NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028800010018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 10, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
April 10, 1976
NO
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
LEBANON: Syrian mechanized
force moves in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ARGENTINA: Mounting political
violence troublesome for junta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
ISRAEL: West Bank elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PORTUGAL-AZORES: Islanders
dissatisfied with autonomy statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
WEST GERMANY: Cabinet gives
go ahead to MRCA production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
MBFR: Round-up of latest session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
USSR: Changes in the
roles of Soviet leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Belgrade concerned
over emphasis on orthodoxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
THAI LAND: Seni Pramot trying
to form new government . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 15
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
The US defense attache in Damascus early this morning observed a large
convoy of transporters loaded with armored personnel carriers moving along the
Damascus-Beirut road from a point six miles west of Damascus. The convoy
included a very few tanks and miscellaneous vehicles such as ammunition, water,
fuel, and kitchen trucks.
Farther west, the attache sighted a convoy of empty transporters returning to
Damascus. The attache could not reach the border because of heavy road traffic and
confusion, but was certain the column extended to the border, a distance of another
nine miles.
The attache believes these forces are from the Syrian 3rd Armored Division. It
is normally stationed just north of Damascus.
Israel so far has not reacted militarily to .the Syrian initiative.
Israeli news media reported that the seizure of Al Masna early yesterday was
probably intended to force the Lebanese parliament, which is to convene today, to
move quickly to elect a new president.
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The Israelis may consider the presence of Syrian troops near Rashayya, and the
size and composition of the Syrian force, to be a threat to Israel's security. Israel's
reaction will depend largely on the size of the force, how much armor it possesses,
and whether it moves farther south.
If a sizable portion of the Syrian 3rd Armored Division has in fact entered
Lebanon, Israeli forces are virtually certain to go on high alert, reinforce the
northern border area, and mobilize some reserves.
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National Intellligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
The Israelis may conclude that they must make limited incursions into far
southeastern Lebanon to take up good defensive positions. Such a move would allow
Israeli forces to control important road junctions and prevent Syrian forces from
moving into southern Lebanon.
We believe that the Israelis are not likely-on the basis of the extent of Syrian
intervention identified thus far-to resort immediately to more drastic measures such
as the occupation of southern Lebanon or a preemptive strike on the Golan front.
Such actions probably would be taken only if the Syrian move were determined to
be a direct threat to Israel's security on the northern border.
Syria's intervention in eastern Lebanon presumably is intended to meet a
number of immediate needs:
--To eliminate the threat to the cease-fire posed by the large leftist, Muslim, and
independent Palestinian militias based in eastern Lebanon and along the main
highway closer to Beirut.
--To resupply and reinforce the increasingly ineffective Syrian-controlled units
of the Palestine Liberation Army in the area.
--To force the Lebanese parliament to act quickly to replace President
Franjiyah with a successor acceptable to Damascus.
In fact, the Syrian move has stalled political progress in Beirut. Leftist leader
Kamal Jumblatt, who earlier this week had cautiously approved Damascus' efforts,
said last night that the war in Lebanon has taken a grave turn for the worse; he
condemned Syria for "resorting to escalation at a time of truce without any
justification."
Jumblatt has not indicated that he will boycott the meeting of parliament
today, but he almost certainly will now be disinclined to compromise with
Damascus on the question of who should replace Franjiyah. Jumblatt ordinarily
would accept any of several weak Maronite Christians as president, but is believed
now to be cooperating with independent Palestinian groups and probably the
Egyptians to promote Raymond Edde, a maverick Christian leader who has attacked
Syria's involvement in the Lebanese dispute.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
Mounting political violence is emerging as a major headache for President
Videla's new government.
Dozens of people have died in clashes between forces of the left and the right
since the military take-over on March 24. Urban guerrillas are attacking police and
security officials, while rightists are mounting a campaign of reprisals that so far has
taken over 20 lives.
In dealing with the renewed warfare, the junta must walk a fine line between
seeming to carry out \/idela's pledge to keep the antiterrorist campaign within legal
bounds and doing what: is necessary to suppress the violence.
