REPORT ON THE INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (P I) BY TRUONG CHINH (DANG XUAN KHU)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008600170008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 26, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION. T1401, -13.S. 0 0:11Y
CENTRAL .INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. 25X1
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Indochina
till SUBJECT Report -.A1 the Indochinese Canon-List Party (P I)
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by Tion g Chinh (Bang ua.Khu)
1?0110.
7FE
DO NOT CIRCULATE
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
MI II. OF ENCLS.
41.isito snow
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
26 Sept. 1951
16
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DOCUESVIT comma IIITCEF4ATIOR AFFEATIlso Thz HATIORAL DEMISE
OF TEE minim STATES SOTHIS TUE 5EA5IN9 OF TEG ESTIONASTS ACT SO
U. L C. as 1181 SS, AS Aritopep ITS 75A1199414610a OII TIll SEVELETION
OF ITS COWTSETS ll ANT IllAnnun TO Alt anaelflOR1211E1 PERSON .1P POO-
FAMED TIT ME ILEPRoDUCTIOR OF ?pia FOER IS PS4111E14E0_
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
The following is a translation of the to7.7t of a paper prepared by Truong
Chinh (Bang Xuan Ithu), key :3.'1.f:two in the Indochineve Coimunist Party (PC:),
on the policy and politics of t:Le PCI. Although easentially an overt
report on PCI strateu, it is believed of definite significance in viow
of the open ad-iss-1.on of the v rious strategies used by the kCI in its
march to full ccIrtr.1 of the rebel nat. onalist regime in Vietnam and the
- complete tie between the and Soviet foreign policy snce the foroation
of the PCI.
P,..:4-01a A:3D 1!7, A IIAT Cl! pl.TICS oI'
IS
(By Courade Trueng Chinh)
Jy is it noce,:.:sary to study the policy of the partyri%)
Document No,
ln Class.
leiv1Mcd
II.
Sii;nifioance of the quest Ion.
a4. Ci;langed To:
TS
III.
GO - to deteralne the 411.rectL.m of party policy.
Adh.: HR 10;2
IV.
The path;: of party policy sil:ce the found:'..ng of the
party.
V.
Col-taus-Ion.
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I hy is it nocosnary to study the policy of the party?
That does policy mean? Policy mans many ideas and plans 1ich the
party advocates touards a deterA.ned question, or it can include the
applicatlon of such ideas to direct the party to77ards the .eal of the
revolution5
b) It is necessa. y to st:dy the policy or t-e party 1ieause the party
tneober who does not 12-sLot7 the ol cy of the party can -et th:Jroughly
? follow the correct path.
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STATE NAVY Xi NSRB
DISTMBUTION
ARMY MR::FBI 1
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By:
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lal.C;;7(77; AaT7cy
x.d.rin,co of
it is riot (2110,1i:fa ,3tody j the prof.ont policy of the
4.iAtr. partly 1..ocy 1oci6:nini1 in ord....r ?caln Croo
porioncera; aid the Lixesont 7acts In ardor 'to acq, iffider prtht cir??
ce:::stanaw,s,, ona (o:La::Ine all the ael)octs of a .22detiox4
then thei'Artilf...1:11w7 Iert. riidoh one is lelorio
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hle studyl.ra ixdat t:liv:rr that the revele.tionare,' ,eceoe.ent has
nowrel, ae td.!.O..st oath phase includes several periods, In 'Vas manner
olie. studios the stre,,,Nei and the taet.l.cs of the party t,'?trotechout, these periods.:
In a '-?orq, etrateee le the teen by '-hich victory in 'ear is on or toe
deeices eteel,Kre.:d by the party during a pa/act/lay war, Revel rtion is the
:tea d to Le 1-at tc,a enaf traf.ear includes all for, o of
organize ons eo,lbet, and ,roada sice.e.no >toed to a ati tie ales of
t!lis stratc;,,, does not cilanc?3 the coarse of
a phase. the Ot.1- '0.7,r7A1.2 ctics can etletays charze,, ?veal :?ro...1 one
hour to the nee te
does one deL er t xo Wtin of party -A., olicy? t>? e ,ete. t etand
still and rack his brain to dater Lino the path of tlee yelety, Orta has to
be informd, to study the 7:orld t :on as ? ell as all the aspecte of
the na;.,onall, L.::t.iat, ? dit dlitary). One ns to stuck/
the (.31;rer,13 and oai,ali'lities? alvantas and disaCvanta,:;er,? to understand
,he zuld to troncis on Liar s.I.O.a as veil as on t1'.4e, enorzvis.,
To stud! politics teirans to etudy the ieporeent maneuvers of different
nations of the Teeelds and the potler of the parties in a given country.
To study scowl:lies :311S to study the Tee= of vroductort and distribution.
