INDICATIONS AND WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000600150007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 8, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
g NOV 1515
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Albert C. Hall
Assistant Secretary (Intelligence)
Department of Defense
SUBJECT Indications and Warning of Soviet
Attack in Europe
REFERENCES A. Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
.dated 9 October 1975
B. NIE 11-14-75: "Warsaw Pact Forces
Opposite NATO," Issued on 4 September
1975
1. Your 9 October memorandum expresses a continuing
concern, which I certainly share, regarding the intelligence
problem of spotting indications and providing timely
warning of any Soviet attack in Europe. As you know, this
problem has been and is the focus of continuing efforts on
the part of various components of the Intelligence Community.
2. This was a problem to which those who worked on
the recently issued. NIE 11-14-75 devoted considerable
attention. Indeed, one of that Estimate`s principal judg-
ments (stated on its page 4) is that:
"The Soviet military evidently believes that
Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's.
They also believe that Pact theater forces
now in Central Europe are not only capable of
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containing a NATO attack in the early days
of a conflict, but are also capable of con-
ducting a non-nuclear offensive into West
Germany."
As you will recall from the discussion at the USIB meeting
at which NIE 11-14-75 was considered, this judgment was
reviewed in some detail by the USIB principals. The only
reservation expressed was that of the Director of the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of
State, who took a footnote; as I read it, however, his
footnote was. prompted by his estimate of the conservative
nature of the Soviet leadership and not by any reservation
over the accuracy of the Community's depiction of Soviet
capabilities. The thoughts behind the judgment of those
present capabilities, and the rationale supporting it, are
elaborated in paragraphs 82-91 of the Estimate proper.
3. There are several other items mentioned in your
memorandum which I believe require some clarification and
which I would like to discuss before turning to your actual.
recommendations:
a. The memorandum speaks of a "growing agree-
ment that the Soviets are stressing the
development of capabilities for attack
without significant prior reinforcement of
the GSFG." As noted above, the Community's
judgment -- as reflected in the recently
issued NIE -- is that the Soviets have
already developed such capabilities and,
hence, that Soviet actions are keyed more
to enhancing these capabilities than to
creating them.
b. Your memorandum argues that "additional
data and analysis are needed in the
development of a broadly based Intelligence
Community position on the details of a
Soviet/Warsaw Pact capability to initiate
an unreinforced attack against NATO." It
seems to me, that the National Intelligence
Estimate in which the USIB has concurred is
itself a "broadly based Intelligence Community
position." As for the details, I believe
they are available in the agencies which
participated in the NIE, and that further
community review of this degree of detail
would be of questionable value. If DOD
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elements would need additional data, it
would seem that they can readily be pro-
vided by those parts of the Defense
Intelligence Projections for Planning
(DIPP) which have Community endorsement,
plus the material covered in the US-only
version of MC 161/76, which is now in an
early stage of development.
c. Your 9 October memorandum speaks of a
perceived need for "full documentation of
the evidential base for such [Soviet] plans
and capabilities." The documentation, in
large measure, is already available, though
circulating it to a wide audience creates
serious problems. As you know, much of the
most significant evidence used is derived
from extremely sensitive sources which
have to be protected. Consequently, this
actual evidence has received and must con-
tinue to receive only limited and controlled
distribution.
d. The judgments the Community has made with
respect to Warsaw Pact force capabilities
for launching an offensive without addi-
tional prior reinforcement from the Soviet
Union have been the subject of considerable
USIB discussion, during which the principals
concerned have had ample opportunity to
express their disagreements and to criticize
or question the evidence supporting these
judgments. The meetings of the USIB repre-
sentatives, who developed the draft of NIE
11-14-75 which the USIB itself considered,
were very free-swinging and provided ample
opportunity for vigorous debate among
knowledgeable experts from throughout the
Community. I would submit, therefore,
that those judgments which were embodied
in the final Estimate have already been
thoroughly and objectively critiqued both
by the USIB itself and by analysts at the
working level representing their own views
and those of their respective USIB principals
I, therefore, wonder what purpose would truly
be served by having others take yet another
look at this assessment.
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4. Your 9 October memorandum suggests that a further
study of this material, focused on its indications and warn-
ing implications, should be undertaken by the Strategic
Warning Staff. Certainly the indications and warning impli-
cations of the Warsaw Pact capabilities are of major concern
to the Staff. Because, however, the detailed study you pro-
pose reaches into so many parts of the Community and the
principal focus of its effort would seem to deal more with
estimative problems rather than those of .warning, I would
think it better to keep this in the National Intelligence
Estimate context.
5. The development of net assessments is a task to
which the Intelligence Community can and should make an
input, though comprehensive net assessments -- strictly
defined -- require the inclusion of data about US plans and
capabilities which are beyond the US Intelligence Community's
purview. NIE 11-14 covers Warsaw Pact capabilities in con-
siderable detail but is not, and does not pretend to be, a
full-blown net assessment. Actually, the data on NATO allies,
so vital to a comprehensive net assessment (no matter who
does it) are less than satisfactory. This is a problem well
known to all of us in the Intelligence Community, a problem"
specifically addressed in Question 29 of the 1975 set of
Key Intelligence Questions and, again, as KIQ 32 in the
FY 19.76 series.
6. None of this is to say, of course, that further
work on this important subject is unnecessary. On-the
contrary, I share your sense of the need for further work
and am already encouraging my associates to undertake it.
It seems to me that the National lligence Officer for
Conventional Forces is in the best position
to stimulate and gui e the necessary Community-wide staff
work on this critical subject.
7. I have already asked to be pre-
pared to discuss this matter furt er with you or with any
members of your own staff to whom you may care to assign
this problem.
W. E. Colby
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SUBJECT: Indications and b9arning of Soviet
Attack in F~urope
Distribution:
Copy 1 - The Hon. Albert C. Ha11
2 - DCI
3 - DDCI
4 - ER
5 - D/DCI/IC
6 - IC Staff
7 -
8 - D/DCI/NIO
9 - NIO/CF Subject File
10 - NIO/CF DCI File
11 - NIO/CF Chrono
12 - NIO/RI
NIO/CF:DEB:jmj/
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~~ ~ ~~~~'
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1lttached i>~ a copy of the letter from Dr. Hall
on ''Indica.tioo,s and ~V'arning of Soviet .Attack i~
Europe, "which was mentioned at yesterday's
pre-I}'SYI~ in eo~axunction with the Slhl'S cl.iaec~sgior~ S
I have been aclvie~ed that has
ds~aft~d and coordinated a response which will be
forwarded to you shortly for signature.
FOL.[a hdEitiF= TO fdsY'JRId TO SENDER
FF3UM: NAME. ADQPt#SS ANO Pi-10t1s No.
[,`ATE