UTILIZATION OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF THE SOVIET ICBM THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002600270002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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UTILIZATION OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE TO DETERMINE THE STATUS
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Other collection sources, including collateral reporting,
have failed to provide positive evidence of Soviet
failed to reveal the construction of the new launch area recently
uncovered in TALENT and also failed to reveal the extensive surface-
to-air missile site construction program now known to exist in the Urals.
ICBM deployment activity.
Despite existing TALENT coverage
on the missile test ranges
and other areas of the USSR, there has been no reliable indication of the
existence or probable configuration of Soviet operational launching
facilities. Even if further TALENT coverage of the two ranges revealed
the operational site configuration, it would in no way reduce the
requirement to determine the location and number of operational sites.
Although covert and other collateral reports on ICBM launch sites
are numerous, virtually none of these reports is sufficiently reliable
to provide the principal justification for a TALENT mission. Accordingly,
any single mission based upon currently available intelligence which has
as its objective coverage of Soviet ICBM deployment activity must antici-
pate possible negative findings in view of (a) the tenuous character of
the intelligence information on which it is based and (b) the unlikelihood
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of chance coverage of a previously unsuspected site location.',
The application of logic to the problem of Soviet ICS! site selection
introduces a variety of factors which we know the Soviets would have had
to consider, regardless of mode of deployment: i.e., range to target;
geodetic data; vulnerability, detection and security of sites; system
logistics, maintenance and communications; climate and weather. We
cannot on the basis of available intelligence determine how much weight
each of these factors would have had in influencing Soviet decisions on
site selection. Thus, in the absence of current conclusive evidence,
there appear to be no technical or logical criteria which alone can
suffice in predicting precise launching points for Soviet ICBMs.
Although we foresee little likelihood of assuring that positive
findings will result from TALENT coverage aimed at individual suspect
point targets, we believe that a systematic search program can be devised
LOA 10 TALENT covers a of a suspected ICBK launch site in the
O rlYi n area. Inclusion of this area in the mission was based upon
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construction in the area; and other fragmentary evidence relating to
military units and communications in the area. While obviously in-
conclusive, this body of evidence on a single suspect ICBM site was
unique with respect to variety and apparent reliability of sources
and consistency of information.
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which will provide a relatively high assurance of determining the status
and scope of the Soviet operational ICBM program. The key to such a
search program is the Soviet railroad network, which we believe would
play the major logistic role in any large-scale and extensive Soviet
ICBM deployment effort. Soviet reliance upon rail transport appears to
be the only factor among the multitude of considerations affecting
Soviet selection of ICBM sites which can be singled out with a high
degree of confidence, irrespective of whether fixed sites or mobile
launching units have been chosen as the basic Soviet operational
concept. It is highly probable, for example, that fixed sites would
be located relatively close to existing rail lines, and that logistic
requirements during site construction and after operational activation
would be handled primarily by rail. Similarly, in the case of,mobile
launch units, the missile system would necessarily be rail mounted,
except for a relatively large number of pre-selected launching points,
and would be maintained and logistically supported entirely by'rail.
The likelihood of Soviet dependence on rail logistics immediately
eliminates large areas of the USSR from consideration as probable de-
ployment areas warranting reconnaissance. Since we cannot infer with
confidence the intended operational range of the Soviet ICBM from the
testing program or other data, we have considered it prudent to assess
all rail-served areas of the USSR within 5,500 nm of all principal North
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American military and industrial targets as areas which the Soviets might
regard as potentially suited for ICt! deployment. The USSR would recognize,
however, that substantial advantages accrue from selecting ICBM sites as
close to the intended targets as other site selection criteria (e.g.,
geography, climate, logistics, vulnerability) permit.
The proposed TALENT search for ICBM deployment activity includes six
regions of the USSR selected on the basis of the factors which Soviet
planners would have had to take into account in reaching their decisions
on IC124 site locations. (For detailed discussion, see Annex to Tab A).
