SALT II CAN IT END THE ARMS RACE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380041-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: May 21, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Article app. ApproveW21 F~r~IRy 1~ 91~b5k'Rnk-&Ai41315R000
on page 21, 27
UR3 i SALT'
An accord that's supposed to
put a ceiling on the weapons
buildup may produce
some surprising results-if
it's approved by the Senate.
The strategic-arms-limitation treaty
that the United States has just conclud-
ed with Russia promises to trigger the
fiercest ratification struggle since the
Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles
60 years ago.
Battle lines already are sharply
drawn, even before the formal signing
of the pact by President Carter and
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev at a
summit June 15-18, in Vienna.
The ratification fight will revolve
around this question: Will the new
SALT treaty help or hamper the U.S. in
countering a dangerous Soviet chal-
lenge-one that could shift the strate-
gic balance in Moscow's favor by 1985?
Dangers of rejection. The adminis-
tration contends that the arms accord
will blunt the Russian challenge while
leaving the U.S. free to proceed with
essential weapons programs. Carter
warned on May 10 that if the pact
wore rejected "we would be looked
upon as a warmonger."
Critics, on the other hand, insist that
the U.S. will be seriously handicapped
by the agreement-in fact, will be fro-
zen into a position of strategic inferior-
ity. The Senate, they insist, must rem-
edy the treaty's deficiencies with
amendments that could require fur-
ther negotiations with the Soviets.
Whatever their differences, the rival
forces agree on one thing: With or
without the new SALT treaty, the su-
perpower arms race will continue and
probably will be intensified in the de-
cade ahead.
The step-up actually has begun. The
Pentagon is proposing a 2-billion-dollar
increase in spending in the 1980 fiscal
year beginning October 1 to modern-
ize the American "triad" of strategic
forces-land-based missiles, subma-
rine-launched missiles and bombers.
Even bigger boosts are expected
over the next few years to finance a
Special Report
new fleet of aircraft to carry cruise mis-
siles and to replace the increasingly
vulnerable Minuteman force with a
new system of mobile missiles.
To quote a ranking White House offi-
cial: "SALT II does not signal an end to
the arms race. It does not mean an end
to competition between the Soviets
and the U.S. It is not a substitute for a
strong defense. But it is decidedly bet-
ter than having no treaty at all."
What, in fact, does the second Soviet-
American SALT' agreement do to regu-
late the weapons race? And why is it
generating so much controversy?
Actually the agreement, guidelines
of which were laid down by former
President Ford and Brezhnev at Vladi-
vostok on Nov. 24, 1974, consists of
three documents-the treaty, a proto-
col and a declaration of principles to
guide the next round of SALT talks.
The treaty, running to Dec. 31, 1985,
limits the strategic nuclear forces of
the two superpowers to a total' of 2,250
delivery vehicles-intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine-launched
missiles and long-range bombers.
The Soviets, with forces already sub-
stantially above the ceiling, will be
obliged to dismantle approximately
270 of their older missiles by 1982. (See
chart on page 23). U.S. strength cur-
rently is well below the ceiling.
By establishing the principle of over-
all numerical equality in strategic mis-
siles and bombers, the accord marks a
distinct departure from the SALT I
agreement signed in 1972, which rec-
ognized Soviet superiority in missiles.
Of even greater importance are the
sublimits on multiple warheads, since
these greatly increase the number of
targets that can be hit. There is a ceil-
ing of 1,320 on the total number of
missiles that may be armed with
MIRV's-multiple independently tar-
geted re-entry vehicles-and bombers
that can be equipped with clusters of
cruise missiles.
Of these, the number of missiles,
land-based and submarine-launched,
that may be MIRVed is limited to a
maximum of 1,200. No more than 820
of these missiles may be land-based.