The activities of the right-wing vigilante groups are particularly troublesome for
the junta. It was widely believed that such actions were condoned, or perhaps even
inspired, by the Peron administration. The junta can ill afford to acquire the same
reputation. Indeed, there is no indication that it has given even tacit approval to the
killings of leftists by off-duty police and security officials.
Even so, the exploits of vigilante groups could quickly dissipate the relative
good will the public has shown the military government. The junta is aware that it
needs all the sympathy it can muster at home and abroad to proceed successfully in
critical areas like the economy.
Military advocates of harsh repression view the continuation of left-wing
violence as an argument in favor of the tough measures they have proposed all along.
The left hopes to provoke precisely such repression, in the belief that the eventual
result would be popular repudiation of the military government.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
Candidates sympathetic to the Palestine Liberation Organization are expected
to get a substantial number of votes in the West Bank municipal council elections on
Monday, even though powerful clan support probably will ensure the re-election of
many of the conservative incumbents who are running.
A total of 577 candidates are contesting 205 municipal council seats in 24 West
Bank towns. Eighteen incumbent mayors and 115 incumbent council members are
running for re-election.
Prospects for the Palestinian nationalists appear best in the West Bank's two
largest towns, Hebron and Nabulus, where the conservative incumbent mayors are
not running. In Hebron, a nationalist slate seems to be attracting strong support,
especially from the city's younger voters. In Nabulus, the nationalist group is backed
by politically influential families.
Nationalist candidates are likely to gain seats on the municipal councils of
other important West Bank towns like Bethlehem and Ram Allah and in some of the
region's smaller communities such as Tulkarm and the college town of Bir Ziet.
Once elected, councils name one of their members, usually the highest
vote-getter, as mayor. Israeli occupation authorities, however, can veto these
selections and appoint mayors they prefer. The Israelis may use their prerogative to
install traditionalist, pro-Jordanian officials if pro-PLO council members are chosen,
especially in major towns like Hebron or Nabulus.
Such measures could spark renewed demonstrations and outbursts of violence
on the West Bank such as occurred there in recent weeks. The balloting will
probably proceed smoothly given the tight security measures the Israelis are likely to
take and in view of the fact that all but the most radical fedayeen groups favor
holding the elections.
Recent Israeli changes in the old Jordanian election laws-including the
enfranchisement for the first time of West Bank women over 21 who meet a
minimum tax requirement-have greatly increased the number of eligible voters.
Approximately 85,000 West Bankers are now registered, including some 32,000
women and nearly 20,000 men who have registered for the first time.
Many of these new voters are likely to support pro-PLO candidates rather than
figures backed by the traditional clan political machines. Women are heavily
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
represented in many West Bank towns, and may become an important factor in West
Bank politics. For the first time, women are also campaigning as candidates-two in
Nabulus and two in smaller towns.
Voter turnout for the elections is likely to be heavy. Over 80 percent of those
registered voted in the 1972 elections as well as in the village council elections held
in October and November of last year.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
PORTUGAL-AZORES
Azorean leaders are not completely satisfied with the articles on autonomy for
the islands in the new Portuguese constitution, but they will probably wait until a
government is elected in the archipelago before pressing their demands much
further.
The original version of the articles on autonomy was generally accepted in the
islands, but was attacked in the constituent assembly by the Communists and their
allies. Laboring under a deadline set by Portugal's military leaders, the assembly
finally approved the compromise language submitted by a Socialist delegate. The
final version gives the national assembly in Lisbon veto power over legislation
proposed by the regional Azorean assembly and considerably weakens the powers of
a consultative council to be established to rule on the applicability of mainland
legislation to the archipelago.
Public discontent with the constitutional provisions has probably led to a
resurgence of activity by an extreme right-wing faction of the Azorean Liberation
Front, which is believed responsible for graffitti painted early this week on the
residences of the US consul and vice consul. Hoping to stem any renewed campaign
for immediate independence, local leaders are now pressing the Lisbon military for
provisional approval of an Azorean-drawn statute that is designed to supplement the
constitution and defines privileges received under autonomy in greater detail.
