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13 February 1969
Morning Meeting of 13 February 1969
Godfrey noted that, if there is a repeat of last year's Tet offen-
sive, it will take place between now and 17 February, with the likeli-
hood that any major offensive action will be undertaken over next
weekend.
D/ONE reported that no problems were encountered in coordinating
NIE 11-1 1-69, Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities,
and SNIE 93-69, Brazil. He reported that SNIE 20-69, Security Condi-
tions in Western Europe During President Nixon's Visit, will be ready
for telephonic coordination tomorrow and that the only potential security
problem envisioned at the moment is in Berlin.
Carver reported that his office is set for twenty-four-hour opera-
tions to meet the Tet offensive contingency.
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Bross related that General Maxwell Taylor was briefed yesterday
on Biafra/Nigeria and raised questions regarding the adequacy of our
intelligence effort in Biafra.
The Director noted receipt of an NSC study memorandum calling
for a SecDef review of South Vietnamese internal security capabilities.
He noted Agency requirements for input to the study and agreed with
Carver's suggestion that SAVA be the primary focal point for input.
Carver noted that he will rely heavily on DD/P-provided data.
The Director commented that he saw ACDA's Gerald Smith, who
greatly appreciated the DD/S&T briefing.
The Director asked the DD/I to assemble appropriate publications
for a possible visit to the LBJ ranch this weekend.
The Director summarized yesterday's JCS briefing on strategic
targeting. DD/S&T suggested that he provide the Director with some
of his Strategic Panel's thinking on this matter.
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Goodwin called attention to the 13 February Wall Street Journal
article speculating on Cuban/U. S. diplomatic ties.
Goodwin reported an inquiry from Tom Lambert of the Los
Angeles Times on tomorrow's briefing of the student editors.
*Extracted and sent to action officer
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Approved Release 2005/12124: CIA-RDP80R 4AO01800080068-6
13 FE319&9 W
& -The arrangement worked out by the Swiss
& Uncle SciU embassy in Havana this week under which'
Fidel
Cuba will allow at least some hijacked Ameri-
Some See Possibility can planes to return immediately with their
a, passengers to the U.S. Until now, passengers
jetliners have been
arrivin
in Cuba on U
S
g
.
.
U.S., ' Cuba May Restore detained overnight and sent back on chartered,
propeller-driven planes; the Cubans have been-,
Diplomatic, Trade 'Vies 'sf that loaded jets oru takes.. off
safely from the Havana airport's tamed q
-Numerous hints by Cuban government of-
ficials to visiting reporters that Cuba might be '
vVashington, Havana, Moscow willing,. under the right conditions, to seek a
rapprochement with the U.S.
Gingerly Broach Subject; -A public statement by the head of the Or.'.
ganization of American States, Equadoria.n;
No Quick Action Expected Galo Plaza, suggesting that Cuba might be wel-
coined back into the OAS, from which it was
expelled in 1962. President Eduardo Fret of
The Role of the Hijackings Chile made a similar statement recently. Chile,
like every hemispheric nation except Canada
and Mexico, has broken diplomatic, relations
HAVANA-The stage is suddenly and quiet. with Cuba.
ly being set here for a possible effort to re. "Nothing; Is Foolish"
store diplomatic and trade relations between These signs, tentative though they are, rep.,
the U.S. and Cuba. ' resent a dramatic switch from the pessimistic-
The initiative is coming partly from the So- outlook that prevailed as recently as last Au.
Viet Union, whose influence and prestige here gust, when Premier Castro told an audience:'
have turned upward recently and upon whom "The revolutionary government has at no time
the Cubans depend for their economic survival. 1 shown the slightest interest in bettering its re-
'Joining the Russians in the diplomatic maneu-lations with the imperialist government of the,
i vering are some key Latin American leaders. United States. . . . We are not interested in
The sharp increase in airplane hijackings to economic relations, and we are even less inter-
Cuba has put pressure on the U.S. Government 'ested in diplomatic relations of any kind."
This article ' was written by staff re-
porter Herbert G. Lawson and special
correspondent Sidney T. Wise.
