INTELLIGENCE ALERT MEMORANDUM: POSSIBLE COUP ATTEMPT BY AZOREAN SEPARATISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 31, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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,----~1ATELLIGEN'CE ALERT MEMaRANDUM: POSS. Bt
' ,
COUP ATTEMRT BY
Approved For Releasopzbftt A 1 86SoE mom STS j ,
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 Approved For Release 2000/09/1 0QUA Ls
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
2E60 Hq
Office of the Director
31 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)
SUBJECT: Intelligence Alert Memorandum:
t B
y
Possible Coup Attemp
Azorean Separatists
25X1X6 25X1X6 25X1X6
tion Front (FLA) -- a coup
from Portuguese control, possibly within the next few days.
Such a move might have early success but odds are that
the Lisbon government would move quickly to suppress it
and probably could do so. The US would come, in for- blame
from Lisbon no matter how it came out. If it should fail,
US efforts to renegotiate base facilities at Lajes would
be complicated, perhaps fatally.
uese military units in the
Portu
g
some
Azores are preparing -- in ,concert with the Azorean Libera-
attempt to separate the Azores
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deelasslIkotion schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5x(1).(2),(3)
Automatically declassified an
Date Impossible to *!erm ne
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 SECRET
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4. Most of the approximately 1000 army troops sta-
tioned in the islands are Azorean natives. These troops
m ight be joined by the roughly 600-man police and Fiscal
Guard forces, but would likely run into opposition from.
navy and air force units -- numbering about 200 and 650
respectively -- which are principally composed of mainland
troops and officers. Relatively small leftist civilian
groups would likely also oppose the move, but a large
majority of the populace would probably acquiesce in
the move if not support it.
S. The reaction from the mainland would probably be
tough. The Lisbon government considers the Azores an
integral part of Portugal and the Armed Forces Movement
would see an Azorean coup as a direct challenge to its
leadership and one that might spread to other parts of
Portugal. Additionally, the Portuguese leadership has
probably picked up many of the same reports we have that
General Spinola might use the Azores to launch his own
effort to recapture power in Lisbon, and this would add
to their desire to suppress an uprising. It is probable
that Lisbon already knows something of this movement.
6. As for Lisbon's capability to suppress a separatist
movement, odds are that it could do so, though the job
might pose some difficulty in putting together an expe-
ditionary force. And the scope of the task would depend
on circumstances in the Azores -- particularly hoo much
local military support the separatists had. If the
Portu.guese part of the Lajes base were available to
Lisbon, it has the airlift capacity and troops to put
forces there rapidly -- probably within 3 or 4 days.
But if the rebels succeeded in seizing that airfield,
Lisbon would be forced to resort to sea transport. This
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would require several more days for the navy to com-
mandeer ships and about 60 hours steaming time from
Lisbon to the Azores. There would be difficulties in
landing if the separatists and the lcoal military had
control of the harbor, particularly at Ponta Delgada.
In sum, Lisbon might face a difficult and uncertain
prospect if the separatists had indeed full local mili-
tary support and moved quickly to consolidate control.
But the size and quality of the local military makes
it questionable that this would prove to be the care.
7. The US would undoubtedly be linked tc any Avorean
coup attempt in the minds of most Portuguese. Man,
prominent Portuguese-Americans have tied to Azorc---an
independence movements, and this is well known to Lisbon.
8. A coup attempt, whether it succeeded or not, would
engender charges in many Western European circles about
US complicity -- almost regardless of the facts. Most
West Europeans are alarmed about trends in Portugal, but
they have not given up on it, and many would condemn the
alleged US role as an unfriendly act toward a NATO ally.
This view would be more pronounced on the left (including
Socialist) and in press and parliamentary circles than elsewhere
in the European governments, but it would constitute a political
complication in NATO. There is little likelihood that any
European nation would support the move and probably nc..ie
would extend recognition to an independent Azorean gov-
ernment unless they had given up on Portugal as a member
of NATO and the independence movement had clearly consoli-
dated its control..
9. The Intelligence Community is keeping the situation
under close watch.
10. This memorandum has been discussed with offices in
DI?., NSA, INR and CIA. 25X1A9a
-- Approved.Eor-RQJe-ase, 2000/09/14_::.rCIA-RDP86T00608R000200020006-3
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020006-3
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SECRET
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