To study socioloar -cearte to sudy clans differences, and the inclinations
and hopes of each class.
To srudr civilizations >Leans to atidy the pla.isibility of =Tont eas, and
the degree of eeeleatibility of such ideas erith the custate, and habLts of the
people,
To study profits and loses beans to stady the strong and 'weak points.
To study strength and t71.: &Alit 1.03 :leans to find out our on strength and
that of the (many. -
One studios the -.7orld r..1-'tuation ir order to 1:not; iioi evts influonce us.
To study enetrY is to lore or Icipal enemy is, and ...there our
direct and indir'...,?ot ailie ar-5 Our ellies are the people's classes and
the revolutionary movereente of the whole vorld. Our indirect allies are
the disagreements aeveng the colonialis.to, beton the colonialists and the
traitors, and aaono, t11.3 treaters theumelves, These allies are an ierportant
force -.,eco.use Tze cannot fight the enemy alone. Beside us there will be the
dire t and indirect forces vf..ich, will help us to fight our enemy.
It must be remembered that the indirect 0-1,2,14.3 are very icei)ortarxt? soraetteles
even more luportant than the direct A.A.1lies. During the second -arid wars for
exaraple, the disagrecreente eetwoon the fascists and the capitelists of the
world were the most useful indirect allies for our revolution.
1V. The political path of cur party since its founding.
Let us study the policy of our party t roughout 5 periods2
se the first was the period of format:on and of the anti-colonialist
anti-feudal ist proclamat :on (V)21-1937-).
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b) the second wan one of revolationary retirement (1)31-105),,
0) the third was the per;.od of the people (1)36-1939)0
d) the fourth was the p4riod of the second 1;004 War, of anti-lase/an.
(19.19-1914).
e) the fifth pernod nas that of the August Revolution and of the resistance.
Throughout these five porAds, the revolution in Indochina has remained
In the period of the anti-capitalistic democratic revolution.
a. Vas nrst.' Ferried.
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1, Unification of the Coomunist group: the popular movement. in Lorth
Vietnam nas rather strong in 1/29, and the proletarians united.
The proletarian movevent became the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth
League. Then It was decided to dissolve this union in order to
found the Communist Party, but this was not approved by the assenbIy.
Consequently the comrades in the north founded the Indochinese
Communist Partys the comrades in the Central region, the Conmunist
Alliance, and the comrades in the south, the Annamese Cota.Tunist Partsy,
On 6 January 1)29, Comrade Nguyen Al Quoc (Ho Chi inh) called a
genera/ assembly at the end of which the Communist Party of Indo-
china was founded. Later on, it was called the Indochinese Communist
Party
The pacy of the party after it was united: After its unifications
the party acted as one unit, but it was not until October 15130
that this Was brought out in the open.
Comrade Tran Phu drafted a report which was discussed throughout
the party. This was the report on the Anti-Capitalistic Democratic
Revolution. The report stresses these points:
Indochina has only a few light industries and no heavy industry
at all. Feudal traces are stilLabundants and therefore colonialism
and feudalism must be destroyed.
All the classes in Indochina, except the feudalistic class,
unanimously alvettive of the revcAtion, and therefore a united
anti-colonialist front must be founded to draw the compatriots
under the leadership of the proletarian class.
This front was finally called the Indochinese Anti-Imperialist
Alliance. The slonans used nere Down vith Imperialism and
Feudalism. Establish a Soviet goverment, with artisan-peasant
and military participation.
Indochina must be completely inderendent.
Establish a COLATarliOt artisan-peasant army.
Confiscate foreign holdings and put them under goverment managedient.
Confiscate the land of the owners and return it to the peasants.
Eight hour work day,
Establisn taxes to baae revenue. Establish nork rolief
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cirrenta, INTI:LLIGEXE AG NOY
Right of of natione to self-determination.
Eqnal rights for men madwomen.
Compulsory education.
Support the Mat.
fleet to these major slogans, the party also had small slogans
such as3
Increase in eanes-Shortex hours-Abolish corporal punishment-
Accident coppensation otc.
In this ray the party consolidated the general slogans with the
scattered ones, and defendet. everyday interests to win over the
populateon. The eovements expanded. from Worth to South, and these
people who attained these COM.1011rihts had absolute confidence in
the party. The struggle of our fe11ov6-countrynen of Naha An-Ha
Tinh was epecially herioc. Nghe AneNa Tinh had eenerienced
heavy rains which caused, a lose of harvests; not only were its
peopLehelpIess, but they also had to pay eeavy taxes. Consequently
the people rose in anger to atruggle to the bitter end. The
delegations of Thanh Cueng, Nam Dan, Nuong Son, had established a
Soviet government.
