Published on CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov) (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom)


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A008900330001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 27, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 4, 1966
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A008900330001-7.pdf [3]1.14 MB
Body: 
Approved For Ruse 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AG 00330001-7 TOP SECRET 4 May 1966 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY State Dept. review completed 25X1 AND uei:ussiviCAniis?"""""'" I Approved For Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A00 9q30 _P R ET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08900330001-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08900330001-7 Approved For Re 4 May 1966 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1) 2. UK-Rhodesia- Zambia.- UK asks Zambia to apply further economic sanctions against Rhodesia. (Page 4) 3. USSR: Prospects for winter wheat crop appear highly favorable. (Page 5) 4. Czechoslovakia: Antiregime demonstration in Prague highlights youth discontent. (Page 6) 5. Notes.- Jordan-Israel; mala. (Page 7) (Finland; Guate- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ wcu r ~ r~c~caac cvvaiv~i ~ ~ wri-rwr ~ a ~ vva~ arwvv vvaavvv ~-~ ME 25X10 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO089003300 1-7 1 1 wo~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 May 1966 *Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) noti CP_ olitical Developments in South Vietnam: Buddhist ons about the role of the-f-orthcoming elected constit- uent assembly continue to foreshadow possible conflicts with the Ky government. [Thich Thien Minh and lay Buddhist leader Tran Quang Thuan, both close to Tri Quang, have reiterated to US embassy officers their view that the assembly should act as an interim legislature and appoint an in- terim government in addition to its duties of drafting a constitution. Epremier Ky and the military Directorate apparently intend to retain full government authority until a consti- tution has been adopted. Ky, however, has raised the possibility that the assembly might evolve into a legis- lature under the Directorate.-Y d WOUVT'hien Minh indicated that the Buddhist Institute d be represented on the committee to be convened shortly to draft an electoral law. With regard to the elections themselves, he said that there would be no Buddhist candidates as such, but that local Buddhist committees would support the "best candidate," what- ever his religious or party affiliation. This tactic should allow the Buddhists to exert maximum influence with little direct responsibility,, and at the same time make it difficult for other groups 'to unite against them] [Premier Ky reportedly stated yesterday, on a trip to I Corps, that the government would make every effort to hold the constituent assembly election by Oc- tober. Ky's indirect suggestion that the government might not meet the five-month deadline promised in its 14 April decree could provide the Buddhists an issue with which to challenge the regime's good faith.] (continued) 2 5 X I Approveu Ir o r lease 22003,04, 1 1 %AA-Mur vu I UVJ I DAWOUVvil ~Vvv I _f --- ------------------------- Approved For The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No signifi- cant military developments have been reported during the past 24 hours. Communist Military-Political Developments: The Chinese Communists, in their Foreign Ministry state- ment on 3 May, have, for the first time, provided spe- cific figures on Soviet military aid sent through China to North Vietnam. The statement asserted that Commu- nist China transported 43,000 tons of Soviet military supplies to North Vietnam in 1965. This figure is close to intelligence estimates of the actual military tonnage moved. The Chinese statement flatly denied recent Soviet charges that Peking has hampered military shipments, and claimed that everything requested by Hanoi and delivered to China by the Russians has been shipped "with priority, at high speed and free of charge." The statement called Soviet military aid poor in quality and "deplorably meager." It stated that, during the first quarter of 1966, the USSR used only one-third of the 1,730 rail cars Communist China agreed to make avail- able for military aid deliveries. Despite Chinese protestations, evidence indicates that Peking has placed onerous restrictions on the overland deliveries. Although the restrictions are unlikely to have limited the quantity or types of weapons supplied by the USSR to North Vietnam, they have slowed down the pace of deliveries. This violent new statement by the Chinese betrays Peking's discomfiture over the effectiveness of the re- cent Soviet ch ` ~r ep . , It probably also reflects Peking's sensitivity to success in its call for "unity" at the 23rd CPSU congress in March. (continued) 4 May 66 Approved F r Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A008 00330001-7 Zb~ Approved For Relee 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0fl0330001-7 SOUTHEASTERN LAOS MU G/A PASS ?NO H VIET AM' Dong H Muong Nong 2112 Pak Song B3 Ba Bouang Nam Attopeu qpp --A C- RPIPase 2003/04/11 ? CIA-RDP79T00975AO08900330001-7 May blb CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map DEMARCATION LINE Ben' Giang SOIJTH IETNAM Dak Sut 25X' Approved For Ri 0ease 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO089003300C 1-7 North Vietnamese Traffic Through Lanso Irl- Communists appear to be moving substantial amounts of supplies along two newly completed roads in the Laos panhandle. Friendly observers positioned near Route 912$ the new road linking Route 101 in North Vietnam with Route 911 in Laos, counted 86 trucks moving into Laos during the period 16-22 April. This rapid exploitation of the new route suggests that the Communists are anxious to replenish their stockpiles in the Laos - South Vietnam border area prior to the onset of the rainy season. Farther south, friendly guerrillas southeast of Attopeu have reported considerable traffic along Route 110, the so-called "Sihanouk Trail," leading from north- east Cambodia toward the South Vietnamese border. In late March only sporadic truck activity was noted but by mid-April convoys containing as man as 30 trucks were reported moving along the road, ' In ar3L2~~~~ 4 May 66 25X1 M Approved For R~ UK-Rhodesia-Zambia: ~he UK has asked Zambia to aplTy- -further economic sanctions against RhodesiQ MEM [Iih talks with President Kaunda last weekend, Brit- ain's troubleshooter for Africa, Malcolm MacDonald, expressed London's hope that Zambia would cut imports from Rhodesia in half by the end of May, and cut all economic ties by the end of June. MacDonald indicated that London envisions exceptions for Zambian imports of coal, coke, and electric power, as well as the use of the Rhodesian railway to export copper. He told Kaunda that the Ian Smith regime is beginning to feel the pinch of the sanctions program and that Zambia's actions would spur Rhodesia's capitulation.7 [Zambian contingency planners have advised the cabinet that the country will not be prepared for a total rupture with Rhodesia before mid-July at the earliest. Meanwhile, they are studying the possibility of pro- hibiting various nonessential imports from Rhodesia. I Czambia's inability to develop power sources and copper transport independent of Rhodesia has caused Lusaka heretofore to be chary of a complete break. Zambia has insisted as a prerequisite that the UK guar- antee a continuing supply of essential goods and services to Zambia or commit itself to Smith's early ouster, by force if necessary. There is no reason to expect Kaunda to drop this proviso, which to date London has been un- willing to acce~i:f=-~ 4 May 66 Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO089003 0001-7 Approved For elease 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900 30001-7 25X1 j . j I USSR: The prospects for the Soviet winter wheat crop appear highly favorable. The US agricultural attache, who is now touring the growing areas, attributes this development to a generally mild winter, an early spring, and extremely good soil-moisture conditions in the areas thus far visited. The USSR's winter wheat crop accounts for only about 40 percent of the total wheat harvest, but it was the good winter wheat harvest last year that partially made up for the decline that ensued in the spring wheat crop, thus preventing the total wheat crop from dro - ping to the disastrous 1963 level. 4 May 66 25X1 lease 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79TOO975AO089003 0001-7 25X1 Approved For /////////////// //////////////////////////////////- pp 25 A roved For elease 2003/04/11. CIA-RDP79T00975AO0890033000 11 -7 S E *Czechoslovakia: A May Day demonstration in Prague illustrates that the regime has again underestimated the discontent of Czech youth and overestimated its ability to dictate the forms of protest which are permissible. Truncheon-swinging police dispersed a crowd of some 300 youths and an equal number of onlookers who demonstrated against the regime during the evening of 1 May. The party daily reported on 3 May that "a group of rioters" had been arrested. Such youth demonstrations were standard fare for May Day evenings from 1962 until.1965, when the regime moved to prevent them by lifting its ban against the tra- ditional student Majales Festival. This festival had been forbidden after 1956 because of the antiregime character it assumed that year. Resumption of the festival on May Day last year deterred the students from rioting, but antiregime slogans were paraded. In addition, over the protests of party officials, US beatnik poet Alan Ginsberg was crowned king of the festival. He was subsequently expelled from the country. The regime is seeking to limit popular attention and attendance at the Majales Festival this year by mov- ing it from May Day to 15 May. More antiregime slo- gans are likely to appear at the forthcoming festival, however, no matter what punitive action is taken against h a Da demonstrators. Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense] 4 May 66 Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO08 00330001-7 I p 25 I 25 Approved For / 0 Approved For lease 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO089003 0001-7 NOTES Jordan-Israel: King Husayn told a US Embassy official on 2 Tay-that Jordan would not retaliate flat this time" for the two Israeli border raids on 29-30 April even though he claimed there was heavy pres- sure from the Jordanian Army and public to "do some- thing." He indicated, however, that Jordan would re- taliate the next time Israel raided alleged terrorist bases in Jordan. Despite high Jordanian casualties-- reportedly 11 dead and five wounded--Husayn has backed off again because of Israel's preponderant mili- tary strength, but he cannot continue to do so without risking political trouble at home and propaganda as- saults on his Arab t 'otism from Cairo and other Arab capitals. (continued) 4 May 66 ////f Approved For R lease 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975AO089003 0001-7 1 25X1 Finland: After several weeks of postelection sparring and negotiation among the political parties, it now appears that President Kekkonen is pressing the Social Democrats to participate in a coalition gov- ernment with his Center (Agrarian) Party and the Communist-front SKDL. There are reports that Soviet officials in Helsinki also favor a three-party coalition. The Social Democrats, however, remain deeply divided over the question of Communist participation, and therefore a minority Social Democratic cabinet appears the most likely outcome at this stage of the negotiations. The US Embassy in Helsinki notes that a prominent Social Democrat is now in Moscow, probabl to obtain first hand Soviet views on this question. 1 __7 *Guatemala: (Recent bombings in Guatemala City have been attribu't'ed to the ri ht-win National The MLN--disgruntled after its poor showing in the 6March general elections--may hope to postpone the seating of the new congress due for 5 May. Although the MLN claims to have military support for its actions, Chief of Government Peralta has promised a return to con- stitutionality and probably retains sufficient backing to 4 May 66 Approved F r Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A0089 0330001-7 Approved For Re ase 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00890430001-7 25X1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistants to the President The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief, Atlantic The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Administrator The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved For Re 25X1

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