IMPLICATIONS OF A DIRECT TELEPHONE LINK BETWEEN THE KREMLIN AND THE WHITE HOUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000700020008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 17, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
17 April 1961
Draft for Board Consideration
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Implications of a Direct Telephone Link between
the Kremlin and the White House
1. The estab lishr.7ent of a direct telephonic link
between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev is one
proposal advanced as a means to avert accidental war, by
providing a way to dispel critical uncertainties rapidly
and authoritatively. Such a communications link would,
h`rever, involve broader political issues and have significant
political implications, It is, therefore, necessary to consider
such a measure both in terns of its feasibility and effective-
ness for its intended purpose, and in terns of these political
implications.
2. A direct communications link, could under some
circumstances, provide a means for clarifying a situation
in which warning indications raised ambiguous possibilities
of an enemy attack. It would of course not be sufficient
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simply to ask if a Soviet attack were underway, since Khrushchev's
word would be no assurance. But in order to avoid the risks in
believing any Soviet reply, the President could tell Khrushchev
of the suspicions which had been raised, and inform him that
we were therefore going to take the necessary precautions,
including Getting SAC bombers airborne. This might induce
Khrushchev to call off an attack if indeed one were underway
and could still be recalled, or if no attack had been planned
he would probably be inclines' to put a defensive interpretation
on US alert measures which the USSR subsequently noted, while
he could of course proceed to alert his own forces. In short,
a top-level communication could under some circumstances be used
to substitute alert for the potential temptation of pre?enptive
military action, in cases of ambiguous warning indications.
3. A second way in which a top-level link could reduce
the chances of war by accident would be by providing the
opportunity for quick notification of the other side in the
unlikely case that a missile or "said" bomber ever escaped control
and headed toward the opponents' territory. There might be
time, in such a case, to relay this information to the other
side, which would probably accept the explanation on the grounds
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that leading off with a single weapon, and giving warning,
was an improbable attack strategy. In this case, as in the
case of notification of one's own alert, the other side would
thus be given the preferable option of alert rather than
prey-er:ll,tion in ;anic.
1+. There are, however, several limitations and disadvantages
to such a measure. A major limitation would be time. It would
not always be possible for one leader to reach the other
instantaneously; in particular, we doubt that Khrushchev's
communications with the Kremlin when he is away match those
between the US President and the White House. More important,
in the missile age it would often be the case that one leader
could not instantly e lain any actions of his side which had
alarmed the other, but only give generalized assurances of
peaceful intentions. These assurances, however, would be
exactly what the other would expect if he thought his opponent
were launching a surprise attack. In fact, so long as surprise
attack remained a lively concern on either side, telephonic
reassurance would probably be heavily rdiscounte(L.
5. Another limitation, disadvantage, and even danger
in such a link,would be its effect on political maneuver,
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especially in times of tension. In seeking clarifications of
warning indicators to avoid war, there would be a common interest.
But in times of crisis one or both sides frequently keep their
ultimate intentions deliberately ambiguous as a means of inducing
the opponent not to press his risks to the limit. There is, in
short, a premium on bluffing, and neither side is likely to give
up this option, or be persuaded that the other has Given it up,
so long as the present level of mistrust continues. A handy
direct link might lead one side, in a time of tension, to demand
clarifications which the other would not wish to make. Thus, in
times of high political tension the link in many cases would not
serve its intended purpose; indeed, it night be a source of
greater, rather than lessened, misunderstanding and risk.
6. Perhaps even more important than its intended purpose, a
communications link would have considerable political significance.
It would, after all, mark a dramatic and unprecedented step.
Khrushchev would probably favor the idea, especially for its
contribution to the prestige of his country an!', of himself.
He also would see uses to which he could put the measure. He
might, procedurally, try to use the idea as a lever to press
disarmament talks. If such a link were established, he would
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probably be tempted to try to use it for summit-like
conversations, and this disadvantage could probably be
mitigated only in part by making clear from the outset the
specific limited function of the arrangement so far as the
US is concerned. He might use it as an instrument of pressure
by calling every time that an RD-1I7 flew near the USSR or a
large-scale SAC bomber exercise occurred, in order to get the
US to restrict its activities.
7. Political reverberations from the establishment of
such a link would stir both the Communist and Western alliances.
Intelligence on the Sino-Soviet dispute during 1959 and 1960
makes very clear that Chinese suspicions of Soviet detente and
high-level direct relations with the US were a major cause of
discord. The Chinese Comunists would probably be highly
suspicious of a direct Moscow Washington tie (it is doubtful
if one of this sort exists even between Khrushchev and Mao),
and frictions in Sino-Soviet relations would be exacerbated.
8. In the West, some of our allies -- especially Adenauer
and DeGaulle -- would probably be ill-disposed toward the idea.
In their view, it might seem to threaten increasing bilateral
US USSR decision-making on matters which they deem to be subject
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to NATO alliance decision. De Gaulle, like the Chinese, might
also be concerned over the dramatic implicit reaffirmation of the
unique Great power status of the US and the USSR. Significant
adverse Western reactions could probably be avoided if there were
prior consultations in NATO. Since the actual purpose of the
communications link would be circumscribed, it should be possible
to justify the link as a military emergency standby arrangement
set up in accord with the US defense policy of secure control, as
well as secure physical invulnerability, of nuclear retaliatory
power. Some allies would probably even favor the idea.
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