THE VIETNAM AIR WAR AND CHINESE BASES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300050019-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 24, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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T-O-R-E-T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
24 November 1967
SUBJECT: The Vietnam Air War and Chinese Bases
1. Since the US bombed Phuc Yen airfield in late October,
North Vietnamese aircraft have on three different occasions
landed at China's Ning-ming airfield after flying combat missions
against US aircraft. In each case the aircraft returned directly
to their home bases several hours later without attempting to
engage in combat enroute. There have also been several instances
when North Vietnamese fighters have flown across the border after
combat missions but returned home without landing in China,
possibly because of poor weather at Ning-ming or because of the
departure of US aircraft posing a threat to the returning MIGs.
We have no evidence that Chinese airfields have been used by the
North Vietnamese to mount combat missions, and we are fairly con-
fident that they have not been so used.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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2. It appears, therefore, that because of present US
attacks on their bases, North Vietnamese aircraft have begun to
make limited operational use of Chinese airfields. But it is not
established that a decision has been made by Hanoi and Peking to
stage North Vietnamese combat operations from Chinese airfields
on a systematic basis. What has already happened, however, does
raise the question as to whether China is prepared to enlarge its
involvement in the war in this manner.
3. It is conceivable that some major change in internal
politics has precipitated a Chinese decision to become more in-
volved in the Vietnam air war and to adopt a tougher, more aggres-
sive stand against the US. Since early September there has been
a respite in the political struggle, and Peking is therefore in a
somewhat better position to deal with the new situation created
by the US strikes against the North Vietnamese airfields. How-
ever, this hypothesis is purely speculative and there have been
no private warnings from Peking, which we would except if a
major shift of policy were in train. There are no other indica-
tions suggesting such a development in Chinese policy. Propaganda
attention to Vietnam remains comparatively moderate in volume and
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adheres to longstanding positions. Ground force activity in South
China is normal, and even the buildup of air defenses, when viewed
in the perspective of the past two years, does not seem particu-
larly ominous.
k. Nevertheless, in going this far in providing a safe haven
for North Vietnamese fighters, the Chinese must realize they have
already assumed some new risks and they must be weighing care-
fully further use of their territory. On the one hand.. Peking may
believe that limited use of Chinese bases would not be especially
risky. They may believe that US concern over drawing China more
directly into the air war has been one of the reasons the US
delayed so long in attacking North Vietnam's fighter bases. They
might calculate that the US would be very reluctant to carry its
air attacks across the Chinese border, and that any such decision
would provoke strong opposition in the US and in the world at
large. The Chinese may also reason that the risks of US re-
taliation could be minimized for some time by holding the use of
Chinese airfields to a low level and by leaving China's role as
ambiguous as possible.
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5. On the other hand, China and North Vietnam must recog-
nize that even in present circumstances there is a chance of hot
pursuit by US aircraft. They must also consider the possibility
that intensified use of Chinese bases would bring a retaliatory
strike by the US. Particularly if the latter came to pass, the
Chinese would have to decide whether to respond with new military
countermeasures or back down and lose face.
6. We think it unlikely that Peking has yet determined
just how extensively and in what circumstances Hanoi may use air
bases in China. Moreover, it could be some time before the North
Vietnamese are forced to abandon all use of their own fields, and
it is by no means certain that Hanoi believes some fighter defense
is so necessary that it would want to go further down the uncertain
road of greater and greater Chinese involvement.
7. Thus the situation may continue unchanged for some time.
However, if the present tactics of partial use of Chinese air-
fields do not elicit a strong US reaction or warning in private,
taking the next step would over time tend to appear less drastic
and risky. And then, if the North Vietnamese airfields could not
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be used, Hanoi would be more disposed to ask for the right to
mount combat operations from Chinese airfields. We believe there
would be about an even chance that Peking would agree to this;
if it did agree, Peking would attempt through propaganda, politi-
cal action, and tight control of the operations to reduce the
risks of a US respon-ve.
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FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES;
SHERMAN PM
Chairman
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