ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC TO SUPPORT A GENERAL WAR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R000300020015-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 237
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 19, 1952
• Content Type: PAPER

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ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC
TO SUPPORT A GENERAL WAR
This document is a Working Paper. It does
not have the concurrence of any of the
agencies participating in the study, Its
submission is for the purpose of criticisms
Such criticisms should be addressed to CIA,
2130 E St., N.W,, Attn:
Economic Intelligence Committee
Working Group on
Capabilities
19 December 1952
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CIA 440007
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ECONIO, IC CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET )31X)C TO
SUI FORT A GENERAL : A11? 1952-1953
Pam
I
Suniary and Conclusions ?..r. v...s.?a ..
1
I I
The Problem and Its Setting , . + ............
2
III
The Analytical Framework. n..?...aao.a..co.
Q.
IV
soviet Bloc Cold war Economic Position
18
V
Oweration cf Soviet Bloc Economy under
Hot `";Tar Conditions ...... $460490#10999 231
VI
Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc
to Support a General V-1ar ,.....,.,... 232
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ANALYTICAL OUTLINE
I sW.,g,~~'~RY AID COI,'CLUSIONS
THE PROBL 7 7 "T"D ITS SETTING
A. The Problem
T3. Assumptions
C. The Report
D. Date
E, Sources and Documentation
F. a_ct.?ad '
III TIE ANALYTICAL F~~1,HE OR3t
:LV S OVI}';T BLOC COLD ECONOMIC POSITION
A. The Strupture of the Soviet Bloc Economy
13. Agriculture (Grains, Meats, Fats and Oils)
(Trends
Supply
Inventory
Pattern of Demand
Input Structure
Summary)
C. Textiles (Cotton, Wool, Hemp)
D. Energy
1. Electric power
2. Petroleum products
E. Metals
1. Iron and steel
2. Copper
3. Aluminum
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F. Chemicals
1. Coke-chemicals
2. Synthetic rubber and rubber products
G, Transportation equipment
1, Automotive industry
2, Tractors
3, Locomotiv:os
4, Rolling stock
5. Merchant shipbuilding
H. Machinery
1. Machine tools
2. Ball and roller bearings
He arty motors and generators
E,. Cot.: mining machinery
5. Electron tubes
I. Transportation
1. Rail
2. Motor and water
a. Construction
K. Household sector
L. military sector
V OPERATIONS OF SOVIET BLOC ECONOMY UNDER HOT '"A CONDITIO1 S
A. The Tar
1. General description
2. Timing and locale
3. Commitment of forces
4. Opposition
5. 1.1ateriel and equipment requirements
6. y`anpower- requiremen t
B. Resource requirements
1. Direct military sector requirements
2. Indirect military sector requirements
3. Hot and cold war comparison
C. Sector capabilities
1. General
2, Agriculture
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3. Textiles
4. Energy
5. Metals
6, Chemicals
7. Transportation
C.. Machinery
9, Transportation
10, Construction
U. Household sector
12. Nilitary sector
VI ECONOMIC CAPAT3ILITI ;S OF THE SOVIET BLOC TO
SUPPORT A GENERAL '':AR
A. Overall economic capabilities
1. General
2. Sectors of strength
3. Sectors of weakness
4. Balance
I3. Relaxation of assumptions
1. Different hot war
2. Different opposition
3. Drawing down military inventory
C. Summary of economic capabilities estimate
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The Sunmary and Conclusions of this Report cannot be
Y-K-- written until Parts V and VI have: been completed. These two
parts cannot be written until osti.mates of hot war military
demand have been made.
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A. THE PROBL1 1
The problem to which the study is addressed is that of
estimating the economic capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to
support a general war between 1 July 1952 and 1 July 1953.
By economic capabilities is meant the ability of the economy
of the Soviet Bloc to produce, or otherwise make available,
economic re;soc < es sufficient to satisfy the reauiromonts of a
specific time and activity situation. Those requirements include
not only the direct requirement of the armed forces and armaments
indu:;try but also the, ro1uirements of industries supporting
the military establishment and the production of military end items.
The Soviet Bloc includes for purposes of this analysis,
the USSR, the European Satellites, and China, The European
Satellites are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Fast Germany,
Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
This Report utilizes economic intelligence estimates of
the availability, production, allocation, inventory, imports,
exports, and consumption of selected Soviet Bloc resources
during the period 1 July 1952 to 1 July 1953.
B. ASStThPTIONS
The basic sets of assumptions considered in. this Report,
postulate for the same time period and for given Soviet Bloc
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area and resources, alternative sets of demands on the economy
of the Soviet Bloc.
First, it is assumed that the cold war will. continue through
the period 1 July 1952 to 1 July 1953. Included in this
assumption is the preclusion of a build-up period. It is assumed
that there is no break with the past in terms of production
trends, consumption, and allocation of resources. Inventories
of military end items and of economic resources are assumed
to accumulate at rates not influenced by the imminence of war,
although the Korean war is assumed to continue without intensification.
The alternative set of assumptions provide that the Soviet
Bloc is engaged in a. general war during the period 1 July 1952
to 1 July 1953. However, it is arbitrarily assumed that there
is no damage to the Soviet Bloc from air bombardment. The
nature of the general war, the locale, the type and amount of
opposition, damage to the Bloc, beginning and ending dates, and
materiel and equipment renuirements, as well as resource
requirements are specified in Part V.
In connection with the general war,, it is assumed that the
inventory of military end items remains constant, i.e., that
there is equivalence between military consumptioi:.r in the field
and the production of military end items. s7hile this assumption
does not invariably hold, for purposes of this analysis, it
represents a realistic approximation. In fact, military
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inventories are reduced, orders are placed and the inventory
built up again; inventories fluctuate widely and in a complicated
manner depending on the requirements of the campaigns. Production
increases, slowly at first, but then more rapidly, and may lag
the initial inventory depletion by as much as a year.
However, the fact that military consumption and its
impact on the economy are not simultaneous does not necessarily
invalidate the assumption that they are simultaneous for purposes
of determining the economic capabilities of the Bloc in under-
taking general war. The impact will be felt and resources will
be renuired, even thou.,h the initial military actions are
undertaken with inventory.
C. THE REPORT
This report consists of six parts. The first is a brief
summary and conclusion; the second sots the stage by briefly
discussing the problem, assumptions, data, sources and docu-
mentation, validity of estimates, and method. The third part
presents the analytical framework. The main empirical effort
is to be found in Parts IV and V. In the fourth part the
structure of Soviet Bloc economic activity is examined both
overall and sector by sector'. The fifth part outlines the
postulated war and stipulates the reruiroments of this war
on the economy of the Soviet Bloc, including a seetor,,by sector
tabulation of hot war renuirements. Furthermore, the implications
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of the new set of military requirements, is analyzed by matching
these alternative demands with the capabilities of the Bloc
economy. Part VI, summarizes these implications, taking part
icular account of the inter-industrial relationships, and indicates
the sectors of relzative strength and weakness in the Soviet Bloc,
The statement of the general war and the requiroments so
generated, has not yet been undertaken. Therefore, the economic
analysis which Urould make use of these data (Part V) as well as
the estimate of economic capabilities which would follow from
such analysis (Parts I and VI) cannot be completed.
This rump draft consists only of Part II (The Problem and
Its Settirng), Part III (The Analytical Framework), and Part IV
(Soviet Bloc Cold Flar Economic Position). These three sections
cannot provide an estimate of the econo_ic capabilities of the,
Soviet Bloc to ;support a general war. They are io rely an
analytical approach and a description of the Soviet Bloc economic
system. However, there is useful and important economic intell.i-
gence which can be used to support judgments about Soviet Bloc
economic capabilities. The genuine analysis of economic capa-
bilities, however, must await the development of information
on hot war military demand.
":then this further information has been produced and
analyzed, Parts I. V. and VI will be written and such revisions
and modifications as appear necessary will be made In the other
parts,
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it is hoped that this draft will be subjected to careful,,
co :stractive criticism by the intelligence coih=nity. Such. criticism
might include:
1. lcefinement of quantitative estimates.
2. Contribution of quantitative estimates which would broaden
coverage,
3. Suggested improvements in the techniques for deriving inter-
industryy, data.
.. Suggested a,p;P=iications of the analytical framework to problems
of economic capabilities and vulnerabilities,
This draft does not have the concurrence of any mer:~b r of the,
Working Group and doer, not establish an intelligence position for airy
intelligence unit.
D. The data consists of estimates under cold war conditions of
production.,, imports and :;sorts, inventories (or stockpiles), use
patterns, and factor inputs:: for the period 1 July 1952 to l July 953
for about forty i_raportant sectors of the So vrii.ot Bloc.
The total output data in this draft are the best estimates as
of April 1952. The data may not exactly conform to more recent cst;lilates.
For example, some of the total output figures are at vc:LAiance with
current estimates by as much as 19 percent copper and aluminum),
Esttiiatcs of Soviet Bloc future production are in a constant
process of revision. However, the study of i..r;.tsr:industrial relation-
shi,s makes it necessary b freeze the output totals at an early
stater in order to examine the into rindustrial structure in d :tzlil.
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For example, one change in the output of an industry requires that the
entire system be altered; the use pattern of that industry must be
revised, which, in turn, alters the input structure of all consuming
industries which then requires a re-examination of the other total outputs,
and so on.
E. SOTJROhS AND DOM,11'11TA'J:ION
The primary sources for this draft are the contributions by CIA/RR.7
G-2, ONN1I, and AFOIN. In addition,
and particularly the work of CIA/141,were
used.
No docume,ntati.o appears in this draft. However, thousands of
pages of documentation are available in the files of the Working Group.
If the Report receives approval and subsequently is formally published,
the .problem .of appropriate dooumontation will have to be considered by the
Vlorking Groin),
F, VALIDITY
No responsible economist can be complacent when contemplating
the -~ral*.dity and roliability of Soviet Bloc economic intelligence
estimates, However, tic ,nalytical technique presented hero can bo
exploited to p:rocUce r,Liable and significant economic intelligence.
Improvement in the product of this typo of analysis must await
quantitative production estimates, use patter%p, and factor inputs
whi.ci: accurately reflect Soviet Bloc experience,
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Not all of the estimates are equally reliable* For instance,
the coal. and electric power production estimates are more reliable
t: :n tb.oso for petroleum products and aluminum or copper. Since no
practicable method has been devised to identify the validity of each
c st-Jraatc, the draft reads as though all estimates are of equal valiidit:y.
It is hoped that th(,, vigorous criticisms of the intelligence community
will assist in establishing the reliability of those osti;raates.
G. METHOD
The general philosophy underlying the Report is that the Soviet
Bloc economy, indeed arty Economy, is a complex of intorrol.ated activities
in which events influencin one sector have repercussions on others,
and V cse repercussions in turn affect other activities, and so on,
unti). all l,.incs of activity are influenced. This phenomen is well
known and is custornial'ily described in texxis of the [general equilibrium
chax'actori sti os of modern economics. The research technique devised to
study general egiili'brium processes quantitatively is called inter-
innnidustry economics (or structural or input-output analysis).
Al.te r.zative sets of demands have been imposed on the Came
economy. Th first scat of demands is known to be with: ',n the capability.
o:L the Soviet Bloc since it is now being met. The second set of demands,
those of a hot war military situation, is then imposed. on the economy
to detc imine the capability..-over-all and sector by sector -- of fulfilling
these domands.
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PART III TILE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The following brief statement of methodology is not
intended as a complete exposition of the theory of eco-
nomic capabilities and inter-industry economics. The
Office of Research and Reports, Central Intelligence
Agency,, is at present drafting a methodology paper to
be issued in the near future. What follows is a pre-
view of that publication, emphasizing the concept of
economic capabilities, the theory of inter-industry
economics, and its application to the problem of e ti,
mating economic capabilities.
A nation does not possess economic capabilities for war" in
general; it either possesses, or does not possess, economic capa-
bilities for a specific war, in a specific area, between specific
dates. The concept of economic capabilities itself has meaning
only insof?r as it is related to a period of time, to a place, and
to a particular activity. While 'it is true that in an economic
system there cqn be na- i~Eistitution, and that over a period of tine
the flexibility of the economy will enable it to meet alternative
goals, it is also true that unless the economic oap bilities esti-
mate is particularistic, it will lose in precision of ste t ment,
may degenerate into a sort ".of.economic capabilities index, and become
non-quantifiable.
The positive or negative over-all economic: capabilities esti-
r Sato is of limited usefulness, unless one is fully aware of ell of
the pitfalls in its construction. There arc at least three stages
in which the estimate may be invalidated. The first is the data
stage; if the data are wrong, then the estimate may be wrong.
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Second,-the analytical framework for the study of economic capa-
bilities may not be applicable or may be logically inconsistent.
Third, the specifications as to kind of war, place, and time period
may not anticipate what will actually happen.
The entire economic intelligence community is working to im-
prove its data; not only to get more data but to make existing
and potential data more reliable. There is no easy solution; mil-
lions of research man-hours will be expended bofor~ intelligence
officers can provide the policy-makers with sufficient) accurate,
and precise date.
The quantitative requirements of specific courses of action
by potential enemies is receiving more and more .attention. What
is needed are realistic assumptions about possible courses of action,
couched in such terms that quantification in resource requirements
is possible.
But all of the data and the most reasonable estimates of courses
of action will be wasted if the research approach to the study of
economic capabilities is inapplicable or conceptually unsound.
