NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027900010004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 2, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
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State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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July 2, lY/5
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 2, 1975
LEBANON: Karami and Arafat agree
to enforce cease-fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ISRAEL: Moderates pressure Rabin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
TURKEY: Ecevit strongly criticized
Demirel at a party rally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CSCE: West continues to resist
Soviet demands for summit in July . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGENTINA: Peron wins significant
victory in conflict with labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
PANAMA: Government more apprehensive
over treaty prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
INDIA: Gandhi outlines new
economic programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
NORTH KOREA -CHINA: Invasion
plans disclaimed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
BURMA: Government operation against
communist insurgents successful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 2, 1975
Prime Minister Rashid Karami and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman
Yasir Arafat agreed last night to enforce an immediate cease-fire in Lebanon. All
major Lebanese and Palestinian political leaders had endorsed a cease-fire after the
new government was formally installed early in the afternoon, but their action was
widely disregarded, and heavy fighting continued in most areas of Beirut.
The agreement between Karami and Arafat was announced after the two met
with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam, senior Lebanese army officers, and fedayeen
leaders to discuss relations between Lebanon and the Palestinians. The agreement
provides that the security forces will:
--move into all areas of the city;
--arrest snipers and kidnapers;
--exercise restraint "even when fired upon;"
--clear the streets of barricades and arms.
Public acceptance of this agreement by Arafat and by the Syrians suggests that
the main Palestinian units will stay on the sidelines as the security services attempt
to stamp out the continuing heavy fighting by radical leftists, small fedayeen groups,
and Christians. If the large fedayeen groups were to abandon this policy of
neutrality and come to the aid of the radicals, civil war would be certain.
The fighting Monday night was very heavy; the US embassy estimates that as
many as 100 persons may have been killed. There is no evidence that the violence
has taken an anti-American tone, although on June 30 a bomb did explode in the
building in which the US embassy's marine security guards live. The continued
intense firing probably is part of a last-ditch effort by Lebanese leftists and fedayeen
radicals to draw the Lebanese army into the fray. George Habbash, the
Libyan-supported head of the Marxist-oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, reportedly is leading this attempt. The attempt could succeed.
According to press reports from Beirut, Karami and President Franjiyah may be
considering a further political agreement to be implemented in case the cease-fire
does not take hold. The agreement would both:
--replace the current commander of the army, as desired by Karami and his
Muslim supporters;
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 2, 1975
--engage the army in efforts to restore order, a move that right-wing Christians
have long advocated.
Actively backed by Arafat and the Syrians, Karami is in a stronger position
than most of his predecessors to overcome Muslim opposition to such moves. He can
claim that, because he is defense minister as well as prime minister, he will be able to
protect the Muslim and Palestinian communities against possible army excesses.
Karami's assumption of the defense portfolio is unusual. In recent years that
post has not been given to-Sunni Muslims, but has been reserved for members of the
Christian or Druze communities. Karami apparently demanded the portfolio in
return for allowing former president Camille Shamun, a non-Phalangist Christian, to
become interior minister. The interior minister, who is responsible for internal
security and Lebanese-Palestinian relations, is ordinarily a powerful figure in
Lebanon. Given Karami's close ties to the fedayeen, however, Shamun may find
himself upstaged.
Leaders of the Phalanges and Progressive Socialist parties, which have been left
out of the cabinet, have so far offered no public comment on the new government.
Press reports indicate, however, that Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil has promised
Shamun that his followers will respect the cease-fire. Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt
signaled his displeasure with the new cabinet by departing Beirut for Cairo just
before the new government was announced.
The new cabinet is likely to remain at its present size for two or three months,
at most. The only cabinet formed without the Phalangists and the Socialists in
recent years-that of June 1972-lasted less than a month.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 2, 1975
Moderate members of Prime Minister Rabin's ruling coalition are urging him to
consider making further concessions to Egypt in order to preserve Israel's close
relationship with the US. One of the country's most respected commentators wrote
yesterday that sources close to Rabin claim he is facing stronger pressure for
concessions from within his coalition than from Washington.
The moderates' drive is spearheaded by the leftist Mapam Party, supported by
the small Independent Liberal Party, and some leading members of Rabin's Labor
Party. The latter reportedly include Foreign Minister Allon and Yitzhak Navon,
chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and a member of
the Labor Party's conservative Rafi faction headed by Defense Minister Peres and his
predecessor Moshe Dayan.
