their support, the miners' stand
encourages other workers to pursue their own griev-
ances, and may induce them to call parallel strikes.
two-day warning strike by workers in the natural
as fields has been extended into an unlimited one
and railroad workers are holding a series of two-
hour work stoppages
(The government is reluctant to enforce its con-
scription orders in view of the solidarity of the miners
and the public support for their position from political
parties, church officials, and businessmen. Union
leaders reportedly believe that even a personal ap-
peal by De Gaulle would now be insufficient to break
the strike without further concessions, These would
not only elicit similar demands from other labor
elements, but would also. complicate the government's
effort to hold the line against inf lation i
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NOTES
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no.
Argentina: Some elements of the armed forces
are dissatisfied with the government for recognizing
the Popular Union Party, which will substitute for
the outlawed Peronist party in contesting the na-
tional elections set for next June. Military leaders,
however, have indicated they will not permit their
subordinates to upset the government's plans. Gov-
ernment officials, meanwhile, have launched a
press and radio campaign to explain the.need to re-
incorporate the Peronist movement into the politi-
cal life of the country, and to give assurances that
there will be no Peronist take-over as a conse-
uence,
*Guatemala.- Students are planning a series of
antigovernment demonstrations in Guatemala City,
beginning 13 March, in commemoration of riots a
year ago in which several students were killed by
security forces.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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