CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 13, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday April 13, 1977 CG NIDC 77-85C
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
w
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, April 13, 1977
e Cable is or the purpose of informing
senior US o icials.
PAKISTAN: Serious Demonstrations
LEBANON-SYRIA: Situation Report
ZAIRE: Situation Report
KUWAIT: Oil Find Near Iraq Border
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Daoud's Visit
NORTH YEMEN: Assassination Aftermath
LAOS-THAILAND: Mekong Islands
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The US embassy reports that demonstrations in Pakis-
tan may nave gained a momentum of their own and that it will
be very difficult, if not impossible, for Prime Minister Bhutto
to stop them. Although Bhutto could still survive, there are
signs that the military is reluctant to save him. Should he
fall, the military presumably would take over, although pos-
sibly for only a brief period. Ultimately, the opposition,
which is deeply divided on almost every issue except Bhutto's
removal, could come to power.
The embassy reports a continuing deterioration in the
politica situation, with demonstrations continuing in most
major cities in the Punjab and the Sind, Pakistan's two main
provinces.
According to press reports, demonstrators used hand
grenades against the police in Lahore yesterday and serious
violence also erupted in Karachi and Multan.
Bhutto has not appeared in public since Saturday. The
embassy relieves the rumors that he is under house arrest or
that a military coup is imminent are a significant reflection
of the erosion of his popular support.
Bhutto's continued effort to work out a compromise
with is opponents may be another indication of his weakening
position. The attorney general has publicly raised the possi-
bility of a new National Assembly election, something Bhutto
refused to consider in the past. The opposition, which might
have been willing to accept this concession a week ago, now
appears willing to settle only for Bhutto's surrender.
Many observers believe it is increasingly doubtful
that the army will act to keep Bhutto in power. Foreign Minis-
ter Aziz Ahmed--one of Bhutto's closest associates--has been
touring the country asking the military to support the Prime
Minister, but, at least in Karachi, he reportedly received a
poor reception.
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If Bhutto were to leave office, it would probably be
the result of pressure from senior army officers, who would
then have to choose between keeping power in their own hands
or turning the country over to the opposition. The generals
might well be reluctant to rule for much longer than it would
take to hold a new election.
The last period of military rule ended disastrously
in ece er 1971 with the loss of the eastern half of the coun-
try--now Bangladesh--in the war with India. Many Pakistanis,
possibly including some general officers, still doubt the mili-
tary's ability to govern effectively.
It is possible that a figure capable of rallying enough
popular support to perpetuate military rule could emerge, but
no general now appears to have the prestige--or even the sup-
port in the armed forces--needed to establish a military dic-
tatorship. Many of the generals would probably prefer to get
out of politics as quickly as possible.
The opposition probably would agree to a short period
o mi itary rule--in fact, it has demanded that the military
supervise a new election--but probably would take to the
streets again if it believed the military planned to stay in
power indefinitely.
The military would have misgivings about turning power
over to the opposition. The opposition, a coalition of ten par-
ties covering the political spectrum, would have difficulty
deciding on any programs. Differences among opposition leaders
could well lead to instability. Moreover, many officers view
policies advocated by some opposition leaders as threatening
Pakistan's existence.
All but one of the opposition parties belong to the
Pakistan National Alliance, which contested the election last
month as a single party. Most of these parties are basically
secular in their outlook, but three advocate basing the gov-
ernment and the society on Islamic principles.
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Former air force commander Asghar Khan, who emerged
as the leading opposition spokesman during the election cam-
paign, heads one of the secular parties in the alliance. He
still commands the respect and loyalty of many in the military
and is regarded by most Pakistanis as a man of principle. His
devotion to principle, however, has at times limited his poli-
tical effectiveness and resulted in seemingly erratic behavior.
He helped found another party iin the alliance, but left it
almost immediately.
The alliance party of most concern to the military
and --to many Pakistanis in the Punjab and the Sind is the Na-
tional Democratic Party, a broad spectrum that ranges from
feudal tribal chiefs to left-wing labor agitators. Nearly all
its supporters favor greater provincial autonomy, and a few
advocate independence--or even union with Afghanistan--for the
North-West Frontier and Baluchistan, Pakistan's western border
provinces. Many Pakistanis believe that Wali Khan, the jailed
leader of this party's outlawed predecessor organization would
dominate any government formed by the opposition.
LEBANON-SYRIA: Situation Report
Fighting in southern Lebanon subsided yesterday
as an undeclared cease-fire began to take effect. Despite sus-
tained Palestinian-Leftist attempts to drive the Christians out
of Maio rii.i.n._ the Christians still control the center of the
town.
Some machine-gun and artillery fire continued yester-
day. A Syrian officer told a US official in Damascus on Monday
that although Syria had laid the groundwork for a cease-fire,
it might take three or four days for the situation to stabilize.
The officer noted that tensions are still high and that the
leaders of the various factions do not have full control of
their followers.