Navon told reporters, after a briefing of his committee by Rabin on the
negotiations two days ago, that in his opinion Israel's security is more dependent on
close ties to the US than on a "single mountaintop or one single place." Israel, he
pointedly remarked, won wars in 1948, 1956, and 1967 without having possessed
the Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai and was unable to prevent a war in 1973 when
it did. Navon seemed to be echoing a major argument used by the moderates to
buttress their case.
Some press reports suggest that Israeli advocates of greater flexibility are
arguing that Tel Aviv should be guided by what it can get from the US-not
Egypt-in return for giving up the passes completely. Specific objectives being
discussed include:
--a two-year US economic aid commitment to Israel worth $2 billion;
--military aid to meet the major part of Israel's requests over the next two
years;
-a public announcement by the US administration to Congress that the US
would support Tel Aviv's reaction to any Egyptian violation of the agreement.
Before making his next move, Rabin probably wants to get a better reading of
just how far Washington and Cairo are prepared to go to meet Israeli demands in
order to prevent another breakdown of the negotiations. An article two days ago,
for instance, by a commentator close to Peres suggests that conservatives in the
cabinet are arguing that there may be an element of bluff in the US position which
could be smoked out by Tel Aviv's demand for further "clarifications" of the
Egyptian position. The commentator claims Tel Aviv thinks Washington and Cairo
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 2, 1975
are extremely anxious to make progress before Secretary Kissinger meets Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko later this month, and before Egypt celebrates its
Revolution Day on July 23 and the UN mandate in the Sinai expires on July 24.
As might be expected, the rightist Likud bloc has come out strongly in support
of Israel retaining the eastern ends of the passes and has urged Rabin to stand firm.
The Likud has also a national unity government.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 2, 1975
Turkish opposition leader Bulent Ecevit used a party rally in Istanbul last
Saturday to launch his most blistering attack so far on the government of Prime
Minister Demirel.
Speaking before a crowd of 50,000, Ecevit accused the Nationalist Front
government of trying to destroy Turkish democracy at home and of bowing to US
pressures on Cyprus and on the arms embargo. He said the government could expect
no cooperation from the opposition as long as it exploited sectarian differences and
other domestic difficulties.
Ecevit charged that Demirel had failed to:
--Exploit Turkey's strategic geographic importance to force an end to the arms
embargo. He had instead "bluffed and threatened" and taken no really decisive
action.
--Outline the kind of solution he envisages for Cyprus, and as a result Turkey
was isolated in the international community. Turkey should aim for the
establishment of an independent "nonaligned" Cyprus, free of both Turkish
and Greek armed forces.
--Articulate Turkish rights in the Aegean, leaving Turkey vulnerable to Greek
demands.
Ecevit has now clearly thrown down the gauntlet to Demirel on the key issues
of Cyprus, the Aegean, and the arms embargo. The truce between the government
and the opposition on these issues, which had become increasingly uneasy, has now
ended. Both sides have their eyes on senatorial elections this fall and possibly early
general elections.
Ecevit's charges and the angry responses they have engendered from the
government promise to throw more heat than light on the national debate on these
vital issues. The increasingly partisan debate will also limit Demirel's flexibility in
reacting to US moves on the arms embargo and other issues. He cannot afford to
appear less determined than Ecevit in defending Turkey's interests.
Meanwhile, the violence between opposing student groups and political parties,
which has plagued Turkey of late, was absent at Ecevit's rally, largely because of
increased security measures.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 2, 1975
Western negotiators in Geneva yesterday put off a response to Soviet demands
that the European Security Conference be ended in July with a summit meeting in
Helsinki; the West and the neutrals are insisting that agreement be reached first on
military-related confidence-building measures and follow-up procedures for the
conference. Even if agreement can be reached on the major issues, the summit could
still founder on the special demands of smaller states like Malta, Romania, and
Yugoslavia.
The Soviets, while admitting that a summit on July 22, as recently proposed by
General Secretary Brezhnev, is no longer feasible, have launched a drive to commit
the West to hold such a meeting before the end of July. The Finns, hosts for the
prospective summit, reportedly have begun preparations for a four-day meeting
beginning on July 28.
Negotiations have been proceeding at a faster pace, with sessions being held
even on a weekend. Tentative agreement has been reached on several
confidence-building measures-how much advance notice on military maneuvers and
the numbers of troops involved, as well as the voluntary nature of these
commitments. The West is hoping that Moscow will make another concession on the
areas covered by this agreement. The West Germans yesterday for the first time
indicated they could not agree to a date until the final version of the text relating to
all confidence-building measures and to principles among states was agreed upon.
