CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A025300130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Central Intelligence Bulletin
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State Department review completed
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Top Secret
Top Secret
c204
2 October 1973
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
FRANCE: Paris moving toward more flexible nuclear
strategy. (Page 1)
GREECE: President Papadopoulos takes further step
i mn plementing promised political changes. (Page 3)
ITALY: Labor takes moderate stance on wages, pending
government's performance on inflation. (Page 4)
ABU DHABI - OMAN: Abu Dhabi aids Oman in counter-
insurgency. Page 5)
BURMA: Army appears ready to contest Communist in-
roads in eastern Shan State. (Page 6)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 7)
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FRANCE: France may be developing a more flexi-
ble nuclear strategy that would be more in harmony
with that of NATO.
According to a high-level French Foreign minis-
try official, Paris realizes that in the event of a
Soviet attack against NATO, the French may wish to
respond without the use of strategic weapons against
the USSR. During the initial stages of a European
conflict, the French might consider a demonstration
use of strategic nuclear weapons or the use of tac-
tical nuclear weapons to indicate Paris' determina-
tion to move up the ladder of nuclear escalation.
The French official went on to say, however, that
France would not associate itself officially with
NATO's strategy of flexible response.
Although the official indicated that the de-
velopment of tactical nuclear weapons has required
France to consider a more flexible strategy to ac-
commodate these weapons, he did not elaborate on the
actual strategy. This may be a reflection of offi-
cial French policy. Former defense minister Michel
Debra" expressed little interest in formulating a
rigorous doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear
weapons. In the French view, the lack of a highly
defined policy serves the dual purpose of enhancing
the credibility of the deterrent by not publicly
formulating a specific outline for its use, allowing
military planners some latitude in selecting the
weapons to fit specific situations.
With the adoption of a policy of flexible nu-
clear response, French strategic thinking is evolving
toward a doctrine more consistent with that of the
US and NATO. Nevertheless, France is expected to
continue on a separate--although not necessarily
divergent--course for the foreseeable future. The
French will continue to insist on maintaining absolute
control over their nuclear forces and will resist
political-military agreements with NATO that in any
way hamper their freedom.
(continued)
2 Oct 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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GREECE: The designation of Spyros Markezinis
as prime minister, which is to be followed within a
week by the installation of an all-civilian cabinet,
marks a further stage in the consolidation of Presi-
dent Papadopoulos' power. It could bring him new
problems, but a smooth transition would be a major
triumph.
Ever since the military coup in 1967, there have
been dissenters within the junta to Papadopoulos'
rule. Some have resented his self-aggrandizement,
while others allegedly have had basic differences
with his policies. This opposition persists and was
demonstrated publicly last week when Deputy Prime
Minister Makarezos--one of the top three junta lead-
ers--resigned, stating that he agreed with the
Markezinis "solution"--a political cabinet--but had
basic policy differences with the President. Other
opponents, the so-called superrevolutionaries, also
continue to voice, publicly and privately, their
dissatisfaction with having to leave the government
in the hands of Papadopoulos, who they fear may move
away from the goals of the revolution.
Papadopoulos so far has succeeded in outmaneuver-
ing his opponents. Since proclaiming himself presi-
dent of the new republic last June, he has implemented
the first stages of his controlled democracy; the
plebiscite in July confirmed the republic and his
presidency, and a constitutional court was formed in
September to oversee the development of political
life. The removal from the cabinet of men with mili-
tary backgrounds is intended as the next major step
toward democratic "normalcy," which Papadopoulos has
promised.
The Markezinis appointment thus marks another
crucial testing point for Papadopoulos, and contains
the seeds of greater problems in the future. The
military officers who fear and oppose a civilian gov-
ernment are grumbling again, and some are suspected
of plotting against the President. As Markezinis, a
career politician, moves eventually to demand real
power and more scope for liberalization, the counter-
vailing pressures from Pa ado oulos' displaced military
colleagues will increase.
2 Oct 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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ITALY: The fragile peace between organized
labor and Prime Minister Rumor's center-left coali-
tion will be tested in the coming weeks as labor
evaluates Rumor's performance in slowing down Italy's
rampant inflation. The autumn round of contract
talks has already begun, with the leadership of the
major unions adopting a relatively moderate stand
in the opening phase.
Rumor demonstrated his recognition of labor's
importance by consulting with union leaders last
summer while taking emergency steps against infla-
tion. The traditionally militant unions gave Rumor
a breathing spell by taking a "wait-and-see" attitude
toward his new government. The powerful Communist
Party has encouraged moderation, and labor has so
far refrained from extreme demands. Across-the-
board pay increases and large-scale strike activity
at this time would disrupt industrial production
and cut short the recent economic upturn.