.'expect any improvement in U.S.-Cuban rela?,
tions, the source replies that "nothing is foolish'
in international relations." Other government
to seek discussions with Premier Fidel Castro. of whether the Nixon Administration is ready
Some U.S. officials believe hijacking would end for a new Cuba policy.
if Cuba agreed to return at least some hijack- One -State Department source characterizes
ers to the U.S. to face criminal charges. this recent activity as "intriguing straws in the
The attitudes of both Washington and Ha- wind. But he adds that "nothing well-formed
Nana are still far from clear, though there have . has appeared yet." A Western diplomat in
been recent signs that a breakthrough is possi-Cuba says "it is too early".for any real change,
ble. Diplomatic sources here and elsewhere in the hemisphere's policy of isolating Cuba, al-
stress that present efforts are only the first, though he, too, is intrigued, by the many trial'
tentative steps on what would be a long road-,balloons going up.
toward any renewal of U.S.-Cuban trade and; But some U.S. officials deeply'involved in
.diplomatic contact. But, after a decade of bit-:'U.S. policy toward Cuba remain skeptical that:
terness stemming from expropriation of Amer any improvement.in relations is likely.- ? ;
lean-owned properties, a U.S. trade embargo, Cuban officials stress two conditions. to be.
the Cuban missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs in-. met before any dialog with the U.S. can begin: ;
vasion, the new peace feelers are viewed here An end to the Vietnam war and 'an indication''
'
with high interest. that the U.S. Navy will withdraw from Cuban
Some Recent Developments soil at Guantanamo.,
Among the recent tangible moves: The U.S. also has publicized two conditions:'
--A secret message from the Soviet Union An end to Castro's often-proclaimed effort to,
~i'estern nation that might mediate any- foment revolution in the rest of Latin America'
t
o a
U.S.-Cuban settlement, noting that the Rus?. and an end to the Soviet military presence in'
mediating country "could do tq normalize rela- ' There's no certainty that. either the U.S. or,
tions between Cuba and the U.S." Cuba is willing to meet the other's conditions.
-The temperate tone of Fidel Castro's 10th; But diplomats note that if the Paris pe;~.ce talks ?
d are successful in "disengaging" the U.S. from
i
k
hi
h
2
J
n mar
e
c
,
an.
, w
anniversary speech
..:
the
contrast to previous speeches, avoided heavy! Vietnam war the source of Culna's most
e?
ld be
f th
S
U
. wou
r
{
e
.
criticism of the U.S. and dwelt on internal' persistent criticism o
Cuban affairs rather than on exporting commu?;the moved. second Other U.S. conditionofficiais say up tho' base atmeeting!
C
' , giving ?:
i
h
re
H
than o
Cub
sp
e
.
em
n
throughout the
-.Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield's Guantanamo, would be more of a diplomatic
They say the base fs
roblem
militar
th
n a
.
y p
,
a
comment earlier this month that U.S. diplo-i.
maUc relations with Cuba are "a possibility" (u^efc 1 but not essential'to U.S. military opera-'!
SIR VLCW 4L 11111, uta:u LV -'"" k"aro uyu..nu,gai i Cuba tacitly maybe meeting the two U.S.
followed by State Department testimony to a;
conditions,' observers say. Soviet niilitary_m,en
house committee that Cuba views the hijack-;
logs n r. "r. serious problem" and doean't', con-
done them..
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aren't significant eviaenee in Cuba now, for w'fiicA`ICir. av u~c i e Wti
intelligence sourc s. report. One U.S. ' analyst parts in the U.S. He so blocked by the U.S.,
says, "I don't think we're going to see (Soviet) from such sources of international. credit as the
missiles going in there again." World Bank.
Premier Castro's enthusiasm for exporting Cuba's desire for easier credit and access to
guerrilla anions to. neighboring countries the U.S. market, along with Russia's desire to.
dimmed considerably after the capture and ex- avoid open conflict over Cuba, ultimately may,
ecution of Che Guevara in Bolivia in,1967, some outweigh Premier Castro's desire to keep the
sources assert. These intelligence analysts embargo for its propaganda value, Cuban. ob- ,
view the Cuban expedition to Bolivia as a dis- servers say. ,
aster for Mr. Castro because It exposed a seri- Castro Today
ous lack of planning and support from Havana, Whatever happens, it's a good bet that Fidel
,dissension between Cuba and the -Bolivian Castro will continue to play the quixotic, sin- :
Communist Party and a lack of spontaneous gle-handed role in shaping events that he'has 11
support from the Bolivian peasantry. assigned himself. It's a role he has played
A top Western diplomat, taking note of all since leading his guerrilla band from the
-these facts, remarks: "it is possible that Cas- mountains 10 years ago to overthrow the Ba-?
tro, either voluntarily, through Soviet pressure tista government. Today, at 41, the husky, six-
or because he has no alternative, may see hope foot-two-inch bearded leader is slightly heavier
in offering internal remedies to his people in- around the waist, wears contact lenses and has
? stead of exporting revolution." developed into a studious economist, and agron-'
President Nixon has refrained from any omist.
major Cuban policy statement during his cam- He still dresses in olive-green army fa-
pat,= and since taking office. Many U.S. advis- tigues. Instead of'a sumptuous premier's suite,-,
ers oppose any relaxation of the tough 'U.S. he uses modest offices. He.is almost constantly:
stance. "Fidel is beyond the pale and has to on the move throughout Cuba. He dodges inter
go," says one. But even if Mr. Nixon saw some views with non-Communist newsmen, and even:
gain for the U.S. in friendlier relations with to his close. associates he often is unpredicta-
Mr. Castro, much stilt depends on the mer- ble.''We don't know-what his schedule Is from
curial personality of the Cuban leader. one day'to the next," remarks a' government
There's some question whether, despite worker.