3. The ieperialist repression and the regression of the movement.
Towards the end of 1,31 the meeement started to decline because
of intense imperialistic repressions. The Central Coemittee of the
South and the Regional Comittee in the North sere broken up. The
strength of the party was diernished.
4. General recapitulation.
Globally the policy was right but its leplementation was frustrated
due to lack of leadership for the people and lack of reasoning.
The proof of this narroenese can be seen in the failure of the
Nghe An-Na Tinh iesurrect:onists to affiliate with progressive
organs and to _Incorporate them into their front. 7Tena the power
of the Soviets was established, they did not know how to organize
guerillas to amplify the struggle. it was lack of organization and
technique for keeping the cadres in the ranks of the people.
5. Experience.
One rust always -keep sight of the enemy and
?be exposes oneself to narrowness and fai7erre
create a solid and broad front which could
anti-imperialists and anti-feudalist forces
party in order to fight imperialism and the
sienle hin out, othervisa
. One met know how to
unite all the revolutionary
under the direction of he
feudal regime.
To rise and take over ;mem, one must be thoroughly prepared. If
the enemy is strong and in control of the cities, only the peasants
should rise, and the local uprising should be converted into
guerrilla activity and be developed, otherwise one would certainly
be surrounded by eneny forces arriving from the cities and the
surroundings.
One should only rise when the enemy is undecided and when the
populadon is set on participating in the revolution and supporting
the chock troope.
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During the repreesion one has to be able to oreanize very scientifitmally
in order to keep ap the ranks.
_Effort and struggle go together. At the height of the streggle
in 1930-1931 the three regions joined in the full% but paid no
attention to their oreanizahlon? and this caused their failure.
7reen the movetant tarts to recede, the party has to know how to
protect the partisans, because the life of the movement- depends to
a-great eetent on its IneMbers. To protect the members is of primary
importance in the proletarian revolution.
b. Secorideperiod enaeoession
1. The decline of the movement: Teuards the niddle of 1931 there vas a
let-down in the activities of the party, the French having scored a
semi-victory in their politer of strangling the movement. As a
result, the offices of the people and the party no longer had any
people to hold matinee or to get in touch vith each other. The
organizations were suspicious and did not dare to contact one another.
The French repression nes savaaev in the South there was a eretense
of -Justice, because the South had a regine and colonial laws. But
in the Central and the North regions, the repressions eere like
those of the Fascists. They established criminal tribunals there
in order to condemn the soldiers of the revolution. -
Period of Rise.
The period of repression did not mitigate the fighting spirit of
the Connunists. Our comrades continued to organize in prison;
to fight, to seek contact erith the outside. The comrades nho rere
free continued to act secretly auong the masses. Some of the
comrades disappeared to reorganize the action offices (sic) and to
gee together eith the comrades outside. Thanks to that, the
uoveeent searbed to rise again. in 1)35, beginning eith battles in
factories, in cities, fighting the transfer of coolies to the upper
regions, fighting market taxes and licences. The novement had
reunited the peasant aasses? norkers? uerchamts, although not in
very large numbers.
Comrades returning from foreign countries (Siam, China) organised
offices at Lang Sun, Cao enc, and along the Teekong. Comrades in
the South and Center, havifig served their prison toren, nent back
and reorganized in rural areas. Concedes reveal Van Tao and Duong
BadhlIai returned in 1934 free France and cooperated with the agents
of the Fourth international in editing the paper The e
ting up the struggle throwsh the press with that of the people
Besides this there ewe activities leseine to the election of
representatives of .workers and of the people to the Colonial
Council, in order to benefit from public representation, and thus
helpieethe alms of the people and beating off cola:Ira-1nm.
3. Big meeting at Liam?.
The party holds. meeting at the end of 1)35 in ',lace?, China.
Conrades Te:eiryen Ai Quoc and Ie Hong Phone* were busy and could net
attend. The meeting consisted of Vietnamese Ccumunists and a-smell
number ofeaembers fren Siam and China.
7.1une Comrade Le Hong Phong came back and presented the decisions
of the Contunist InternaVonall one realized that the party policy
had been altogether wrong. The International stressed that the
enetee in vierreme Fascism and not Imperialism; that the ally at
the proletariat was the petty capitalist in the cities, the peasants,
oppressed peoples, and poosibly a part of Impoeialism that was
against the Fascism, and against war, Conseeeently the policy of
the party was chanced as ord:agI7.
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Comrades Le Hong /lion_ aid Ha Huy Tap then called a meeting of the
members to alter the decisions reached at the first Lig ueeting
and revise them to the policy of the people's period,
Experience of the secon0 period.
The Indochinese and the ,:orId Revolution are closely related. The
Indochinese Revolution heca.e part of the 4orId ::evolution end of
world vide activity in vieu of the anti-Pascist wars and became
the elamy of the Indochinese Revolution was no loneer the same as
befo!e. Thera? c it eccame necessary to follow gloeal tendencies
as well as the interior situation.
