NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010030-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: June 17, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Thursday June 17, 1976 CI NIDC 76-142C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
AbOMENA
Top Secret
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Palestinian and Lebanese leftist leaders have denied
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, June 17, 1976.
The NID Cable is for the purpose o In orming
senior US officials.
any responsibility for the murders of Ambassador Meloy and Eco-
nomic Counselor Waring.
Syria has not yet commented on the murders. Damascus
may be studying whether to take action in response. If it con-
cludes that Libyan Prime Minister Jallud's efforts to arrange a
truce with Palestinian and leftist forces are likely to get no-
where, Syria could use the murders as an excuse for a concerted
military push against the leftists.
On the other hand, the Syrians seem interested in a
truce that would at least give them more time to continue their
negotiations with the Palestinians. They have been playing along
with Jallud in an apparent effort to win political credit for
seeming to be conciliatory.
I I Jallud has in the meantime made no apparent progress
on the Syrian withdrawal plan he announced on Tuesday. Although
no major fighting occurred yesterday, there has been no sign
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that Syria intends to implement the plan, which calls--without
a timetable--for a phased withdrawal first to northern and east-
ern Lebanon and ultimately back into Syria.
The separate efforts of Arab League Secretary General
Riyad to secure agreement on the size and composition of the
joint Arab peacekeeping force have been no more successful.
Riyad yesterday obtained a heavily qualified endorsement of the
force from Lebanese Christian leaders, who last week adamantly
opposed it.
I IChristian leaders announced that they will not oppose
the force so long as it cooperates with but does not replace
Syrian forces, does not include Palestinians, and takes on as
its principal task the enforcement of the 1969 Cairo agreement
restricting Palestinian activities. The Christians also stipu-
lated that Libyan, Algerian, and Iraqi forces would be unaccept-
able.
I I These conditions would be virtually impossible for
the Palestinians or the Syrians to accept. The Palestinians want
the Iraqis involved to counter Syria's heavy involvement; the
Syrians want the Libyans and Algerians involved to ensure that
the Iraqis and the Egyptians will not play an important role.
Syrian President Asad arrives today in France for a
two-day visit. He has canceled his scheduled visit to Eastern
Europe presumably so he can return more quickly to Damascus to
deal with his pressing problems in Lebanon, with Iraq, and at
home.
Iraq's military moves also require close attention.
Although Baghdad shows no sign of having decided to move its
forces into Syria, its display of force has already tied down
several thousand Syrian troops and presumably provided additional
encouragement to Asad's domestic opponents.
Syrian officials have attempted to seize on the ex-
ternal threat from Iraq to elicit greater popular support for
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Asad and his policies. They appear to have made little progress,
however; there continues to be signs of dissatisfaction both
among civilians and within the armed forces.
25X1 I IA meeting of a Damascus area Baath Party unit last
week reportedly "broke up in chaos" after party leaders were
shouted down by critics of Asad's policy in Lebanon. Bombs
placed by unknown persons exploded at two locations in the
capital Tuesday night.
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We cannot confirm Palestinian and leftist claims that
a Syrian army unit protesting its assignment to Lebanon mutinied
on June 14, although a Palestinian pilot in the Syrian air force
defected to Iraq that morning. The Syrian army's autonomous De-
fense Companies, which are primarily responsible for internal
security, carried out "annual exercises" on June 14, but we have
no evidence that this was in response to a threat to Syrian
security. F7 I
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I ICurrent weather conditions in wheat-growing areas of
the USSR and recent Soviet forecasts of crop disease indicate
that rust fungus is likely to reduce the 1976 Soviet wheat crop
by over 10 million tons, double the usual loss from this disease.
The additional 5 million ton wheat loss is about the amount the
Soviets usually export to their client states, and it is nearly
the same as the normal amount of grain--6 million tons--the So-
viets are purchasing from the US each year under the current
five-year agreement.
Two high-level Soviet administrators and scientists
have forecast a high incidence of wheat rust this year. One in-
dicates that the north Caucasus, southwest Ukraine, and northern
Kazakhstan are threatened. The other added the non-Black Soil
Zone of European Russia and the Ural foothills to the areas
likely to be affected.
Practically all Soviet wheat varieties are susceptible
to the new virulent types of leaf rust, which first appeared in
1973 and which damaged 25 to 50 percent of some varieties. There
has been above-normal precipitation this spring in the wheat
growing areas, which favors the growth of the rust fungus. De-
pending on weather conditions during June and July, the enormous
reproduction rate of the rust fungus could quickly lead to the
development of a severe epidemic.
The Soviets have recommended that farms use relatively
expensive preventive and control measures, including aerial ap-
plication of fertilizer and fungicide. Soviet authorities, for
example, propose to spray about 10 percent of the spring wheat
in northern Kazakhstan with a phosphorus-potassium solution.
I I This solution is unlikely to reduce the development
o rust appreciably, but may increase plant vigor and resistance.
The proper application of fungicide could achieve some reduction
of the disease on specialized fields of wheat grown for seed.
