THE USSR AND LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303230012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 9, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Summary
The Soviets will try to exploit tensions or .
even limited hostilities in Lebanon to improve the
USSR's position in the Middle East, particularly
with the Syrians and Palestinians. But they have
also opposed a major Syrian-Israeli clash which
could lead to a US-Soviet confrontation. The
contradictions involved in pursuing such a course
means Soviet policy is not always clearly defined
and can lead to miscalculation.
In the event of hostilities, the level of
Soviet military support to Syria would depend on
the scope and scale of the fighting. The USSR has
indicated to Syria that it would provide only
limited military support--such as arms resupply--
if the fighting was confined to Lebanon. If the
Israelis made substantial attacks into Syria,
however, we believe Moscow could place some of its
airborne units on alert, step up weapons
deliveries, or possibly send Soviet SAM crews or
fighter pilots to Syria. Moscow would be more
likely to introduce airborne or ground troops in
the event of a full-scale war that threatened the
fall of Damascus or the destruction of the Syrian
military.
Washm otDC2050s
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 February 1982
THE USSR AND LEBANON
Soviet policy toward Lebanon is determined by the impact of
developments there on the USSR's broader position in the Middle
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East, particularly its ties to Syria and the, Palestinians. The
Soviets especially want to strengthen their close ties with Syria
and to reinforce the USSR's image as a protector of Palestinian
rights. The Soviets would also like to have a role in any
settlement that might be arranged. Tensions--or even limited
hostilities--in Lebanon enable the USSR to increase Syrian and
Palestinian dependence on Soviet support while portraying the US
as the sole supporter of Israeli intransigeance.
Ties and Influence with Syria and the PLO
One aspect of the USSR's close relationship with Syria--
since conclusion of the friendship, treaty in October 1980--has
been stronger Soviet support of Syrian policy in Lebanon. In the
past, Lebanon had often been an irritant in Soviet-Syrian
relations and Moscow's opposition to Syria's intervention in
Lebanon in 1976 had severely strained bilateral ties. The USSR's
objection reflected its interests in keeping the Palestinians in
Lebanon free from Syrian political domination and susceptible to
Soviet influence. While this concern probably continues to color
Soviet attitudes toward Syria's presence there, Syria's enhanced
importance to the USSR is pushing the Soviets to lend more
support to Damascus. During last year's missile crisis in
Lebanon, for example, the Soviets, for the first time,
characterized the Syrian presence in Lebanon as legitimate. The
Soviets may calculate that Syrian President Assad's increasing
dependence on Soviet support will lead Syria to pursue policies
in Lebanon that are more compatible with Soviet interests. 0 25X1
The Soviets also have important equities with the
Palestinians and have consistently supported their presence in
Lebanon. They think that close ties with the Palestinians help
enhance the USSR's image as a supporter of the Arabs and pressure
other Arabs to oppose US diplomacy that ignores the PLO and
excludes the USSR. Moscow's decision to upgrade the PLO office
in Moscow last October was aimed at underscoring Soviet support
to the Palestinian cause. The USSR is providing more and better
arms to the Palestinians. he two sides 25X1
recently finalized an arms deal that includes surface-to-air.
missiles--a missile the Soviets have not previously delivered--
and anti-aircraft weapons.
Leverage on Syria and the PLO
Moscow's ability to influence events in Lebanon is
constrained by the need to protect its relationship with Syria.
The Soviets have only limited leverage on Damascus' actions in
Lebanon without damaging their close ties to Assad. He has long
kept the Soviets at arms length regarding Lebanon because he
considers Syrian interests there vital and separate from the
Soviet-Syrian relationship.
The divisions within the PLO offer the USSR the opportunity
to play one Palestinian faction off against the other, thereby
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enhancing Moscow's leverage over the PLO. The Soviets have long
been suspicious of Fatah leader Arafat and have occasionally
sought to strengthen the more radical Palestinian groups to
restrict Arafat's policy options. Moscow especially wants to
ensure that Arafat remains opposed to any Arab-Israeli settlement
process that excludes the USSR. Soviet influence with the PLO,
however, is diluted by the ability of Syria and Libya to serve as
alternative arms suppliers to the PLO and by Fatah's intense
suspicions of the USSR.