Russian pressure for an easing of tension, Pre- Some Cuba-watchers In, the U.S. claim to:
mier Castro wants the U.S. to lift its trade em- see a major change in the premier's personal
bargo. The embargo, more than eight years ity in recent years. "Assassination concerns
,'old, has become one of Mr. Castro's most use- him greatly and extraordinary. security sur
;-ful tools in rallying the country behind him. rounds his movements," says one. "There's
"We love the State Department," jokes a every reason to think Fidel is -becoming iso-;
propaganda official here. "Please tell Washing- lated, physically and mentally, within his re
ton not to lift the economic blockade." An offi- gime." , -
cial of a West European embassy here .adds, That characterization appears overdrawn to
"The embargo is the cement that holds to- those who observe the premier here.' They say
gether a political system under increasingly he retains much of his old -impetuousness said,
heavy pressure." still mingles-with the people, dedicating major.
A Blockade, Not an Embargo projects with lengthy speeches and playing vol=
Mr. Castro himself said in his Jan: 2 speech, leyball or Ping-Pong with friends. One thing Is
'?_"The blockade makes us want to laugh." undisputed: Premier Castro commands nearly-
Though severe consumer shortages are no absolute power within the government:-
they are. eas- Fidel The Maverick
atter now to Cubans
hi
l
,
ng m
aug
ler to accept when they are blamed on the U.S. His maverick nature is.still evident, too, in:
for
ialist cam
t
f th
'S
p
oc
e
o
embargo (which Cubans prefer to call a his. chiding of the res
"blockade" with its connotation of a military not adopting.his vision of the Marxist state, He
encirclement of the island). The premier con- insulted President Tito in a speech last August,
etantly Instills a feeling of heroism among Cu- calling him "an agent of imperialism." The
bans by picturing them' as a tiny band of pa- Yugoslav president merely lodged a mild pro-,
ainst a bullying Yankee test with the Cuban embassy in Belgrade:
a
di
g
ng up
trims stan
colossus of 200 million people just 90. miles. As for the Pussians, despite unusual praise
t
t
ro repea
-
away. last month for Soviet aid, Mr.. Cas
The propaganda use of the embargo is seen edly displays his differences 'with them over
in cardboard posters that fill otherwise empty such issues as "creeping capitalism". in East-
glass merchandise cases in-a department store ern Europe. In his view, the '"vulgar use of?ma-
. here. They tell a disappointed shopper that he terial incentives" such, as extra pay to' highly
must not forget "the enemy exists." If a car skilled technicians is corrupting. communism
breaks down for lack of repair parts or if there.
there's no medicine in the pharmacy, Cubans The Red Chinese have. fallen Into almost
tend to see their misfortune as caused by the total disgrace here. Premier Castro's differ-,
embargo. - ences with the. Maoist ? line, .coupled with
The fact Is, Western analysts assert, short- China's failure several years ago to deliver
ages exist here not because of the U.S. em- promised rice shipments, have led to bitter ar-
bargo but because of the way Premier Castro gument. Che Guevara's death also deprived the
is managing the economy. He has declared on Chinese of their best ally here. The result is.
numerous occasions that Cuba must sacrifice that the Chinese embassy here has been re-,
consumer goods so that it can pay for its heavy duced to a handful of men led by a charge
investment to modernize agriculture. d'affaires. Its former staff of over 100 was
The embargo is blithely ignored not only by headed by an ambassador.
the Socialist camp but also by some of the cl,x- But Cuba's biggest diplomatic problem may
west European na= turn out, to be. how to handle the Russians,
,,,__ _f th
TT a *^n
e
y
oug
Cu a
d
f
..
s
Lions snip a variety o
goo
the exports are limited by a shortage of hard Soviets deeply resent Premier Castro's criti-.
currency here. Among Cuba's active trading clam of Russian - monetary incentives and;
, "The suggestion that'
C b ' to fan scheme
a a u
.
p ,
partners are anti-CommunL?it Spain as well ns u
Canada Britain, aly and France. anyone Is going. to get to the promised land.
iklRI QVA%4r lease 1200M 2a4 :aQH?1-ft[9faE0180#8*A064 "Mftuft-
posed problems for Cuba. There Is much Amer- sigma," he. says. ; ;; ;:?. ? ..