Jhcn the Imocmont declined the party had to chan.e its tactics in
a suitable feshion, protect its ranks to continue the struggle,
and remain in touch with the people.
The paety already know hot; to exploit the press in order to carry
out the struggle for the eenefit of the people.
The moment the movement had its recession, the people became
discouraged, In such a case the party must glue itself to the
people and direct them, to save the reel ineerests and at the some
tiMP reform the movement.
In the period of recession of the movement, the party sheuld exploit
all the resources of the situation on the outside, in order to
reunite all the revolutionary forces and form the movement in the
interior,
c. The thi,d period. People's period of Democratic action 1935-19396
1. The principal enewb Our principal enemy was the Freech
reactionary colonielints who were servants of the French ur:RULT"
(200 French femilies). These had COOM04 interests with world
Fascism. The French people's front was created to fight the
French colonialists,
2. The secondary enemy: the traitors, the ranks of the local
reactionaries, servants of the colonialiets.
3. The enemy cold be rascist Japan, which at that time had the
intention to conquer Indochina.
L. The allies were the Indochina proletariat, the petty cepitqlists
in the cities, the progressive capitalice,s of the country, the
small land-owners and the French people's front.
The indirect allies were: . disagreement among the French
colonialists, contradictions between the Democratic and Fascist
parties or the world.
Policy: On its highest level the policy of the people's epoch
was the establishment of the Indochinese Democratic Front in
order to fight the coloiloOists and the traitors serving theme
The front included all the classes of the people and the
progressive greups in Indochina, including the French.
At this moment the party did not come out with the slogan:
"Independence for Indochina", but instead came out with a slogan
which aimed at the return of Democratic freedoms and basic rights:
Down with the roe etionary colonialists, se_ vents of the 200
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French familiee*.
-de protest against waelike fascicm.
Lene live the French ?caplets *tat.
Food, clothing, frecdom, peace.
Democratic freedom, freedom for trade unions.
Enlaree the represer_tation of th) people.
Freedom for politicel prisoners.
Down with corrupt officials.
Land reform.
Down with usury.
Down with taxes and due.
No more illiterates.
Towards the end of 1933 Jape% atte-oted to take over Indochina.
The party came out with the slogan?Conditional defense of
Indochina.
Period of ctrueele.
During the people's epoch the paety dircted the struggle with great
zeal. Demonstratioes of the people, suce as never eefoee seen in
Indochina, attracted nearly half a inillic people in the north and
south. The commies who were elected thrciele the goverment of the
people actively directed the activities, i. not officially, at least
he supporting them under cover. Our comrads depeaded equally on
the official press and all official organizetions (..ennected with
the struggle,
The party was really ie a ?c.. tile state, with eublic demonstrations
anL campaigns ft:Y.114n, a caecon front with the eetivAies of the press
and assemblies.
There are intaagible but powerful forme of sereegle? like the protests
and will of the people. such was the moveeml. ter repreeeetation of
Indochina in the peeelets government in Fran 3.
Experience.
1. Our party always distineeished between tee primary and 'econdaey
enemy; between the urgent responsibilitile and those of t
whole revolutionary period* The party rest know how to arr,,:e
its revolutionary forces to upset the enav and rally all the'
sympathizers on its aide. During the peoplets period, the part
acted in this sense, which e:e_Plains its success.
2. While particip.tin with other parties on the same front it is
understood that, altecueh tolerance is peraissible, it should
be just. At the sane time it is mandatory that our party
closely guard its oeganization and its viewpoint regarding
class differences, and also disseminat, its view to the
rightists and leftists among our allies. Neither mast we stop
propagandizing for our own doctrine.
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3. The party muet alee hoe to diecora ia a iven sitnation
or circumstances ihat ca e ue I. mediately realized, and ehat
cant t; what is required 'or lecediate realization, and after
the first step is mane to preeeed to the second.
Durine the peerlete eu-ied, that which was ineediately
realizable were the democratic fr.'tdoes; that nhich was not ems
the sioean "indeeeneence". For a lone time we have lived
eubjectcd to imerisonment and massacre. 3onscquently we must
obtain necessary liberties first of all, and hang on to them to
wake up the people.
14, The party knuw how be take essential advantaeee which presented
thenselves, and how to ealaree Lhe ranl:s and enrch straieht ahead
with the populace. It bee hnoan how to lead the non-or.anized
population from an inferior fightine organization to a superior
unit.
The party must knoa how to combine secret with overt activities.
Durine the latter, it must always hold back cfnle of the secret
neohers. Lt the party finds out that the advnetaees of an open
stru gle no loneer aeplyn it must reverse itself immediately to
clandestine strueele, nahnn; sure that the caure agents are Well
protected from capture.