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The personnel shifts in Romania's Council of Ministers
on Tuesday stem from President Ceausescu's increasing concern
over consumer dissatisfaction and economic inefficiency.
I I Ceausescu has moved a senior functionary with proven
administrative ability, Deputy Premier Niculescu, into a key posi-
tion affecting consumer welfare, presumably in an effort to im-
prove economic administration. Niculescu will head the newly es-
tablished coordination council for the production of consumer
goods. Bucharest's Mayor Cioara, another trusted Ceausescu sup-
porter and a strong proponent of better economic management--al-
though possessing a poor administrative record as mayor and re-
portedly ailing--was named a deputy premier. His new duties are
not known. The health minister and the chairman of the national
union of agricultural production cooperatives were replaced.
I ICeausescu's grip on the reins of power is strong,
u e apparently recognizes that he is most vulnerabl
to
e
an
economic downturn. Since last October the leadership has become
more responsive to hints of popular dissatisfaction;
I There also were changes in the military. Former defe
minister Ionita was named a deputy premier and presumably will
supervise military-security activities. Ionita's successor, army
chief of staff Colonel General Coman, reportedly is favorably
disposed toward the US. His trip to the US last summer was the
first visit here by the chief of staff of a Warsaw Pact member's
army.
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//The co-chairmen of the Conference on International
Economic Cooperation will meet in Paris today and tomorrow to set
an agenda for the next plenary session in July.//
//The agenda will guide senior government officials
in July in selecting problems to be addressed during the next
half year and setting a target date for completion of the nego-
tiations.//
//Also at issue will be the fate of the conference's
raw materials commission. Some developing states and EC members
have argued that the decision of the UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi
last month to schedule talks on commodity issues eliminates the
need for the raw materials commission.//
//The industrialized states, and the EC in particu-
ar, are looking for common ground on which to establish a joint
policy for future meetings with the developing states. They will
discuss differences at the ministerial meeting of the OECD next
week and at the summit meeting in Puerto Rico, but difficulties
are likely to persist between those that want to keep concessions
within a free-market framework and those arguing for increased
government involvement.//
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//The 19 developing states that must represent in
Paris t e more than 110 members of the developing states' cau-
cus--the so-called Group of 77--are under pressure to show that
some of the Group's demands can be satisfied.//
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//Most of the moderate developing states have ex-
pressed general satisfaction with the Nairobi meeting, but almost
all are disappointed with the slow progress of the Paris talks.
They will try in July to set a deadline for completing substan- 25X1
tive negotiations, probably within a year. They will also resist
efforts to select a few key issues on which to accelerate nego-
tiations for fear of splitting the group.
Bolivian President Banzer's efforts to ward off a gen-
eral strike have failed, and in fact seem to be making the situ-
ation worse.
Workers from two major state-owned mines who walked
off the job last week in reaction to the government's declara-
tion of a state of siege now have been joined by other miners
and some employees in industry and the universities.
The miners are demanding the removal of the troops,
the release of union leaders from detention, and a wage settle-
ment. They are asking for a 150-percent wage increase and have
said they would not consider a government counter-offer.
Banzer visited the mines this week but apparently was
unable to persuade the miners to return to work. He then called
a special meeting of the armed forces high command, but no pro-
posal for solving the problem has yet been announced.
The North Koreans recently have taken a number of
steps publicly to demonstrate their unhappiness with the support
they are receiving from the Soviet Union. Their attitude has
attracted attention to Pyongyang's independent policies, which
the North Koreans probably think will help their campaign to
win support from nonaligned countries.
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In the past month Pyongyang:
--Played host to a high-level Egyptian military delegation
following Cairo's abrogation of its friendship treaty with
Moscow in March.
--Included for the first time an "antihegemony" clause (a
Chinese anti-Soviet formulation) in a joint communique issued
on May 26 following Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's visit to
North Korea.
--Identified itself more openly with Romanian apprehensions
over Soviet efforts to impose closer controls on independent-
minded regimes in Eastern Europe.
I ISoviet - North Korean relations have been correct but
coo since the early 1970s. The relationship periodically cools
or warms depending in large measure on the amount of effort and
resources Moscow invests to counter Peking's position in Pyong-
yang. Clearly the Soviets have not been trying hard of late.
I I The five-year trade and aid agreement signed with the
USSR in February, for example, provides little new economic aid.
North Korea was reportedly granted a five-year moratorium on
its debt to the USSR, but Moscow did not provide the hard cur-
rency loan necessary to help the North Koreans avoid further
default on debts with non-communist nations.
Pyongyang's debt problem hampers its trade with the
West and reinforces its dependence on Moscow and Peking. The
new five-year agreement with the USSR reportedly calls for a
40-percent trade increase over the previous five-year period.
Pyongyang also is annoyed at Moscow's occasional
gestures toward South Korea. Early this month, Seoul announced
that the Soviets had agreed for the first time to permit families
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of Korean origin interned since World War II on Sahkalin Island
in the Soviet Far East to emigrate to Japan. Most of these
families are likely to return ultimately to South Korea F
It is in North Korea's interest to maintain at least
a rough balance in its relations with China and the USSR. A trip
to Moscow by President Kim Il-song, who made a much-publicized
trip to China in April 1975, would go a long way toward achiev-
ing that goal. There were signs that Kim was planning such a
visit last September, but the Soviets put him off. More recently
Soviet officials have stated privately that a Kim visit would
come in "the second half of this year."