One obstacle to agreement is the Turkish demand for a clause requiring them to
provide advance notice only for all military maneuvers on their northern and
western boundaries. No one has supported this demand; the Greeks, too, have
demanded similar treatment.
Substantial progress was made earlier this week on meetings to follow up the
conference. Most delegates appear willing to support a solution along the lines of a
recent Swedish proposal that senior officials meet-beginning in 1977-to assess how
the conference's decisions have been implemented and to ensure the continuity of
the multilateral process. This provision would keep alive the possibility of convening
another conference.
Negotiations in other areas are proceeding. Accord was reached Monday on
guidelines to the freer movement of ideas and people between East and West. The
major powers reached agreement on a clause protecting Allied rights in Germany and
Berlin. Several smaller states still object to this clause, but are not expected to cause
serious problems.
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July 2, 1975
Moscow appears willing to go along with a Western request for a disclaimer that
the results of the conference are politically, but not legally, binding. Delegates meet
again today to try for agreement on remaining issues. And the Soviets will probably
renew their demands to set a date in July for the Helsinki summit.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 2, 1975
President Peron has won a significant, although probably short-lived, victory in
her continuing conflict with labor. The labor leaders pledged to respect the
President's authority, temporarily denying the leaders of the Peronist labor
confederation the ability to carry out their threat to send their followers into the
streets for a final showdown.
The President's unexpectedly strong position has caught the labor leaders off
guard. They had apparently assumed that the government would yield easily, but the
administration's persuasive economic rationale for overturning recently negotiated
massive pay hikes has considerably lessened their ability to act.
At the direction of chief presidential adviser Lopez Rega, the government
sought first to undermine the authority of the labor leaders and now seeks to divide
the whole labor movement. The administration opposed last week's wage hikes only
after many, but by no means all, of the important unions had secured new wage
contracts. The government thus set union against union and demonstrated once
again to the workers their leaders' inability to deliver.
Against this setting, the Peron administration has come forth with a proposal to
increase wages by 80 percent, in installments. This will probably appeal to those
workers not yet under contract, but it is angering those who have obtained
increases of 100 percent or more. The President has also announced a doubling of
certain benefits that apply primarily to workers at the lowest end of the wage scale.
Both the President and Economy Minister Rodrigo, a protege of Lopez Rega,
have made tough, well thought out speeches cataloguing the nation's many
economic ills, pointing out that austerity is in order and that this
administration-the constitutional heir to the magical Peron legacy-is uniquely
qualified to deliver it. The stress on legitimacy is designed to discourage military
intervention; indeed, most officers are known to favor the maintenance of
constitutional rule if at all possible.
In a related move, Lopez Rega has taken another step toward building greater
control over the nation's security apparatus. Last week, the government created a
new post within the Interior Ministry-that of undersecretary for domestic
security-and filled it with a former federal police official. The new official will
coordinate all government anti-subversive efforts. The appointment came before the
current crisis and could have been designed to give the government an alternative
means of dealing with potential labor violence, given the military's unwillingness to
intervene against workers and on the side of Lopez Rega.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 2, 1975
If the government wins its contest with labor, the main victor will be Lopez
Rega; his mastery of the political situation will then be virtually complete. A
fragmented, leaderless labor movement could prove more dangerous in the long run,
however, than tively disciplined, force that now exists.
The Panamanian government has become more apprehensive over prospects for
an early conclusion of a new Panama Canal treaty. In late June the US House of
Representatives voted to deny funds for treaty negotiations-Senate action is still
pending. This situation has heightened Panamanian fears of US Congressional
negativism toward the conclusion of a new treaty.
The Panamanians have taken prompt action to dampen the repercussions in
their country. The government-controlled press has published an official statement
by Panamanian national leader General Omar Torrijos, reiterating his faith in the
good intentions of the US negotiators and his belief that Washington would honor
its commitment to conclude a new agreement. National Guard officials closely
monitored activist student groups in the expectation that they would seize the issue
and carry out demonstrations against the US and possibly their own government.
The National Guard reacted quickly and effectively on Monday in dealing with
leftist student marches on the US embassy and the Panamanian Foreign Ministry.
