SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001202830035-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: October 28, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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F
The IISSB's inability to affect the outcome of or
capitalize on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the
continuing war between Iran and Iraq has highlighted
the limits of Soviet influence in the Middle East.
Moscow's prestige and credibility with states in the
region have sunk to the lowest point in years. The
fundamental weaknesses of the Soviet position in the
region argue against a quick reversal of fortunes.
Nevertheless, the. Soviets have already begun to recoup
some of tLeir losses through their one dependable
asset--military assistance. The Kremlin's initial
actions have focused on Syria and have led to some
improvement in the relationship. iTe believe the
broades thrust of Moscow's efforts, however, will be to
block the~e~ergence of a. IIS-sponsored, Arab-Israeli
settleaent that would ezclude the IISSB and to prevent a
further deterioration of its position in Iran and
Iraq. The success of this strategy is largely
dependent upon the actions of gavernmen which
the Soviets have little ar no control.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 October 1982
SOVIET STRATEGF IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE NERT SIR MONTHS
Summarp
This memorandum was prepared by Office of
Soviet Analysis, Current Support Division, for Geof?rey Remp,
Senior Middle East officer of the NSC Staff, at the req.nest of
the NIO for Near Bast/South Asia. It is to be drawn upon in the
redrafting of National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 4: IIS
Strate y for the .Near East and Southwest Asia. Comments and
queries are welcome and ma be addressed to
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The Current. Balance Sheet
The gremlin's key Arab allies--Syria and the PLO--suffered
major military defeats in Lebanon. The seeming ease with which
--the Israelis scored their victories. caused the Arabs...-to question
the effectiveness of Soviet weapons. Moscow had to watch from
the sidelines as the US negotiated a withdrawal of PLO and Syrian
troops from Beirut and as peacekeeping forces from three NATO
aembers were deployed in Lebanon --possibly for a long stay.
Syria is in a much more vulnerable position militarily, with
Israeli forces poised on its western flank in Lebanon ?a Bekaa
Valley and straddling the Beirut-Damascus highway. The PLO?a
military arm--which is Soviet-supplied- has been decimated. If
the PLO shifts the emphasis of ite struggle to the political
sphere, as seems likely, its ties to the USSR will diminish in
importance.
Libya--another Soviet ally--further isolated itself from the
Arab community by its scathing attacks on other Arab governments
for failing to come to the aid of the Palestinians and its own
reckless advice to the PLO that its members commit suicide rather
than withdraw from Beirut. There have even been signs of strain
between Moscow and the heretofore solidly pro-Soviet regime in
South Yemen.
Finally, the war between Iran and Iraq continues to -
frustrate the USSR. It has sought to preserve relations with
each side by not appearing to tilt decisivel toward either but
has only succeeded in antagonizing both.
Despite these developments, the picture is not~~all bleak-for
the Soviets. Syria's vulnerability has made it more dependent
upon Moscow than ever. Notwithstanding their doubts about the
performance of Soviet arms, Damascus and the other major arms
clients of the USSR in the region have few alternatives to
continued dependence on Soviet weaponry. Even Iraq, which has
taken steps to diversify its sources, has found. that it can ill
afford to jeopardize the Soviet arms link as long as the war with
Iran continues. Jordan has begun to receive its first Soviet
weapons and military advisers, and it continues to acknowledge
the need for Moscow to play a role in the Middle East peace
process. In addition, the US image in the Arab world has also
suffered due to the widely-held perception that Washington bears
responsibility for Israel's actions in Lebanon. ~~
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S ria
The Rremlin?s efforts to recoup its losses pyre centered on
Syria. Moscow has already replaced much of the weaponry Damascus
lost durin the confl
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FTe believe the USSR will continue to be forthcoming. in
meeting Syria's military needs but will advise Damascus not to
make any provocative moves against Israeli forces in Lebanon.
The Soviets recognize the vulnerability of the Syrian position
there. They almost certainly want to avoid a major Israeli-
Syrian battle that would lead to another Syrian defeat and might
also prompt Assad to request direct Soviet militar intervention,
which Moscow remains reluctant to provide. 25X1
Negotiations to obtain mutual Syrian and Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon would cause problems for Moscow. They are not
likely to urge Assad to withdraw if it involved US mediation,
which would again leave the USSR on the sidelines. Moscow, in
this case, would probably utilize its leverage with Damascus in
an attempt to forestall a US-sponsored solution, but would have
little choice other than to acquiesce if the Syrians decide to go
along.
The PLO
The Soviets can also be expected to maintain their concerted
effort to repair their- damaged relations with the PLO. In our
judgment, their main objective will be to derail any move by the
PLO toward the moderate Arab states or the liS. Moscow's concerns
on this score appear to have been intensified by PLO leader
Arafat's failure to reject outright the US Middle East peace
initiative and by his mid-October discussions with Jordan?s Ring
Hussein.
Since the summer, Moscow has been promoting its links with
the radical PLO factions of George Habash (PFLP) and Naif
Hawatmah (DFLP) in an apparent effort to obtain Ieverag~e over
Arafat and to deflect the PLO from a moderate course. If the PLO
splits over the issue of Arafat's more moderate course, the
Soviets could throw their support behigd the PFLP and DFLP. Thep
also could funnel additional arms to PLO fighters in northeastern
Lebanon to encourage a confrontational course with Israel. But
the Kremlin undoubtedly realizes that Arafat will remain the mast
influential Palestinian spokesman, and it will not burn all its
bridges with him, even if he begins to talk with the US.
Furthermore, the Soviets will have to tread a delicate path in
the growing dispute between Arafat and Assad to avoid further
alienating either.