There have been, in general, two approaches to quantitative
research in economic capabilities. One might be called stimmation;
the other, integration.
The sumxaation concept has been most commonly used. It amounts
to a listing of the important aspects of strategic economic resources
such as production, stockpiles, imports and exports, requirements,
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and gecographic location for the economy of potential enemies, as
well as the time path of these components over the recant ptiast.
The crudest example of this method is the listing of time series
of production of strategic commodities, industrial products, and
military and-items. From this listing and from what the intelli-
gence officer mentally visualizes about their interrelationships
and their relationships to the economic capabilities problem at
hand, an estimate., largely subjective and non-quantitative,, is made,
A more sophietieatod form of summation has also boon employed,
in the form of the construction of index numbers for various parts
of the economy and aggregation to produce an index for the entire
economic system in which component parts are weighted according to
their relative importance in the national economic effort. These
time series are studied, their interrelationships examined and
matched with possible demands of the various sect. ?rs of the economy,
and again the intelligence officer, this time with a more. reliable
quantitative base, subjectively makes an estimate of economic capa-
bilities,
The summation method has been subjected to severe criticism,
One of the most serious criticisms which can be mode is that its
merit depends almost entirely on the competence of the i.ntolligenco
officers who make the estimate, If they are of unusual ability,
then the estimate will likely be good; if they are unimaginative
and lack comprehension of the operation of an econorm>vy and the course
of economic history, the estimate will likely be a poor one..
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The method of integration, by establishing causal relation-
ships between the data and the conclusions, relies less on the
intuitive judgment of the intelligence officer. The method places
a premium on high-grade data. The intelligence officer continues
to be an important ingredient of the estimate, but in a different
way. The gap between the data and the final capabilities estimate
is closed by virtue of more detailed and precise information which
is organized, .quantified, and statistically assimilated in such
a way that the estimator is required to manipulate only those
economic variables pertinent to the required intelligence estimate.
The intelligence officer addresses himself more to getting more
and better data, to the analytical framework and theoretical under-
pinnings of the estimate, and to the various assumptions under which
the estimate is made.
Both methods are used; the summation method more frequently
than the integration method, In most of the Notional. Intelligence
Estimates on economic capabilities the summation method in relied
upon primarily, with the integration method more an intuitive
process on the part of the estimators.
Intelligence Memorandum # 181, in which balances were struck
for several important parts of the Soviet Bloc economy, was an
early example of the use of the integration method. Similarly,
the present study is an integration study; the first of its kind
on this scale. However, the estimate itself which would utilize
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the analytical framework and data Cannot be prepared, since the
specificntions of hot war requirements have not yet been suede.
The integration method is frequently called inter-industry
economics, input-output technique, or structural analysis. The
basic conceptual framework dates back to Quesnay and his T4 bleau
conom.i ue (Eighteenth Century) and later, Wairas' r athematlea].
general equilibrium: economic system (Nineteenth Century). However,
the empirical impl.ementa.tion and the use of the technique in a. wide
range of practical problems comes largely from the work in the l?e~t
two decades of Wassily Leontief.
It would be neither feasible nor desirable to attempt to
telescope the entire method of inter-industry economics into just
a few pages, For elementary expositions the reader is referred to:
Wassily Leontief, The Structure of the 1~nierican Ecene ,
.., Now York, 1951.
Dunne Evans and Marvin Hoffenborg, "The Interindustry
Relations Study for 1947," Review of Econoi i.cs -,My
Statistics, May, 1952.
The method employs the basic philosophy that any economic
system is a complicated set of iuterrelAtionships wherein a given
industry buys inputs from many other industries and sells its
output to still. others. The system of inter-industrial relation-
ships can be depicted in imithematical equations; each oquwitien
re;prosenting an industry. When the system has been set up rigorously and
all the quantities inserted, the variables become determinate,
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The system of equations can then be manipulated to indicate
what happens to the output of all industries when the demand
by one industry increases or decreases or when the amount of
input per unit of output of an industry changes.
This is precisely the information that the intelligence
officer needs to link his data directly to the capabilities
estimate. He needs to know what outputs are required in order for
the economy to support the demands of the military sector (the
armed forces and armament industries) under specific wartime
conditions for specified periods of time. The direct requirements
of the campaigns are obtainable directly, by translating the
military end item requirements into resource requirements. Given
these resource requirements, the estimator must determine the
capabilities of the economy to produce quantities adequate to meet
the specified demand, since it is not sufficient merely to match
the new demand with available quantities. Some of the dem% nds of
the non-military sectors are technologically fixed; others, for
policy reasons, are inflexible; and others can be changed only
slowly, by substitution. Hence, on the imposition of additional
demands by the military sector, there will not only be the direct
requirements, but also a complicated round of indirect requirements
will be generated, raising the level of all outputs.
For example, suppose that the military authorities suddenly
decided that they needed a million more tons of coal. Orders
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would be placed and gradually the higher level of production would
be attained. But in order to get the additional production, it
would be necessary to employ more coal miners, build more con
mining machinery to work the mines, use more electricity to keep
the mines operating, use more petroleum products, transportation,
and the output of many other industries. Hence, the output of
each of these industries would expand. But in order to attain
the expanded electric power output, more coal is needed; the addi-
tional workers in mining communities Would use more coal, more
electricity, and buy more services and goods; the new coal mining
machinery would require metals, machines, and skilled workers.
The increased demand for metals, machines, and labor would raise
the output of still more industries requiring coal, and so on.
The result of all these inter-related transactions might well be
a need for 1.2 million tons of coal, instead of a million, and
the output ' of many other industries would also have been increased
in the process.
To take another case, from Tablellf.in Part IV. The military
demand for aluminum in the USSR under cold war conditions is
100,000 tons out of a total production of slightly more than
300,000 tons. The minimum military demand for a.liiinin.7 m in the
USSR in war is about 300,000 tons. In order to fat the additional
aluuminum, increased inputs of electric power, coal, transportation,
construction, trade, and manpower are needed, requiring increased
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outputs in these industries. To expand output, these industries
would. require more aluminum, as well as larger input; from other
industries which would in turn require a larger aluminum input
to expand their output. In order to compute the total required
output of aluminum., it might be assumed that the household demand
for all.aminum would remain stationary; that stockpiling would cease,
and that the existing stockpile would be drawn down 25 percent per
year. Under and other conditions specified for the purpose
of making the capabilities estimate, it is possible to compute
exactly the level of output of all industries, including aluminum,
necessary to sustain the new military demand.
The iterative process described above allows the estimator
to vary the assumptions, industry by industry, about the der nds
of particular industries, about stockpiles and stockpiling, and
about substitutions and cut-backs. While it is impossible to
exhaust all of the inter-} ndustriel relationships by iteration,
it does permit varying the assumptions and results in a realistic
estimate of economic capabilities.
A more precise method for determining both direct and indirect
requirements is possible. First, a coefficient table is constructed
from the transactions table; it is subtracted from an identity
matrix and the result is inverted. The inverse is the solution to
the system of equations implied in the transactions and coefficient
table, under the single assumption that the input per unit output
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is fixed, In general, this more mechanistic solution is of limited
usefulnoss, since the fixed coefficients assumption may hot be
realistic for a study of economic capabilities.
The integration method is by no means foolproof. Its most
serious disadvantage is that it requires large amounts of accurate
and precise data. For every industry a detailed breakdown of its
costs (inputs) in terms of quantities of outputs of other industries
is needed. Alternatively, a detailed listing of sales to all other
industries is required. This information is not readily available
even for the United States, where there are elaborate statistical
gathering procedures. For the USSR and other Bloc countries it is
even more difficult to obtain this type of information. However,
with the use of proper sources the intelligence community is gradu-
ally building up a fund of knowledge of this type.
In addition, in the integration method there is the over.?prosorit
hazard that the mathematical rigor of the analyses will impart to
the conclusions anyunjustified sense of reliability.
The whole field of inter-industry economics and its relation-
ship to quantitative economic research has been incompletely ex-
ploited, especially in intelligence research. As a method of into-
;ration it offers tremendous rewards, if used judiciously, not only
in estimating economic capabilities, but also is other fields of
intelligence research, such as target research, logistical planning,
and strategic and operational military problems.
I7?-
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92B01090R000300020015-7
S-E--C-R-E-T
P,RT IV
A. STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY OF THE USSR
Inter--industry studies for the Soviet. Bloc as a whole,
and for the European Satellites and China separately, have
riot reached the stage where there are sufficient systematic
data to warrant their presentation in this manner. Therefore,
the ]faster Tables as well as the sector analyses emphasize the
USSR, with the European Satellites and Chin,--k treated in the
text and in textual tables.
A summery picture of the Soviet economy is given in
the Consolid
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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO1090R000300020015-7
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Approved For Releas
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
PART IV
B. AGRICULTURE
During the period 1 July 1952 to 1 July 1953, grains, meat,
and fats and oils will provide about 80 percent of the caloric
intake of the population of the Soviet Bloc, and of this intake,
grains will account for more than two-thirds.
Trends
The agriculture sector has been one of the least successful
Soviet Bloc enterprises. Despite strenuous efforts to increase
the level of production, there has been a notable lack of success,
The USSR has invested heavily in machinery and equipment in the
agricultural sector and in farm improvement and irrigation type
investments. However, production in general now stands at about
thu same level that prevailed in the late 1930's.
Total grain production has deteriorated over the last
decade and 1952-1953 production will be below the 1939 1evc1.
- 33. -
s'"-'H" F-T
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
S-F-C-R- E-T
Grain Productionl/
(million metric tons)
All Grains
Year
Broad
Grains
Rice
Other
Chija
satellites
Total
1939
106,0
49.2
101.0
99.8
107.0
49.6
256,4
1943
83.9
38.6
82.8
70.3
94.3
40.8
2059,4
1946
82.3
47.1
77.2
66.4
11.1.7
28,4
206.5
1947
85.8
47.3
89.3
80.2
111.4
30.5
222.1
].948
92.2
49.0
88,6
74.9
116.9
38.1
22949
1949
90.0
45.3
84.2
76.6
104.3
38.7
219.6
1950
92.1
46.4
83.9
77.9
107.8
36.9
222,6
1951
103.3
45.6
87.5
86,6
106,9
42.9
236.4
37 I FI 7 nr, wheat, rye, corny oats, barley,,. rice, grit3. a sor ;hum, and
miscellaneous grain.,,. Data have been adjusted to reflect barn production,,
not biological yield, which includes waste and losses of all kinds.
Quantities are reported in metric tons,
Meat production in the USSR for 1951 was about 500,000 metric
tons above the 1939 level. However, per capita, production in 1951
was not substantially changed from the 1939 level. For the Soviet
Bloc as a whole, production was approximately one million tons less
than the level achieved in 1939.
Meat Production in the Soviet Bloc
millions of metric tons
Year
Bloc
USSR
China
Europ n Satellites
.
,
1939
10,4
2.7
4.7
2.9
1943
8.3
2.2
4.4
1.8
1946
8,0
2.2
4.4
1.4
1947
8.1
2.1
4.4
1.6
1948
'8.2
2.3
4.4
1.5
1949
8.6
2.6
4.4
1.6
1950
9.0
2.9
4,4
1.7
1951
9.3
3.2
4.4
1.7
34
S-E-C ~R-E-T
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
S-E- C-R-E- T
Production of fats and oils has remained relatively stable
in the Soviet Bloc since 1939.
Producti n of Fats and Oils in the Soviet Bloc l/
Year
Vegetable
Oils
OOO,0
Animal
Fat:
Virw-ghert~FYY~
metric tons
Total USSR China
European
Satellites
1939
4.6
2.6
7.4 1.4 4.5
1.5
1943
4,2
1,9
6.1 0.9 4.2
0.9
1946
4.5
1.7
6.2 0.9 4.7
0.7
1948
5.0
1.9
6.9 193 4,9
0.8
1951
5.4
2.3
7.7 1,8 5,0
1.0
Includes boans, peanuts, rape seed, cotton seed, sesame, tung,
linseed, castorseed, hemp;eed, teaseed, perille, and tallowseed (vegetable
oils), and animal fats and button.
p
Grp The total availability of grains in the Soviet
Bloc for the period 1 July 1952 to 1 July 1953 will be 245
m ?1'_on metric tons, originating almost entirely from domestic
production. Net imports by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland,
w l,l be. negligible amounting to approximately 30,000 tons.
The USSR will produce 92 million tons# or 38 percent of
total Soviet Bloc production; with the European Satellites pro-
ducing 41 million tons (17 percent) and China, 112 million tons
(46 percent). Satellite production is estimated to be as follow:
Poland, 11,8; Rumania, 7.9; Hungary, 6,6; and East Germany, 5'07;
million tons. The USSR is expected to produce 60 million tons
of bread grains (wheat and rye) and 32 million tons of course grains.
35
5-E-C-H,-B-T
4+ Iw p1/ 4V +! ~
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
S-g-C R-,,-T
eat Total availability of meats in the Soviet Bloc
(occlu(Ang China) in 1952-1953; will be about 7,1 million tons
of carcass weight. Net imports are negligible, accounting for
not more than 1,000 tons. Production in the USSR will be
about 4.5 million metric tons and the European Satellites will
produce 2,8 million metric tons.