These regions are outlined on the attached map in schematic fashion to
illustrate the most likely general areas of ICBM deployment and are
designated in order of probability of selection by the USSR.* No
account has been taken of TALENT operational considerations in defining
these regions. The first five priority areas (Regions A?E) are well
served by existing rail lines. The sixth area (Region F) is composed of
major Soviet air bases on the Northern perimeter and represents the only
feasible exception to the rail support premise. Although this region
could be supplied by sea and air during the construction and operational
phases of ICBM deployment and is within close and demonstrated Soviet
ICBM range of US targets, it presents serious disadvantage as the location
of the main Soviet deployment effort because of vulnerability,; unfavorable
Regions A and B have been sub-divided into two zones each, indicating
our view of relative priorities within these broad regions.
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climate, and logistic and communications problems.
The initial phase of the TALENT search program would be directed
toward locating and identifying on the earliest possible mission the
first site or group of sites. Success in this respect would immediately
provide the basis for a more accurate appraisal than is now possible of
the status and probable intent of the Soviet ICBM program. It !, might
also lead to a substantial revision of priorities for further TALENT
coverage and would probable reduce considerably the area to be searched
before a satisfactory intelligence judgment of Soviet operational capa-
bilities could be made. If, on the other hand, the initial missions
failed to disclose ICBM deployment activity in the one or two most
likely areas, it would still be necessary to continue the search in
other areas before being. able to conclude with an acceptable degree of
assurance that no Soviet ICBM deployment program of significant
proportions was underway. Because at least several missions would
probably be required to attain the objectives of the program, it is
highly desirable to initiate and carry out the search program as rapidly
as possible.
The obvious national security implications of present US uncertainty
about Soviet strategic intentions and capabilities, as reflected in the
current divergency of opinion within the US intelligence community on the
status of the Soviet ICBM program, lends increased urgency to the collection
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of reliable evidence, even at considerable risk. Present estimates
on the date of availability to the USSR of operational ICBM sites
range from early 1959 to late 1960. In the former case, a relatively
few launching positions should already be completed and operational,
with upwards of 50 launching positions dispersed in anywhere from 10
to 25 or more different complexes in various stages of preparation.
By mid=1960, these numbers would be a great deal larger. In the case
of an operational capability estimated for late 1960, only a few
launching positions would be underway at the present time, possibly
at widely separated locations and in early stages of construction.
In either case, some activity should already be discernible through
photography. Regardless of the current status of Soviet operational
ICBM! capabilities, the proposed TAIaENT search program appears to be the
only means now available to obtain an early and accurate assessment of
the Soviet ICEM threat.
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ANNEX TO
TAB A
FACTORS AFFECTING ICBM DEPLOYMENT IN THE REGIONS
Region A: Priority I
(1) Distance to Targets: All major US military and industrial targets
would be within 5,500 nm range of Soviet ICBM bases located anywhere
within this Region. Distance to target diminishes toward the north and
about half of the US targets would be within less than 1+,500 am range
of bases located in the north along the Pechora or Vologda-Archangel
rail lines.
(2) Vulnerability to Attack. The middle and southern. portion of this
region are located deep within the USSR and would permit maximum warning
time and a defense in depth against attacking enemy weapons whose mission
was the destruction of ICBM bases. Vulnerability would increase substantial-
ly toward the north.
(3) Capability for Logistic Support: A large part of this region is
serviced by some of the most modern and extensive rail facilities in the
USSR. The southern portion of this region encompasses a sizable portion
of Soviet industry.
(4+) Available Intelligence Information. The major portion of what little
evidence exists concerning Soviet ICBM deployment has concerned portions
of this region, ire., evidence which could equate with ICBM site construction
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activity at Polyarnyy Ural and reports of activity at Ust Ukhta and
certain points along the Vologda-Archangel railway.