A check on technology. The agree-
ment also limits the number of multi-
ple warheads on each missile and the
maximum number of cruise missiles on
each bomber, The aim is to establish
rough but not necessarily equal limits
on the total number of nuclear war-
heads that the two superpowers can
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z our rK e
Jackson. The treaty will per- Nunn. "We must not allow the
mit Soviets to deploy substan- Soviet Union to hold our land-
tially superior strategic force." based ICBM's at risk."
launch. While existing missiles may be
modernized to improve accuracy and
explosive power, only one new "light"
land-based missile may be introduced
by Russia and the U.S. between now
and Dec. 31, 1985. This is viewed as a
modest step to slow down the rate of
change generated by future advances
in technology.
In addition to these limits set by the
treaty, the temporary protocol bars the
deployment or flight-testing of mobile
missiles and air-to-surface ballistic mis-
siles. Also barred is the deployment of
ground-launched and sea-launched
cruise missiles with a range of more
than 375 miles. This ban runs to Dec.
31, 1981. Administration officials say
that none of these weapons could be
produced by the U.S. within the time
span covered by the protocol.
Benefits for U.S. The Carter admin-
istration maintains that this package
deal is distinctly advantageous for the
U.S. Without SALT II, Defense Secre-
tary Harold Brown says that the Rus-
sians could deploy an. additional 500
strategic weapons by 1985. Administra-
tion officials point out that the Russians
would be free to test and deploy four
new powerful missiles that they have
developed.
Brown argues that the U.S. would be
compelled to spend an additional 30
billion dollars on its strategic forces
over the next 10 years in response to a
still-greater Soviet challenge.
Critics dispute the administration's
claim that SALT establishes a principle
of equality in superpower strategic
forces. The influential British weekly
The Economist puts their argument
this way: "On the surface, the pro-
posed new treaty is neatly balanced,
but it conceals, just tinder the surface,
a large imbalance in Russia's favor."
Three factors behind this "large im-
balance" are cited. First, Russia will be
able to reach the ceiling of 820 land-
Baker. "Senate ought to con-
sider this treaty in context of
total U.S.-Soviet relationship."
Glenn. "Verification issue, will
be the critical issue when this
comes before the Senate."
based missiles with multiple warheads our capacity to monitor Soviet strategic
while the U.S. will not be able to get weapons development." Administra-
beyond 550 before 1985. Second, the tion officials disagree. They say that
Soviets are allowed to retain 308 super- the Russians might get away with mi-
missiles, capable of carrying 10 war- nor cheating, but if they attempted it
heads each, while the U.S. will have on a scale that would pose dangers for
none.. Third, all of Russia's land-based the U.S., they would be detected.
missiles can carry more than the three Some observers say the administra-
warheads fitted to America's Minute- bon's success or failure in the ratitica-
man missile. tion fight will hinge on. its ability to
As a result of these advantages, the convince the Senate on this score.
Soviets within a few years will be in a 2. Countering Soviet challenge. Crit-
position to threaten a knockout attack ics argue that the U.S. could be serious-
against this country's force of 1,054 ly hampered by SALT in its efforts to
land-based missiles. meet the Soviet threat to its Minute-
Former Secretary of State Henry man force. They fear that the protocol
Kissinger sums up the danger: "By ban against mobile missiles will be ex-
some time in the early 1980s, the Sovi- tended indefinitely. Also, questions
et Union will have the capability to have been raised about the fate of an
destroy with a reasc:nable degree of American plan to build a multiple pro-
confidence most of our land-based tective shelter system-NIPS--to con-
ICBM's. In the same period of time, we coal U.S. land-based missiles. Under
will not be able to destroy the Soviet this plan, clusters of silos would be dug
ICBM force. This creates a gap in the and a missile launcher would be shut-
design of the two forces that is bound tied around the holes in each cluster in
.to have geopolitical consequences, es- a kind of "shell game,
pecially since we are clearly inferior in During the negotiations; the Carter
forces capable of local intervention." administration informed the Soviets
Secretary Brown acknowledges the that it considered this proposal consis-
threat, but he maintains that the U.S. tent with the treaty. But the Russians
would face it with or without SALT. rejected the argument, contending
It is against this background that the that the plan would violate the verifi-
Senate battle over ratification of the cation provisions of the treaty. Critics
SALT II treaty is shaping up. The de- say it Would be dangerous for the Sen-
bate is expected to focus on five specif- ate to ratify SALT until this question is
is issues: clarified to U.S. satisfaction. Says Sena-
1. Policing the Soviets. The treaty tor Sam Nunn (D-Ga.): "We must not
provides that the U.S. and Russia will allow the Soviet Union to hold our
monitor compliance by relying on so- land-based ICBM's at risk."