The Lebanese army commander, General Khoury, told a
US of icial early this week that he hopes to deploy a force in
the south within two weeks to supervise the cease-fire. He
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reportedly intends to rely heavily on a relatively small mixed
Christian-Muslim group originally put together by the Syrians
to form the nucleus of a new Lebanese army.
Khoury, recognizing that the new force will be able to
maintain the peace only with the acquiescence of the Palestin-
ians and the Christians, said that a cease-fire must be in ef-
fect before the force moves into place.
//Syria has begun to replace military units in
Lebanon with fresh troops from Syria.
told the US defense attache in Damascus on Monday that the ro-
tation would be gradual and that the troops to be moved into
Lebanon would be drawn from assorted Syrian units.
I//The rotation appears to have begun on Sunday when
the first replacement units reportedly were observed heading
toward Lebanon. About 30,000 Syrian troops have been stationed
in Lebanon for nearly a year and are in need of rest, refitting,
and training. Syrian forces in Lebanon have had little organ-
ized unit training since they entered the country, and their
equipment reportedly has begun to deteriorate because it has
been in the field a long time without proper maintenance.//
ZAIRE: Situation Report
There are no new reports of fighting west of Kolwezi.
Most of the first contingent of Moroccan troops are Located in
this area. They do not yet appear to have moved toward the Ka-
tangan forces, which are probably still over 50 kilometers
away from Kolwezi.
A clash has been reported, however, to the west of
Katakumba,'which could indicate a Katangan move toward Kamina.
A Zairian unit in the area seems to have fled, leaving its weap-
ons behind.
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General Singa, the new Zairian commander in Kolwezi,
has apparently established some control over the Zairian sol-
diers there and has sent many troops out of the city for re-
training.
The first Moroccan troops apparently are mostly from
a paratroop brigade. The overall Moroccan commander, Colonel
Loubaris, served as commander of a Moroccan paratroop unit with
UN forces in the Congo in 1960-1961. The US defense attache in
Rabat reports Loubaris is a tough, able officer. He will be
stationed in Kinshasa and has instructions to report twice
daily to King Hassan.
Other recent gestures of support for Zaire have been
made by Sudan, Mauritania, and the Central African Empire.
Many African states, however, are withholding judgment because
of the conflicting claims emanating from Kinshasa and Luanda.
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The Zairian air force did bomb two Zambian villages
near t e border last weekend following unconfirmed reports that
Katangans were infiltrating via Zambia. Two persons were in-
jured. Lusaka's attitude on the Shaba crisis is mixed. Any more
such incidents could result in retaliation, such as shuttin
off fuel supplies to Shaba from Zambia's refinery
KUWAIT: Oil Find Near Iraq Border
//Kuwait reportedly has discovered oil near
the rage border. Territorial quarrels have flared periodically
between the two countries. In this case, we would expect Iraq
to be less concerned about boundaries than about the possi-
bility that Kuwaiti extraction from a field that may straddle
the border could limit Iraq's own ultimate recoverable crude
reserves.
//Drilling operations in the area were resumed last
November in what appeared to be a Kuwaiti response to several
Iraqi incursions into Kuwaiti territory. The site of the Ku-
waiti drilling, which is supported by troops, is not far from
an oil operation Iraq began in early November just inside its
territory. Iraqi troops are encamped between the Iraqi drilling
site and the border--reportedly less than 100 meters north of
the Kuwaiti well.//
//Kuwait currently has no producing oil wells near
the drilling site. The Kuwait Oil Company began exploration
in the area in 1964 but abandoned the operation after interfer-
ence from Iraq. The Rumaila oil field, on the Iraqi side of the
disputed border, is the largest in Iraq, with proved oil reserves
of about 12 billion barrels. If the Rumaila field extends into
Kuwait, border problems and development rights are likely to
become an increasingly sensitive issue.//
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//Preliminary estimates based on the discov-
ery well indicate that there is sufficient oil to justify the
development of the deposit. The drilling of a second well to
confirm the size of the field is expected to start in mid-
April.//
maims tield, Kuwait could not immediately siphon large amounts
of oil from Iraqi territory. Several development wells would
have to be drilled first and a pipeline laid to connect the
area with export facilities. Kuwait probably will act cau-
tiously in these areas because it will not want to give Iraq
a pretext for military action or for heightened support for
subversives.//
//Even if the discovery is an extension of the Ru-
//Iraq has made no recent statements on the Kuwaiti
drilling activity and may not be aware of the oil discovery.