(5) Possibility of Detection by Other Means: The remoteness of much of
this region, coupled with stringent Soviet security measures, makes it
unlikely that ICBM sites would be detected by conventional Western
intelligence collection means.
(6) Geog aphic, Geodetic and Climate- Except for the northeastern
portion, the entire region had been covered by first-order survey as
of January 19114 The precise degree to which first-order survey has
been extended in this region is not known. However, it is known that
Soviet activity in this field has been extensive throughout the USSR,
and it is assumed that the majority of this region has probably now been
covered. The geologic and geographic features of most of the region
present no major obstacles to ICBM deployment, regardless of mode.
Weather is frequently severe in much of this region, but this is true
for most portions of the USSR which appear likely areas for ICI
deployment.
(7) Communications-. Although the northern portion of this region is
subject to intermittent radio propagation problems, particularly in the
auroral zones, land lines extend throughout the region which would probably
be adequate for most communication emergencies.
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Region R. Priority II
(1) Distance to This region is almost identical to Region A in
distance-to-target factors.
(2) Vulnerability to Attack. Much of this region is located near the
western border of the USSR and would be relatively vulnerable to both
conventional bomber and missile attack from bases in Western Europe.
(3) Capability for Logistic Support. This region has the highest density
of rail transport facilities in the USSR. Good quality air transport
facilities are also available. Logistic support for ICBM sites within
this region could be provided by a large number of industrial and service
centers.
(4) Available Intelligence Information. Aside from some tenuous
associations with the test ranges, occasional sightings of LOX carriers
singly or in groups, and a variety of low level unconfirmable reports of
"rocket bases" in portions of the region, there is no evidence on the
existence of missile bases in this region. Interpretation of available
information in an ICIBM context is made particularly difficult because of
the probable deployment of shorter range ballistic missiles in this region.
(5) Possibility of Detection by Other Means. This region, among those
considered, is probably the most suspectible to conventional Western
intelligence collection. Much of the region, however, is closed to
foreigners,, and although there is some foreign travel along many of the
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rail lines and commercial air routes, it is doubtful that detection of
IC deployment could be assured.
(6) Geographic, Geodetic and Climate: This region has been covered by
let Order Geodetic Survey. Large areas within the region, however, would
be unsuitable for the construction of launch sites due to the presence of
marshes. In addition the essential flatness of a large part of terrain
would complicate attempts to conceal ICBM deployment. Climate is probably
more favorable in this region than in the others.
(7)
Communications: Comrmunicatiorfacilities are excellent throughout
the region.
(8) Relationship to IRB4: An important factor which is pertinent to this
region and Region E is the possibility of deployment of both ICBMs and
IRAs. If the mode of deployment for both weapons were the same, with many
elements of systems equipment similar, they might be deployed together and
share certain command and support facilities. Information concerning ICBM
deployment might also be derived through the analysis of IRBM facilities.
Region C: Priority III
(1) Distance to Targets: This region, ranks with Region E as being the
least favorable from the point of view of distance.to-target. Only a
few key targets would be less than 42500 m range from bases in this
region, and the majority would require 5,000.5,500 am range.
(2) Vulnerability to Attack- This region is situated well within the
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interior of the USSR,, thus permitting maximum warning times and a
defense in depth against attacking weapons.
(3) Capability for Ice isticc Support: The region is served by modern
rail facilities. The basic shape of the rail network of the region,,
however,, would mean that logistic lines were somewhat extended and
transport would be confined to a few major arteries. There are numerous
industrial and support centers within the region
(4) Available Intelligence Information. There is no direct information
which would equate with ICEM deployment activity within this region and
there have been very few reports of such.
(5) Possibility of Detection by Other Means. The remoteness of the
region coupled with Soviet security measures would given ICBMs deployed
in the region a very low susceptibility to detection by conventional
(6) (;eographic.9 Geodetic and climate, These factors appear to present
no major obstacle to the establishment of IC 4 bases within the regions
(7) Communications.- There are good communication facilities throughout
the region.