called national technical means, such Some senators want an ironclad Car-
as spy satellites and electronic-monitor- ter commitment to build a mobile
ing stations. With the loss of key U.S. land-based missile system at a cost of
monitoring stations in Iran, critics 20 to 30 billion dollars. !!'
claim that it is impossible to verify So- 3. Exempting Backfire. The adminis-
viet performance. tration's decision to omit any limits on
The argument as summed up by Sen- the controversial Backfire bomber l
ator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.): "The from the treaty is bound to face a
loss of the facilities in Iran has done strong challenge, possibly supported by
irreparable harm for years to come to some military officials. President Car-
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SALT ii at a Glance
Limits on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Through 1985
If the new treaty is ratified, the U.S. and Russia each could have-
Total strate9 c vehicles
(long-range missiles and bombers) .......... .. ............... . 21250
(2,400 through 1981)
Of those-
Land-based and submarine-based missiles with MIRV's
(multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles), maximum .......... ....... 1,200
Of those-
Land-based missiles with MIRV's, maximum ........::::............... 820
(quota for Russia can include up to 308 large_)SS-18 missiles; for U.S., none)
Plus--
Bombers armed with cruise missiles ...................................... 120
(can ae increases it number
of missiles with MIRVs
is reduced correspondingly)
Further, between now and 1982-
Mobile land-based missiles: Flight testing and deployment banned.
Cruise missiles: Those launched from the ground or sea limited to 375 miles in range.
Russia's Backfire bomber: No limits, but the Soviet Union promises informally not to increase
production above current rate of about 30 a year or to deploy bomber in intercontinental strategic
role. U.S. reserves right to produce comparable plane.
Where the Strategic-Arms Race Stands
Long-Range Missiles and Bombers
Total of missiles
and bombers
Individually targeted
warheads .
Today 1985
With SALT
Payload of missiles and
bombers (million pounds) 7.2 12.0 8.3 13.6
1985
Without SALT
U.S. U.S.S.R.
15,000 11,700
SALT advocates say- Numbers show that Russia would be much further ahead
by 1985 without a SALT agreement.
But SALT critics say- Figures tell only part of the story; other provisions of the pact
will handcuff America in competing with the Soviets.
Source, U.S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dept. of Defense; American Enterprise Institute
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9,200 4,900 11,700 9,500
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20 Years of Arms Agreements
What the Record Shows
Ik sides the SAL II treaty that
hati just been concluded, the U.S.
Union have signed
and ti- ,e
1-1 other bilateral or multilateral
.unls-control agreements over the
pat 20 ,,ears. They are--
Antarctic treaty-1959. Bans all
military activities in Antarctic.
Hot-line agreement-1963. Es-
tablishes a direct communication
link between Washington and :'v'Ios-
cow for use in emergency situations.
The supplemental 1971 accord pro-
vides for a satellite communications
system.
Limited-test-ban treaty-1963.
Prohibits the tests of nuclear weap-
ons in the atmosphere, in outer
space and underwater. Two nuclear
powers, France and China, were not
among the 103 signatories.
Outer-space treaty-1967. Pro-
hibits orbiting of nuclear or other
weapons of mass destruction and in-
stallation of military bases or fortifi-
cation or testing of weapons on ce-
lestial bodies.