Attitude Toward Tensions and Hostilities
The Soviets are not opposed to tensions per se in Lebanon as
long as they remain at a manageable level and do not escalate
into a crisis serious enough to draw them into a confrontation
with Israel or the US. Indeed, insofar as chronic instability in
Lebanon reinforces Palestinian and Syrian dependence on Moscow's
good will and military support, the Soviets favor and encourage
it. They probably hope that the tensions in Lebanon will unite
the Arabs behind Syria and the USSR while isolating the US with
Israel. They also may anticipate that such tensions will put
more pressure on Egyptian President Mubarak to distance himself
both from Israel and the US. Moscow would also use the problems
in Lebanon to seek a broader role in Middle Eastern diplomacy.
They already cite the situation in Lebanon as evidence of the
need to replace the US-sponsored Camp David process with an
international approach in which the USSR would have a role equal
to that of the US.
At the same time, the Soviets remain concerned that any
crisis in Lebanon might escalate into a broad Israeli-Syrian
conflict. They have a keen appreciation of Syria's military
shortcomings and realize such a conflict might lead to a Soviet-
US confrontation if the USSR tries to prevent a Syrian defeat.
From Moscow's view, other possible negative ramifications of a
large war include Assad's possible fall from power, the
establishment of an Israeli-dominated Christian state, and the
possible ouster of the PLO from Lebanon. These concerns have led
the Soviets to caution the Syrians about undertaking any major
hostilities in southern Lebanon. During the Syrian-Israeli face-
off in Lebanon last year, for example, the Soviets gave Syria
full political and diplomatic support but indicated Soviet
military support would be limited in the event of a conflict in
Lebanon. The Soviets have continued to assure Damascus of the
USSR's support in the event of an Israeli attack on Syria but
have also cautioned the Syrians against escalating the Lebanese
conflict.
Soviet Military Responses to Hostilities in Lebanon
An Israeli attack.bn Syria's SAM sites in Lebanon or a
large-scale ground incursion into Lebanon would probably prompt
the Soviets to resupply the Syrian military and position ships
from the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron off Syria's coast. These
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actions would be intended to demonstrate to Assad and other Arab
states the value of close ties and alliance with the USSR. The
Soviets also would seek to deter further Israeli military action
and to position the USSR to take credit for halting Israeli
aggression.
Moscow's immediate response would likely be to. caution
-Israel and influence the US to restrain Tel Aviv. The Soviets
would hope that Assad's unwillingness to take on Israel in a
major war and US pressures on Tel Aviv to avoid a major conflict
would limit the fighting while offering the USSR the opportunity
to project itself as Syria's protector, enhance its position with
other Arab states, and gain a major role in the settlement of the
crisis.
An expansion of hostilities to the Israeli-occupied Golan
Heights would present the Soviets with a major decision,
especially if Assad's intention was to escalate the fighting with
the aim of obtaining direct Soviet and US involvement. The
Soviets would want to avoid leaving Assad in the breach. But
they might simply decide to refrain from any immediate military
moves that could embroil the USSR in the hostilities in hopes the
conflict would be short-lived and a compromise reached that would
enable Damascus to claim a victory. More protracted fighting
would lead the Soviets to step up the resupply effort, provide
more sophisticated arms, and step up the USSR's naval activity
off Syria's coast.
If the Israelis carried their attacks into Syria the Soviets
would consider further military actions designed to deter Israel
and induce Washington to pressure Israel to desist. These could
include placing some Soviet airborne units on alert, providing
more sophisticated arms to Syria, or introducing Soviet SAM crews
and fighter pilots into Syria.
The Soviets would be more likely to introduce their own
airborne or ground units in the event of a full-scale war between
Israel and Syria in which Israel sought either to take Damascus
or destroy the Syrian military. The evidence available indicates
the Soviets have promised the Syrians in general terms that the
USSR would take military action in the event of a major Israeli
attack. Furthermore, a significant Syrian defeat or Damascus'
acceptance of clearly unpalatable conditions at Israeli's hands
would adversely affect Moscow's standing with the Arab states.
The value of an alliance with the USSR would be weakened and Arab
confidence in Soviet political and military support undermined.
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Addressee
DDI Action Staff
SA/DC I,
EA/DCI, John McMa on
Senior Review Panel
OCO/IMB/CD (1
DD/SOVA
NESA
A/NIO/USSR
SOVA/PAD
C/CSD Chrono
C/CSD/C
CSD/C
CSD/C Chrono
sourced
SOVA/CSD/C (09FEB82)
copy)
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