The Communists' intervention with labor on be-
half of Rumor is an outgrowth of what the party
leadership calls its "different" kind of opposition.
By not automatically opposing all government efforts,
the Communists are out to make two points. They
want to emphasize that the center-left government,
although still inadequate, is an improvement over
Giulio Andreotti's right-leaning coalition. More
important, they want to prove that the country's
problems cannot be solved without Communist partic-
ipation.
Recent high-level labor meetings suggest that
the unions may adhere to this moderate line in the
negotiations. However, pressure from the rank-and-
file will increase if the government's anti-inflation
efforts falter. A recent spate of strikes in a seg-
ment of the auto industry demonstrated the imperfect
control exercised by the trade union leadership and
underlined worker fears over the effects of infla-
tion.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Iraq IL
Al Basrah?
Abu Dhabi Troops to Northern Oman
Abadan
Kuwait
*Kuwait
Judclahy' Mecca
'Port
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Sudan
Qatar
*Ad Dawhah
Abu Dhabi
United
Ethiopia
*Aden
SOCOTRA
(Yemen-Aden)
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MILES
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Saudi-Iraqi
Neutral Zone
Riyadh*
Yemen
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*San aLL
Yemen
(Aden)
/'A Buraymi *Muscat
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ABU DHABI - OMAN: Three companies of the Abu
Dhabi Defense Force will take up garrison duties in
northern Oman in the near future. The Abu Dhabi con-
tingent will relieve Oman units for service against
the rebels in Dhofar Province.
This is the first significant military coopera-
tion between Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Sultan
Qabus of Oman,
(About 200
Iranians have been operating w tn ie Sultan's forces
in Dhofar since early 1973, and some Jordanians are
serving in training and advisory roles.
Oman's army of about 7,500 has been stretched
thin by the protracted guerrilla war being waged in
Dhofar by the leftist - Popular 'F'ront for the Libera-
tion of Oman and the Arab Gulf with the support of
Yemen (Aden). The war probably will heat up in
coming weeks with the end of the monsoon along
Dhofar's coastal plain.
2 Oct 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Kachin
State
Sagaing
Ar of '
munist
surgency_
Shan Stag
sourH
~rtiaM
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BURMA: For the first time, the Burmese Army ap-
pears ready to challenge the territorial inroads made
by the Burmese Communists in the eastern Shan State.
A newly reinforced 5,000-man government force is
being mobilized to move against a rebel force of about
equal size that has been massing in the Kengtung area.
The initial objective of the campaign is to secure
Route 4, the economic lifeline of the eastern Shan
State, from further insurgent ambushes. Its interdic-
tion would be viewed as a major psychological setback
in Rangoon and as an economic disaster in Kengtung.
Senior army officers in Rangoon have been frus-
trated over their inability to block the growth of
the Burmese Communist movement (BCP), which is sup-
plied and directed in part by the Chinese. Until
now the army command has ruled out major ground opera-
tions in the remote border area because extreme dis-
tances from supply depots, rugged terrain, and a
hostile population put the government at a strong
disadvantage in fighting the well-armed and -supplied
insurgents. The generals also have not been anxious
to mount large-scale operations near the China border
for fear of provoking Peking.
While this operation does not mean that Rangoon
has thrown caution to the wind--the army sees it pri-
marily as a defensive move--it does underline how
seriously Rangoon takes the Communist threat. Al-
though Rangoon's political writ is only nominal in
large areas of the eastern Shan State, the army be-
lieves that if the BCP can establish a major strong-
hold in the Kengtung area it will be in a much stronger
position to threaten important lowland population cen-
ters in the eastern Shan State.
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France: The fourth French supersonic Mirage
IV bomber to crash in less than a year went down on
27 September, apparently because of a mechanical
failure. The Mirage IV, which first entered serv-
ice almost ten years ago, is France's only strategic
bomber, and after years of accident-free flying, may
now be suffering maintenance and aging problems.
Finland-EC: President Kekkonen has announced
that he will decide Wednesday whether Finland will
sign its long-pending free trade agreement with the
European Communities. The Finnish Communist Party,
which led the opposition to the agreement, has been
isolated domestically; probably only last-minute
Soviet objections could dissuade Kekkonen from sign-
ing the agreement.
*These items were prepared by CIA without consulta-
tion with the Departments of State and Defense.
2 Oct 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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