Khrushchev and the American Elections

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 6, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
5 October 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Khrushchev and the American Elections
SUMMARY'S
A. Two major uncertainties will condition Soviet foreign
policy in the coming weeks -- the effects of the elections on US
policy and the December meeting of Communist parties to deal with
the China problem.
B. Though the Soviets expect President Johnson will win,
they are worried that the election campaign may cause a hardening
of policy. They are going to be reserved and cautious until they
can determine what, if any, changes of American policy have occurred.
Khrushchev will be angling for a meeting with the President and
probably will make some amiable gestures after the elections.
C. We foresee no great change in the general lines of Soviet
policies. The factors which led to the improvement of Soviet-
American relations last year are still operative. The China problem
in particular provides a strong incentive for Khrushchev to keep
his relations with the West fairly stable. There are, however,
important issues, such as Cuba, where the Soviets may have little
choice but to take a strong position which would heighten tensions
and jeopardize other aspects of their Western policy. Khrushchev is
This memorandum has been prepared with the assistance and
concurrence of 0/CI.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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likely to try to postpone any such tests at least until he has
dealt with the problem of China at the Communist meeting in
December, a meeting which will demonstrate how far the disintegra-
tion of Soviet authority over the Communist movement has progressed.
1. Early this year the Soviet leaders apparently concluded
that no important business could be transacted with the West until
the American elections were out of the way. They indicated that the
most they hoped for in the interim was to keep relations with the
US on an even keel. In the last few months, however, some new
elements in the Soviet attitude have become evident. Initially,
they seemed generally relaxed about the elections, but since the
nomination of Senator Goldwater, the Soviets have taken up a
harsher propaganda line.
The Election C;mpain
2. The new aspect of Soviet observations on American
politics is the emphasis on the differences between the 1964
campaign and previous ones. Usually, the Soviets have a preference
between the candidates but adopt the standard propaganda position
that in the US system there can be little basic difference between
opposing candidates or policies. This year, however, they have
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made it plain that there are sharp distinctions between the con-
tending parties and policies and there is no doubt they prefer
President Johnson.
3. A second significant departure in the Soviet analysis
of the election is the conclusion they have evidently drawn about
the effect of Senator Goddwater's candidacy. There is a clear
effort by the Soviets to credit the emergence of tense situations,
as in Vietnam and Cyprus, to American election, pressures. While
they have been careful not to criticize the President personally,
they have asserted that the administration is reacting to the
growing pressures from the right wing. As one Soviet leader put
it typically last week,
"in the countries of the capitalist West, a new
activization of the forces of extreme reaction is
taking place ... Reaction is raising its head in
the US. The US wildmen are fanning chauvinism in
its most extreme form."
I+. We believe that this propaganda line reflects some
genuine concern among the Soviet leadexa. Insofar as they are
actually worried about a hardening of US policy, however, they
almost certainly attribute this to the temporary factor of
election pressure. There is little doubt. that Khrushchev expects
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President Johnson to be elected in November. In the light of this
expectation, the present Soviet treatment of the election campaign
has some advantages. Kh-rushchev will be able to hold up President
Johnson's election as a vindication of the USSR's peaceful co-
existence policy and as a rebuff of the "fascists" forces. Of
course, if Senator Goldwater is elected, then the Soviet propaganda
machine has laid the groundwork for a change of Soviet policy,
if need be.
5. In the next few weeks before the elections, the Soviets
are not likely to embark on any major policy ventures. Khrushchev
will be reluctant to become involved in any critical situations
with the US (Southeast Asia, Cuba, Berlin) where he would probably
anticipate that election pressures in the US would force the
administration to react sharply. At the same time, as their
recent responses to the situations in Cyprus, Indonesia, and
Zanzibar demonstrate, the Soviets are not foregoing opportunities.
Post-Election Policies
6. Looking past the elections, we do not foresee any pre-
planned moves to confront the US with sharp challenges. Though a
This paper treats only probable policies in the event of
President Johnson's election, because we think Soviet policy is being
planned against this expectation.
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number of issues are hanging fire because of the election campaign,
the Soviets are likely to move.slowly at first, testing and probing
the US to determine what effect the campaign has had on American
policy. We would expect some early gesture toward the President --
intended to make it clear that Khrushchev endorses the outcome and
to stimulate hopes for a further reduction of international tensions.