Nuclear-nonproliferation trea-
ty-7968. Designed to prevent
spread of nuclear weapons, the pact
commits nonnuclear states to re-
frain from developing nuclear
weapons and commits nuclear pow-
er to reduce their armaments..
Seabed treaty-1971. Bans nu-
clear or other weapons of mass de-
struction on the seabed beyond the
12-mile limit.
Nuclear-accidents pact-1971.
Provides safeguards by Russia and
U.S. against accidental detonation
or unintended launching of nuclear
weapons.
argrunent that
~1 lli~ s 1T C it' +. 4ri bomber, despite
evidence that; it can hit American tar-
gets on one-way missions.
The Soviets, in a separate statement,
promise to limit Backfire production to
30 a year and "to limit upgrading of
the capabilities of this aircraft.". The
U.S. insists that the statement is as
binding as the treaty.
4. Straining the alliance. Many Euro.
pearls are disturbed by'U.S. willingness
to accept limits-ostensibly ternpo-
rary-on ground-launched and sea-
launched cruise missiles that might be
useful for their defense. At the same
time, they point out, the administra-
tion is not insisting on comparable
curbs on Soviet weapons targeted on
Europe-the Backfire bomber and the
SS-20 missile.
The Europeans fear that Russia will
challenge as illegal any proposal for the
U.S. to share cruise-missile technology
with its allies. A number of senators
have signaled their intention to de-
mand clear-cut assurances on this issue,
even if it requires an amendment and
further negotiations with the Soviets.
5. Deterring Soviet adventurism. Re-
publicans have declared their inten-
tion to link ratification of the SALT
treaty to evidence of Soviet good; he
havior internationally-for example, in
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola and..the
Middle East. Senate Minority Leader
Howard Baker of Tennessee, a press-
dential aspirant, is taking the. lead in
pressing for such linkage, which the
administration opposes.
In the face of these challenges, what
are the prospects for ratification of the
SALT treaty? Even the most enthusias-
tic supporters concede that at the mo-
meat the odds favor treaty opponents,
who need only 34 votes in the Senate
to block acceptance, as opposed to 67
votes required for ratification.
But administration officials are conk-
dent that they can repeat the feat they
achieved when they won approval of
the Panama Canal treaties last year
against seemingly insurmountable 1.
odds. They point out that public-opin- !
ion polls indicate strong support for an
arms treaty, in contrast to overwhelm-
ing opposition to the Panama accords.
In this battle, one argument that the
administration is certain to forgo is the
claim that the SALT treaty will end the'
arms race. In fact, the final price for
ratification may he a firm commitment
to Senate fence sitters by the WVhite
House to speed up American weaponsl
programs in order to counter the Sovi
et challenge. .0.
Biological-warfare convention-
1972. Prohibits development, pro-
duction and stockpiling of bacterio-
logical and-toxin weapons, and calls
for destruction of existing stocks of
those weapons.
Agreement on prevention of
high-seas incidents-1972. Pro-
vides measures to assure safety. of
navigation of ships and planes of
U.S, and Soviet Union on or over the
high seas.
A13M treaty-1972. As subse-
quently modified, the pact limits cle-
ployment of antiballistic missiles to
one site in the U.S. and Russia.
Interim. SALT agreement-1972.
Provides ceiling for five years on to-
tal number of Soviet and American
intercontinental ballistic missiles
and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles. The agreement expired in
1977 but has been tacitly extended.
Threshold test-ban treaty-1974.
Prohibits Russia and U.S. from con-
ducting any underground nuclear-
weapon test having a yield exceed-
ing 150 kilotons. The Senate has not
ratified it, but Russia and U.S. are
observing terms of the accord.
Peaceful-nuclear-explosions
treaty--1976. Limited size of peace-
ful nuclear explosions to. under 1,50
kilotons, and provides for limited
on-site inspection. The Senate has
not ratified it.