Region Ida Priority 7
(i) Distance to T gets: Almost all major US military and industrial.
targets would be within 4,000 to 4,,500 nm of ICBMs deployed in this region.
From the standpoint of only distance=to=target, this region is the most
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favorable of those considered on the basis of rail support.
(2) Vulnerability to Attack: The entire region is highly exposed and
near a border which does not have a buffer of Soviet-dominated' territory.
Warning times would be minimum and IC4 bases would appear to be quite
vulnerable to attack by both land and sea-based aircraft and missiles.
It, with Region E, is the most vulnerable of the regions considered.
(3) Capability for Logistic Support: Rail transport in the.region is
good, but not as extensive as in the other regions considered.
(4) Available Intelligence Information: There are a variety of low
level unconfirmable reports of "rocket sites" in this region. There is,
however, no information at present from other sources suggesting unex-
plained activity is in progress in this region which might equate with
ICBK deployment.
(5) Possibility of Detection by Other Means: Although stringent
security measures are employed in the region, the visit of foreign
nationals on a regular basis to ports, and the location of the region on
an exposed border of the USSR, would increase somewhat the possibility
of detecting ICBK deployment by conventional Western intelligence
collection means, compared to other regions.
(6) Geographic, Geodetic and Climate: The region is generally favorable
from the standpoint of these factors.
(7) Communications: There are good communication facilities in the region.
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Region E: Priority V
(1) Distance to Targets: This region ranks with Region C as being the
least favorable from the point of view of distance-to-targets. Only a few
key targets on the North American continent would be less than 4.,500 nm
range from bases in this region, and the majority would require 5,000-
5,500 run, range. There is an additional factor, however, which justifies
the inclusion of this region within the study. The region is well situated
for the deployment of ICBM and IRBM sites whose mission would be to
destroy US strategic bomber and missile strike capabilities in Alaska, in
Japan, in the Ryukyu Islands, and in the central and eastern Pacific
areas.
(2) Vulnerability to Attack: This region is similar to Region D in its
vulnerability to attack. Warning times would be minimum and ICBM or IR'BM
bases would be susceptible to attack by both land and sea based aircraft
and missiles.
(3) Capability for Logistic Support: Rail transport in the region although
of good quality is the least extensive of the regions considered. As a
region, it is the most distant from probable production centers, of those
considered. The industrial base of the region has sufficient capacity to
support deployment operations.
(4) Available Intelligence Information: Aside from several low level
reports concerning deployment activities in this region there are two
areas worthy of mention: the first area concerns the locations of
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Kraskino and Slavyanka at the extreme southern part of the region.
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the second area concerns
recently sighted six LOX rail cars, surfaced roads, and military personnel
within a maximum security area at this location. The same source also
reported seeing two flat cars carrying possible missile containers on a
siding at Voroshilov. (See also para. (8) below)
(5) Possibility of Detection by Other Means: The rigid security
the location of,Ippolitovka ( 44 02 N - 132 12 E).
practices employed by the Soviets in this region coupled with infrequent
travel by westerners, sharply reduces the probability of detection by
conventional means of IC 'i or IRBM sites within the region.
(6) Geographic, Geodetic and Climate: This region from the standpoint
of these factors is well suited for the deployment of ICNIs orIRBMs.
(7) Communications: Communication facilities within the region range
from good in the larger industrial and population centers and along main
transportation routes to marginal in the more remote areas.
(8) Relationship to IREM: See Sec (1) above and Region B, Sec (8) for
discussions of this factor.
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Region F
This region constitutes what we believe to be the only feasible exception
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to the regions chosen on the basis of the factors given above.* We
believe that the only rationale for Soviet deployment of ICEM sites in
this region would be a marked limitation in the range of the present
Soviet ICBM-
* or a discussion of the factors governing the inclusion of this
region, see page 4 of text.
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