//Afghan President Daoud arrived in Moscow yes-
terday for a state visit probably aimed at reassuring Soviet
leaders that his recent constitutional changes will have no im-
pact on Afghanistan's close relations with the USSR.//
//Soviet-Afghan summits are generally an annual
a air, and the USSR has been pressing since last November for
Daoud to return a visit by President Podgorny to Afghanistan in
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December 1975. The Soviets were surprised by Daoud's rapproche-
ment with Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto last year, and they
may also have wanted to smooth over frictions that reportedly
had developed in the Soviet-Afghan military aid relationship.//
//Daoud apparently was not anxious to go to Moscow
until atter he had instituted the constitutional changes. When
Moscow kept pressing, he sent Mohammed Naim, his brother and
one of his key political advisers, to the USSR in January in an
effort to keep the Soviets happy.//
//Despite recent frictions, Daoud's visit should
be a fairly harmonious one. He has been dealing with the Soviets
for the many years he has been a political power in Afghanistan
and knows how to reassure them. He almost certainly will promise,
for example, to keep them better informed about developments in
Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan.//
//Afghanistan is one of the top ten recipients of
Soviet economic and military assistance, and some new projects
might be announced. In January 1975, the Soviets extended $425
million in new credits for Afghanistan's current five-year plan,
only a small portion of which has thus far been allocated to
specific projects. Last November, the Soviets sent a delegation
to Kabul to do a feasibility study on a major new irrigation
scheme.//
NORTH YEMEN: Assassination Aftermath
The assassination last Sunday in London of a re-
spected North Yemen political leader, former prime minister
AbdaZZah al-Hajri, may prompt President Hamdi to move against
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tribal opponents. Although the identity of the assassin is not
yet known, the North Yemenis believe one of two groups was re-
sponsibZe for the killing: either ousted leftist politicians
in League with dissident tribesmen, or radical South Yemenis
opposed to their country's growing ties with Saudi Arabia and
North Yemen.
Al-Hajri was an arch-conservative and a close ad-
viser to Hamdi; he was viewed by many as the unofficial number-
two man in the government. He had been leading an effort to
broaden the regime's base of support by establishing a pro-
government political party encompassing the country's dispa-
rate political groups.
The US embassy believes Hamdi is likely to place the
blame for al-Hajri's death on the leftist-tribal grouping, at
least until contrary evidence is available. Tribesmen led by
Hamdi's rival, Abdallah al-Ahmar, recently have again asserted
their control over parts of northern North Yemen at the expense
of the central government's authority. Hamdi also is irritated
by tribal allegations to Saudi Arabia that he has "leftist"
tendencies.
Hamdi will attempt to turn popular resentment over
al-Hajri's death into support for his regime. As he has in the
past, Hamdi is likely to move against the tribal dissidents by
indirect political means rather than with military force. He
probably will renew attempts to discourage contacts by the
Saudis with his tribal rivals.
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LAOS-THAILAND: Mekong Islands
Lao government forces have dislodged rightist Lao
rebels from two islands near Vientiane in the Mekong River,
which forms the border between Laos and Thailand. The rebels
seized one island late last month and another last week. Al-
though the danger of Thai-Lao armed conflict over the incident
has passed, the Lao regime is continuing to demand that Thai
officials cease their alleged support for the rebels and turn
over to Lao authorities those who fled the islands.
Both governments were anxious to avoid escalation of
e inci ent. Lao officials warned Thailand of plans to recover
the islands; the Thai agreed that the islands were Lao terri-
tory and pledged not to assist the rebels. Although the Lao
government called a state of alert, reflecting concern that
its attack on the islands might provoke a Thai reaction, the
likelihood of a serious confrontation was never high.
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The seizure of the islands by the rebels came af-
ter several weeks of Thai press reports about internal disor-
Local Thai o icials in the northeast are sympat he tic to e
resistance, however, and probably provide some assistance and
encouragement. The issue will continue to be a serious point
of contention between Bangkok and Vientiane.
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HAITI: Economic Problems
//The Haitian Leadership, plagued with corrup-
tion and znep 2 ude, has been stow to come to grips with eco-
nomic problems caused by severe drought, crop failures, and
acute power shortages. This has Zed to increased questioning
of young President DuvaZier's Leadership even among some of
the nation's elite, who for the first time are personally ex-
periencing hardships.//
/Crop failures and hoarding have led to a shortage
of such basic foodstuffs as rice, corn, and beans, and the
situation is worsening. Inflation and unemployment, although
difficult to measure in the impoverished country, have risen
significantly in the last year.//
Ironically, Duvalier's cautious efforts to foster
economic -development and allow greater domestic freedom--his
almost six-year record compares favorably in this respect to
the 14-year dictatorship of his father--add to his problems by
creating an atmosphere in which criticism has begun to be
heard.
//Duvalier may take the initiative against his
critics. n a ve reminiscent of the elder Duvalier's "demon-
strations" of public support, the President is organizing a
peasant march to the capital.
//Marie-Denise Dominique, the President's am-
bitious sister, potential problem for him in the present
alace intri ue.
The President's re ations with his influential mother have a s
become strained.//
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//Plotting by exiles, which is always present,
will be spurred by the regime's continuing difficulties and at
the least will help fuel the capital's rumor mill.//
//Leading military figures appear to be still
ioyal to uva ier. There has been no serious plotting against
thr3 President at lower levels of the military, but dissatis-
faction is beginning to be expressed by some middle-grade of-
ficers.//
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