Convention banning rnodifica-
tion of environrnent---1977. Prohib-
its military or any other hostile use
of techniques to modify the envi-
ronment. The U.S. and Soviet Union
joined 32 other nations in signing,
but Senate has not ratified it.
Hat line links Washington with AAo!~cow as result of agreement signed in 1963.
This article was written by Assistant'
Editor Joseph Fromm.
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 oil SALT
The administration is relying
on "spies in the sky" to
police the arms pact. Is that
enough to convince senators
that Russia can't cheat?
In the Senate battle that will deter-
mine the fate of the new strategic-
arms-limitation treaty with Russia,
there is one clear make-or-break issue:
Can the administration convince 67
senators that the Russians cannot en-
gage in serious cheating without being
detected by the U.S.?
That question is deemed more criti-
cal than ever in light of the loss of
America's electronic monitoring sta-
tions in Iran and the vulnerability of
similar stations in Turkey.
The administration, in seeking Sen-
ate ratification of the arms treaty, will
have to demonstrate that the job of
verifying Soviet compliance can be
clone-largely by America's highly
technical system of spy satellites.
To supply ammunition to committed
supporters of SALT in this coming bat-
tle, the White House for the first time
is lifting the lid on one of this nation's
most secret intelligence operations.
President Carter himself set the
stage for unveiling some of the facts
about the multibillion-dollar spy-satel-
lite project with a carefully worded
statement: "Photo-reconnaissance sat-
ellites have become an important stabi-
lizing factor in world affairs. In the
monitoring of arms-control agree-
ments, they make an immense contri-
bution to the security of all nations. We
shall continue to develop them."
A close look. The President did not
elaborate. But from private talks with
jQp-level -and,- Pentagon officials,
`-`~ U.S.News & World Report has put to-
gether this picture of what the latest
highly complex satellites can and can-
not do, how they are used and just. how
effective they' are.
Today the U.S. has a number of oper-
ational surveillance satellites circling
the globe, reporting on every square
mile of the Soviet Union. A variety of
types is involved, using a variety of
techniques. They look for gaps in the
cloud cover, take pictures, record radio
acrd radar transmissions and watch for
unexpected Soviet missile launches.
The standard photo satellite now in
orbit is known as Big Bird, a huge
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at~ties
a
structure compared with the "orbiting
cameras" of just a few years ago. Each
Big Bird is about 50 feet long and 10
feet in diameter, crammed full of high-
ly sophisticated photographic and com-
munications equipment. It weighs
roughly 11 tons, in contrast to the 38
pounds of early U.S. satellites.
Most spy satellites are launched into
orbit from Vandenberg Air Force Base
in California, at the rate of two or three
a year. The biggest are carried aloft by
a powerful, 59-million-dollar Titan 3D
rocket, directed southwest out over the
Pacific and fitted into a near-polar or-
bit. The big satellite circles the globe
over the poles every hour and a half as
the earth turns under it, thus covering
a different area each time around. Cir-
cling the earth at an alti-
tude of 100.miles or more,
it stays up for several
months of intensive sur-
veillance-200 days by
one report.
Exactly what the Big
Bird can do is given in
broad terms. It routinely
takes thousands of black-
and-white photos of the
entire Russian land naass.
Its complex cameras can
zoom in on anything sus-
picious and take close-up
color photos or infrared
pictures if needed.
These photos are sent
back to intelligence tech-
nicians in the U.S. in one
of two different ways.
Most are processed auto-
matically on board and
Orbiting U.S. spy satellites, from altitude of 100 miles,
can read numbers on Soviet Army truck.
"zapped" back electronically, much
like a television broadcasting station, to
U.S. receiving stations spotted strategi-
cally around the world. But when max-
imum resolution is called for, actual
photos are dropped from Big Bird in a
special re-entry packet. The packet is
caught in midair, as it floats by para-
chute through the latter part of its de-
scent, by specially equipped aircraft
based in Hawaii.
