CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A017200070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 28, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
28 September 1970
State Department review completed
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No. 0232/70
28 September 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
JORDAN: The "agreement" announced in Cairo is likely
to be little more than a stopgap. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Significant Communist military activity
rem~d at a low level over the weekend. (Page 5)
SOUTH VIETNAM: President Thieu has started to line
up support for his re-election. (Page 6)
COMMUNIST CHINA - BURMA: Slow thaw (Page 7)
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I JORDAN: The "agreement" announced in Cairo last
night is likely to prove to be little more than a
stopgap.
Essentially, the agreement is merely an effort
to halt the fighting while a three-man "follow-up
committee" grapples with the problems that brought
it about. The agreement calls for the "quick with-
drawal" of Jordanian forces from Amman to their
"normal bases," withdrawal of fedayeen forces from
Amman to a "place suitable for fedayeen action"--
presumably the Israeli frontier--and a return to the
status quo ante in other Jordanian towns. Civil
administration authorities apparently are to pre-
serve security--presumably an effort to return the
maintenance of law and order to the police. Nothing
is said about the subordination of the fedayeen to
Jordanian law or of any restriction on fedayeen ac-
tivity; these matters are to be dealt with by the
follow-up committee, chaired by Tunisian Prime Min-
ister Ladgham and including one Jordanian and one
representative of the fedayeen. In effect, King
Husayn and Yasir Arafat have come up with an agree-
ment to agree.
There are indications, however, that the King
may have made certain concessions. There is a ref-
erence, for example, to ending the military rule;
it is not clear that the King's newly appointed
cabinet, while partially civilian, will suffice.
While the agreement to be drawn up is to respect
the country's sovereignty, it is also to ensure con-
tinuation of fedayeen action--even at the expense of
adherence to law, if necessary. Prime Minister
Tuqan had told the US Embassy before the King's de-
parture for Cairo that any agreement made would be
identical with the one announced several days ago;
that one called for the virtual elimination of feda-
yeen presence in Jordanian cities and its restric-
tion to the frontier. It may well be that Husayn,
faced with a hostile audience of Arab leaders,
agreed to concessions which he has no intention of
implementing--even if the army were to let him. It
is also unclear whether Arafat has the power to
speak for the more radical fedayeen leaders, who
are vowing loudly to fight on to the death.
28 Sep 70
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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C The cabinet named Saturday in the ?wake of Daud's
resignation seems to represent an attempt by the
King to placate the Palestinians. Tuqan, the new
prime minister, is a Palestinian, and there are
three other Palestinians in the cabinet. Although
the cabinet is headed by three civilians, it retains
a strongly military flavor. Five of the ministers
are hold-overs from the preceding military government,
four other members are army men, and two more have
military backgrounds. The fedayeen are not likely to
be mollified by the appointment of Tuqan, who is one
of the tamer Palestinians. Most of the cabinet min-
isters are political nonentities, leaving the King
and the army clearly in charge. The fedayeen central
committee promptly denounced the new government as
no better than its predecessor.
The cease-fire seems to be holding up fairly
well in Amman, although occasional firing continues
and moderately heavy fighting is going on in a few
areas. Fedayeen broadcasts charge that the Jabal
Ashrafiyah area has come under artillery, tank, and
machine gun fire from the army. Fighting is also
continuing in the north. I
The whereabouts of the remaining six hostages.,..,,
is not entirely clear. According to press reports,
a spokesman for the Egyptian Embassy stated yesterday
that the six would be released within 48 hours. The
delay in the release, according to the spokesman,
is partially due to the travel of the hostages to
Amman from another area robably the."liberated
zone" in the north. (Map) ]
28 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Current Situation
Cambodia
s y ! aKraie E
Korn oir Tan ~'I PossibleEnemy Anti;
Chhnan Kau i
G ernment Force
ska CousoIjd~ts Pbsiti
Kompong0
Principal city (10.000 or over)
Population over 125 per sq. mi.
Communist-controlled area
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THAILAND
Prey V$n
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Rieng
Saigon
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CAMBODIA: Significant Communist military ac-
tivity remained at a low level over the weekend.
It consisted mainly of light harassing attacks and
ambushes against government positions and lines of
communication in widely scattered areas.
On the government side, Cambodian Army troops
involved in the drive toward Kompong Thom were busy
reorganizing and consolidating their positions at
Tang Kouk. There are no indications as to when the
government column will resume its advance north.
According to an unconfirmed report, the Communists
have moved six antiaircraft guns into a small vil-
lage on Route 6, less than six miles north of Tang
Kouk.
Another Cambodian river convoy was scheduled
to leave Kompong Chhnang yesterday for Kompong Thom,
bringing four 105-mm. howitzers to bolster that
city's defenses. For their part, the Communists
reportedly are telling villagers near Kompong Thom
that they will attack the city soon, once they re-
ceive reinforcements and install antiaircraft de-
fenses.
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It he increasing enemy attar s
along Route 4 have been made by Vietnamese-led Cam-
bodian Communists, and at
least six Cambodian Communist battalions could be
mustered for a campaign against strategic points
on the highway. North of Route 4, a well-armed
Communist force from the Kirirom area now based in
the village of Trapeang Roung reportedly is threat-
ening isolated government positions along the coast.
(Map)
28 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SOUTH VIETNAM: President Thieu has started
to line up support from local officials for his re-
election next year.
Thieu has said that he considers winning mass
support to be a major goal of his campaign. To this
end he recently held a series of meetings with mem-
bers of the councils of South Vietnam's 44 provinces.
Many of the councilors were impressed by his polit-
ical astuteness, and even those in opposition parties
were pleased by his promise of increased income,
status, and authority for the councils. Thieu's
opponents among the An Quang Buddhists say that the
meetings were aimed at upstaging their own plans
for a convention of political and religious leaders,
which was to press the government for more liberal
policies.
Government supporters and opponents among the
councilors disagree about how much support Thieu
won at these meetings. Two progovernment officials
say that the great majority fully supported him,
but spokesmen for his opponents assert that many
are suspicious of Thieu's rather transparent at-
tempts to gratify them and gain their backing.
28 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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COMMUNIST CHINA - BURMA: The thaw in Sino-
Burmese relations continues to be a slow process.
The Chinese accepted but failed to reciprocate
Rangoon's proposal to appoint a new ambassador
to Peking. Instead, Peking sent an envoy of
counselor rank to become charge d'affaires in
Rangoon. This represents a slight upgrading in
Chinese representation--the former charge held
the lower rank of first secretary--but almost
certainly is not what Rangoon had hoped for.
Nevertheless, Rangoon no doubt welcomes even this
small gesture from Peking as a step in the direc-
tion of a gradual improvement in relations.
28 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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