IMPLICATIONS OF A DIRECT TELEPHONE LINK BETWEEN THE KREMLIN AND THE WHITE HOUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000700020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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CONFIDENTIAL
C E N T R A L . I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
16 April 1961
SUBJECT; Implications of a Direct Telephone Link Between the
Kremlin and the White House
1, The establishment of a direct telephonic link between
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev is one proposal advanced
as a means to avert war arising from weapons accidents to misinter-
pretations of alert actions on either side9 It would provide a way
to explain accidents and to dispel critical uncertainties rapidly
and authoritatively. This memorandum discusses the proposal in
terms of its feasibility and effectiveness for its intended purpose,
in terms of other purposes to which it might be put, and in terms
of its broad political implications.
The most conspicuous way in which a top-level link could
reduce the chances of war by accident would be by providing the
opportunity for quick notification of the other side in the
unlikely case that a missile or bomber ever escaped control and
headed toward the opponentst territory, There might be time,
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in such a case, to relay this information to the other side,
which would probably accept the explanation.on the grounds
that leading off with a single weapon, and giving warning,
was an improbable attack strategy,, The other side would thus
be given the preferable option of alert rather than pre-emption
in panic.
30 A direct communications link could, under some circum-
stances,, provide a means for clarifying a situation in which
warning indications were ambiguous and raised questions of the
possibility of an enemy attack, For example, if either party
felt it necessary in such a case to undertake alert actions
which could be subject to misinterpretation it i5ould convey
directly assurances of its defensive intent, In most circum-
stances, the problem of winning; credibility for such assurances
would bu difficult, since the communication could obviously be
used to further deception. Nevertheless., we believe there might
be circumstances in which, assuming that both sides genuinely
wished to avoid warp such a communication might contribute to
arresting further provocatory actions on either side and thus
providing time for regular diplomatic action,,
14., There are, however, several limitations on the feasi-
bility of such a measured A major limitation would be time.
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It would not always be possible for one leader to reach the other
instantaneously^ Not only would there be problems of physical
availability in the capital cities, but there are complications
in security of communications ties, and language interpretataon.
It would also often be the case that one leader could not
instantly explain specific actions of his side which hod alarmed
the other,, but only rive generalized assurances of peaceful
intentions?
5. One of the principal disadvantages and even dangers
in such a link would be its susceptibility to political maneuvers
especially in times of tension. There would be a common interest
in seeking clarifications of warnin,, indicators to avoid war.
But in times of crisis one or both sides frequently keep their
ultimate intentions deliberately ambiguous. There is,, in
short, a premium on bluffing, and neither side is likely to
give up this option., or be persuaded that the other has given
it ups so long as the present level of mistrust continues. A
direct link might lead one side, in a time of tension,, to demand
clarifications which the other would not uish to make. Thus,
in times of high political tension the link in many cases would
not serve its intended purpose; indeed,, it might be a source
of greater,, rather than lessened,, misunderstanding and risk.,
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6, perhaps ever more important than its intended purpose.,
a communications link would. have considerable political signifi-
cance* It would mark a dramatic and unprecedented steps
Khrushchev would probably favor the ideas especially for its
contribution to the prestige of his country and of himselfa
He also would see uses to which he could put the measure. If
such a link were established,, he would probably be tempted
to use it for political conversations, He might also try to
use it as an instrument of pressure by calling every time that
an RB-47 flew near the USSR or a large-scale SAC bomber exercise
occurred, in order to r:et the US to restrict its activities,
7, Political reverberations from the establishment of
such a link would stir both the Communist and Western alliances.
Intelligence on the Sino-Soviet dispute during 1959 and 1960
makes very clear that Chinese suspicions of Soviet detente and
high-level direct relations with the US were a major cause of
discord, The Chinese Communists would probably be highly
suspicious of a direct Moscow Washington tie (it is doubtful
if one of this sort exists even between Khrushchev and Mao),,
and frictions in Sino-Soviet relations would be exacerbated.
8, In the West, some of our allies -- especially Adenauer
and DeGaulle -- would probably be ill-disposed toward the idea,
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In their view, it might lead to increasing bilateral US-USSR
decision-making on matters which they deem to be subject to
NATO decision, DeGaulle, like the Chinese, might also be
concerned over the dramatic implicit re^ffirmation of the
unique teat power status of the US and the USSR.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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Abbot Smith
Acting Chairman
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