Fats and Oils. The Soviet Bloc supply of fats and oils
in 1952-1953, will be derived almost entirely from domestiq
production, Of a total availability of 7,2 million metric tons
only 19,000 will be imported. The USSR will produce about
2 million tons (28 percent of total Soviet Bloc supply), China
will produce 4.2 million tons (58 percent), and the European
Satellites about one million tons (14 percent).
ant ory
Inventory
The Soviet Bloc maintains large (by Western standards)
inventories of basic food Items, probably amounting to as much
as 6 percent to 10 percent of annual production. The inventory
is continually turning over but its size provides a substantial
buffer at any particular time, The following table indicates the
magnitude of this inventory:
- 36 -
i-J;-C-R-1 %T.
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
Estimated Food Stock, 1 July 1
000 metric tons
Goun rZ
Meat
Fats and Oils
Albania
78
~+w
Bulgaria
644
3
Czechoslovakia
348
33
East Germany
2,853
151
Hungary
955
Poland
3,047
171
44
Rumania
1.,263
1
European
Satellites
9,188
359
1+4
USSR
14,000
China
0
368
Bloc
23,188
359
612
Pattern, of Demand
Gr The overall allocation of the supply of grain in
the Soviet Bloc indicates that about a third is plowed back
into agriculture and nearly a half goes to household consumption,
The USSR exports slightly more than 4 percent of its grain output
and sends about the same amount to inventory,
The use pattern in the European Satellites is similar to
that of the USSR, while in China, a much larger percentage,
of total,
probably as much as 80 percon' goes to direct household consumption.
Ment. In the USSR, about 88 percent of moat production will
go to households with the remaining 12 percent going to the
military establishment.
Fats and Oils. Fats and oils have a more complicated use
pattern than do grains and meat production. However, even with
the complicated product-mix of fats and oils, and heavy demands
- 37
S-E-C-R-F-T
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
Security Inforrjn tion
USSR USE PP,TT'RN rOR GRAIN
(000,OO0,mt)
Consuming Indu trsr Quaritity Percent?
Agriculture 34.7 37,7
Textiles 0
Electric power 0
Coal 0
Petroleum
Steel 0
Copper 0
Aluminum 0
Rail Transport 0
Motor Transport 0
ter Transport 0
Trucks 0
Tractors 0
Locomotives 0
Rolling Stock 0
Coke-chemicals 0
Rubber 1.0 1.1
Machine tools 0
Ball and roller bearings 0
Heavy motors arid generators 0
Coal mining machinery 0
Electron tubes 0
'erchant shipbuilding; 0
Construc tir.n 0
Mining, nec 0
14achincry,nec 0
Trade 0
Consuming industries, nec 2,0 2.2
Households 44.3 413.2
Defense 2.0 2.2
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory accretions 4.0 4.3
Exports 4,0 4.3
TOTAL OUTPUT 92.0 100.0
-33-
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
S E-~ ft-,:;-T
Security Information
USSR USE PATTERN FOR MEAT
(000,000 mt)
C umin. Industry
uantit PercentaRe
Agriculture
Textiles 0
Electric power 0
Coal 0
Petroleum 0
Steel 0
Copper 0
Aluminum 0
Rail. Transport 0
Motor Transport 0
Water Transport 0
Trucks 0
Tractors 0
Locomotives 0
Rolling Stock 0
Coke-.chemicals 0
Rubber 0
Machine tools 0
Ball and roller bearings 0
Heavy motors and generators 0
Coal mining machinery 0
Electron tubes 0
Morchant shipbuilding 0
Construction 0
Mining, nec 0
Machinery, nec 0
Trade 0
Consuming industries, nec --
Households 3.8 88-4
Defense C).5 11.6
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory accretions --
Exports --
TOTAL OUTPUT 4.3 3.00.0
- 39 -
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR000300020015-7
S-E-C-R-T
Security Information
USSR USE PATTERN FOR FATS AND OILS
(000 mt)
Consumin Industr
Agriculture
Textiles
Electric power
Coal
Petroleum
Steel
Copper
Aluminum
Rail Transport
Motor Transport
Water Transport
Trucks.
Tractors
Locomotives
Rolling Stock
Coke-chemicals
Rubber
Machine tools
Bal~ and roller bearings
Heavy motors and generators
Coal minim; machinery
Electron tubes
Merchant shipbuilding
Construction
Mining, nec
Machinery, nec
Trade
Consuming industries, nec
Households
Defense
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory accretions
Exports
TQTAL OUTPUT
antic Percentage
100 5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
260 13
1210 .60,5
30 1.5
400
2000
-40-
S-L-C-I Er- T
100.0
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92B01090R000300020015-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
by industry for some products, households consume about 60
percent of fats and oils produced in the USSR and as much
as 20 percent goes .nto inventory, About 5 percent goes back
into agricultural production and the remainder is divided up
among the various industrial sectors of the economy and the
armaments Industry.
The use patterns for agricultural products are relatively
inflexible and are dominated largely by household conoumj.}tion.
Moreover, household consumption Is suppressed below that level
which would result from consumer preference. The present size
and rate of grov h of population in the Soviet Bloc in relation
to the expansion of agricultural production precludes extensive
shifting of the use patterns of agricultural commodities.
In.ut Structure
Considered as an industry, agriculture (not just grains;
moat, and fats and oils) is the largest single consumer of many
important inputs. It is by far the largest single employer of
manpower, although this manpower is primarily unskilled. The
movement of agricultural commodities uses more motor trans-
portation than does any other single industry, and in addition,
consunnes a stubstantial amount of rail transportation, The
agriculture sector is also a large consumer of energy, construction,
and some types of transport equipment such as trucks and tractors.
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S-E-C -fl-.Is T
Security innfarmation
USSR INPUT PATTERN FOR AGRICULTURE
Producinfr ,tr r
antit
Percentage
Grain (000,000 nit)
34.7
37.7
Meat (000,000 tut)
--
Fate and oils (000 nit)
100
5
Cotton (000 rat)
20
2w2
''oo1 (000 nit)
15
17.4
Hemp (000 mt)
53
28.3
Electric power (000,000,000 K"11)
5.0
4.0
Coal (000,000 mt)
--
Petroleum (000,000 mt)
7.6
18.2
Steel (000,000 mt)
0
Copper (000 mt)
0
Aluminum (000 mt)
0
Rail transport (000,000,000 ton km)
30
3..9
)Rotor transport (000,000,000 ton km)
3.6
11.4
Water transport (000,000,000 ton Ism)
Trucks (000 -- 2 ton units)
60
9.6
Tractors (000 - 15 hp units)
290
74.9
Locomotives (units)
0
Rolling stock (000 - 2 axle units)
0
Refined bcnzol (000 mt)
4.4
1.7
Toluol (000 nit)
--
Phenol (000 nit)
--
Rubber (000 mt)
20
7.2
Machine tools (000 units) Ball and roller bearings (000,000 units)
0
Hesvy motors and generators (000 kw)
--
Coa1, mining machinery (units)
0
Electron tubes (000,000 US $)
0
Merchant shipbuilding (000 GIST)
0
Construction (/)
11.1
11.1
Trade (%)
4.0
4.0
Producing industries, nee
Households-labor (000 man years)
51300
57.8
Inventory depletions
0
Imports
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S--C -R-E-T
~~ Cr ~- 1Y ~11IF
The investment program in agriculture is substantial,
makin it an important indirect user of large quantities of
metals and construction materials,
USSR Agricultural E ui nen Inputs,--,1952-1253
(000 units)
Tractor Plows (moldboard types) 150
Combines 60
Tractor Seed-drills 150
Tractor Cultivators 125
Agricultural 11achinery, all types 2,500
Snar rr
Agriculture has been one of the least successful enterprises
in the Soviet Bloc, notably In the USSR. Its failure to grow
at rates comparable to the growth of the industrial sectors
has resulted in lowered standards of living for the population.
`''hile the direct influence upon industrial sectors is not
great, the failure to produce adequate supplies of agricultural
commodities has tended to lower labor productivity and thus
has indirectly impaired industrial production,
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PART IV
C. TEXTILES
Despite strenuous efforts to increase production, the
output of basic textile materials in the Soviet Bloc, in
1951, was virtually unchanged from levels of output achieved
at the beginning of "~orld War II.
Ts
Cotton production in the Soviet Bloc has not increased
significantly in the past fifteen years. In recent years,
production has steadily recovered from wartime low levels and
at present is only slightly less than the peak pro:war output
of 1939. At the sane time, per capita cotton production has
deteriorated": and in 1951 amounted to about 9 pounds as com-
pared with 11 pounds in 1939.
Production of Cotton Lint
(thousands of metric tons)*';
ear
Bloc
USSR
China
European Satellites
1937
1,591
806
774
12
1939
1,288
871
410
8
1948
1,Q43
566
469
g
1949
963
588
370
6
1950
1,252
718
529
5
1951
1,509
$27
675
7
Wool production (clean basis) in the Soviet Bloc in 1951
was about 10 percent greater than in 1939, vdth the increase
accounted for entirely by the USSR which increased its production
by about 27 percent between 1939 and 1951.
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USSR per capita wool production in 1951 was about 13 percent
higher than per capita production in 1939.
Production of 7oo1
(1,300 me tons
Year
China
European Satellites
1939
222
132
39
52
1948
191
119
34
38
1949
218
145
34
40
1950
228
152
34
42
1951
244
168
34
42
Grease ^reight. The figures in this table are not directly
comparable with 1952-53 estimates since the latter are on a
scoured basis.
Production of hemp in the USSR was 58 percent greater in
1951 than in 1939. This expansion accounted for a 2Q percent
increase in Bloc output inasmuch as production in China and the
European Satellites had not recovered to 1939 levels,
Production of Hemp be
(000 metric tons)
USSR
China
Eurgpoan Satellites
1939
206.2
110.0
14.6
81.6
1948
23.0.1
141.7
1110
57.4
1949
246.4
174.0
11.0
61.4
1950
246.9
174.0
11.0
61.9
1951
246.9
174,0
11.0
61,9
?"'ith respect to textile mill products, Soviet Bloc output
in 1951 was somewhat higher than in 1939. Furthermore, the Fifth
Five Year Plan includes ambitious plans for textile products;
cotton fabrics due to increase by 55 percent to 65 percent
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over 1950 and ti?rool fabrics 2 to 2.5 times the 1950 level,
The }oars can be achieved if the USSR decides to divert sufficient
resources for this purpose. However, past experience indicates
that Five-Year Plan goals in textile products are flexible
downs^rard.
Textile tut
_ 000 metric tons
1_3
1!0
1948
IU2
1210
Cotton Yarn
Bloc
1,103
1,088
1,,029
1,050
1,148
1,206
USSR
559
595
493
562
607
630
China
300
300
336
260
300
325
E. Sat,
244
193
200
228
241
251
' ool Yarn
Bloc
205
185
157
182
186
189
USSR
78
78
71
85
88
88
China
3
3
3
3
3
3
E, Sat.
124
104
83
94
95
98
Rayon
Bloc
101
138
103
137
150
197
USSR
11
15
19
25
34
41
E. Germany 76 106
41
64
69
98
Other Sat, 14 17
43
48
47
58
Silk Production
Bloc
5.7
5.3
6.4
6,0
6.1
64
USSR
1.7
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
China
3.9
3.5
4,8
4.4
4.5
4.5
B. Sat.
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Supply
Cotten. Total availability of cotton. in the period 1 July
1952 to 1 July 1953. will be 1,770,000 tons, of which net imports
will accout for 104,000 tons. The USSR with 960,000 tons or
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57 percent of total Bloc production, is the biggest producer,
followed by China, 681,000 tons (41 percent) and the European
Satellites, 26,000 tons (2 percent).
China accounts for 50 percent of total Soviet Bloc imports
of raw cotton with Czechoslovakia and Poland accounting for four-
fifths of the remainder.
?";ool. The total availability of wool for 1.952-1953 will
be about 151,000 tons, of which 86,000 will be produced in
the USSR. The European Satellites will produce about 25,000
tons and China about 21,000 tons. Net imported wool All be
19,000 tons for the Bloc. The Satellites have a positive net
trade balance of 21,000 tons; China has a 7,000 export balance;
and the USSTZ, 5,000 import balance.
Hem E. The total supply of hemp in the Soviet Bloc will be
284,000 metric tons . USSR production of 183,000 metric tons,
represents 65 percent of Bloc output, while China accounts
for 14 percent and the European Satellites, 21 percent of total
production. Rumania, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are
the largest Satellite producers. There are no net imports of
hemp into the Soviet Bloc.
Inventor.
The mid year 1952 strategic inventory of cotton(ginned
basis) in the Soviet Bloc was about 232,000 metric tons or
about 14 percent of estimated production. The wool (clean basis)
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inventory was about 64,000 metric tons, or about 48 percent
of annual production. These stocks are hold primarily in the
USSR, with the European Satellites and China holding only
working inventories amounting to approximately one or two
months supply. It is possible that some stocks of hard fibers
are held by the USSR.
Pattern of Demand
Cotton Virtually all of the available cotton goes to
the textile manufacturing, industry and from that industry to
the ultimate consumer. Households, the largest single con-
sumer of cotton, in the form of textile mill products, clothing,
and other finished textile products account for about 50 percent
of cotton consumption. Nearly 20 percent, about 190,000 tons,
of the cotton produced in the USSR is exported to European
Satellites. Slightly less than 10 percent of cotton production
goes into the manufacture of various kinds of rubber products.