Officials who have seen photos sent
back from the big satellite say the qual-
ity of the pictures is "astounding."
Long-focal-length lenses and high-
quality film are used so that even small
details become clear when the photo-
graphs are enlarged.
What this means in practical terms is
that a trained technician can detect
objects only slightly larger than a ten-
nis ball in a photo that has been taken
100 miles up.
What about identifying military oh-
jects that are camouflaged, obscured
by clouds or buried underground?
Each. is now being done-within lirn-
its-by Big Bird's sophisticated photog-
raphy, the technicians indicate.
Avoid cover. Some key locations, in-
cluding Moscow, are rarely free of
cloud cover. So their detailed coverage
is coordinated with information re-
ceived from weather satellites to assure
the maximum use of all clear skies.
Some of the photography is "multi-
spectral," with the use of a number of
different filters, in order to penetrate
the artificial camouflage.
Still other pictures are made with
infrared cameras that sense variances
in heat given off by different objects.
Large underground missile silos, for ex-
ample, must use heat or air condition-
ing to keep equipment at a uniform
temperature, so these installations
stand out starkly on infrared film. With
this range of techniques available, the
new spy satellites are reportedly able
to identify new missile sites, detect
shifts in operational procedures sug-
gesting a change in Soviet hardware,
keep a watch on industrial facilities,
including plants for the assembly of
missiles and submarines, and observe
progress in the construction of missile
silos, launching sites and major radar
installations.
Traveling at about 18,000 miles an
hour, each satellite can photograph an
area half the size of New England in
one film clip and return the finished
product in a matter of minutes. The
system for processing this information
is fast enough to find anything suspi-
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COZ INTJl'D
 into li =~nc.a officials ssy. treaty must-and will be-"crifiable
1 )_ able to home in on all area riJ vry~2^?"~ From the (lay it is signed." V;T
mat :dclri.ly looks suspicious, the Carter's assurance Was based on it
90
iilo --ern satellites are equipped decision, rcac'hed after Turner's tcsti
\t It OF rockets that call change, many, to n ike a multimillion C!C'~ll Sir In
r9l
t :i i)a.c> hip's orbit and send it quick vestment in upgrading the 11 S. surveil
is p.irticti! bui~t, for example, surveillance , "w in their weapons tests. The U.S. will
as cz?a period of weeks or months will z va have to put what was described as a
"biorer ear" on its planes and satellites
.how new roads or railroads, then con- e .~ 4v
struction of buildings, clearing of or it will not be able to pick tip these
launching sites and digging of deep signals.
holes, All this takes time and increases Although there has-been public spec-
the. chances that the installation will elation that the U.S. would use high
eventually be spotted, no matter how flying U-2 spy planes to monitor Soviet
tests, other planes, as well as ground
good the camouflage.
A more accurate view. An even stations in a number of countries bor-
dering the Soviet Union, will also be
more sophisticated version of the ~:4 Ai
American Big Bird satellite, known as used to replace the Iran Facilities.
the MI-11, is now coming into service, Missile lifts cornmunications satellite into In addition to the photo satellites,
capable of locating precisely and moni- orbit to listen to Soviet military activities. the U.S. has other even more secret
toring military installations that are satellites that listen to Soviet communi-
hidden from normal photography. but that verification by today's satel- cations and pick up radar signals.