The statute was presented to the Lisbon government in February, but must be
approved by the new national assembly that will be elected on April 25. There is
concern among Azorean officials that when the autonomy statute is formally
presented by the Azorean assembly to the national assembly for final
approval-sometime this summer at the earliest-irreconcilable differences will
endence
f inde
i
,
p
on o
emerge and pressure will increase for a unilateral declarat
especially if an attempt is made to dissolve the Azorean assembly.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
The West German cabinet has decided to go ahead with production of the
multirole combat aircraft, now dubbed the Tornado. The cabinet's decision must be
approved by the Bundestag when it considers the matter in early May, and passage is
expected.
Of the two other participating countries, London announced its decision to
produce the aircraft in late March and there has been no formal announcement from
Rome. The West German decision may speak for the Italians, however, since Bonn is
already paying the relatively small Italian share of MRCA development costs.
The MRCA is Europe's most ambitious multinational weapons development
program. Because uncertainty has plagued the project from its beginnings in 1968,
the decision to go ahead with production is a major victory for Panavia, the
consortium responsible for overall development of the aircraft. A successful debut
by the MRCA could be an important stimulus to the growth of collaborative
weapons projects and to the principle of common procurement and standardization
in Western Europe.
Co-production is viewed as the only way for West European companies to
remain competitive with the US in advanced weapons development and sales in the
1980s. The Panavia consortium may serve as a model for future West European joint
military ventures.
Rising costs and engine problems over the last few years raised doubts that the
MRCA would ever reach series production. The huge investment already made,
however, weighed heavily in the final decisions to produce.
Bonn's share of MRCA program costs is $6.2 billion, out of a total cost of over
$13 billion. The program will provide 70,000 jobs for West German industry over
the next 10 years. The unit cost of the MRCA is now projected by the West
Germans at $10.6 million-more than double the original estimate in 1970 of $4.6
million-but even the new price is probably understated. We believe that it does not
include the necessary spare parts, ground-support equipment, and research and
development costs; these would bring the cost to over $19 million a copy.
The cost of the closest comparable fighter, the US F-111, is about $15.6
million. Exports outside the Anglo - West German - Italian consortium would
lengthen production runs and, thereby, lower unit costs. Canada, Australia, and
Japan have expressed interest in the MRCA.
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April 10, 1976
The MRCA program is about four years behind schedule. Most recently, the
flight-test phase has been slowed because of problems with the aircraft's Rolls Royce
engine and the crash in February of an Italian prototype. Although Bonn reportedly
will start getting ready for series production in July, the air force and navy will not
receive their first fighter-bombers until 1979.
Over 800 of the swing-wing aircraft will be produced for the three nations
participating in the program. West Germany and Italy will produce 322 and 100
MRCAs, respectively, to replace their F-104G fighters. The British will build 385
MRCAs, of which 165 will be the specialized air-defense version. The British MRCAs
will replace several older aircraft, including F-4 interceptors, Buccaneer
fighter-bombers, and the Vulcan and Canberra bombers. 25X1
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
The ninth round of the slow-moving force reduction talks in Vienna adjourned
yesterday for the spring recess.
During the session, Eastern representatives welcomed the West's December
offer to negotiate the withdrawal of some US nuclear forces, but they also criticized
it as inadequate. The East continued to reject Western demands for greater ground
force reductions on the Eastern side.
The East modified its own reductions proposal in February, and there were
indications during the session that it may be preparing to submit data on the nature
and size of its forces within the area where reductions will take place. The West has
so far, however, detected no sign that the East is prepared to abandon its original
objective of maintaining its present force advantage.
In a recent report to the North Atlantic Council, the West's representatives
observed that the Eastern proposal was probably intended to neutralize the positive
public reaction to the West's December offer.
The next round of the negotiations is scheduled to begin on May 17.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
Soviet Premier Kosygin told Swedish Prime Minister Palme this week that the
Politburo has decided that he and General Secretary Brezhnev should take a rest and
"let new political leaders be seen for awhile."