The military sector takes about 5'percent.
In the Soviet Bloc as a whole a somewhat larger proportion
is used for household consumption purposes with the European
Satellites diverting approximately 75 percent 'to households
and China about 70 percent.
Wool. The use of wool in the Soviet Bloc is also oriented
primarily toward the household sector. In the USSR household
consumption takes about 42 percent of total wool production.
48
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S?*E+C?-R-~-T
Security Information
USSR USE PATTUwni FOR COTTON
(000 mt)
Consumi g Industry
uantit
Percentapo
Agriculture
Textiles
Electric power
20
0
2.2
Coax.
0
Petroleum
0
Steel
0
Copper
0
Aluminum
0
Rail Transport
0
Motor Transport
0
?'Pater Transport
0
Trucks
Tractors
0
Locomotives
0
Rolling Stock
0
Coke-chemicals
0
Rubber
90
9.3
Machine Tools
0
Bail and roller
bearings
0
Heavy motors and generators
Coal mining machinery
Electron tuvea
Merchant shipbuilding
Construction
Minim;, nee
Machinery, nee
Trade
0
Consuming industries, nee
75
7.8
Households
4610
50.0
Defense
50
5.2
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory accretions
55
5.7
Exports
1.90
1908
TOTAL OUTPUT
960
100.0
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So-C
~? ~, L-T
Security Information
USSR USE PATTERN FOR 'OOL
(000 Mt)
Cons_urnin Industry %a~, nt ty rcentare
Agriculture 15 17.4
Textiles
Electric power 0
Coal 0
Petroleum 0
Steel 0
Copper 0
Aluminum 0
Rail Transport 0
Motor Transport 0
Water Transport 0
Trucks 0
Tractors 0
Locomotives 0
Rolling Stock 0
Coke-chemicals 0
Rubber 0
Machine tools 0
Ball and roller bearings 0
Heavy motors and generators 0
Coal mining machinery 0
Electron tubes 0
Merchant shipbuilding 0
Construction 0
Mining, nec 0
Machinery, nec 0
Trade. 0
Consuming industries, nec a 9,3
Households 36 41.9
Defense 5 5.9
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory accretions 14 16.2
Exports 8 9.13
TOTAL OUTPUT .86 100.0
_50_
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Agriculture receives about 17 percent, the military about 6
percent, and slightly more than 15 percent goes to inventory.
Slightly more than 9 percent of total, wool production is ex-
ported from the USSR. The use patterns in the European
Satellites are dissimilar; households will consume about
70 percent. The European Satellites produce about 25,000
tons and import about 21,000 tons from both the USSR and the
West. In China, nearly a third of wool will be exported and
households will use about one half of production.
Hemp. About 10 percent of the hemp produced in the USSR
is used in the military sector of the economy; households
consume about 30 percent and manufacturing industries use
about 30 percent. Somewhat less than 30 percent Foes back
into the agricultural sector,
About 25 percent of flax in the USSR is used by industry
and slightly more than half goes back into agriculture, House-
holds use 12 percent and the military sector, 10 percent. In
the European Satellites proportionately more goes into industry,
(about 40 percent), agriculture, proportionately les ,(25 percent),
and households more (24 percent),
Silk is used by households and the military sector in the
Soviet Bloc in a 2 to 1 ratio. Jute and hard fibers in the
Bloc are used by agriculture and industry in about a 2 to 1
ratio,
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ConsuUn Industry
Security Information
USSR USE PATTERN FOR H1 24P
(000 Mt)
anti, Percentage
Agriculture 53 25.3
Textiles
Electric power 0
Coal --~
Petroleum 0
Steel 0
Copper 0
Aluminum 0
Rail Transport --
Motor Transport --
Water Transport
Trucks 0
Tractors 0
Locomotives 0
Rolling Stock 0
Coke-chemicals 0
Rubber --
Machine tools 0
Ball and roller bearings 0
Heavy motors and generators 0
Coal mining machinery 0
Electron tubes 0
Merchant shipbuilding 0
Construction 0
hMining, nee --
Machinery, nee 0
Trade 0
Con3uming industries, nee 53 28.3
Households 57 30.6
Defense 20 10.7
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory accretions
Exports 4 2.1
TOTAL OUTPUT 187 100.0
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S-E-RIB-E-T
Input Structure
The inputs allocated to the textile industry are the total
inputs into the culture, processing, and manufacturing of textiles
and textile mill products. Since the industry is a multi-stage
operation and the output of one stage becomes an Input at
another stage, these internal flows are eliminated in the total
pictu.re.
The most important single input is manpower; employment
is about 1,200,000 full-time employee equivalents per year.
Other important inputs are transportation, trade, and some
chemical products. Textile machinery as well as some agri-
cultural machinery are also important inputs into the industry.
The primary obstacle to expansion in the industry has
not been the availability of inputs in general, but climactic
obstacles to the growing cotton and wool. Such :i.npits, warm
climate, abundant moistur j natural irrigation on a large
scale, are not subject to administrative allocations and are
in relatively short supply in the Soviet Bloc.
The textile industry in the Soviet Bloc is a slowly
expanding activity, hampered by untoward natural conditions.
Sufficient textile products are available to clothe the population
and provide necessary supplies for the industrial sectors.
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Security Information
USSR I11I'UT PATTERI FOR TEXTILES
Producin, Industr quantity
Percentage
Grain (000,000 mt)
0
Meat (000,000 nit)
0
Fats and oils (000 mt)
--
Cotton (000 nit)
wool (000 nit)
3r
Hemp (000 nit)
Electric power (000,000,000 IV'-H)
Coal (000,000 nit)
Petrolemu (000,000 mt)
--
Steel (000,000 nit)
0
Copper (000 nit)
0
Aluminum (000 mt)
0
Rail transport (000,000,000 ton km)
--
Motor transport (000,000,000 ton km)
0.6
1.9
7,ater transport (000,000,000 ton km)
--
Trucks (000 - 2 ton units)
0
Tractors (000 - 15 hp units)
0
Locomotives (units)
0
Rollin; stock (000 - 2 axle units)
0
Refined bonzol (000 nit)
4.0
1.6
Toluol (000 nit,)
--
Phenol (000 nit)
--
Rubber (000 nit)
0
Machine tools (000 units)
--
Ball and roller bearings (000,000 units)
0
Heavy motors and generators (000 kw)
--
Coal mining machinery (units)
0
Electron tubes (000,000 US 4a)
0
Merchant shipbuilding (000 GRT)
0
Construction (n)
2.4
2.4
Trade (2)
12*0
12,0
Producing; industries, nee
Households-labor (000 man years)
1200
1.4
Inventory depletions
0
Imports
0
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PART IV
D. ENERGY
The basic sources of energy are coal, petroleum, and
the forces of gravity and wind. The Soviet Bloc is well
supplied with the basic energy sources. The USSR in particular
has a vast reservoir of unexploited resources. With 17 percent
of the area of the world, and 15 percent of the enargy resources,
the USSR accounts for only 9 percent of world energy production,
The United States, on the other hand, with 6 percent of the
world area and about 29 percent of world energy resources,,
accounts for 38 percent of world energy production. Europe
has 4 percent of world area, uses more than 38 percent of
world energy, but has only slightly more than 9 percent of
world energy resources.
The vast energy potential of the USSR is widely distributed;
there are large reserves of coal of all kinds, untapped reserves
of petroleum are being exploited. rapidly, _ and .thy: USSR- uses- only
a small fraction of the available water power capacity.
The European Satellites are less well off. Each is
producing energy at a rate higher than their percentage of
world resources, China, on the other hand, has great reserves,
probably about a fourth of total world resources, but is
producing only a small fraction of world energy.
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USSR INPUT PATTERN FOR ENERGY
Producin Industry
Quantity
Percentage
Grain (000,000 mt))
Meat (000, 000 mt)
Fats and oils (000 nit)
Ootton ( 000 pit)
Wool (000 mt)
Hemp ( 000 mt )
-
0
0
0
0
Electric power (000,000,000 kwh)
31.5
23;8
Coal (000, 000 mt )
78,0
25;1
Petroleum (000,000 mt)
2,2
50'3
Steel (000)000 mt)
O.7`
2,8
Copper (000 mt)
90.0
30,0
Aluminum (000 nit)
30.0
9;8
Rail transport (009,000,000 ton km)
200'
26;0
Motor transport ( 000,000,000 ton lon
1;8
5,8
Water transport (000,000,000 ton km)
49.0
Trucks ( 000-2 ton units)
0
Tractors (000-15 hp units
0
Locormotj_ves ( units )
0
Rolling stock ( 000.2 axle units
0'
Ref? ?nod bcnzol ( 000 mt)
77.6
30;2
Toluol ( 000 mt)
15,1
19.8
Phenol ( 000 mt)
2.8
54
Rubber ( 000 nit)
0
Machine: tools ( 000 units
..
Ball and roller bearings (000,,000 units)
0
Heavy ::mo tor5 and generators ( 000 kw)
1700
X8;0
Coal mining machinery (units)
2500
100.0
Electron tubes (000,000 US di)
0
Merchant shipbuilding ( 000 GRT)
0'
Construction (%)
148
14,8
Trade (j)
3,5
3.5
Producing industries, n ec
Horeeholds??labor (000 manycars)
1610
1.9
Inventory depletions
0
Imports
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COAL
The production of coal in the Soviet Bloc provides the
economy with its basic energy resource, Coal is relatively
more important than it is in the West because the general level
of industrialization in the Bloc is somewhat less advanced.
In the West, the coal industry is a declining industry. In
the Soviet Bloc the industry is still growing, even though
the rate of growth in the postwar period is slackening slightly.
The Soviet Bloc produces nearly all grades and varieties of
coal, including anthracite, bituminous, sub-bituminous, lignite,
brown coal, and peat.
Trends
The postwar trend of USSR production is nearly a straight
line with a steeper slope than that of the prewar rate of growth.
There was a significant decline during the war which carried
the USSR back to the level of about 1932, Since the war advance-
ment has been rapid and all planned goals have been achieved.
or over-fulfilled. The goal of the Fifth Five Year Plan of
375 million metric tons is easily within the capabilities of
the USSR.
Of the European Satellites, Poland is the most important
hard coal producer, with East Germany an significant lignite
producer.
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Soviet Bloc Coal Production
000,000 nit
1938
1940
12L8
1949
l19LO
Anthracite & Bituminous Coal
Bloc 232
284
254
284
318
344
USSR 115
139
146
166
187
203
China 32
47
20
27
35
41
Poland 69
77
70
74
78
82
Czechoslovakia 16
21
18
17
18
18
Lignite
Bloc
171
239
218
243
265
266
USSR
18
27
63
70
75
79
East
Germany 120
169
111.
124
138
159
Other Satellites 33
43
44
49
52
28
SAY
The accompanying table indicates the supply position of the
Soviet Bloc in solid fuels for 1952+-1953:
Soviet Bloc Supply of Solid Fuels 19 27jj52
000,000 metric tons
Bloc
USSR
China
Eur, Sat s
Supply
ue
Anthracite & Bituminous
372,0
232,7
44.0
95,3
Brown and-Lignite
319,0
87,5
0
231.5
Total
691,0
320.2
44,0
326.8
Production
Anthracite & Bituminous
381.5
224.0
45,5
112.0
Brown and Lignite
319.5
87.0
0,5
232.0
Total
701.0
311.0
46.0
344.0
Imports
Anthracite & Bituminous
17.2
9.0
0
8.2
Brown and Lignite
4.5
0,5
0
4.0
Total
21.7
9.5
0
22.2
r 58 ..
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Bloc
USSR
China
Eur. Sa ts.
Anthracite & Bituminous
26.7
0.3
1.5
24.9
Brown and Lignite
5.0
0
0.5
4.5
Total
31.7
0.3
2..0
29.4
Anthracite and bituminous production constitute about 72
percent of total coal production in the USSR, The European
Satellites, on the other hand, produce primarily lignite and
brown coalo with anthracite and bituminous making up only
33 percent of their total production. China produces only
small quantities of coal, nearly.all of which is bituminous
and anthracite.
The supply of coal available for use in the Soviet Bloc
is somewhat different than domestic production, due both to
the Import-export balance and to increases in working stocks.
Poland exports about 28 percent of its hard coal production,
with about one-third going to the West and two-thir:s going
to other members of the Bloc, especially the USSR..
Inventory
The Soviet Bloc does not stockpile coal but maintains
very large working inventories.
Coal Inventory
(000,000,000 mt)
Bloc USSR
China Bur. Sets.
Anthracite and Bituminous
3.0
3.0
0
Brown. and Lignite
0,1
0
0.1
Total
3.1
3.0
0.1
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Pattern of Demand
The major consumers of coal in the USSR are the electric
Hower industry (22.9 percent), railroads (27.2 percent), and
the steel industry (19.3 percent). The steel industry's
consumption is largely for coking purposes.
There is a differentiation in use between hard coal and
lignite and brown coal. Lignite and brown coal are consumed
primarily in the electric power industry. Those soft coals
are also used to a limited extent in coke production in the
European Satellites, but not in the USSR. Hard and soft coal
can be substituted in almost any use, but with varying degrees
of efficiency. The most efficient use of brown coal and lignite,
which has a lower Btu content, is in the generation of electric
power and in heating industrial and private establishments.
