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24 October 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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3. Indonesia-Malaysia: Djakarta's subversive cam-
paign against Malaysia is determined and flexible.
(Page 4)
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6. Congo: Civil servants began partial work stop-
page on 23 October. (Page 7)
7. Dahomey: Riots of 22 October reflect dissatis-
faction with economic and political situation.
(Page 8)
8. Brazil: Goulart seeking to strengthen his weak-
ened political position. (Page 9)
9. Bolivia: Government reform efforts in national-
ized tin mines encounter strong local opposition.
(Page 10)
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Indonesia-Malaysia' (Indonesia's subversive cam-
paign against Malaysia is both determined. and flexible.
All three major elements of the Indonesian power
stru ture--the army, the Communist Party, and. Su-
karno himself--are cooperating and appear confident
of ultimate success. At the same time, Sukarno and.
his chief civilian and military officials are aware of
some major obstacles. Their appreciation of Britain's
determination to defend Malaysia, at least for the pres-
ent, has led them to avoid direct military confrontation
in favor of long-range military and political subversion
Indonesia is also aware that it is largely isolated
on t Malaysia issue and that it is economically hard
pressed as a result of suspension of Western aid and
its own economic break with Singapore. Both Moscow
and Peiping have made gestures of assistance in order
to exploit this situation.
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ON
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Cong : A partial work stoppage by Congolese
civil servants began on 23 October.
The civil servants are striking for a pay raise
which has been under negotiation since last August.
In addition, teachers in Leopoldville are still on
strike for salary arrears, despite a government or-
der to resume teaching. These and some other labor
grievances seem legitimate, but the unions' objectives
have become increasingly political. An interunion
statement on 21 October again called for a new, "gov-
ernment of public safety."
The government is fearful that labor agitation,
plus a new surge of antigovernment plotting by leftist
politicians, might result in disorders which the army
could, not or would not control. To meet the threat,
a regime of quasi-martial law has been established
under a three-man "emergency committee" headed
by Minister of Defense Anany and backed by army
chief General Mobutu.
The government is reported. to be ready to give
the civil servants a substantial pay raise, but Anany
has made it clear he will deal harshly with "trouble-
makers! I F_
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Dahomey: Rioting in the city of Porto Novo on
22 October appears to have been a symptom of wide-
spread discontent over the economic and political
situation rather than an organized effort to overthrow
President Maga.
*The riots followed the freeing, under parliamen-
tary immunity, of a National Assembly deputy involved
in a murder case. There are indications that National
Assembly President Aplogan deliberately allowed the
affair to get out of hand, presumably in order to em-
barrass Maga. On 23 October the assembly authorized
prosecution of the deputy.
There have been reports of stepped-up organiza-
tional activity among the unions and of an increasing
restiveness among the large numbers of unemployed
in the area. I- la labor demon-
stration has been plannect to coincicte with Maga's re-
turn to Dahomey today from an extensive foreign tour.
The Dahomean gendarmerie and army are believed
to be capable of handling minor unrest. A serious
disorder, however would confront the French, who
maintain a force f 700 men in Dahomey-J, with a prob-
lem like those th recently faced in t e Congo (Brazza-
ville) and Chad. I
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Brazil: President Goulart is taking measures to
strengthen his badly weakened political position.
In the past few days, for example, Goulart has
been talking with leaders of the moderate faction in
his Brazilian Labor Party, apparently in hopes of ob-
taining their assistance in gaining the cooperation of
other parties. Goulart is also anxious to regain sup-
port from the Social Democrats, many of whom have
recently lost confidence in him.
This show of conciliation has given rise to specu-
lation that Goulart may be shifting to a more centrist
political stance. However, during the past week or
so, Goulart has also proceeded with the investiture of
extreme leftist General Assis Brasil as his chief mili-
tary adviser, and has held lengthy discussions with
pro-Communist Governor Miguel Arraes.
Until there is more convincing evidence, Goulart's
actions can be interpreted as dictated essentially by
short-run tactical considerations.
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Bolivia: Government efforts to implement long-
needed reforms in the country's nationalized tin mines
continue to encounter entrenched local opposition.
M Two Communist union leaders at the key mine of
Catavi, Federico Escobar and Ireneo Pimentel, are
refusing to go along with the agreement signed on 17
October between the national tin union leaders and the
state mining corporation (Comibol). Government po-
lice are attempting to arrest them.
11
Despite this opposition, the government is moving
forward with its program and has "retired" close to
400 surplus workers at Catavi. It plans to remove
several hundred more in coming weeks.
The national union leaders; are irritated,at the
delaying tactics of the Catavi agitators, and probably
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would not give support if the latter instigated another
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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