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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
5 ]-
27 December 1969
STATE review(s) completed.
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No. 0310/69
27 December 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Thailand-US: Thai Government leaders are keeping
alive the possibility that some Thai troops may be
withdrawn from Vietnam. (Page 1)
Communist China: Peking's campaign to streamline
local-level administrative organs is hampered by
footdragging and inefficiency. (Page 2)
Arab States: The collapse of the summit conference
probably will not result in an open break. (Page 4)
India: The recent convention of the opposition
Congress party was devoted primarily to attacks on
Prime Minister Gandhi. (Page 5)
Czechoslovakia: Moves are under way to "re-Stalinize"
the judicial system. (Page 6)
Panama: The government has reassured the business
community of its good will., (Page 7)
USSR-Peru: Moscow will extend a $30-million credit
to Peru. (Page 8)
Israel-Egypt: Air attacks (Page 9)
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Thailand-US: Thai Government leaders are
keeping alive the possibility that some Thai troops
may be withdrawn from Vietnam.
Foreign Minister Thanat announced to the press
early this week that during the recent ASEAN meeting
in Kuala Lumpur he had brought up with South Viet-
namese Foreign Minister Lam the possibility of
withdrawing troops. Thanat said that although the
two had discussed the continued need for the Thai
contingent and the timing of withdrawals, they had
made no definite plans. A few days earlier a group
of Thai legislators, with the approval of other gov-
ernment leaders, sent an open letter to Prime Minis-
ter Thanom calling for withdrawal of the Thai troops.
In raising the troop issue Bangkok apparently
had a number of purposes in mind. Both Thanat and
Deputy Prime Minister Praphat have given assurances
that their government fully appreciates the need
for Thailand to keep troops in Vietnam for the time
being and that there is no plan for withdrawal.
One government spokesman, however, has indicated
that Bangkok might soon be interested in a token
withdrawal.
In the light of Thailand's growing dissatisfac-
tion with the US on other matters, the manner in
which the Thai have raised the troop issue--direct
discussions with Saigon and in the press--may be
designed in part as a reminder to Washington of the
importance Bangkok attaches to being involved in
decision making on matters of mutual interest.
27 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Communist China: Peking's campaign to stream-
line local-level administrative organs is being
hampered by footdragging and inefficiency.
An important element in the campaign is the
transfer of large numbers of urban civil servants
to China's rural areas. According to a Peking
broadcast on 17 December, however, there have been
numerous complaints that the influx of urban cadres
is putting a heavy burden on the peasants who are
forced to house and feed them. The broadcast pleaded
that the outside cadres must be considered "assets"
and not "burdens," and it justified the transfers
as part of Mao Tse-tung's own "long-range plan" to
prevent the growth of a privileged bureaucratic
elite.
There are also signs that the program is hin-
dered by considerable apathy on the part of the
cadres. The authoritative People's Daily recently
devoted two editorials--the first on domestic topics
since March 1969--to cadre work methods and urged
that cadres should regard manual labor as a duty.
Although cadre retrenchment is not a new pro-
gram, the heavy publicity given the campaign in re-
cent weeks underscores Peking's frustrations. De-
spite Peking's active attempts to thin unwieldy bu-
reaucratic ranks since the fall of 1968, complaints
are cropping up that cadres in fact are expanding
their organizations and staffs. In defense of this,
overburdened local officials allegedly are protest-
ing that there is "too much work to do and too few
people to do it."
The regime now appears to want to avoid send-
ing too many experienced personnel to the country-
side and, perhaps with this in mind, has recently
been stressing a system of rotation. Under this
system, one third of all cadres engage in manual la-
bor in the fields, while another third participate
27 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
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in political study classes, and the other third re-
main at work in their offices. Apparently, however,
this system is often being abused, with old-line,
experienced cadres getting away with serving only a
minimal stint at manual labor. Several recent pro-
vincial broadcasts suggest that many cadres are still
being sent to labor permanently in the countryside.
They imply that many of the cadres sent down for life
should be the "representatives of the masses," i.e.,
the new cadres who emerged during the Cultural Rev-
olution. Many are probably illiterate and most are
inexperienced and have proved unsuited to office
tasks.
The whole process of cadre reform is complicated
by continued quarreling between former Red Guard fac-
tionalists who have been elevated to the cadre ranks
and veteran cadres who were often subject to Red
Guard attacks during the Cultural Revolution. Re-
peated exhortations to the old cadres by the regime
to be patient with their new counterparts in their
training and daily work suggest that considerable
antagonism still existing between these groups is
obstructing the normal functioning of various organ-
izations.
Until Peking achieves some solution to its cur-
rent cadre problems, progress in reconstructing a
viable civilian administrative apparatus at local
levels in both town and countryside is likely to be
slow. Meanwhile, the continuing retrenchment of
technical and administrative cadres has sharply un-
dermined morale and built:up a reservoir of resent-
ment, disillusionment, and insecurity.
27 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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C Arab States: The collapse of the Arab summit
conference in Rabat, despite an exacerbation of dif-
ferences between the radical and conservative Arab
regimes, probably will not result in an open break.
The conference, which closed on 23 December
without any final resolutions or communique and with
three of the radical Arab states boycotting the
final session, publicly revealed fundamental dif-
ferences. The issue which ultimately brought about
the failure of the conference was the refusal of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Algeria to re-
spond to the, call for greatly increased financial
and military support. The conference was highlighted
by bitter attacks on leaders of the conservative
Arab countries, especially King Faysal of Saudi
Arabia, for their failure to support the call for
additional funds.