The Soviets have already hinted at a summit, and hrushchev is quite
capable of appearing in New York for the UN General Assembly. Soviet
tactics will depend to a great extent on the US response to such
gestures and probes.
7. There are strong forces still operative in Soviet policy
which appear to rule out an abrupt shift to a rough line. Soviet
military programs in the two years since Cuba have not led to any
basic changes in the strategic situation which would support a
more aggressive policy. Khrushchev still needs more and longer-
term economic credits from the West. He has made some progress in
this respect over the past year, and the competition for Soviet
orders which he has stimiLlated promises to yield even more signifi-
cant gains. He probably attributes this success, at least in part,
to the better climate of East-West relations since the test ban
treaty. This economic offensive, therefore, is likely to set some
limits on Khrushchev's freedom of action.
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6. The line Khrushchev has adopted for dealing with the
Chinese Comonnists has reduced hia maneuverab-tlity regardless of
the outcome of the American el,e";iono. Presumably, one way of
meeting the Chinese challenge would have been to compete in
revolutionary fervor, militancy and aggressiveneRs. But, at least
since the Cuban miaail.e crisis, ',._rus'achev has adopted the
alternative responae and ban cndex o ^ed to otabill.ze his Western
front and demonstrate that it is poesible to deal with the West.
As pointed out by Togli&tti in his much publicized memorandum, the
test ban was a significant, blow a ainst the Chinese. Though
Soviet ambitions in the underdeveloped areas are contra y to
Western interests, much of their energy has been devoted to
freezing out the Chinese, or at least undercutting Peiping's
position with such non-revolutiona,y tactics as diplomacy,
personal visits, economic and military aid. And in Laos and
Vietnam, where the Soviets might have effectively competed with
China in militancy, I=ushchev has deliberately tried to di 6en--
gage the USSR from any responsibility or commitments, even going
so far as to hint strongly that Hanoi and Peiping cannot count on
automatic Soviet support in a war with the West.
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9. We conclude from the record of the past two years that
the Chinese problem has not had the effect of pushing the USSR
onto a more aggressive course in the non-Communist world. This
is likely to hold true in the near future. Even though Khrushchev
will seek to strengthen the Soviet position against the Chinese in
preparation for the anti-Chinese conference in December, we do not
think that his efforts to this end will take the form of tough
new moves against the US; he almost certainly does not want two
confrontations -- with the US and with China -- at the same time.
Some Specific Problems
10. T+;o important issues are likely to arise shortly after
the elections: US overflights of Cuba, and Soviet refusal to pay
up its arrears for UN peacekeeping operations.
11. Both Khrushchev and Castro have made it clear that the
issue of U-2 overflights will be raised once the American elections
are over. Castro has not yet inscribed this question on the
General Assembly agenda, but he has indicated that he intends to
put the issue before the UN in some way. The main question is
whether the Cubans will eventually order a shootdown if they make
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no headway with a political solution. Castro may have been
sobered by the example of American retaliatory action in the
Gulf of Tonkin, but the U.) cannot count on Castro's moderation.
12. As for Kkrus hchev, he doubtless hopes that his sharp
warnings last simper will have some effect. He probably will be
looking for some sign after the elections that the U-2 program is
being cut back or suspended. Castro, however, has considerable
bargaining power with Knrushchev,on the U-2 issue, since Cuba's
support against China in the December Communist meeting is by no
means assured. Thus Kh ushchev almost certainly will provide Cuba
with strong political finzpport, in the UN and elsewhere, on the
overflight issue. But the Soviets probably will want to avoid a
showdown with the US at least until after the December meeting
of Communist parties.
Article 19
13. A second issue could arise when the UN General Assembly
convenes for its 19th session on 10 November. Under Article 19,
the Soviets are technically liable to lose their General Assembly
vote if they do not pay on their arrears for the UN peacekeeping
forces in the Middle Vast and the Congo. The Soviets have been
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adamant in their refusal to pay, and they are not likely to change
this position. Article 19 is not likely to be applied automatically,
and the Soviets seem fairly confident that the unwillingness of
many UN members to face a showdown on this issue will enable them
to defeat any parliamentary maneuvering to deprive them of a vote.