The following tables show the use patterns of coal typos in
the Soviet Bloc..
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USSR USE PATTERN FOR COAL
(000,000 mt)
Consuming Industry
OuantitZ
Percentage
Agriculture
Textiles
Electric power
71.0
22.9
Goal
5.0
1.6
Petroleum
2.0
,6
Steel
60.0
19,3
Oopper
0.5
.2
Aluminum
1.0
.3
Rail Transport
85,0
27,.3
Motor Transport
0
Water Transport
1..0
.3
Trucks
1.3
.4
Tractors
0.8
.3
Locomotives
0,1
-
Rolling Stock
0,2
.1
Coke-chemicals
1.0
riacnine fools
0
Ball & Roller Bearings
0
Coal Mining Machinery
0
Electron Tul es
0
Merchant Shipbuilding
0
Construction
-
Mining, n.e.c.
Machinery, n, o, w .
Trade
0
Consuming Industries,
n.e.c.
58.7
18.9
Households
20.0
6.4
Defense
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory Accretions
3.0
1.0
Exports
0.3
1
TOTAL OUTPUT
311.0
100,0
Heavy Motors & Generators .i
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Estimated Consumption Pattern of H-'rd Coal in the Soviet Bloc,
July 3-952 to 1 July 1953
(percent of total consumption)
Consuadn7 Inetu trv USSR C i a
Satellites
Bloc
Mines -- 6.3
4.2
1.8
Briquette Plants 2.1 n.a.
1.4
1.7
Electric Power 12.5 13.1
15.8
13.6
Gas r,"?'orks 0.3 1.1
3.5
1.2
Railroads 32.6 18.2
14.2
26.1
Water Transport 0.5 1.3
0.0
o 6
Coke 23.9 4.3
2290
21.0
Iron and Steel 3.9 0,9)
1.8)
3.0)
Nonferrous n.a.
Chemicals n.a, n.a9
0,0
0.0
Synthetic Liquid Fuel 1.7 nqa.
000
1,1
Cement Brick n.a. 3.9
1.6
0.9
Heating (private) 6,5 28.1
16.2
11.6
Other 15.8. 23.0
18,9
17.3
Total 99.8 100,2
99.6
99.9
Total hard coal consumption
(metric Lori?) ` (29,500) (44,000)
(95,263)
(368,963)
Estimated Consumption Pattern of Lignite and Brown Coal in
the Soviet B].cac 1 Jul 19 2 to 1 July 1953
(percent of total consumption)
Ccnsundn Indust v
USSR
Satellites
Bloc
Mines
0.1
0..1
Electric Power
47.5
30.0
34.9
Gas Vfiorks
0.3
.0~3
Railr()ads
11,7
11.1
11.3
Water Transport
0.1
0.1
Coke
14.4
10.3
Iron and Steel
0.9
0.6
Nonferrous
Chemicals
n. a,
n,a,
0.8
0.5
Synthetic Liquid Fuel
6.9
5,0
Comentt, Bricks
n.a9
0.7
0.5
Heating
5.7
8,9
8.0
Unallocated
35,1
25.8
28.3
Total
100.0
100.0
99.9
Total lignite and brown coal
(metric tons)
(87,500)
(225,613)
(313,113)
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S-F -C -?h--I '
Comparison of the USSR end Satellite consumptions reveals
that relatively more hard coal is used in the Satellite electric
power industry, with relatively less consumed by the Satellite
railroads and coke industry (iron and steel industry). Heating
consurnos 1642 percent of coal suppliers in the Satellites, in
contrast to 6,5 percent in the USSR,. On the other hand, about
half of the lignite and brown coal in the USSR is consumed by
the electric power industry" in contrast to only 30 percent in
the Satellites. Coke production currently utilizes about 15
percent of lignite and brown coal. supply in the European Satellites.
Inputs
Inputs into the coal industry in the USSR as shown in the
following -Libulatlon.
USSR, Conn. Tgfachin.o Input
(units
Coal- loaders 90o
Coal combines 400
Coal cutters 1,250
The overall position of the Soviet Bloc in regard to
coal supplies is sa:tisDtctory", Some increase in the demand for
coal could be met without increasing prodiction by restricting
the con.sumpta.on of coal for heating and other uses,
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USSR INPUT PA'T'TERN FOR COAL
Produc:i_nrg Incliistry Quantity Percontage
Grain (000,000 r,lt) 0
Moat (000, 000 mt:,) 0
Fats anti oils (000 mt) 0
Cotton (000 mt) 0
Wool (000 rd) 0
He:np (000 mt) C)
E1, ctr/ic poucr (000,000,000 KWY) It.5~ 31 1?6
Cc'`,.,_~. q( c)'0,000 mli) 5.0 .6
Petroleum (000, 000 mt) -
St-col (000'C"00 ;nit) 0
Cope r (000 mt) 0
Aluminum (000 pit) 0
flail tranrslport (000, 000, 000 ton km) 160 20.8
Motor transport (000?000,000 ton km) 0.6 1.9
Jttc ti*dn:.;port (0o0} 000, 000 ton kin)
Truckc;:, (00C) - 2 ton units) 0
T2" c.to. e (000 - 1 hp units) 0
Locomo`4 .TCs (unit?) 0
Roll i.nn stock ()00 -? 2 axle units) 0
Reined bcnzo-l_ (000 mt) 04'
Toluol (boo mt) 0
Phenol (000 rat) 0
Rtil~i:~ r r (0() 0 :rrnt) 0
P1mchine tools (000 units) 0
Ball and roller bearings (000,000 units) 0
Heavy motors and generators (000 TV) -
Coal -mA.ning machinery (units) 2500
Electron tubes (()00,000 US $) 0
Merchant shipbuilding (000 GRT) 0
Cens bCuctiion 5.5 5.5
Trade (%) 1.0 1.0
PrcC:' Icing industries, nee
Households-l or (000 man yoars 1000 1.1
Inventor dept et:i.rns 0
"Crnoor?t*>, 9.5
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S-E-C R--E-T
Coal production of all types can be increased if the
Soviet Bloc is willing to direct rich aiid machinery into
the coal industry. The major limiting factor that would
tend to prevent the grotiath, or the shifting of coal supplies,
is the availability of transportation facilities.
PETROLEUM
The petroleum industry of the Soviet Bloc is one of the
oldest industries. Petroleum which was an important export
during Czarist rule., ceased to be exported at the beginning
of Bolshevik rule. With the advent of industrialization,
petroleum has become one of the most critical measures of t e
war--rnal,d.ng capahi..lity of the Soviet Bloc. The USSR is the
dominre.ent petroleum producer within V e Bloc with Rumania a
poor second. It is estimated that the USSR has 10 to 20 per cent
of world petrolcoiun resources,
Trends
The following t< ble shows the trend of production in
the Soviet :Bloc.
Crude Petroleum Prodtuction
( 000 000 mt )
r~ r
Bloc
USSR
Rumania
1938
36c8
30.2
6.6
1940
37.0
31.2
5,8
1948
33,4
29.2
4.2
1949
37.9
33.4
4.5
1950
42,1
3705
4.6
1951
47:.,0
4140
6,,0
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S E-C -R-E,- ,L
For the USSR, Stalin, in his February 1946, speech set
a goal of 60 .mil .lion metric toils f or+ 1960 ? While this seemed
ambitious at that tine, the Fifth Five Year Plan specifies
a goal of about 70 million metric tons for 1955, This change
in plan is indicative of the increased activity of the petrolown
industry in the USSR and especially in the Second Baku, and
also indicates the incre{aced capacity of the USSR to expand
the petroleum industry The 70 million metric ton goal for
1955, while a.mbi.tious, is entirely within the realm of possibility
and will probably be achieved.
1M7-ach of the difficulty in interpreting, plan goals is a
semantic problem. Petroleum is spa term which. usually includes
natural bras. At this time it does not appear likely that the
USSR will be able to produce '10 million metric tons of oil by
1955.
Much of the gains in recent years .Have cone from the Second
Bnku9 a relatively now and rapidly growing field. Since the
USSR is a carefully planned economy, their exploitation of
resources should be aimed ,,it achieving maximum production and
would be arranged in such a manner that petroleum would not
be extracted from the ground in an uneconomical fashion.
However, in the desire for increased production in the short
run, Soviet fields are being drilled intensively, wasting
much of the natural pressure and making unavoidable a high
residual loss, unextractab7.e from the ground.
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?M- 01-1.
The Soviet Bloc supply of petroleum, in terms of petroleum
products, for 1.952-1953, will be slightly more than 50 million
metric tons, of which not quid:: 42 million metric tons comes
from the USSR. Foreign trade is not an important element in
the petroleum supply situation, except for Austria. The Soviet
Zone of Occupation in Austria is included in the following table
in the 117..?viet Bloc imports. The crude production in East Austria
is entirely under Soviet control and is logic,,)3-ly a part of
the crude supply of the Soviet Bloc, East German production
is primarily petroleum products manufactured synthetically.
Soviet Bloc Fetroleoum Slaly 152 ~- 193
. _ r.. _..~. (T)OO, 000 mt
viet Bloc
S
USSR
China
E. Sats
E, Gores
Rumania
o
.
.
Supply
5Oog
41,,5
0.4
8.9
Production
49.3
41.8
0.4.
7.1
1.3
4.4
Imports
?2,O
0
0
+2.0
Exports
Inventor
-0~5
-0.3
0
-0,2
The Soviet, Bloc is estimated to have between 3.5 and 20
million metric tons of petroleum products in inventories and
stockpiles or about a two to four month' s supply of petroleum
products, under peace time conditions. The great bulk of this
stockpiling is in the USSR.
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S-E-C--R-E-T
USSR USE PATTERN FOR PETROLEUM
(000,000 mt)
Consur:dn Industa tlontit Percentage
6,0
Rail Transport 3.8 9.0
Motor Transport 11.7 28.0
Water Transport 1.7 4.0
Trucks -
Tractors -
Locomotives -
Rol..ling Stock -
Coke-chemicals
Rubber -
Machine tools
Ball and roller bearings -
Heavy motors and generators -
Coal mining machinery -
Electron tubes 0
Merchant shipbuilding -
-
Construction
Mining, n. e;. c. -
Machinery., n,e,c..
Trade 0
(Consuming industries' n.e.c. 7.1 17.0
.0
Households 2.9 7.0
Defense 3.3 8.0
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory accretions
Exports
Agriculture 88
Textiles h.
Electric power 2,5
Coal -
Petroleum.
Steel
Copper --
Alluninum -
63 --
41.8 100.0
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Pattern of Demand
The most important users of petroleum products in the
order of quantities consumed ,arf the motor transport industry,
the agricultural. sector, the military establishment, and the
iron and steel industry. These consumers take nearly 60 percent
of petroleum products.
One of the most notable characteristics of the pattern
of uuse, not only in the USS?t but also in the European Satellit:s*
is the relatively small proportion of the output of the industry
~c ing to the household sector for purposes of transportation
and recreation, This fact is often cited as an advantage
of the Bloc over the West since the Bloc can use these products
for military and other users,whereas in the West, because of
the inflexibility of the petroleum use pattern, large supplies
must go to the household sector. Labor productivity, however,
suffers somewhat as a result of the lack of civilian vehicles.
The usee, p d tern for petroleum products is misleading in
the It it is not always theo, bulk of total products which is im-
portrant in economic capabili_ti(s. Both aviation gasoline and
jet fuel are a very small ""slice" of the crude petroleum
barrel. It is quite possible to have an adequate overall
supply of products but extreme stringency for particular
pr~:x:~~7cts.
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S-E-C-R-.F--T
USSR INPUT PATTEFN FOR PETROLEUM
i'rocljicirr. In~3ustry Gluant ty Percentage
Grain (000,000 rat,)
Meat (000,000 mt) 0
Fats and o?.ls (000 mt) 0
Cotton (000 mt) 0
WWrol. (000 mt) 0
Heal:, (000 t~st) 0
Lie..ctr:ic power (000,000,000 1m) 5.0 4.0
Cora (000, 000 rnt,) 2,0 .6
Petroleum (000, 000 rat)
Steel (000,000 mt) 0.7 2.8
Copper (000 mt) 0
Aluminum (000 mb) 0
Rail transport (000,000,000 ton km) 40 5.2
Motor transport (000,000,000 ton km) 0.9 2.9
Water transport (000,000,000 ton km) 49.0
7':r:uc1 s (000 - 2 ton units) 0
Tractors (000 - 15 hp units) 0
Locc,rnot_i.vc,s (units) 0
Rolling stock (000 - 2 axle un-? ts) .0
Refined bcnzol. (000 mt) 71.6 30.2
Toluol (000 rat) 15.1 19.8
Phenol (000 rat) 2.8 5.4
Rubber (000 ).',it) 0
Machine tools (000 un.i,ts) --
Pali and roller be: r_i.ng;s (0;:)0,000 un:i..ts) 0
heavy motors and goncrators (D-)0 K1/) 30C) 8.6
Coal i:i.i_ning machinery (r:uni_ts) 0 100
Hlcctron tubes (000,000 US 0
l1{=rc>>: it h iphuild':ing (000 C"1RT) 0
Cons' ,i.ic bi_on (%) 4o7 4.7
Trade (%) 1-5 J..S
Producing industries, nec
Hous eho1_dnwlabozr (coo man years) 310 .4
Inventory c1apletlons 0
Imparts 0
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Inputs
The petroleum industry is a large consumer of transportation,
electric power, labor, and capital equipment, The equilpment
items are exploratory equipment, drilling machinery, refineries,
tubing and pipelines. The capital equipment items of the
petroleum industry are in short supply. The USSR is inexperienced
in their manufacture and these products require large amounts
of strategic resources.