The great advantage of the new sat- lites should be good enough "to protect When the Russians fire test rockets
ellite is that it can send back high-qual- against the other side achieving a stra- into the Pacific, a specially equipped
ity pictures electronically in minutes, tegic advantage." As he sees- it, "One U.S. Navy ship photographs the re-en-
eliminating the delay involved in drop- undetected missile out of a thousand is try arid tapes any signals sent out by
ping a film packet from orbit. not strategic advantage." the missile. A new superpowerful radar
The effectiveness of the present gen- Paul C. Warnke, former director of. set in the Aleutians plots the charactcr-
eration of U.S. recon satellites can be the Arms Control and Disarmament istics of the Soviet missile and its indi-
seen by a sampling of their recent ac- Agency, contends that "the anticipated victual warheads.
coiriplishments. For instance, they- strategic-arms agreement is adequately During missile tests, the new treaty
o Revealed that Russia was con- verifiable" by present. satellites and on- prohibits the Soviets from sending sig-
structing a new supersubmarine and a the-ground intelligence. nab back to earth in a way that could
new miniaircraft carrier. Experts directly involved with the impede the U.S. in verifying corripli
a Knocked down reports of a new satellite system have few if any doubts. once with -the agreement. This provi-
Soviet chemical-aid-biological-warfare "There's no question," says one insider, sign does not satisfy some critics of the
center by showing that the supposed "that the photorecon satellites, in con- SALT pact.
CBW "factory" was actually a reserve junction with other forms of intelli- Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), a for-
arnis storage facility. They also dis- gence, will be fully capable of detect- mer astronaut, says he is not satisfied
proved earlier reports of a Russian ing cheating by the Soviet Union on a the treaty can be verified without the
"missile gap." scale that could prove dangerous." Iran stations. Ile suggests the treaty
a Disclosed that the Soviets were be- Administration officials also argue provide that the Russians announce
ginning to equip intercontinental- that the treaty, which bans camou- their tests in advance and then permit
range missiles with MIRV's-multiple flage, will make it easier to monitor American planes to fly over Soviet ter-
independently targeted warheads. weapons developments. What about ritory to monitor them.
The question now being raised ur- the effect of the loss of the monitoring More worries. Other critics contend
gently: Are the present U.S. spy satel- stations in Iran? that the real problem is in intorpreta-
lites good enough to detect cheating by Listening devices at those posts were tion. They worry that administration
the Russians under a SALT agreement? able to detect preparations for missile officials devoted to arms control will be.,
Ask some of the best-informed sources tests. This permitted the U.S. to posi- reluctant to blow the whistle at the
in Washington, and these are the air Lion its satellites to get the most detail first hint of cheating by the Russians.
swvers you get: on the tests. The stations also recorded Furthermore, they contend that the
Defense Secretary Harold Brown in- signals sent back by Soviet missiles dur- loss of the Iranian stations will make it
sists: "It is my judgment that our moni- ing the first few minutes of their flight. much more difficult to detect and res-
toring will be such as to provide ade- CIA Director Stansfield Turner o ;nine that first hint of cheating.
quite verification as to Soviet com- touched off a furor in early April when In the end, the fate of the new arms
pliance with the curbs on new or modi- he reportedly told a Senate committee treaty in the Senate may hinge on the
-fied intercontinental ballistic missiles." in secret testimony that it would take administration's success in refuting the
Former Central Intelligence Agency the U.S. as much as five years to re- critics and convincing the lawmakers
Director William Colby believes the place the intelligence capability it had that spy satellites can do an effective
Russians could still hide some vy:?eapons, lost in Iran. President Carter subse- job of policing the pact. D
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 SALT II Special
WWA
For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380041-5-__
AIMAL IM-Aft "MIAftu"Iels AftMoft
Uhmal flubw Un- lip
~0 on New Armes Past
MOSCOW leaders have made clear they would
Not many Russians expect a bright, be prepared to negotiate "more far-
nee~ era of closer U.S.-Soviet cooper- reaching measures" in SALT 111, in-
ation and understanding to open up chiding a further lowering of ceilings
as a result of the SALT II agreement. on intercontinental ballistic missiles
Yet Soviet leaders believe that the and long-range bombers.
pact is by far the most important de- Although some Americans worry
velopment in relations between the over changing attitudes when a new
two superpowers since detente first Soviet leadership takes over from the
began to go sour four years ago. present aging one, officials here
Officials here in the Soviet capital stress that SALT, as the official news-
welcome the treaty for these reasons: paper Pravda said recently, "is a con-
e If it helps to stabilize the strate- tinning and lasting process."