Nasir, however, has apparently decided to play
down the differences which arose at the summit. He
has stated that despite these "differences and nega-
tive aspects" the conference had its positive as-
pects, and that there were differences at previous
conferences although they were not publicized. The
semi-official Cairo newspaper al-Ahram,following
the same line, states that Libya, Saudi Arabia, and
Kuwait did agree to contribute an additional $84
million for arms purchases in addition to the annual
subsidy of $228 million paid by the three countries
to Egypt and Jordan. The Arab states are also re-
ported to have agreed to pay $62.4 million to the
Palestine Liberation Organization.
The continuing financial dependence of Egypt
on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will probably preclude
Nasir from renewing open hostility between the
radical and conservative Arab regimes such as ex-
isted prior to the 1967 war.
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India: The recent three-day convention of the
opposition Congress party was devoted primarily to
scathing attacks on Prime Minister Gandhi.
Little of significance came out of the conven-
tion on domestic issues, but the government was
roundly denounced for its "pro-Soviet" foreign pol-
icy. The large number of delegates to the conven-
tion and the fact that several Indian states were
well represented show that the opposition party,
while smaller than the ruling Congress party, has
retained considerable nationwide appeal.
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Czechoslovakia: Moves are under way to "re-
Stalinize" the judicial system and to restore wide-
ranging powers to prosecutors.
The Ministry of Justice announced at a meeting
of chairmen of Czech regional courts on Monday that
it no longer feels bound by the "judiciary action
program" adopted in June 1968. It was emphasized
that this program,which contained numerous guarantees
for due process and the protection of individual
rights, had led to limited protection of state in-
terests and to a weakening of the leading role of
the party in the judiciary. It also had the effect
of circumscribing the arbitrary powers of the admin-
istrators of justice.
The same day a nationwide meeting of prosecu-
tors was held to issue instructions on implementing
repressive laws scheduled to come into effect on
1 January 1970. This "temporary" series of laws
was passed in August to strengthen the power of the
police in the wake of disturbances on the anniver-
sary of the Soviet invasion. The role of the pros-
ecutors in restoring absolute state power and in
strengthening an ideologically--rooted system of "so-
cialist legality" was stressed.
Both meetings were reported briefly by Czech-
oslovak news media. The tone of the reports, and
the absence of previous authorization from higher
authorities to take such strong measures, suggest
that the moves are primarily the work of conserva-
tives who control the security and legal apparatus.
Presumably these orthodox officials believe that
the general resolutions of the central committee on
consolidation of party control over society consti-
tute a basis for proceeding without specific author-
ization. If this view is correct, moderates in the
Husak regime who are not prepared to return to the
system inherited from Stalin may carry the issue
to higher authorities.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Panama: The government has moved quickly to
reassure the business community of its good will.
Meeting with leaders of the country's major
business organization early this week, President
Lakas announced that restrictions on travel by prom-
inent Panamanian businessmen have been lifted. In
addition, the President reportedly said that as a
civilian he was aware of the importance of private
enterprise in the national economy and wanted to
keep open the channels of communication between gov-
ernment and business.
The travel ban, which is now being blamed on a
junior National Guard officer, resulted from the
Guard's anger over a declaration issued by the busi-
ness organization only hours after the coup attempt
against General Torrijos. The declaration criti-
cized one-man rule in an obvious reference to Tor-
rijos and called for a return to civilian govern-
ment.
The President's vigorous approach to the problem
of restoring investor confidence appears designed to
stress the initiative and independence of the new ci-
vilian junta. The businessmen realize, however, that
nothing is being done without the approval of General
Torrijos, and it will take more than a single meeting
or a single action to improve business-government re-
lations.
27 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR-Peru: Moscow will soon extend a $30-
million credit to Peru to finance the purchase of
agricultural machinery for Peru's agrarian reform.
The deal, involving Russia's first credit to
Peru, was announced by Peru's foreign minister and
confirmed by the Soviet commercial attache. The
Russian told a US Embassy official, however, that
the final contract had not yet been signed and pro-
fessed not to know any specific details. The Soviet
credit offer probably involves the shorter repayment
terms typical of Soviet trade credits--ten years or
less--and not the extension of long-term aid credits.
. The purchase of Soviet agricultural machinery
might depress the immediate market for sales of some
Western equipment, if the Peruvian Government offers
to sell some of the Russian machinery to private
farmers. In other Latin American countries, how-
ever, the poor quality of Soviet machinery and lack
of service eventually led users back to traditional
US and West European suppliers.
27 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C Israel-Egypt: Israel's eight and one-half hour
air attack across the Suez Canal on Thursday was the
longest sustained air operation since the 1967 war
and destroyed SA-2
sites which the Egyptians nave been trying to re-
build after earlier air strikes. The Israelis denied
an Egyptian claim that four Israeli planes were shot
down. The entire length of the Egyptian side of the
canal has been subjected to almost daily Israeli air
strikes for the last
tion and Friday's th
on targets near the
ever, may indicate a
four mon
ree and o
southern
step-up
ths
ne-
end
in
.
hal
of
the
Thursday's
f hour air
the canal,
effort to
opera-
attack
how-
"edu-
cate"
the Egyptians.
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