Summar
The Soviet Bloc petroleum industry is a large, rapidly
expanding industry with adequate reserves in the ground. The
industry is on a sound technological basis. The supply of
capital inputs is stringent but not crippling. Present production
is adequate for cold war needs.
ELECTRIC POWER
The electric power industry in the Soviet Bloc plays a
leading role in Soviet economic policy. Lenin's comment that
i'commu.nism is Soviet rule plus the electrification of the whc:>le
country" has been followed censistontly by Soviet planners
since the Revolution,
The production of electric power is simply the provision
of a secondary energy supply source having greater mobility
and flexibility than does the primary or basic energy source,
The basic energy sources are coal, petroleum, the pull of
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gravity, and the force of wind. In the Soviet Bloc coal is
by far the most important present source of energy supplies.
About 80 percent to 85 percent of electric power is generated
from coal. Hydro-electric power is much greater in potential
in the USSR, but its generation constitutes only 15 percent-18
percent of the total, Natural and manufactured gas, oil,
wood and wood derivatives, and wind power are only a small
percentage of the total.
Trends
The electric power industry has been one of the most
rapidly expanding Industries of the Soviet Bloc. Generation
of electricity in the Bloc in 1951, amounted to about 157
billion kilowatt-hours as contrasted to about 75 billion
kilowatt-hours in 1946. During the early 1930's, the annual
rate of increase in output of electric power was about 25
percent declining to a low of 10 percent immediately prior
to World War II. In the post war years, the average rate
of increase in electric power generation has been about 15
percent. Expansion in the European Satellites has been at
a somewhat lower rate, but the increases have been substantial.
The increases in output have reaulted from substantial
additions to capacity over the years, USSR capacity in 1920
was only about 1.2 million kilowatts, as against 5.6 million
kilowatts in 1935, 10,5 in 1940, and by mid-1952 it will
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reach about 23.3 million kilowatts. Mid-1952, capacity, for
the European Sotol.lites will be about 16.1 million kilowatts.
Of a total of 181 billion kilowatt-hours which will be
produced in the Soviet Bloc in 1952-1953, 124 billion kilowatt-
hours, or 68 percent, comes from the USSR, with East Germany,
the next largest country, producing 21 billion kilowet -hours,
or 12 percent of the total. The remainder of production is
accounted for by Poland. with 7 percent; Czechoslovakia with
6 percent; Hungary with 2 percent; [Zumnnia with 1 percent; and
China, with 3 percent of total Soviet Bloc generation.
Electric Power Generation
Count
USSR
East Germany
Poland
Czechoslovakia
China
Hungary
Rumania
Bulgaria
Albania
less than I percent.
180.94
of Total
68
12
7
6
3
2
1
In general, trade is not of great significance in the
electric power industry. The North Korean Suiho plant has
exported about 680 million kilowatt hours into Southern Manchuria.
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Billion KWH
124,00
21.25
12.00
11.50
5.00
3.40
2.80
.93
.06
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Some of the European Satellites, notably Rumania and Hungary,
have made arrangements whereby their electric power resources
would be interconnected and hence there would be, transmission
across international. boundaries.
The USSR dogs not make such extensive use of huge integrated
electric power systems as does the United States and Great
Britain, There are some nine or ten main regional high tension
networks in the USSR, but very little connection between than
and no national grid, The most important power systems are
the Moscow-Gorki, the Urals, the Dneiper-Donetz, and the
Leningrad systems.
The plant factor, i.e., the relationship between actual
generation and generation at rated capacity, is very high in
the USSR. This reflects a conscious effort to suppress peak
loads and to distribute electric power requirements over the
day, week, and month in such a manner that huge standby
capacity units are not necessary. The fact that industry is
one of the largest consumers and that household consumption of
electric power, which frequently gives rise to very high peak
loads, is a relatively small proportion of total power consump-
tion, means that a high plant factor can be aghioveeed. The
plant factor for the USSR is between .5 and .6. In the
United States, the plant factor is between ,4 and ,5.
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In the European Satellites, on the other hand, it is
necessary to make a distinction between installed capacity and
operable capacity. The plant factor figured on operable capa-
city for the Satellites would be high. On installed capacity,
which is in need of substantial repair and parts reeplAcement,
would be much lower. In general, the USSR and its Satellites
are able ,and do attain higher plant factors than other parts
of the world, largely through the regulation of the use of
electric power,
Inventory
Electric power cannot be stored except by batteries or
by pumping water so as to give it a head. These are high
cost operations in which the Soviet Bloc does not engage.
Pattern of Demand
The most important characteristic of the use of output
of electric power in the Soviet Bloc is the very high percen--
tage which goes into industry and the relatively small proportion
which is consumed by the household sector.
Whereas in the United States, less than 50 percent of
the total power is allocated, to industry, in the US,S1, about
65 percent is so allocated, in East Germany, 62 percent,
Polands66 percent, and in Czechoslovakia, 65 percent. Both
the United States and Great Britain allocate nearly twice as
much, proportionately, to household consumption as does the USSR.
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USSR USE PAT TERN FOR ELECTRIC POWER
(000,000,000 KWH)
Consuming Industry
Quantity
Percentage
Agriculture
5.0
4.0
Textiles
Electric power
20.0
16.2
Coal
4.5
3.6
Petroleum
5.o
4.0
Steel
9.7
7.8
Copper
0.7
.6
Aluminum
6.o
4.8
Rail Transport
1..0
3.2
Motor Transport
0.1
,1 .
Water Transport
0
Trucks
0.8
.6
Tractors
0,3
.2
Locomotives
0.1
.1
Rolling Stock
0.1
Cope-chemicals
Rubber
Machine Tools
0.2
.2
Ball & Roller Bearings
0.1
.1
Heavy Motors & Generators
011
.1
Coal Mining Machinery
-
Electron Tubes
-
Merchant Shipbuilding
-
Construction
-
Mining, n. e . c
Machinery, n,e.c.
10.0
8,1
Trade
.5
.4
Consuming Industries, n.e.c.
34.8
28.1
Households
18.0
14.5
Defense
14.0
3.2
Army
Navy
Air
Inventory Accretions
0
Exports
0
TOTAL OUTPUT
124,0
100.0
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Despite the already high allocation of electric power to
industrial use and despite the high plant factor in the Soviet
Bloc, there remains substantial flexibility in the use of
electric power in the Soviet Bloc, This is not national flexibility,
inasmuch as the regional grids are not interconnected. However,
within any one grid, the use pattern may be so) shifted about
so as to achieve alternative objectives selected in the
planning process.
Input Structure
The most important inputs into the electric power industry
on current account are coal, electric power, petroleum, and
labor. On capital account, aluminum (for high tension wire),
industrial housing, heavy motors, and generators are the most
important inputs.
There is no shortage of the basic energy resources for the
electric power. The Soviet Bloc makes every effort to utilize
low grade coals, thus releasing their high grade coal for other
industrial purposes.
Heavy electrical equipment and wire for transmission
are the determinants of the rate of growth of the industry.
This machinery is difficult to build and the Soviet Bloc
is making every effort to import motors and generators. The
wire requires either copper or aluminum, both of which are
strategic items.
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Producing T d stry Quantity Percentage
Grain (000, 000 mt) 0
Meat (000,000 mt) 0
Fats and oils (000 mt) 0
Cotton (000 mt) 0
Wool (000 mt) 0
Hemp (000 mt) 0
Electric power (000,000,000 KWWH) 20.0 16,2
Coal (000,000 mt) 71.0 22.9
Petroleum (000,000 mt) 2.2 5.3
Steel (000,000 mt) 0
Copper (000 mt) 90.0 30.0
Aluminum (000 mt) 30 9.8
Rail. transport (000,000,000 ton km) 0
Motor transport (000,f 000, 000 toh km) 0.3 1.0
Water transport (000, 000, 000 ton km) 0
Trucks (000 - 2 ton units) 0
Tractors (000 - 1; bp units) 0
Locomotives (units) 0
Rolling stock (000 - 2 axle units) 0
Refined benzol (000 mt) 0
Toluol (000 mt) 0
Phenol (000 mt) _ 0
Rubber (000 mt) 0
Machine tools (000 units) 0
Ball and roller bearings (000,000 units) 0
Heavy motors and genera; tors (000 KW) 1400 39. 4
Coal mining machinery'(units) 0
Electron tubes (000,000 US `W) 0
Merchant shipbuilding (000 GRT) 0
Construction (%) 4.6 4T6
Trade (o) 1.0 1.0
Producing industries, nee
Households-labor (000 man years) 330 .
Inventory depletions 0
Imports 0
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S~amm~~~r
The Soviet Bloc is well. supplied with primary energy
resources for its electric power industry which is a rAp1dly
ooxl:anding industry. There is a large hydro-electric power
potential and coal is in adequate supply. The basic deter-
minant of expansion is the availability of heavy electrical
machinery and other capital equipment. The aloctric power
industry is dominated in its use by industry and operates
with a high plant factor.
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S-E-C-R.-E-T
PART IV
E. METALS
With the exception of a brief period during World War II,
the metals industries of the Soviet Bloc have been expanding.
In general, this expansion has been at a relatively high rate,
declining slightly over time, as higher levels of output are
achieved. The post--war rates of expansion reflect the reactiva-
tion of war-dammed facilities.
Metals are a basic determinant of the rate of growth of the
economy as a whole. It would be possible for the economy of the
Bloc to grow even faster were it not for heavy allocations of metals
to the military and the stockpiling program. However, since metals
are only one ingredient of growth,;it cannot be said that current
metal use patterns alone are impeding the economic growth of the
Bloc.
Soviet Bloc Metal Production
8
i2LO
8
19
4
12
50
51
_
-
Raw Steel (000
000 Mt
Bloc
22,7
22.3
23.7
29.5
34,0
38.7
USSR
18.0
18.3
18,0
22,5
26.3
30.3
China
0.6
0.5
0,6
0,6 ,
0.9
Czechoplovakia
1.8
24
2.5
2.6.
2.7
219
East Germany
01.4
0.6
1..0
1,2
Hungary
0.6
0,8
0.7
0,8
0.8
0.8
Poland
1.4.
1.9
2.2
2.3
2.3
Rumania
0,3
0,3
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
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1
l
22
a
~
CoP ,r 010 znt
Bloc
237.0
261.9
284.2
296.1
USSR
103.2
161,0
230.0
260.0
275.0
285.0
China
0.5
2.3
0.5
Czechoslovakia
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
East Gerymany
6.4
9.0
9.1
11.0
Aluminum (000 mt
Bloc
58.3
86.4
206.4
215.5
23916
282.0
USSR
56.3
78.2
197.0
201.5
221.6
260.0
China
5.0
Hungary
1.5
3.2
9.4
14.0
18.0
22.0
Molyix7.onun (mt.,~.
Bloc
1230
1370
1550
USSR
780
900
1370
1.550
Chino
350
450
450
n stcn ,000 mt
Bloc
7.0
7.8
8.8
10,2
USSR
1.8
211
2,6
2.6
China
7.3
4.8
5.2
5.7
6.2
7.6
Nickel 000 m- ,
..
UssR (Boe
3.0
11.0
25.0
25,0
27.5
29.0
-Cobalt (mt)
USSR (Bloc
800.0
850.0
900.0
950,0
Tin Pl11tg-LE2.t1
Bloc
80.3
153.7
191,4
222.2
254.0
USSR
71.0
132.0
167.0
195.0
225.0
Czechoslovakia
6.8
7.6
7.9
8.2
8.6
Poland
1010
11.8
14,0
16.3
17.0
Rumania
2.5
2.3
2,5
2.7
3.4
Platinum 000 tray ounces)
USSR {Bloc
120.0
110.0
125,0
120,0
100.0
95.0
Annttimon 000 mt
Bloc
8.6
12,7
4.9
7.8
10.8
12.8
USSR.
2.8
2:$'
China
7.8
8.5
3,3
6.0
6.0
8,0
Czechoslovakia
0.8
4.2
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.0
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M2
0
i942
12LO
1951
Mercury 000 iG 2'
lash
PLc
14.3
29.4
USSR
8.7
28.0
Cn n:i
2.7
4.3
0.5
Czechoslovakia
2.9
2.6
0.8
0.8
0.9
Tin 1QPQ tj
Bloc
12.8
12.4
11.2
11.6
13.3
15.0
USSR
:1.0
1.7
6.3
7.3
8.3
9.0
China
11.8
10.7
4.9
4.3
5.0
6,0
uors ?r .1-O ) mt
Bloc
120.0
126.2
131.5
163.8
188.6
185.5
USSR
75.0
85,0
100.0
125.0
150,0
150.0
East Germany.
45.0
41.2
31.5
38.8
38.6
35.5
Zinc 000 mt
Bloc
185.0
217.4
USSR
78.0
86.1
81.0
103.0
100.0
105.0
Czechoslovakia
8.9
10,3
Poland
1.08.1
120.0
87.1
92.0
100.6
1.18.0
Lead 000 mt)
Bloc
101.8
104.3
104.0
119,1
131.6
138.9
USSR
69.0
75.0
76.4
90.1
100.0
100,0
China
2.0
2.7
0.8
6.0
Czechoslovakia
5.0
3.5
5.8
7.0
7.6
8.'?