Durine the peoplete peeioe the party incessantle oreanieed the
workers Jelin= while .at the Gene-time it organized secretly.
Thus, when Daladier eiened the nueich pact eith ratier, the
parlyinmediately prepared to go under .over. It cent aeents
to the rural areas to establish hoses there.
5. The party comes suddenly out in the open to op-ewe? evil trende;
armee rare and isolated occasion.
6. Durhie the 2eoeleta eeriod, the deficient aspect of the party
consisted in its eecessive displcy of confidence in the
people's front, to the point of foreetting the question of
indeeendence. It is true that the party no longer could come
out with the eloean of "complete independence, yet it should
have been p.inted out in the party program.
7. The movement for increaned Indochinese repres,ntation
partly occaur,o of ,French repr seien, but also eecauee of the
failure of the party to organise a .ront composed of proeressive
capitalists. Our too nunereue demands intieielted the
Important intelecctuals and the eie land-owners.
80 The alliance with the paetieans of the 4th International from
1934 until 1936 throueh the press (The etruegle) was understand-
able in vim of their good faith. DEVMETITo Liescow trials
it becane evident that these latter were provocative aeents for
the imperialists, so that a prolonged alliance with them was
against all principles, especially since the party had sufficient
means for itself.
Second period of struggle with the FrecheJapanese Fascism from
1939-1945.
After the :Lunich pact France chaneed its polic, (reposing the
workers and diselvine the peoplets front. ear brelte out with the
Germans outside of the country-, yet :Vence did not atop oppressing
the workers at home, or the population in the colonies.
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The war between :LI land, :Create, Coreany and Italy tee an
imperialiet war, so the party pproved none of It.
The Central Camittee net in Cochinchina and decide&
To prot st a :ainet the peiicy of imperialiet war.
To establish a people*e front against :truich imeerialism.
The party did noL utilize the sloean of land seizure in order
to rally the landouncre to the ranks of the oppressed eeoeles;
on the contrary, the park made uee of the eloean of anti-
repression and the one of the strueele of the masses. After
the strike of Lilo aorkers at Cia Lau, the yovement fell off
eouewhat. Nevertheless, one month letcr France capitulated,
and in June the Japanese leaded in Indochina. They attacked
Lanz Son, where the iseeneh were bia,en and withdrew to Bac
Kan. In the meantime the ea e.onal ecreeittee led the
insurrection at Vu Lanz. The i?rench oeencd the door for the
Japanese and returned to oppmes the movueent at Bac Kan -
Lang Son. This was durin, the 7th central meeting of the
party. :iLiaing that the moveeent in Bac 'Kan - Lang Son stood
little chance to continue, the party decided to prepare for
a eeneral uprising in order to preserve the euerilla oroes
in Bac Kan - Lang Son for a futuee action. The assemely
dispatched a messenzer to erinz this decision to the South
Vietnam section. Dut it was to late, the order for the
general uprising had been elven, and subsequently forty
insurrections took place with the military comrades joieing
enthusiastically. The breeeh took counter-measures. The
troops in Salon were disarmed while the insurrectionists at
Gia Dinh, Soc Trang and Tra'adhlaere ferocieesly suppressed,
Some of the soldiers retr_ated into the weeds and centinued
their activities for a while. Thu edlitiamen of S,t. Oung rose
at Cao Dang; in January 1941 he started at Do Luong, took it,
and then cam dawn to Thanh Vinh. Not knowing how to fight
guerrilla style, his insurrection was soon subdued. The party
eained many experiences, and on the 3th meeting, called by
Uguyen Ai euoc, it was proclaimed that the Viet Un revolution
is a revolution of the peopleee liberation.
So instead of the sloe= of land partition it was opportune to
ally with the landowners and to lead them to the national
Union Front aeainet ,rance and Japan.
The National Union Front called itself: Union of Allies for
the Independence of Viet Nam.
Its purposes ,ere to support the IR-,..).5n in case of attack, and
to participate in the anti-fascist struegle.
The central =matte? was just about to close the plenary
session when it eot news of the attack on the USSR. The
circelar pledgine support of the a,t was immediately brought
out.
Guerrilla action broke out again in August 1941 at Bac Kan -
Lang Son. The French forced the population to turn over their
harvest to prevent then from supplying the euerrillase
Hostilities in the Pacific broke out in Eecember 1941, when
the Japanese decided on the invasion of the colonies held by
to powers in Southeast Asia.
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1111, 1,1 .
The eereanent coeoieeion of the Ccitral Coes-Atte rcce nited
in F"'UCXY 19L 3 that!
The nature of the hoctilitiea going oa in the oorld choucd
but Lo clearly that with the participstion of the ZISaa,
anti-:ancist ani pro-:X e7 wars were wers of erogrees,
whereas any other war is pro-Zascist and in the path of
reaction. It thus hecaee important to voice opposition to
the Pacific war.