South African police have sealed off Soweto Township,
the sprawling all-black suburb of Johannesburg, after a day of
rioting by thousands of secondary students that left at least
seven persons dead and some 40 wounded.
he riots were the culmination of a strike that began
in mid-May when some black students rebelled against the govern-
ment's insistence that certain courses be taught in the Afri-
kaaner language. Afrikaans is widely regarded by blacks as a
symbol of white oppression.
The authorities seem to be in control of the situation
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and should be able to prevent the disturbances from spreading
outside Soweto, but they may feel compelled to reconsider their
insistence on the use of Afrikaans in black schools. A reversal
of the order would be considered a political victory by Soweto's
blacks and could lead to other demands for change.
The riots will inevitably recall memories of the 25X1
"Sharpeville massacre" of 1960 in which some 60 black demon-
strators were killed and will lead to another round of foreign
condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policies.
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//The EC and Canada completed negotiations last
week on a trade and economic cooperation agreement that proba-
bly will come into effect late this year.//
//The non-preferential agreement is the first of
its kind between the Community and a major industrialized coun-
try. It could be a model for EC accords with other developed
states, such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.//
//The agreement was threatened by EC insistence--
mostly at Danish prodding--that it include a clause giving the
EC nondiscriminatory access to Canadian natural resources and
guaranteeing security of supply. Canada refused to make such a
promise, arguing in part that it would require changing price
controls that had been in effect since October 1975. Ottawa
also maintained that the exploitation of natural resources was
a matter for provincial authorities and lay outside the control
of the federal government.//
//Canada finally agreed to let the EC state its
views in a unilateral note, which will be added to, but not be
a part of, the final agreement. Canada will acknowledge the EC's
position in a second note.//
//The agreement will provide a framework for regu-
lar ministerial meetings, joint industrial ventures, and ex-
changes of commercial, agricultural, and technical information.
On trade matters, the agreement will basically reiterate the
most-favored-nation commitments already covered under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.//
//For Canada, the agreement has considerable politi-
cal significance. It provides the backbone of Prime Minister
Trudeau's "third option" foreign policy, which calls for reduc-
ing Canada's dependence on the US by expanding relations with
other nations. For that reason the government considers it im-
portant that the agreement bear some economic fruit in the next
few years.//
I //The agreement--which contains no specific trade
measures--is likely to have little economic effect on Canada.
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It is unlikely to reverse the EC's declining share of total
Canadian trade--ll percent in 1975 as compared to 14 percent in
1970--especially in view of Canada's desire to export finished
goods and the EC's wish to import natural resources.//
//As a result Canada's favorable trade balance with
the EC--some $4.1 billion in exports compared to $3.3 billion
in imports last year--will not be greatly affected. Canadian
imports of finished goods in 1975 including beverages, steel
shapes, transportation equipment, and clothing were more than
offset by exports of wheat, ores, asbestos, and wood pulp. EC
exports to Canada, however, have grown at nearly double the rate
of imports since 1970.//
//Joint ventures and investments in Canada will be
the greatest avenue for cooperation, particularly in the pro-
duction and processing of forest products, uranium, and non-
ferrous metals. The EC, for example, recently loaned the British
Steel Corporation $78 million to exploit new iron ore deposits
in Quebec.//
//The Trudeau government hopes that the agreement
will foster investment in Canada, thus reducing dependence on
US and Eurobond financing. On the other hand, Ottawa's Foreign
Investment Review Act may retard EC participation in Canadian
ventures. Over the past year foreign investors have complained
about the uncertain investment climate and the confusing regu-
lations under which the law is administered. These problems will
probably be discussed within the new consultative framework.
//French President Giscard is likely to push his
proposal for a new multilateral aid fund for Africa at the
economic summit meeting in Puerto Rico.
//The Giscard concept first came to light during
a Franco-African summit meeting in May. The French plan to flesh
out details of the proposal and hope to gain US support for the
fund before it is brought up at the summit.//
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/The French plan resembles a US proposal made by
Secretary Kissinger during his recent visit in Africa. Both
plans envisage a multi-billion dollar program to help the
drought-stricken nations of the Sahel over the next several
years. The French plan would extend assistance to other African
areas that the French wish to favor.
I
--Preserve its close ties with francophone states in Africa
and expand relations with other African countries.
--Promote new aid plans to improve North-South relations.
--Balance ill will in black Africa generated by the recent
French agreement to provide South Africa with major new nuclear
power plants.
--Help counter growing Soviet influence in Africa in the wake
of Angolan developments.//
//The French expect their European neighbors to
balk at the proposal--which will cost $1 to $2 billion--because
of already large commitments to Africa. Paris, however, hopes
that contributions will be voluntary and that funds can be either
public or private. Private capital would be backed government
guarantees or subsidies.
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//The Giscard government hopes its proposal will:
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