Hungary
O.1
0.1
02
Poland
20.0
23.0
16.9
18.0
20.0
20.0
Rumania
5.7
061
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
Iron and steel, copper, and aluminum are substantial consumers
of nearly all the strategic resources of the economy. The following;
table lists these inputs and the percentage of total production
of the input consumed by metals.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Producing Industry
Quantity
Percentage
xrain (000,000 mt)
0
at (000, 000 rr_t )
0
Fa : and oils (000 mt
0
Cotton. (000 mt )
Wool (000 nit
0
Hemp (000 rn.t)
0
Electric power (000,000,000 kwh)
16.4
13,2
Coal ( 000, 000 rat )
61.5
19.8
Petroleum (000,000 mt)
3.7
8.9
Stool (000,000 mt)
4.4
17,6
Copper (000 nit )
3.6
1.2
Aluminum (000 mt)
14.0
4.6
Rail transport (000,000,000 t/km)
120,0
15.6
Motor transport (000,000,000 t/km)
1.2
3.9
Water transport (000,000,000 t/km)
37.8
Trucks (000 2.-ton units)
0
Tractors (000 15-hp units)
0
Locomotives (units)
0
Rolling stock ( 000 2-axle units)
0
Refined benzol ( 000 mt)
0
Toluol (000 mt)
0
Phenol ( 000 mt)
0
Rubber (000 mt)
0
Machine tools ( 000 units)
-
Ball and roller bearings (000,000 units)
0
Heavy motors and generators (000 kw)
52010
11,7
Coal mining machinery (units)
0
El octron tubes ( 000, 000 US,)
0.
Meechant shipbuilding (000 GRT)
0
Construction ( ) 10.6 10.6
Trade (y') 7.5 7.5
Producing industries, nee
Households-labor (000 manyeers) 1,070.0 1,2
Inventory depletions
Imports
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S-E-C-R E-T
fron and Steel Industry
The iron and steel industry may be logically divided into
three stages; (1) production and assembly of raw materials;
(2) processing of raw materials into raw steel, and (3) produc-
tion of finished steel products. The first stage embraces mining,
quarrying and collective operations to provide iron ore, coal,
limestone and scrap which are the primary raw materials of the
industry. In the second phase coal is carbonized into coke in
ovens; iron ore is reduced to pig iron in the blast furnace; and
scrap and pig iron are refined into steel in the open hearth,
Bessemer and electric furnaces. The liquid steel is cast into
molds to produce castings or ingots. In the final stage the ingots
are rolled or forged into two general classes of products; (1) semi-
finished and (2) finished. Semi-finished consists of blooms, billets,
slabs and sometimes skelp rolled on primary mills. Finshed products
include plates, strip, sheets, bars, structural shspes, pipes and
tubes, rails and tin plate all of which are made on finishing rol-
ling mills. Forgings and castings, while not rolled items, also
are classed as finished products.
After manufacture, the steel products are distributed to the
consuming industries in numerous ways
The accompanying chart presents a graphic picture of the flow
of materials in the USSR iron and steel industry and reveals the
average quantities of raw materials required to produce one hundred
tons of raw steel and the average distribution of raw steel in sub-
sequent stages of processing. 84
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP92B01090R00030002001EdNFIDENTIAL
FLOW OF MATERIALS IN USSR IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY"
IRON ORE
(50%)
137 tons
SINTER,
SCALE,
AND SCRAP
4.5 tons
mss
BLAST FURNACE PLANTS
70 tons
of iron as pig or hot metal
GAS
AND
SLAG
PIG OR HOT METAL
50 tons
OTHER
SCRAP
SOURCES
22 tons
SCRAP
55 tons
INGOTS
97 tons
H
H
SCRAP
10 tons
SCRAP
15 tons
SCRAP
8 tons
ANGANESE
ORE (40%0)
1 ton
OXIDIZING
ORE
FERRO-
ALLOYS
1.5 tons
STEEL MAKING PLANTS
100 TONS
of raw or crude steel
BLOOMING MILLS
85 tons
FINISHING MILLS
70 tons
of finished rolled products
CONSUMING
INDUSTRIES
STEEL FOUNDRIES
3 tons in
2 tons out
INGOTS,
BLOOMS,
AND BILLETS
HEAVY
FORGINGS
COKE-
CHEMICALS
5 tons
CONFIDENTIAL ~.~ .~
,I WomaAFor Release 2001 SMitf(MA"RDP92B0109OROdryy2O9ld3l7{raw steel
PIG IRON
20 tons
As mined 162 tons
Beneficiated 116 tons
SCRAP
11 tons
33 tons in
17 tons out
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S-E--C-R-E--T
Trends
The over-all growth rate for the iron and steel industry in
the Soviet Bloc has been approximately 1.0 to 14 percent per year
for the postwar years, For the period 1 July 1.952 to 1 July 1953,
raw steel production in the USSR will be 34.7 million tons nrLd for
the Soviet Bloc 43,9 million tons as compared to row steel produc-
tion, in 1938, of 18.1'and 24.0 million tons respectively.
The growth of the industry during this period has not been
continuous. During the war years a substantial portion of the
USSt iron end steel industry was destroyed and overrun. Likewise,
successive occupation by the Germans and the Bussians interrupted
Satellite steel prodscction. Following 1945, the USSR steel industry
was r. ebui'-Lt very rapidly and by 1944 the prewar 1ovels of output
had been attained. The USSR steel industry its currently expanding
at the rate of approximately 3 million metric tons per year. This
growth comes from three sources, (a) new plants are being built,
(b) existing plants are increasing their capacity for making; steel,
and (c) the USSR has, in recent years, demonstrated an ability to
use their existing plants and plant facilities more efficiently.
Stalin has stated that current plans provide for the produc-
tion Of 60 million tons of raw steel in 1.960. These ambitious
plans seer., to,be::foaasible since maintenance of the 1.947-1951 growth
rate would result in production in the USSR in 1960 of slightly loss
than the planned 60 million ton,-, while the Fifth Five Year Plan
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provides for production in 1955 of about 42.6 million tons. If
the other Soviet Bloc countries progress at the same rate, the
Soviet Bloc as a whole would have by 1960 a raw steal output of
about 75 million metric tons. At the present time the Soviet Bloc
is produciog at about one third the rata of current (1951) output
of tho United States, while 1960 planned Soviet Bloc production
will. amount to about 60% of the current (1951) output of the United
States.
The Soviet Bloc economy will have available to them nearly
44 million metric tons of raw steel between 1 July 1952 and 1 July
1953, of which 79% is produced in the USSR. This amount of raw steel
reduces to .31.6 million metric tons of finished steel. products for
the Soviet Bloc, and 25.0 million metric tons of finished steel
products for the USSR.
Soviet Bloc Stool SDi.,pply, 1952-1953
millions of Dy tric tons
Sov. ~}31~~c m
ItSSR_..,,.Ct1i a
Czech.
E. Gerrrir i
Polflnd
Supply
43.9
34.7
1.0
2.9
1.7
2.6
Production
43.9
34.7
1.0
2.9
1.7
2.6
Imports
--
---
Exports
---
Inventory
0
0
0
0
0
0
Finished Stool Pr,
31.6
25.0
0.7
2.1
1,2
1.9
The USSR steel products supply is indicated in the following
C _,b7.t:, l`Tor~ t}~ n one fourth is in the form of light sections, siv91l
billets, and bars, much of which is consumed directly in the various
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engineering industries, in the fabrication of machine paa,ts, and
in building construuction. Ingots, bloomsg heavy billets, find slabs
are customarily en intermediate sti ;o in steel processing and are
often made or forged in the plant where they are subsequently con--
vertad into some other steel product. Sheet is used in oil drums,
car bodies, packaging materials, roofing, and in small machine parts.
The distinction between plate and sheet is somewhat arbitrary;, plates,.
which are thicker than sheets, nro used in the engineering industries,
shiphu.il..&i.ng and in the manufact.zro of armored vehiclos.
The distribution of steel products by type varies in the different
countries, however, considering the relative size of the industry
in Czochoslovakia, Best Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania, this
variaati.on, is not likely to cause the distribution for the Soviet Bloc
to significantly depart from the. USSR distribution.
~~.k.~._,.._. ~._..USSTt....Steel Plant --duct
?c.~-~
000 tons
Total
100
25,000
Ingots, blooms, heavy billets and slabs
16
3,9/0
I envy rails and accessories,
8
2eg050
Plate -
9
2,430
Heavy sections
3
640
Light sections, sn.all billets, and bars
26
6,460
Hot rolled. strips
3
780
Wire rods
7
1,800
Cold rolled strip
2'..
420
Bright stool bars
1
220
Shoot
10
2,740
Tin, tonne and black prate
1
280
Tubes, pipes and fittings
6
1,550
Wire
1
200
T' i x os, wI'a.l ; and axles
3
830
Stool forgings
2
430
Steel ,,c sin
%' _....... - .-.
~~ x 480
-, 138 -
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S-E-C-R-E-T
The Soviet'Bloc's iron and steel industry consists of about
240 plants of which 160 are in the USSR. In the USSR the small
plants, 85% of the total number, produce oily about 26% of the
total output of the industry. On the other hard the nine largest
plants in the USSR produce over 47% of total output.
While trade is not quantitatively an important element in the
iron and steel industry of the Soviet Bloc, the USSR, Czechoslovakia.,
Hungary and Poland import iron ore from Sweden. The USSR imports
steel products from its European Satellites, and the USSR exports
pig iron to these Satellites.
The USSR is the largest producer of steel in the Soviet Bloc
accounting for about 79 percent of Sotidtt Bloc production, with
the European Satellites accounting for 19 percent and China 2 per,=-
cent of the remainder.
nveM or1,es
There is no inventory of iron and steel in the Soviet Bloc.
There are substantial working stocks, in the form of ores and coal.
at the first stage of production; pig iron, raw stool ingots, various
types of semi-finished steel products held in storage, and stool
products in the hands of final consumers. This pipeline supply
is substantial, probably between 25 percent and 40 percent of
annual production.
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The Pattern of Demand
The pattern of demand for steel in the Soviet bloc reflects
the rapid industrialisation of the Bloc economies and the high
priorities given to military end items, About 25 percent of all
stool products goes into the manufacture of various kinds of machi--
Iery. Nearly 14 percent is plowbd back into the iron and steel
industry, both in order to maintain the existing facilities and
for the industry's further expansion. Transportation equipment,
including roils, consumes about 25 porcent4 Construction, chiefly.
industrial housing, consumes about 17 percent, while the marnrfac-
ture of all kinds of military end items, such as naval vessels,
armored combat vehicles, tanks, and self-propelled guns, artillery
pieces and other items, uses slightly more then 10 percent of
finished steel products,
Since opportunities to substitute for stool are severely
limited (light metals in some uses, and wood in construction), the
consumption pattern of stool in terms of large groups of industries
is relatively stable over a prolonged cold wur situations It is
possible to inaroase the amount going to the military sector, but
only at the expense of failing to build as solid an industrial
base for the economy as is possible. A shift of steel to the mili-
trry soctor will be at the expense of each of the other sectors,
The hardest hit would probably be the construction sector.
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S"E-C- ,-E-T
Security Information
USSR USE PATTERP FOR STEEL
(000,000 mt)
Industr
C
Quantity
Percentage
j
onsuiw
Agriculture
Textiles
Electric power
0
Coal
0
Potroleuni
0.7
2.8
Steel
3.4
13.6
Copper
0
Aluminum
0
Rail Transport
2.1
8.4
Motor Transport
0.4
1.6
Water Transport
0
Trucks
1.2
4,8
Tractors
0.7
2.8
Locomotives
0.6
2.4
Rolling Stock
1.3
5,2
Coke-chemicals
0
Rubber
0
machine tools
0.2
.8
Ball and roller bearings
0.2
.8
Heavy motors and generators
Coal mining machinery
0.1
Electron tubes
0
Merchant shipbuilding
0.1
.4
Construction
4.2
16.8
nec
Paining
1.0
4.0
,
Machinery, net
4.8
19.2
0
Trade
5
6
Consuming industries, net
1.4
.
Households
10
4
Defense
2.6
.
Army
NOvy
Air
Inventory accretions
Exports
TOTAL OUTPUT
25.0
10060
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On balance, it appears that while steel is economized strin-
gently and its allocation is done with considerable care, a shortage
of steel will not prevent the USSR from achieving its planned goals.
However, it is clear that more stool would enable the economy of
the USSR to expand at an even faster rate. In an expanding econoriy,
;,teal is one of the critical elements which determines the rate of
expansion of industry, and its scarcity imposes a coiling on indus-
trial capacity.