There ,ere two kinds of -:ascist xeups in Indochina, the
'ereach and the Jnpaneee, while another ereup of 'Zrench
Datocrats sou ht -.Mos again:A the Japaneee.
Ceeeade Van Lreueht us armed propaganda units rrem act
Laah liooration troops in Larch 1.545 to att-ck Bac Kan.
At this time cur eroup and eoee 1.rench military joined
into what was kalitd the "United ircach -.ietnaLece
Coittoo" i eecet tiee afterwards this eame group of
r_eachuen fled :Leto China and left us lone to fieht the
Japanese, lcevin, ?US 50rJO arlA0a.
Although the revolutiol in Indochina was to oe a revolution
lit,eratin: the neople, it remained eoseetiall.; tied to
capitaliml. French policy durine 1941-191,5 was aimed at
dissieatine the doctrixze. of the party. Nevertheleos?
thanks to its scientific organization, the :ix-et organ of
the revolution, as well as the one of the people, remained
firm.
The circulars of the Centre/ ,:oi;Littee specifitally
recommended that enrolIoent he meee with uteost prudence
so as to protect the work of the party coepartmentalization.
Constant watch over the eahke is of vital importance to the
party. :After the open s'ava,,le comes to an end, it h_s
been found through experiente that principles should be
kept secret. :oespect the rules of the perty.
After 1944 the party tied itself to the group of Duane Due
:lien students and founded tho "Deeocratic Party of Viet lam"
in order to divide the proeJapaneee intellectuals and win
them over to the %a front.
A_ter 1944 the party made contact with the eocial-coeeunist
group at Mmd. Commeniek, gr,upc succeeded in being
ectaUished in the Legion army, and the party made use of
these iWoormediaries with the Do Gaulle ercup.
In :Toveeher 11,44 the party realized that the Japanese ii.euld
attack Indochina efore lonc, and proposed to the irench
Democratic ,reup that they unite in a common struggle
against the Japanese Through the intermediary of the
social-communiet cx-up the party made the following proposals
to the De Gaelic: roup for a common struggle:
Advocate the cessation of harvest storage.
Advocate the liberation of political prisonore.
Sue,ly arms to the Viet Unh to fight the Japanese.
The 1,rench rejected the third condition, promising to
fulfil/ the others. Shortly afterwards 136 political
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orieoacrs were released in Uanoi, ands= AXI1 in Ilea Dinh.
It turnedout that these had but light sentences to serve
=yaw, and the storage of troops continned.
Pro?insurrection period,
9 Lareh 1945 ? The Frcach and the Japanese. weou fiohting this
very nioht. The permanent commission of the Central Conmittee
met to decide on its stand and concluded that the Japane_e
would come out on top, but would be defeated in the near future.
Our principal ene:ay after the coup dletat was still Lae Japanese,
and consequently one could unite with any French group whatever
in the fight against the Japanese.
The pereanent commisaion also uecided to establish regional
committees to prepare ler the general uprising. The strategic
and tactical directives were chan,ed aecordinoly. The security
organieations increased, the aray organizatione multiplied
everywhere to assassinate traitors and Japanese officers. Eeen
in the heart of the cities our agents direcLed the destruction
of rice warehouses, Voile oar units, equipped withpropaoanda,
shoved up all over and prevented the storage of rice and helped
the population overeome famine. All thLso forms of battle led
the population pro reeeively towards an armed insurrection.
The official ononaoanda olooans went accordingly.
At a nilitary revolutionary meeting in 1945 it was decided:
? to unite the two arudes (Liberation and Youth Liberation
aruy).
? to prepare for the gencaal uprising.
? to establish a government of the liberated zones.
? to develop guerrilla warfare.
The meeting also decieed on a general session in noust, the time
of the general uprising, as well as for the extraordinary session
at Tan Trao for the establishment of a provisional government
under the presideacy of No Chi Linha
The new& of the Japaneee defeat came jus_ as the party members
were preparing for a elenar., eeosion. It came so suddenly that
many of them stopped right in the uidae of the session.
In several places the uprising started upon the receipt of the
flaws about the Japanese surrender, although a number of them had
not yet received the circular from the permanent commission.
Despite they acted on time, holding themselves to the
directives of 12 :Jere% 1945 issued by the permanent commission.
The uprising spread throuohout the country, not by an automatic
martian of the people, but under the open or camouflaged
leadership of the party.
The slogans for this period were:
Down with _renchaJapanece *aascism.
Complete independence for Indochina?
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CLZIT?.AL
LetallEs the Demeeretic opu.lien nioa of Indochina.