gic balance at rough equality, Mos- While the Russians talk about the
cow would avoid a costly arms race- broad, long-range advantages of the
a competition it is bound to lose in treaty, Western diplomats in Moscow
the short run because of its techno- point out that Soviet leaders view
logical inferiority. other gains as just as important.
a The pact will reinforce detente, Moscow has not, for instance, been
'
s
which will relax tensions on Russia
European flank at a time when fears
of war with China run high.
ai The risk of confrontation should
be reduced when Russia's status as a
superpower equal to the U.S. formal-
ly is recognized once and for all.
While Soviet leaders show quiet
satisfaction over the agreement,
many are turning their attention to
the next difficult step-approval by
the U.S. Senate.
Moscow is now engaged actively in
the selling of SALT to the Senate-
for example, by allowing a big in-
crease in Jewish emigration and by
swapping jailed dissidents for Soviet
spies in the U.S.
"Awkward situation." Efforts by
the Senate to modify the treaty seem
certain to be poorly received here.
The Soviets probably would insist on
renegotiating the entire agreement,
but this time in an atmosphere of
heightened suspicion of U.S. motives.
Says a senior American official in
Moscow: "Even minor changes will
make them very angry and create a
highly awkward situation."
Judging by the past, the outlook in
that event would not be reassuring.
Congress modified the 1972 Soviet-
American trade pact in 1974 to link
the arrangements to Soviet accep-
tance of individual freedoms and the
right of Soviet dissidents to emigrate.
But Moscow renounced the agree-
ment in early 1975, charging that the
changes violated the spirit and letter
of the document.
That is one side of the coin. The
other: If SALT II is ratified, Soviet
Agency estimated last January that
Moscow was spending the ruble
equivalent of 146 billion dollars a
year on defense, and predicted that
this amount would continue to rise 3
to 4 percent a year during the first
half of the 1.980x.
An all-out arms race, considered
inevitable without a SALT 11 pact,
would have upped arms spending an-
other 3 to 5 percent a year. The
Kremlin wanted to avoid this to pro-
tect its already ailing economy.
The concessions the Soviet Union
made to get the pact testify to how
badly it was wanted.
The Russian leaders agreed to
scrap several hundred missile
launchers in order to establish a ceil-
ing of equal numbers on both sides.
They also agreed to restrict the num-
ber of warheads permitted on each
missile, and pledged to refrain from
deploying their existing SS-16 mobile
missiles until the end of 1981, at
President Brezhnev is chief architect of Soviet policy favoring SALT agreement with
U.S. But he commands full support of Kremlin leadership.
forced to accept any linkage be-
tween SALT and its future behavior
in parts of the world where the U.S.
may have vital interests.
The Russians also were not re-
quired to commit themselves to
work with America in reducing Mid-
dle East tens ons. And nothing in the
agreement ssggests that there will
be any real slowdown in Soviet pro-
duction of conventional arms or their
continuing use in areas of unrest in
black Africa and Asia.
Because the weapons covered by
SALT II account for only about 10
percent of the Soviet defense bud-
get, experts see no chance that the
treaty will bring heavy cuts in mili-
tary spending.
The U.S. Central Intelligence
least. Further, Moscow dropped de-
mands to explicitly bar the U.S. from
transferring cruise-missile technol-
ogy to its allies and from testing long-
range ground-based cruise missiles.
Some observers have suggested.that
these concessions were producing di-
visions inside the Politburo.
This view is not generally accepted
by Western experts here. They credit
President Brezhnev for pushing
SALT, but they note that other Sovi-
et leaders fully backed the concept,
As a senior Western diplomat puts it:
"SALT makes sense for the entire
Soviet Union, not just Brezhnev."
Robin Knight, chief of the rnaga-
zine's bureaus in Moscow. .filed this
dispatch.
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