The use of stool products in the Soviet Bloc is in general
similar to that of the USSR. There is probably less steel going
into the manufacture of military end items since the USSR prefers
to predorninry.te in the manfacture of large pieces of equipment,
with the Satellites frequently making components which. consume
relatively less stool, The emphLi sis in the .y ropean Satellites
upon the building of an industrial base suggests that a high pro-
portion of stool products is used in rna.chinory,equipment~ construc-
tion, and transportation equipmento
I~7ut St~rtzctux~esa
Since the iron and steel industry is a multi-stage operation,
only by breaking the industry down into its stages and determining
the inputs into each industry and the allocation of its outputs to
the next stage could a completely accurate; input structure be
determined,, The following table is an inadequate description
of the complexity of the inputs and the, technological cost structure,
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Security Information
USSR INPUT PATTERN FOR STEED
Industry Quantity
Producing
Percene
,
Grain (000,000 mt)
0
Meat (000,000 mt)
0
Fats and. oils (000 mt)
0
Cotton (000 mt)
0
7''Tool (000 mt)
0
Hemp (0Ck) tilt)
0
Electric power (000,000,000 '".'H)
9.7
7.8
Coal (000,000 pmt)
60.0
19.3
Petroleum (000,000 rat)
3.7
8.9
Steal (000"000 tat)
344
13.6
Copper (000 mt)
3.6
1.2
Aluminum (000 mt)
14
4.6
Rail transport (000,000,000 ton km)
100
13.0
Motor transport (000,000,000 ton kin)
0.6
1119
'pater transport (000,000,000 ton km)
37.8
Trucks (000 - 2 ton units)
0
Tractors (000 - 15 hp units)
0
Locomotives (units)
0
Rollin, stock (000 - 2 axle units)
0
Refined benzol (000 nit)
0
Toluol (000 mt)
0
Phenol (000 mt)
0
Rubber (000 mt)
0
Machine tools (000 units)
--
Ball and roller bearings (000,000 units)
0
Heavy motors and genera tors (000 K{'))
400
110
Coal mining machinery (units)
0
Electron tubes (000,000 US $)
0
Merchant shipbuilding (000 GRT)
0
Construction ( )
6.8
6,8
Trade (%)
14..5
4.5
Producing industries, nec
Households-labor (000 man years)
920
1.0
Inventory depletions
0
Imports
0
.. 93
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of the iron and steel industry. Iron ore, manganese ore, lime-
stone., various fluxes, coal, electric power and nicnpower are the
bec:ic current production ingredients of the iron and steel industry.
The capital inputs are many and varied, iicluding rolling mills
and rolling mill equipment, blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces,
forges, and other heavy metallurgical machinery and equipment.
Steel is the largcest single consumer of coal, a substantial
consumer of electric power and rail transportation, and is probably
the largest industrial enterprise in terms of its manpower require-
ra< nte,
nr rySto tcbient
The iron and steel industry in the Soviet Bloc, under cold
t U
4O E m T.i m
Pop -i 4H H
~9~E-+ as
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iii
L- O C- co
ao . a> co
?1-
O LO * LO
~ U) In
.0 O's w
0 O r-1
U) rl r-1
CS 10 LD
.~
0
00
r-i r?I
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Inventory
Locomotives in the Soviet Bloc have a relatively long
life. Virtually, none of the locomotives placed in service
since the Revolution have been retired as obso.ete. The
strategic inventory of locomotives is as follows;
Locomotive Park
1`2
USSR
36;000 37;500
Poland
6,050 6,100
East Germany
5;500 51500
Czechoslovakia
4,400 4;600
Hungary
1;700 1;730
Rumania
3,050 3,075
Bulgaria
720 720
Albania
Negligible
China
4,698
4,764
European Satellites
21,420
21;725
Bloc
Pattern of Demand
62,118
63,989
The demand for locomotives comes primarily from the
rail transport industry. It cannot be said that the demand
is fully satisfied? since the transport system in the Soviet
Bloc, especially the USSR, has long been neglected. However,
there is no indication that a shortage of locomotives will
seriously impair the operation of the transport network.
USSR Locomotive Use Pattern
Consuming Industry
Quantity
Percent
Rail Transport
1,700
97
Locomotives
I 50
3
Total
1,750
100
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Input P~.ttern
The input
the locomotive
most strategic
table lists the most important inputs into
industry in the USSR. Omitted are perhaps the
items since capital equipment, such as cranes,
presses, forges,
and other metal working equipment, important
to the locomotive production,
Summar?
are not listed.
Soviet Bloc production of locomotives plus their park,
is adequate to moot the needs of the Soviet rail transport
industry. Locomotives and other pieces of railroad equipment,
whilo overworked, their service life is relatively long. Con-
centration upon relatively few models enables the industry to
operate at an efficient scale of output.
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USSR INPUT PATTERN FOR LOCOMOTIVES
Produci.~I Industry Quantity Percentafe
Grain (000,0'lO mt) 0
Neat (000, 000 mt) 0
Fats and oils (000 mt) 0
Cotton (000 mt) 0
Wool (000 mt) 0
Hemp (000 m't) 0
Electric power (000,000,000 KWH) 0.1 .1
Coal (000"000 mt) 0.1 -
Petroleum (000,000 mt) -
Steel (000,000 mt) 0.6 2.4
Copper (000 mt) 4?0 1.3
Alum.1-num (000 nit) 4 1.3
Rail transport (000, 000, 000 ton km) 0
Motor transport (000,000,000 ton km) 0
Water transport (000,000,000 ton km) 0
Trucks (000 - 2 ton units) 0
Tractors (000 - :LS lip units) 0
Locomotives (units) 50 2.9
Rol-ling stock (000 - 2 axle units) 0
Refined benzo:L (000 mt) 0
Toluol (000 mt) 0
Phenol (000 mt) 0
Rubber (000 mt) 0
M.,chi.no tools (000 units) 2.4 2.5
Ball and roller bearings (000,000 units) 2.0 1.8
Heavy motors and generators (000 KW) -
Coal raining machinery (units) 0
Electron tubes (000,000 US $) 0
Merchant shipbuilding (000 GRT) 0
Construction (/) 0
Trade' (1Q) 0
Producing industr:i.os, nec
Households-labor (000 man years) 25
Inventory depletions 0
Imports 26.11
S.L-C-R-E-T
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ROLLING STOCK
The Soviet Bloc produces a limited number of typos of
rolling stock. The most important types are the sixty-ton
flat cars, the fifty-ton box and tank cars, the forty-ton
hoppers, and the forty to sixty-ton tipping gondolas. These
cars, for the most part are eight wheeled, but a few four
wheel cars are still being constructed. Passenger cars in a
limited number of models are also being constructed.
Trends
.--....ter,.
Soviet Bloc Production of Freight Cars
(units)
1.11 Rrei,7ht Cars
1937
34,000
1938
33,000
1939
32,000
1940
31,000
1941
30,000
1946
16,000
1947
25,000
1948
36,00)
1949
53,000
1951
62,000
The above figures are the actual number of units produced,,
On the basis of uniform two.axle units, the Soviet Bloc will
produce in 1952-1953, slightly more than 200,000 two-axle
units. Of these, 75 percent will be produced in the USSR,,
Hungary and East Germany are the major satellite producers.
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Inventq
As in the case of locomotives, the rolling stock in the
Soviet Bloc has a very long life. The following table indicates
the strateic inventory of rolling stock in 1952 and 1953.
Soviet Bloc Strategic Inventcry of Rolling Stock in 1952 and 1
1 July
1952
1 July 1953
,
USSR
1,396x360
1,545,633
Poland
181,000
188, 520
East Germany
121,730
122,660
Czechoslovakia
100,500
101,700
Hungary
41,790
42,294
Rumania
66,800
68,000
Bulgaria
15,550
15,500
Albania
191
191
China
82;400
83,400
All European Satellites 527,561
538,915
All Soviet Bloc
2,006,321
2,167,948
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Supply
The following table shows the supply situation in the
Soviet Bloc for 1952-1953.
Soviet Bloc Su 1- of Railroad Izolling Stock
(000 units)
Bloc
USSR
China
Eur. Snts.
Aib. Bul.
Czech.
E. G.
Ham.
Prod. Rate
(1 July 52)
201.6
152
2.5
47.1
1.3
8
5.5
8.5
Prod. Rate
(1July 53)
203.6
152
2.5
49,1
0
1.3
8
5.5
9.5
Production
202.6
152
2.5
48.1
0
1.3
8
5.5
9.0
Exports
0
0
0
26.4
0
o
5.3
2.1
7.8
Imports
0)
26.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Trade Bal.
0
26.4
0
-26.4
0
-5.3
-2.1
-7.8
Total Deomestic
Supply
202.6
178.4
2.5
21.7
0
1.3
2.7
3.4
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Pattern of Demand
Rolling stock is allocated in its entirety to the railroad
transportation industry. As in the case of locomotives, the
park constitutes an important ingredient in rolling stock
usage, By Western standards, current production is low and
the park small, however, they appear adequate to meet the
needs of the cold war economy.
Input Structure
The rolling stock industry in the Soviet Bloc is a relatively
small industry which does not consume large nuantitios of any
of the basic resources of the economy,
Inputs into USSR Rollin? Stock Industry 1252,
- 1953
Producin Industry
Electric Power (000,000,000 kwh) 0.1
Coal (000,000 mt) 0.2
Steel (000,000 mt) 1.3
Ball and Roller Bearings (000,000 units) 2.0
Producing Industries n.e.e. (%) 20,0
Labor (000 man years3 40.0
Summary
The Soviet Bloc concentrates upon a relatively small
number of models. The obsolesence and depreciation rates
in the industry are relatively low. Current production
and the park are adequate to meet the cold war demand on
the economy.
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USSR INPUT PATTERN FOR ROLLING STOCK
Produ.cing Industry Quantity Percentage
Grain (000,000 mt) 0
Meat (000,000 mt) 0
Fats and Oils (000 mt) 0
Cotton (000 mt) 0
Wool (000 mt) 0
Hemp (000 mt) 0
Electric power (000,000,000 KWH) 0.1 .1
Coal (000,000 mt) 0,2 .1.
Petroleum (000,000 mt) -
Steci (OQ0,000 mt) 1.3 5.2
Copper (000 rat) 2.0 .7
1, lum:inum (000 mt) Li. 1.3
Rail transport (000,000:,.000 ton km) 0
Motor transport (000,000,000 ton km) 0
Water transport (000,000,000 ton km) 0
Trucks (000 - 15 hp units) 0
Tractors (000 - 15 hp units) 0
Locomotives (units) 0
Rolling stock (000 - 2 axle units) 0
Refined benzol (000 mt) 0
Toluol (000 mt) 0
Phenol. (000 mt) 0
Rubber (000 mt) 0
Machine tools (000 units) 1.5 1.5
Ball and roller bearings (000,000 units) 2,0 1.8
Heavy motors and generators (000 KW) -
Coal mining machinery (units) 0
Electron tubes (000,000 US $) 0
Merchant shipbuilding (000 GRT) 0
Construction (J) 0
Trade () 0
Producing industries, nec
-
Households-Labor (000 man years) 40
Inventory depletions 0
Imports 0
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MEItCH NT SHIPBUILDIP?G
This report covers merchant shipbuilding; only. In the
USSR, this is only a small percentage of all shipbuilding,
while in the European Satellites, merchant shipbuilding
more important than naval construction.
Trends
Merchant shipbuilding is a very erratic industry over
time and in the Soviet Bloc: it has been conspicuously so.
The current expansion in the industry began in 1948.
Su ?l
The accompanying :table 'indicates the supply position of
the entire Soviet Bloc insofar as merchant shipbuilding, is
concerned. It io to be noted that the USSR is not a significant
contributor to the Soviet Bloc; the USSR produces only about
18 percent of the total. East Germany is the largest single
producer, the USSR is next, and Poland next,
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~p ~ w~. .ter ww~
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43
q
c1
0
-TST-
0
0
O
(~
n
N
0
H
00
0
?
U1
H
CO
Co
Co
E+
.-
a
Co
1
o
1
O
0
C7
0
0
0
Cb
C
00
U
{
0
O
0 00
0
OD
CD to
H
-1 -1
o
00
0
Co
CD
H
w
0
A
p
a
ei2
CO
~++
Co
.a
0 Co
w
CO tC)
I
0
0
0 0
Co
0 0
E04 0
0 Co
CO
GQ
CD
Co
OD
N
SN
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InvenUr
Little is known of the inventory, that is, the Merchant
Fleet of the European Satellites. The following table is the
for 1952-1953.
USSR Merchant Fleet
125 ?953
Maritime
3,678,000 GRT
not available
River Fleet
Self-propelled
278,000
295,000
Non self--propellor
4,010,000
4,250,000
Total River Fleet
4,2.88,000
1j,_545,000
Caspian Fleet
Cargo, passenger
& combine (over 1,000tons)
44,000
46,000
Tankers (over 1,000 tons)
303,000
310,000
Self-propelled (under
1,000 tons)
12,000
12,000
Non self-propelled
44;000
46000
Total
403,000
U-100
Fishing Fleet
371,000
390,000
Grand Total
8.000
Satellite Merchant Fleets - 1951
Combination
Freights
Tankers Misc.
Total
Poland
19,634
186,933
14,694 9,302
230,563
China
53,058
86,627
16,278 -
155,963
Bulgaria
10,338
- -
10,338
Hungary
1,022
- -
1,022
Rumania
12067
14,491
- -
26,858
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Albania
TOTAL
85,059
299,411
30,972 9,302
424,744
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Care should be taken in comparing the Satellite and
USSR data because of the difference in time period and the
apparent greater inclusiveness of the USSR data. The Sat,llite
estimates ignore various small craft included in the USSR
estimates.
Pattern of Demand
Merchant shipbuilding is alloc