Set up the .'eo:)let sqaverriti nt a,.:eordini:, to the ecLieneo
of the new dcLocracy.
eonfiscate the lands red property of the im)erelists and
traitors.
Loeer the a,;r:cultural tae.es and rates of interests on loans.
Lst.blich social security.
The right of selfeduteruination for the people1
equal rights Letueen men aneeomen.
erase illiteracy and provide for compulsory education up
to elmecatary echool.
Lstalaish the Viet nam Liberation arm:.
Support the !Jeep?. resistance.
30sides the aeove =timed sic, ;ensthe party also had others
vileichwele more realistic and temporary.
Dean with 07ex-cordon.
Resist the etorat. of rice.
Cppose the centre]. of tr.-4i ng and the excessive market taxes.
Oppose the conscription of soldic:es and coolies,
aliZO the aea)ons of the ?nag end turn thew on hta.
1:xperience.
1. The party has elwaye coneentrated on the primary enemy. At
the outereak of hostilities the party enuP out with the
'eattle slogan against French imperialism; but upon the
Japanese invasion of Indochina, and during the government
of the 11,asciet Decoux, the elogan was against the Franco?
Japanese Zasciam. After 9 arch theslo,;ens were kAinet
Japanese fascism.
2. The party followed a policy of solidarity, wide enough in
scope to encoepaes the revolutionary and douocratic forces
and to load them in opposition to fascism. The party
intentiona.ly dropped the eloean of land partition in order
to 'ee in hamony with its allies, especially with the French
Democrats of Indochina after the formine of the Viet Llinh
front.
3. As far as strateey and tactics were concerned, the direction
of the party Was truly adequate during this period. Upon
the arrival of the Japanese in August 1940 the party saw
that the enemy would be the French and the Japanese
tocethro The party thus rallied against them the democratic
elements of capital, with the workera, the peasants, and
the French Dee.ocrate of Indochina* The party also knew how
to take advantage of the disagreements between the French
and the Japanese for the sake of the revolution.
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The part; parte- also knew "low to uee shil1f.1lyevexe eeene to
advance the moveeent re:idly ehcn the various
oreanieations wore eland; eith imeerialism, the earty at
once organized undercover security connittees, and at the
time of the Japaneee su lendee formed Ulitary eroupe which
:ore directed by the Colenittee of Liberation. These groups
became the peoplegs coemittees and then the Aniniserative
Coenittees. All aspects of the etrueele, including strikes
which changed into guerrilla action, were utilized. The
party also divided sone of the coneuered land alone the
agricultural woekere, or destreeed rice earohouees like that
at Jac Giane. Before the period of the uprising the
a,elication of propaeaeda as well as erred demonstrations
repleeed the old ecthode of ereeaeanda? which had less
eifect0 .hen the situation allowed such activities, the
party did not hesitate to create a people's anmy.
The party was atae to absorb the methods, of scientific
organization, and waa sufficiently farsiehted to. keep its
oreaeization intact despite ruthless oppression from the
leeenco-Jepaneee ;asciasp to centinue the struggle.
e. Our party has fulfilled one of its essential duties relative
to the support of the IL5ua against Fascism' followine the
pludee made by the eonmunit Internetional e fight against
the French and Japanese Fascists which are a wine of German
Fascism.
The party thoroughly prepared the military uprising and had
eathered military ceecriences since its fteindation, so that
during theeeeeiod of its first strueeles, the party could
profit in the laree scale military streegle.
Our party closely protected the uaity of the party,
opposing the tendencies of the right, and the formation of
cliques.
C . The :A:east Ilevolution and the I:esisLanee of 1945.
The Aueurt eevo ution broke out at the right time and won just
and well earned success. Dut in teeing over power for the
first times we encountered Lguee difficulties. en 30 Septewber
1945, the erench colonialists started the assault, on South Viet
Nam under cover from British troops. At the same time the
3hineee :eaeionelists were dieaxbuilt. the Japanese above the 16th
parallel, briegin with them a whole unit of traitors, destined
to uow disorder aeon: our eanks. :.fter this Prance maneuvered
with the United Nations to replace the ihinece, while we were
just feral% our overneents not havine had the necessary time
to forti4y oureolves. Our loader, eith the aereouent of the
Jentral Coeuittees decided on the 6 'larch aereement to eain
time. Our president went to :Crance to continue the discussions
already under wee', but the bad faith of the ".erench had oecone
too obvious. .e therefodee eiened the nodus vivendi of
14 eeeteeber 1946, to .:ain tine as we prepared to fight. The
French provoked us constantly and oCCOLO more insolent every
day. Contrary to the aereemont made, they attacked 1.15, at
flaiphone and in the capitol (Hanoi). Lel 19 Decenber we started
the attack to protect oueselvee, forwelknew very well .,eat if
we failed to attack them, ee would soon be sureouneed. From
that date on the total Aeht of the whole couetry 'ocean.