This move demonstrated the Guard's ability to control such incidents and highlights
the government's apparent desire to contain the situation and maintain an
environment favorable to negotiations. Even so, opposition elements will continue
their efforts to exploit any opportunity that would undermine prospects for a new
treaty or discredit the General. As a result of these pressures and Torrijo's own
desire to move ahead with the treaty talks, further signals to the US that some
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 2, 1975
Prime Minister Gandhi promised something for everyone Tuesday night when
she outlined new economic programs-relief for the poor, strong steps against the
wealthy, and austerity and hard work for all.
Gandhi focused on relief efforts, hoping no doubt to buy political support. She
promised:
--more action against inflation, including credit controls and curbs on
government spending;
--vigorous implementation of land reform laws;
--abolition of indentured agricultural labor;
--liquidation of farmers' indebtedness to moneylenders;
--provision of better quality cloth at controlled prices;
--more grain at controlled prices.
Mrs. Gandhi did not say these programs aimed at subsidizing consumption
would mesh with government efforts to limit spending. Her plans to increase
production are not impressive. They involve plans to expand irrigation and supplies
of electrical power and to simplify investment licensing procedures as a sop to
private industry.
Gandhi's economic policies are typically long on political considerations and
short on wherewithal to accelerate the slow-growing Indian economy. Increased
agricultural production is the key to Indian growth, but the Prime Minister offered
no new programs aimed at increasing food supplies. Indeed, if she were vigorously to
pursue land reform and an end to grain hoarding, she might reduce agricultural
production.
India was generally calm yesterday, but trouble is brewing for Gandhi in
southern India, particularly in the state of Tamil Nadu, which is ruled by an
opposition party. The chief minister, a states' rights advocate and foe of the Prime
Minister, refuses to enforce press censorship or to arrest protesters. In neighboring
Kerala State, the leading opposition party, the Marxist Communists, is openly
critical of Gandhi's emergency moves.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 2, 1975
Mrs. Gandhi, meanwhile, in a speech Tuesday to Ruling Congress Party
members of parliament, continued to justify the state of emergency on the grounds
that underground organizations are planning widespread sabotage in the country.
Her remarks presaged a new ordinance providing the government with even more
latitude for arresting and jailing dissenters.
Yesterday, Gandhi affirmed India's interest in improving relations with the US
and said she hoped President Ford would visit India this year.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 2, 1975
The North Koreans and Chinese are continuing to profess that Pyongyang has
no intention of using force to reunify the country. In speeches and commentary
marking the 25th anniversary of the Korean war last week, various North Korean
spokesmen said flatly that talk about northern invasion plans was "ridiculous." In
addition, Foreign Minister Ho Tam recently acknowledged to Australia's Foreign
Minister Willesee in Pyongyang that reunification was not an early prospect and that
a new Korean war was not likely.
Willesee was given the same message in Peking. Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao
Kuan-hua played down Kim ll-song's visit to Peking in April by claiming that it had
been planned months in advance and only fortuitously coincided with the collapse
of Indochina. Chiao expressed confidence that North Korea would not attack the
South. Chinese officials in Europe, at the UN, and elsewhere have emphasized that,
although reunification of Korea is a matter for the Korean people to decide, Peking
urged a moderate course during Kim's recent visit. Moreover, Chinese propaganda
has continued to stress "peaceful" reunification, a line Peking has highlighted since
the Kim visit.
North Korean propaganda continues to play some militant themes, but with
less prominence since Kim's foreign trip last month. The statement first introduced
by Kim I I-song in Peking-that the North would not stand idly by in the event of an
uprising in South Korea-still appears, as do warnings that the North will meet any
aggression from the US and Seoul with vigorous revolutionary war. But Pyongyang
almost certainly recognizes that Kim's threatening tone at the outset of his visit to
Peking backfired, insofar as it encouraged a closing of ranks in South
Korea-quieting President Pak's political opposition-and prompted strong
expressions of support for Seoul by high US officials. The current stress on peaceful
intentions is probably also aimed at increasing diplomatic support for North Korea
at the Lima conference of nonaligned countries and at the UN this fall.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Government forces claim
to have killed some 120
communist insurgents during
an operation in northern Shan
State last week. The
government admits that 32 of
its own soldiers died in the
fighting.
The operation was
against communist forces that
had crossed the Salween River
and were attempting to
establish a foothold west of
their normal operating area.
The government success
follows victories earlier this
year over communist units to
the southeast, near Kengtung.
Burmese officials
July 2, 1975
apparently were encouraged 25X1
by the lack of response from tf
D
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e
ng to the
suffered by the Burmese communists.1
oug the Burmese army currently holds the u er hand, it
acs the ca pa i i to wipe out the communists completely. 25X1
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