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The Peace Process
Soviet media commentary and private statements by Soviet
diplomats suggest that Moscow is deeply concerned by signs of
Arab movement toward consideration of a US-sponsored peace
settlement, as this threatens to perpetuate Soviet isolation from
Middle Eastern diploaacy. These recent developments include:
The qualified praise many Arab officials have given
President Reagan's initiative;
The moderation of the Arab positioa at the Fez summit;
The discussions between the two sides in Washington is
October; and
The talks between Arafat and King Hussein concernin a
Jordanian-Palestinian political affiliation. 25X1
The USSR has already mounted an effort to have its voice
heard in the latest round of maneuvering by repackaging President
Brezhnev?s long-standing proposal for an international conference
on the Arab-Israeli question. This new version incorporates some
of the points of the Fez plan in an effort to convince the Arabs
that the Soviet proposal, unlike the US one, is compatible with
their position. The Soviets have vociferously disparaged the US
initiative, claiming that its ignores Palestinian interests.
Moscow will continue to lobby intensively with the Arabs on
this issue. It probably will host a delegation from the Arab
League, similar to the one that has just visited Washington, to
discuss the Fez and.Brezhnev plans. We judge that winning. -
supgort for .their own plan is of secondary importance to the
Soviets. Their primary goal will be to scuttle any further
movement toward a new US-Arab. dialogue on the peace process.
Iran and Iraq
The failure of Iran's pffensive into Iraq has taken the
pressure off the USSR for a major reassessment of its policy
toward the war. Since Iran's July offensive, Moscow has tilted
slightly toward Iraq, voting twice in the UN Security Council for
an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal to the pre-war border.
Tehran has roundly condemned the USSR for these. votes. The
Soviets also have continued to ship a steady flow of arms to
Iraq. .Iran, at the same time, ie procuring Soviet-designed or
-built weapons from North Korea, Syria, Libya and East European
countries, but only limited amounts directly from the USSR. The
Kremlin, however has earned little gratitude in Baghdad for this
policy. .. _
In part because of this slight pro-Iraqi tilt, Soviet-
Iraaian relations are now at their lowest ebb since tTie summer of
1980, when. former Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh waged a-personal
campaign against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviets
have stepped up media polemics against Tehran~s anti-Soviet
policies and pronouncements and have adopted a more aggressive
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stance toward Afghan insurgent operations near the border between
Iran and Afghanistan. Moscow appears to have concluded that the
chances for an early end to the downward swing in relations are
slim. Although the Soviets will continue to probe for any
xillingness in Tehran to improve ties, relations are unlikely to
improve during the nest half year. Nevertheless, pant Soviet
performance during the war suggests that the USSR is unlikely to
tilt more decisively .toward Iraq during the next six ~onttis for ,
fear of doing more lasting damage to its ties with Iran. ~~
Libya and South Yemen
The Soviets are continuing to expand their use of Libyan air
and naval facilities, but they will be careful to avoid getting
entangled in Qadhafi's running dispute with the US over the
extent of Libya's jurisdiction in the Gulf of Sidra. Moscow,
similarly, will continue to develop its military relationship
with South Yemea. Its misgivings about President Hasani's more
open attitude toward economic dealings with the West and China
are probably still outweighed by the fact that his overall _
policy, on balance, is firmly pro-Soviet. The Soviets,
nevertheless, will monitor Hasani's performance closely and will
seek to maintain their assets in the South Yemeni ruling
hierarchy as a form of leverage and as a base from which to mount
a move a ainst him in the future should they deem~it necessary.
The Arab Moderates
Moscow. will not back away 'during the next six months from
its steady effort to drive a wedge between the US and moderate
Arab states. .Egypt, which the Soviets consider the most
important Arab country, will remain the primary focus of this
effort. The Soviets will continue to probe for an Egyptian
willingness to improve ties. They will probably make some
progress in the economic sphere and might obtain the return of
both ambassadors to their respective posts. President Mubarak's
deep mistrust of the USSR, however, all but rules out a dramatic
breakthrough in relations over the next half year. The same can
be said with regard to Soviet-Saudi Arabian relations, which
remain dormant. despite repeated Soviet overtures.
Moscow will attempt to build upon the success it has had
over the last few years in improving its ties with Jordan, Kuwait
and North Yemen. Soviet provision of arms will remain an
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important aspect of each relationship, but the Soviets will
continue to seek a broadening of the political, economic and
cultural aspects as well.
Israel
Soviet-Israeli relations have declined to their lowest point
as a result of mutual polemics over Israel ?s invasion_.,of
Lebanon. Since then, Moscow has publicly questioned the right of
Israel to remain a member of the UN and voted twice to oust Tel
Aviv from UN-affiliated organizations. Despite this, the
Soviets, as always, will keep the door open for dialogue with
Israel. They would benefit greatly from the ability to talk to
both sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Arab resentment of
Israel is at such a fever pitch, however, that the chances of a
Soviet move to improve relatins with Tel Aviv during the next six
months are remote.'
Outlook
_~
In our judgment, Moscow's primary objectives over the next
few months will be to restore its damaged credibility with its
allies in the Middle East, block the emergence of a US-Arab
dialogue based on the American and Arab peace plans and prevent
further deterioration of its position in Iran and Iraq. The
ability of the Soviets to achieve these objectives, however, will
depend less upon their own actions than upon the creativity of US
peacemaking efforts, the Arab world's percegtion of the utility
of achieving its goals through negotiation, Israeli moves and the
course of the war between Iran and Iraq. Barring dramatic
internal changes in key countries that might bring a more pro-
Soviet. regime to power, Moscow's best chance for quickly
regaining ground lies in exploiting any Arab disillusionment
should the US fail to lessen Israeli intransigence.
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