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TOP SECRET 4 May 1966
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
State Dept. review completed
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4 May 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. UK-Rhodesia- Zambia.- UK asks Zambia to apply
further economic sanctions against Rhodesia.
(Page 4)
3. USSR: Prospects for winter wheat crop appear
highly favorable. (Page 5)
4. Czechoslovakia: Antiregime demonstration in
Prague highlights youth discontent. (Page 6)
5. Notes.- Jordan-Israel;
mala. (Page 7)
(Finland; Guate-
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 May 1966
*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
noti CP_ olitical Developments in South Vietnam: Buddhist
ons about the role of the-f-orthcoming elected constit-
uent assembly continue to foreshadow possible conflicts
with the Ky government.
[Thich Thien Minh and lay Buddhist leader Tran
Quang Thuan, both close to Tri Quang, have reiterated
to US embassy officers their view that the assembly
should act as an interim legislature and appoint an in-
terim government in addition to its duties of drafting a
constitution.
Epremier Ky and the military Directorate apparently
intend to retain full government authority until a consti-
tution has been adopted. Ky, however, has raised the
possibility that the assembly might evolve into a legis-
lature under the Directorate.-Y
d
WOUVT'hien Minh indicated that the Buddhist Institute
d be represented on the committee to be convened
shortly to draft an electoral law. With regard to the
elections themselves, he said that there would be no
Buddhist candidates as such, but that local Buddhist
committees would support the "best candidate," what-
ever his religious or party affiliation. This tactic should
allow the Buddhists to exert maximum influence with
little direct responsibility,, and at the same time make
it difficult for other groups 'to unite against them]
[Premier Ky reportedly stated yesterday, on a
trip to I Corps, that the government would make every
effort to hold the constituent assembly election by Oc-
tober. Ky's indirect suggestion that the government
might not meet the five-month deadline promised in its
14 April decree could provide the Buddhists an issue
with which to challenge the regime's good faith.]
(continued)
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The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No signifi-
cant military developments have been reported during
the past 24 hours.
Communist Military-Political Developments: The
Chinese Communists, in their Foreign Ministry state-
ment on 3 May, have, for the first time, provided spe-
cific figures on Soviet military aid sent through China
to North Vietnam. The statement asserted that Commu-
nist China transported 43,000 tons of Soviet military
supplies to North Vietnam in 1965. This figure is close
to intelligence estimates of the actual military tonnage
moved.
The Chinese statement flatly denied recent Soviet
charges that Peking has hampered military shipments,
and claimed that everything requested by Hanoi and
delivered to China by the Russians has been shipped
"with priority, at high speed and free of charge." The
statement called Soviet military aid poor in quality and
"deplorably meager." It stated that, during the first
quarter of 1966, the USSR used only one-third of the
1,730 rail cars Communist China agreed to make avail-
able for military aid deliveries.
Despite Chinese protestations, evidence indicates that
Peking has placed onerous restrictions on the overland
deliveries. Although the restrictions are unlikely to
have limited the quantity or types of weapons supplied
by the USSR to North Vietnam, they have slowed down
the pace of deliveries.
This violent new statement by the Chinese betrays
Peking's discomfiture over the effectiveness of the re-
cent Soviet ch `
~r ep . , It probably also reflects Peking's
sensitivity to success in its call for "unity" at
the 23rd CPSU congress in March.
(continued)
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SOUTHEASTERN LAOS
MU G/A
PASS
?NO H
VIET AM'
Dong H
Muong Nong
2112
Pak Song
B3
Ba Bouang
Nam
Attopeu
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DEMARCATION LINE
Ben'
Giang
SOIJTH
IETNAM
Dak Sut
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North Vietnamese Traffic Through Lanso Irl-
Communists appear to be moving substantial amounts
of supplies along two newly completed roads in the Laos
panhandle.
Friendly observers positioned near Route 912$
the new road linking Route 101 in North Vietnam with
Route 911 in Laos, counted 86 trucks moving into Laos
during the period 16-22 April. This rapid exploitation
of the new route suggests that the Communists are
anxious to replenish their stockpiles in the Laos - South
Vietnam border area prior to the onset of the rainy
season.
Farther south, friendly guerrillas southeast of
Attopeu have reported considerable traffic along Route
110, the so-called "Sihanouk Trail," leading from north-
east Cambodia toward the South Vietnamese border.