Kosygin said Brezhnev is still on vacation in the Black Sea area. The Soviet
Premier, looking fit and relaxed, said that he too had recently been on vacation.
Kosygin's remark about "new political leaders" could refer either to the new
members of the Politburo-Leningrad party boss Romanov and party secretary
Ustinov-or to the "younger" generation of Soviet leaders. Romanov and Ustinov
have not been unusually active in the post-congress period, nor have their normal
public appearances been accorded unusual publicity.
Among the "younger" leaders, only Politburo member Kulakov has appeared in
a new role. He headed the Soviet delegation at the Bulgarian party congress in late
March and early April. This was the first foreign party congress he had attended
since becoming a full member of the Politburo in 1971.
The policy of giving relative unknowns greater exposure is apparently not going
to be followed at the Czechoslovak party congress that opens Monday. Although
there has been no official announcement of the Soviet delegation, I
it will be headed by Politburo member
Kiril n < rezhnev's unofficial deputy and one who has attended such affairs in the
past.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 10, 1976
Belgrade believes the recent Soviet party congress placed increased emphasis on
orthodoxy in the "socialist community," and it fears Moscow is beginning to make
some effort to impose these standards on Yugoslavia.
The chief of staff of the Yugoslav armed forces has told the US military attache
that Moscow is expressing interest in greater access to Yugoslav naval repair
facilities. The Yugoslav officer said Belgrade would refuse to ease its extensive legal
regulations that restrict use of Yugoslavia's Adriatic ports by foreign navies.
According to a Soviet diplomat in Belgrade, Moscow last month sent a letter to
President Tito that complained about offensive articles in the Yugoslav press.
The current round of Yugoslav complaints about the Soviets began while Tito
was abroad. Tito's subordinates are inclined to publicize negative Soviet overtures,
but Tito believes that a public airing of differences only invites reprisals from
Moscow and unwanted attention from other powers such as China. Should the
criticism of the Soviets become too shrill, Tito will no doubt again step in to mute
it.
The current debate over US policy toward Eastern Europe has added to
Belgrade's fear of increased Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav press is apparently
playing down the debate, but Tito's likely successors doubtless are concerned over
what the Soviets may think about US policy toward Eastern Europe.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1976
On the strength of his party's victory in the election on April 4, Seni Pramot,
leader of the Democrat Party, is casting about to form a new government. The
Democrats are 25 seats short of a majority in the national assembly, making a
coalition government necessary.
According to most recent reports, the Social Justice, the Social Nationalist, and
the Thai Nation parties are the most likely coalition partners. They have 28, 8, and
56 seats, respectively. The inclusion of the Social Justice Party, headed by retired
Air Marshal Thawi Chunlasap, and the military-backed Thai Nation Party would
bring added support to the Democrats from the military and conservative business
elite. The four-party grouping would give the coalition a commanding 67-vote
majority in the national assembly.
Earlier, Praman Adireksan, leader of the Thai Nation Party, was reportedly
promoting the idea of a two-party coalition with the Democrats and indicated that,
in exchange for his party's support, it would want to hold the posts of minister of
defense, minister of agriculture and cooperatives, and minister of communications.
It appears, however, that Seni views the Social Justice and the Social
Nationalist parties as his primary supporters, mainly because retired General Krit has
strong influence over them. Krit gave substantial financial support to Seni and his
party, and apparently is a major influence in Seni's plans for the new government.
Krit is likely to be named minister of defense in exchange for his continued support.
The Thai Nation Party does not relish assuming the role of the opposition
party. It reportedly believes that, if it remained outside the government for an
extended period, the party would slowly weaken because it has no strong political
ideology to, hold it together. It may be prepared to lower its demands in exchange
for a voice in the new government. '(
For his part, Seni would probably welcome the Thai Nation Party as one of
several coalition members. With the four parties behind him, Seni would have a
powerful majority in the national assembly. He would then be less vulnerable to
pressure from any one member of the coalition and from factions within his own
party.
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