Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82-00457R010200180004-9
Body:
Approved For Release 2006/03/01 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO10200180004-9
v
COUNTRY Korea
CLASSIFICATION
SECURITY ORMATTON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
LONFID `i_.
25X1
DATE DISTR. 23 Jan- 1952
SUBJECT Relief of PAK Icon-yang and H0! Myang-hi as NO. OF PAGES 2
Vice-Premiers in the North Korean Government
25X1 ACQUIRED
DATE OF
INFO.
NO. OF ENCLS.
'A~_ thbLt
SUPPLEMENT TO
Tests DOCUMINTCONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTIN.IMENATONALDSFEM!E
OF THE O11MIN STATER WITHIN M MEANING OF 1192 10. SECTIONS 708
AND 7.4. OI THE U. S. CODE. AS ANMNDID. ITS TNANSMISSION OR NEVEL?
ATION Or ITS CONTENTS TO ON RECEIPT By AN UNAOTHORTIED PERSON
IS PROHIBITED BYLAW TEE REPRODUCHOH OF THIS PORM ISP$OHISITSD.
SOURCE
04 lS; - NEN? LUYE
DO !
%.Y J T C! RCUI ATF
ION
25X1
1. In early January PAK Hon-yong, the North Korean Foreign Minister and the top
South Korean Communist in the KIM :11-Bong government, and HONG Myong-hi (,3 4
Minister without Portfolio, were relieved of their posts as Vice-Premiers. PAN ?~
is still Foreign !inister but HONG"-was relieved of all cabinet responsibility,
though he retains his positiOn.in the Democratic Front for Unification of the
Fatherland. This makes Ht) Ka-i the sole Vice-Premier in the North Korean
government.
2. The background. Of these changes is as follpvs:
a. PAK and HONG were appointed Vice-Premiers by KIM Il-song to demonstrate his
desire to have South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) leaders in his government,
and to conceal from then and the nationalist Communists in North Korea the
fact that he is being directed by the Soviets,
b. PAK was trained in the Soviet Union and actively fought the Japanese in Korea.
He is more popular with the Koreans than KIM 11-song but he is unable to
challenge KIM for party leadership because he lacks Soviet backing. NevertheleE
PAK attempted to gain political and military parer with the support of the
following:
CH'OE Tong-tal (t 4 . ), former Minister of Justice under the interim
North Korean Peoples Committee (NKPC).
YI Kang-kuk (.Z, L ), former Chief of Foreign Affairs Bureau and
member of NKPC.
HONG Nam-pyo ?( $ ;a 0,1 ), former professor of Seonl University.)
YI SKng-yilp, leader of guerrillas in Korea.
KIN Won-gong ( ir A ), former Chairman of the People's Progressive
Party in the ROK.2
HO Song-t'aek, former North Korean Minister of Labor.3
c. The North Korean government overestimated the SKLP potential when they invaded
STATE X NAVY Z NsJtB
ARMY AIR FBI _IX I
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Approved For ~ IA-RDP82-00457RO10200180004-9
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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the 10K because Ni Hong advised KIN I3.song that the $KLP could control
South Korea when the North Koreans took Se 1. PAK plumed to overthrar the
RKES goverment the moment Seoul tell to the Cam "mists. PAR was able to
secure adherents In the armed forces and in the North Korean occupation agencies
operating in South Korea. When the Chinese Comuni.ett entered the conflict,
PAR approached the pro-tlhinese Ca rxunist clique in North Korea with similar
prapmiees ~, using It Kang-kuk,. KIM W -pomg, and CR+OR Wife-ti sere-, who were all
foraerli with the KIN It government 3n C)}ina and good friends of the pro-
Chinese Communist generals, CHI OK Yang-ken and, KM Mhz. oh ng. PAK pUybd a
double gene, horraver, and also approached the Soviets through 11 Kang-kuk (eta) s
N1 choli C#h OE, PARR N1m un and (WOK W .pil, all Oaamsan'4 t Intel Me MR
who` attoanpted to i see the Soviet enbsesdorg
d. KIM fl .opg was assured of the solid support of the Soviet Union, brewer, and
began Cleaning out the pro-Chinese Ca mist officials in the goverment and
$iRYr relieving KIM 1 -oh&g and (WOE Tehg-Vin of their high positions.t4
KIM 11-wing plane , In the event of a Korean a'mi oboe, to rid the -Worth Korean'
o the
goverment of South Noreen Communists and nationalists by sending # 5 1 to believes
ROK with loyal KIM 11-song am -to infiltrate ROK political parties*
the ROK goverment would eventually execute or Jail these returning loaders. The
North Korean goverment would thus gain favor with the Cam oohs-.` in the and
eliminate the South Korean Labor Part' leaders simu3Wtensous3y. What the North
Korean government fears most Is that the Oo fists in the ROK will -earn of the
split bets the North Korean goverment and thq South Korean Labor Party and
that they will refuse to cooperate, but KIM 33-0ng will take this chance and
hopes that the ROK goverment will be blamed for the eliainstion of the SI4LP
25X1 l0 I Ca -ent. BSLP leader and Vice-Chairman of the Presidium, Supreme Korean
'
-
Xiaombly,
s
25X1 2. Comment, Fled to North Korea in 1949 and became head of the National
onfIIistryf in 19500 25X1
25X1T?ta ICIt'I 25X1
orth Korea .
Approved For Release 2006/03/01 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO10200180004-9