The present policy of the party was as follows:
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Unifi*esioa of all the pciple? extended resiotaice: our aim
is to completely liberate the nation and to promote the regime
of the new deu.ocracy. Our task is to promote the reeistence
and to reconetruct the country. Still, between the two teeks,
the victerious eesistaeco is the more importent. The Central
Committe. also (eel? out with the slogan: All for victory0
iTershal bete the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary
forces of Indochina. The primary enemy is the reactionary
Freach coloaialiets. The eecondary enemy is the traitors,
friends of the French.
The direct allies are all classes of the population eecept the
traitors, similar movements throughout the world and the
celoaial liberation movements.
Indirect allies are the disagreements between the traitors and
the French, between the traitors and Avemselves? and between
the French and the Americans.
Establich the enlarged united fronte Viet Unh and Lien Viet.
The principal slejans:
Ilunt dawn the 1",reneh colon:alists.
Threw over the puppete.
Vietnam completely united and independent.
Laos and Caebodia completely liberated and sepaeate states in
the Indochinese
ally all the people for the resistance and reconstruction.
Sabotage the econoey of the enemy and develop our own.
Iesrease prodeotion for our own subsistence.
_tick to the lowerie; of the land dues.
Danish ifliteracy.
Foster civilization and education in our new democracy.
Spread patriotisn in order to insure immediate success of the
resistance.
After the ,attles in the north (1947) a flaw of enthusiasm
spread all ov,r the country. The leader and the Central
CoLmittee launched the patriotic emulationmememnt to pass
over to the second stage of the resistance.
During this peried of resistence the party and all the people
made peo,yees in all directions, thanks to he calculated
policy of the party which had merited the confidence of the
people. The pert- proyeaued with more speed than ever before.
The Carseedian and Laotian sections of the party had just been
organised.
Such queetions as dialectical education, shaping of personality,
reform of workinc methods, formatioa of new cadres and the
improvement of the old ones, were given conside_ation by the
party. The question of organization methods was also on the
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order J. et the day, althouda it still is in its first stones.
Satiaing up the exnerionce of this first period the following
can be stated:
The annust upeaeinn tras tactically an accomplishment of
the first order*
The unification policy advocated by the leader and the party
proved useful, and already was bearing fruit.
The party directed the resistance properly and profited
greatly by the Law.
The achievement of personnel organizations, of correcting
its own mistakes, the change of the worl:inn methods, all
aided the party in obtaining more results*
Tho launching of the patriotic emulation drive paid off in
time and helped speed up the resistance and reconstruction*
The subject of the new democracy wasbrought up on time..
It is natural to point out negative aspects such ass
The party has failed to pay any attention up to now to the
subject of agrarian re2orm among the ethnic minorities of
Cambodia-Laos, and to the dialectical subjects.
CONCadaICN:
ee have studied the policy of the party from its beginning up to date. 40
find that despite certain negative points of detail, the party has closely
followed the method and path of Dolshevism.
This path has been followed faithfully, for the pasta adhered to the
dialectical method handed down by the Llarx-Lenin doctrines and epelied in
Indochina,
se have the directives at hand, the method of tactical instruction and the
road to follow. The tactics of the party were instituted according to the
following points:
a. Always seek out allies.
bo Locate the main enemy to be fought.
CO The party knows very well that it cannot succeed with its advance
guard alone, but also needs the effective support of the population?
do Once the goal is fixed, one dare not lose one minute, nor lose
confidence in the face of setbacks, but one must be determined to
go to the final goal*
To change the strategy means at times to change certain aspects of the
struggle, of direetives, propaganda and activities depending on the
fluctuations of the strugnle. Yesterday, before the Japanese coup elle-tat,
we left the rice warehouses intact, whereas today we destroy them.
The party has acquired valuable lessons thanks to the ,dcperience, and is
aranalfied to carry out the eollowinn tacticss
a. Know when to advance and when to retreat at the right time, so that
you evade the enemy who is waiting to strike* Take immodiate
advantage of the moment to strike mortal blows at the onemyo
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b. ChanLe the orgaLiization and directives accordin; to the proye s
or regression of the movement.
c. Knoa hou to adply the policy ker.noto in the chain of events;
consolidation of strength calls for quick decIsions.
Waen the Japanese perpetrated Lhoir coup d'etat the party uantod to lead
the population to take part in the battle, and employed as the key-noto
"destro:i the warehensesit in order to load the movement pro ressively
touards the general uprising.
In other words, the party has m_de gr at efforts to become a ,13olshovist"
Party*
a. Study the doctrine of narx and Lenin and know hi to apply it to
the situation in Indochina.
b. Observe the people closely, guide tlea? and study their self-
initiated actions.
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