Nevertheless, the Soviets are not looking for a showdown. They
have repeatedly hinted that they would welcome a postponement or
compromise and the Soviets will be probing for some flexibility
in the US position. If the US, however, forces the issue, the
Soviets will stand their ground.
Potential Trouble Spots
14. The completion of the American elections is not likely
to have much effect on Soviet moves in a number of trouble spots
where the USSR is already involved. It is clear that the limited
rapprochement with the West was not intended to curb anti-Western
policies in the underdeveloped world or cause the Soviets to forego
opportunities. We would emphasize Cyprus and Indonesia as situations
where the Soviets are being pressured to take riskier actions.
Details of the Soviet-Cypriot agreement will be available soon, and
Sukarno has been in Moscow, evidently to determine how much political
and material support he can count on from Moscow for his confronta-
tion with Malaysia.
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Berlin and Gerriany
15. One area where we expect a cautious and reserved policy
from Moscow is Berlin. Trouble can always erupt in Berlin suddenly
and small incidents can escalate rapidly. But we think that in
this area Soviet policy is to pursue a more conciliatory line,
aimed at establishing greater contacts between the East German and
West Berlin authorities, and to the extent possible also with Bonn.
It is also evident that Soviet policy is shifting from the question
of Berlin to the broader question of Germany. What Khrushchev
has in mind in pressing for a meeting with Erhard (probably in
January) is difficult to perceive, but it is apparent that Soviet:
diplomacy in Europe is being reactivated. After, the Erhard
meeting, the Sowieta will be urging a visit by de Gaulle, and
contacts with a new (or old) British Prime Minister are to be
expected.
16. The Soviets are also unlikely to push an aggressive line
in Laos and Vietnam. The main effect of the American election on
Soviet policy in these areas may be to revive diplomatic efforts for
a Geneva conference. Despite earlier threats by Moocow to withdraw
from its responsibility as co-chairman of the Geneva conference,
Khrushchev has put off any final decision. Some time ago the
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Soviets told the Laotian ambassador that there was little chance
for a diplomatic movement until after the elections. Thus Moscow
might make one more try to put Laos, and Vietnam as well, under
international negotiation. In the process, they would be likely,
on the one hand, to threaten the US with the prospect that they
will wash their hands of the problem, while indicating to China
and North Vietnam, on the other hand, that in any enlarged con-
frontation the USSR might publicly side against them, as in the
Sino-Indian border war. They have already sent diplomatic notes
to unaligned countries attacking both US and Chinese policy in
Southeast Asia.
The China Problem
17. Overshadowing almost every other aspect of Soviet policy
is the coming meeting of Communist parties in December. Scarcely
a move is made in Moscow that is not in some wey related to anti-
Chinese maneuvering. The meeting in December will be a landmark
in the breakup of the Communist movement. Of the 25 parties
invited to Moscow, six will probably boycott the meeting: those of
China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Japan, Indonesia, and .Albania.
Of the remaining parties, many are reluctant to attend and will
come only to "expound their own views," as the Italian party has
put it.
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18. This reluctance has already established certain limita-
tions on what the Soviets can accomplish. No formal condemnation
of China is likely, no "excommunication" of China is likely, and
no new International is likely. Thus the Soviets will have to be
satisfied with a general statement of Communist policies, although
the Soviet delegates will almost certainly exert heavy pressure for
a declaration that can be turned against Chinese views.
19. Soviet acceptance of such limitation on the objectives
of the meeting may sway the Rumanians and persuade them to attend.
As of now, however, they are still uncommitted, and there is a
possibility that they are making another attempt at mediation during
the current visit of their high level delegation in Peiping. If
the Rumanians do attend, their presence will strengthen the faction
that seeks to play down the dispute, avoid a general conference,
prolong negotiations, and extend overtures to China. It is
possible that this group, which has the behind-the-scenes support
of Tito, will succeed in selling Togliatti's proposal for a group
of parties to undertake a mission of conciliation to Peiping.
20. Regardless of the specific outcome of the December meeting,
the fact that the Soviets are going ahead to hold the conclave
without China and its allies, marks an important turning point for
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