CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A022600020002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 18, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
C 26
18 August 1972
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18 August 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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MOROCCO: The death of strongman Oufkir.adds to.
ten and instability. (Page 3)
UN-DISARMAMENT.:; Soviet call for world conference
lI ely to have third world support. (Page 4)
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MOROCCO: Loyal forces have restored order, but
the Bath of Morocco's military strongman, Major Gen-
eral Mohamed Oufkir, will increase the tension and in-
stability caused by the attempt on King Hassan's life.
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Oufkir directed loyal forces in the initial
counterattack, but 25X1
he took his own life several hours later,
reportedly out of remorse for having failed to pre-
vent this latest attack on the King. So far, in-
dependent sources have been unable to confirm that
Oufkir did commit suicide, and his death has in-
spired speculation concerning hi sible complicity
in the attempted assassination. 25X1
Moroccan officials re-
ceive a con ession from Lieutenant Colonel Amekrane,
a principal rebel officer seized in Gibraltar, im-
plicating Oufkir in the assassination plot. Oufkir
may have shot himself when he realized the coup had
failed and his fellow conspirators had been captured.
'Amekrane's alleged confession also introduces the
possibility that loyal officials executed Oufkir dur-
ing the roundup of suspected rebels.)
Whatever-Oufkir's role, his death and the air
force attack on the King will have serious repercus-
sions in the military establishment, which has never
fully recovered from the army uprising in July 1971.
Major General Driss Ben Aomar has been named acting
defense minister. He is a loyal and respected army
officer, but he lacks Oufkir's drive and formidable
reputation. The 55-year-old Driss Ben Aomar has se-
rious health problems and is probably not capable
of carrying through forcefully with Oufkir's massive
military reorganization.
The assassination attempt is another demonstra-
tion of the continuing discontent with King Hassan.
As was the case in the July 1971 coup attempt, most
of the rebel officers are Berbers, who resent the pre-
dominantly Arabized political and social elite in Mo-
rocco. There is also deep-seated dislike among many
educated Moroccans for the King, his sumptuous life
style, and his autocratic rule. Hassan's position de-
pends almost entirely on the support of the military
and security forces, and the future of the monarch is
now more than ever in jeopardy. 25X1
18 Aug 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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UN-DISARMAMENT: A Soviet initiative at the
fort coi oming Genera Assembly for a World Disarmament
Conference (WDC) may benefit from renewed third
world pressure.
The deputy director of the UN Disarmament Divi-
sion recently expressed the view that unless the US
or China strongly opposes the Soviet proposal the
momentum which began at last year's General Assembly
cannot be stopped. He predicted that third world
leaders would help in formulating a proposal accept-
able to the Chinese and that the assembly will at
least establish a preparatory body for a WDC.
The Chinese, while hoping to maintain enough
flexibility to avoid appearing the primary opponent
of a WDC, have not changed their opposition to par-
ticipation in disarmament talks. Chinese officials
have told Pakistani representatives in Peking and
Geneva that a WDC could be profitable only if items
China considers basic to the political situation--
such as a pledge of non-first--use of nuclear weapons
and security assurances to non-nuclear states--are
given priority.. The Chinese threw cold water on the
whole idea of a conference by remarking that the po-
litical environment is not suitable at this time for
disarmament negotiations of any sort since political
problems and the basic relationships between the ma-
jor powers must be defined and settled as a prereq-
uisite to any meaningful disarmament talks. The Chi-
nese undoubtedly realize that such conditions are un-
likely to be met by the major powers. Peking is de-
termined to develop its nuclear strength. Moreover,
Soviet sponsorship of a WDC would be enough to en-
sure Chinese opposition. -
Meanwhile, an Italian representative in New York
has said that his government will endorse the Soviet
proposal for a WDC because Italian views on this
topic are similar to the Soviet Union's.
18 Aug 72
Central Inte igence Bulletin
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