CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, COMMENTS CONCERNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP54-00337A000100070013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 26, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2001/0 (YID:`' a 7A000100070013-4
26 November 1952
5. My comments follow:
a) Delays in obtaining decisions and action are appalling.
This is probably the largest single cause of poor morale and lost
motivation in this organization. These delays I would estimate
result in no less than 10 times as much lost time as in another
comparable government
Zef To form atiop
TO : Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Director of Training
SUBJ: Central Intelligence Agency, Comments concerning
FROM:
1. On 25 August 1952 I reported to this Agency from a background
of 16 years of naval service, including 3z years of Naval Intelligence
training and experience. I believe, therefore, that I have some under-
standing of and sympathy for the special problems and difficulties of
intelligence work. I came by my own request, strongly motivated by
the mission assigned to this Agency, and enthusiastic for the opportunity
to contribute toward the fulfillment of this mission.
2. Now, after 3 months, I am leaving the Agency at my own request,
thoroughly disillusioned, and with my confidence in the Agency's ability
to perform its mission destroyed.
3. My personal problem is relatively unimportant and, in any caue1
has been solved by my leaving the Agency. Even the fate of the project
to which I was assigned, though important, would not justify this letter,
if this project were an exception to an otherwise healthy organization.
But I believe that my experience was typical enough to indicate that
something is seriously wrong with Central Intelligence Agency. In any
case, I believe that it may be of some concern to the Director that
a service officer, reporting to this Agency at his own request and with
considerable motivation, can leave the Agency in 3 months' time completely
disillusioned.
!t. My comments, from 3 months' experience within one area of this
Agency's activities, obviously cannot extend to recommending and blue-
printing a corrective program for Central Intelligence Agency. Rather
I consider that my comments may serve to show weaknesses which should be
considered in planning effective corrective action.
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comparable government organization. And such delays exist apparently
independent of the type of action or decision required, from an
operational decision to the procurement of an item of equipment or
the processing of a travel claim. And I believe that the cause
is deeper than a merely overworked or inefficient personnel.
b) Each office, division, branch, unit of any kind should have
a clearly written mission, steaming initially from the Agency's
overall mission. Each unit's mission should be part of and contribute
to that of its next superior. And each unit should have a clear
understanding of its responsibilities and authority, with goals to
conform. This is fundamental to good organization, yet appears
to be a basic weakness in this Agency. The delays in getting action
or decision, mentioned above, I believe stem largely from uncertainty
throughout the Agency as to individual missions, responsibilities,
and authorities. Nothing could be more fatal to action. Decisions
are "coordinated" and"cooperated" into oblivion when an individual
feeling of-responsibility for such decisions would undoubtedly produce
prompt results. Compartmentation, application of the "need-to-know"
security rule, aggravates this Agency weakness. For units operate
too much in a vacuum, ignorant as to where they are assuming some
other unit's responsibilities, or when and where they should request
advice, assistance, or support*
c) Contributing to the paralysis of action, and allied to
mission weakness, is evidence that the administrative complex in this
Agency is not functioning, as it should in any organization, solely
as a support for operations. Instead, administrative decisions,
reviews, failures to support.,-or delays in supporting, in effect
result in approval or disapproval of operations, The result of
out-of-line administration can only be paralysis and ineffectiveness
of operations,
d) There appears to be no standard system of correspondence
or filing within the Agency. This is so basic and primary a need
as to be a prerequisite to improvement elsewhere. A minimum
and vitally-needed goal is the capability throughout the Agency for
writing letters and memoranda and getting prompt processing in the
form of written approvals or disapprovals or other clear indications
of action taken. This obviously requires a filing system such that
full records and references are readily availablee
a) I firmly believe that this Agency could not pass a business-
like analysis of its operations, a comparison of production versus
expenditure and effort. And I believe that an intelligence organization,
like any other Government organization, should be able to pass such
a realistic business analysis. Each unit should be analyzed as
follows: What is its mission? Responsibility? Authority? Goals?
What has it accomplished accordingly, and in what amount of time,
and with what effort and expenditure?
f) There is evidence of a lack of long-range planning, so
vital to a national intelligence organization.
g) Personnel morale,
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g) Personnel morale, largely as a result of the above factors,
often drops the full scale to an unbelievable low, with resultant
loss of once-motivated personnel and conversion of the remainder
to frustrated or resigned "Workers for a living,"
6. I have tried to keep the above commentary as objective as
possible. I am fully prepared to support each of my observations from
my own limited experience in this Agency, I have no personal objective,
either for myself, or against anyone else or any group or activity within
this Agency. I have been so appalled at the evidence of the inefficiency
and ineffectiveness of this Agency that I consider the submission of
this commentary to the Director as a patriotic duty,
MTB/TR(S)/JWP:hgb
cc: Director of Training
V i fol-irntiffl
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