In late March only sporadic truck activity was noted but
by mid-April convoys containing as man as 30 trucks
were reported moving along the road,
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UK-Rhodesia-Zambia: ~he UK has asked Zambia
to aplTy- -further economic sanctions against RhodesiQ
MEM
[Iih talks with President Kaunda last weekend, Brit-
ain's troubleshooter for Africa, Malcolm MacDonald,
expressed London's hope that Zambia would cut imports
from Rhodesia in half by the end of May, and cut all
economic ties by the end of June. MacDonald indicated
that London envisions exceptions for Zambian imports
of coal, coke, and electric power, as well as the use of
the Rhodesian railway to export copper. He told Kaunda
that the Ian Smith regime is beginning to feel the pinch
of the sanctions program and that Zambia's actions
would spur Rhodesia's capitulation.7
[Zambian contingency planners have advised the
cabinet that the country will not be prepared for a total
rupture with Rhodesia before mid-July at the earliest.
Meanwhile, they are studying the possibility of pro-
hibiting various nonessential imports from Rhodesia.
I
Czambia's inability to develop power sources and
copper transport independent of Rhodesia has caused
Lusaka heretofore to be chary of a complete break.
Zambia has insisted as a prerequisite that the UK guar-
antee a continuing supply of essential goods and services
to Zambia or commit itself to Smith's early ouster, by
force if necessary. There is no reason to expect Kaunda
to drop this proviso, which to date London has been un-
willing to acce~i:f=-~
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USSR: The prospects for the Soviet winter wheat
crop appear highly favorable.
The US agricultural attache, who is now touring
the growing areas, attributes this development to a
generally mild winter, an early spring, and extremely
good soil-moisture conditions in the areas thus far
visited.
The USSR's winter wheat crop accounts for only
about 40 percent of the total wheat harvest, but it was
the good winter wheat harvest last year that partially
made up for the decline that ensued in the spring wheat
crop, thus preventing the total wheat crop from dro -
ping to the disastrous 1963 level.
4
May
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*Czechoslovakia: A May Day demonstration in Prague
illustrates that the regime has again underestimated the
discontent of Czech youth and overestimated its ability
to dictate the forms of protest which are permissible.
Truncheon-swinging police dispersed a crowd of
some 300 youths and an equal number of onlookers who
demonstrated against the regime during the evening of
1 May. The party daily reported on 3 May that "a group
of rioters" had been arrested.
Such youth demonstrations were standard fare for
May Day evenings from 1962 until.1965, when the regime
moved to prevent them by lifting its ban against the tra-
ditional student Majales Festival. This festival had been
forbidden after 1956 because of the antiregime character
it assumed that year. Resumption of the festival on
May Day last year deterred the students from rioting,
but antiregime slogans were paraded. In addition, over
the protests of party officials, US beatnik poet Alan
Ginsberg was crowned king of the festival. He was
subsequently expelled from the country.
The regime is seeking to limit popular attention
and attendance at the Majales Festival this year by mov-
ing it from May Day to 15 May. More antiregime slo-
gans are likely to appear at the forthcoming festival,
however, no matter what punitive action is taken against
h a Da demonstrators.
Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense]
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NOTES
Jordan-Israel: King Husayn told a US Embassy
official on 2 Tay-that Jordan would not retaliate flat
this time" for the two Israeli border raids on 29-30
April even though he claimed there was heavy pres-
sure from the Jordanian Army and public to "do some-
thing." He indicated, however, that Jordan would re-
taliate the next time Israel raided alleged terrorist
bases in Jordan. Despite high Jordanian casualties--
reportedly 11 dead and five wounded--Husayn has
backed off again because of Israel's preponderant mili-
tary strength, but he cannot continue to do so without
risking political trouble at home and propaganda as-
saults on his Arab t 'otism from Cairo and other
Arab capitals.
(continued)
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Finland: After several weeks of postelection
sparring and negotiation among the political parties,
it now appears that President Kekkonen is pressing
the Social Democrats to participate in a coalition gov-
ernment with his Center (Agrarian) Party and the
Communist-front SKDL. There are reports that Soviet
officials in Helsinki also favor a three-party coalition.
The Social Democrats, however, remain deeply divided
over the question of Communist participation, and
therefore a minority Social Democratic cabinet appears
the most likely outcome at this stage of the negotiations.
The US Embassy in Helsinki notes that a prominent
Social Democrat is now in Moscow, probabl to obtain
first hand Soviet views on this question. 1 __7
*Guatemala: (Recent bombings in Guatemala City
have been attribu't'ed to the ri ht-win National
The
MLN--disgruntled after its poor showing in the 6March
general elections--may hope to postpone the seating of
the new congress due for 5 May. Although the MLN
claims to have military support for its actions, Chief
of Government Peralta has promised a return to con-
stitutionality and probably retains sufficient backing to
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistants to the President
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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