LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET ANTIMISSILE CLAIMS AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020018-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 19, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE 0I' NATIONAL ESTIMATES
19 April 1962
MEMC2WMUM FOR THE DIR' BCTOR
SUBJECT: Likelihood of Soviet ithtitlissile Clains and Demon-
strations in the Near Future
1. In a series of estimates, beginninC, with NIE 11-4-60,
"Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965,"
published 1 December 1960, we have drawn attention to the polit-
ical and psychological advantages which the Soviets would expect
to obtain from early deployment of an antimissile systeu, even one
of limited military effectiveness. 11, number of considerations,
set forth below, lead us to believe that the USSR will make a
strenuous effort, within the next few weeks or months, to persuade
the world, that it has an operational antimissile capability..
2. The Inge of Soviet StrenL;th. Moscow sets great store
on cultivating; a worldwide belief in Soviet military superiority.
This effort has in the past depended heavily on claims in the
strategic missile field, but Khrushchev recognizes that recent US
statements and press stories, based in part on a new Washington
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estimate of Soviet ICBM strength, have blunted this approach for
the time being, especially among NATO governments.
3. Effect of Forthcoming US Demonstrations, The Soviets
know that the US is on the verge of Nike-Zeus systems tests.
They must reckon on at least some US successes at Kwajalein, ac-
companied by widespread publicity. They must feel themselves under
considerable pressure to show even greater progress and to do this
before the first US successes.
4. Nuclear Testing. It seems certain that the Soviets will
resume nuclear testing after, and perhaps hard upon, the beginning
of US testing in the atmosphere. This will, provide them with an
opportunity for any high-altitude detonations they wish to under-
take and publicize as part of an effort to demonstrate an anti-
missile capability.
5. Preparatory Propaganda. The Soviet press and radio have
given considerable play to Malinovskyts October statement that
the "problem of destroying rockets in flight" have been "solved."
More recently, Khrushchevts statement on a "global rocket" has
been used to support a claim that US warning and defense systems
are useless. These two propositions appear designed to prepare
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the ground for assertions that the USSR has an effective anti-
missile defense and that the US has not.
6. Status of the Soviet ABM Program. The Soviets probably
have conducted firings against incoming ballistic missiles, and
their 1961 nuclear test series included detonations designed to
determine the ability of antimissile system radars to track in
the presence of debris and ionization from nuclear bursts. They
probably are ready for complete ABM system testing, and they may
have begun the construction of operational sites. Thus the USSR
may be in a position to make claims which have a substantial
basis in fact and could be demonstrated in a genuine fashion.
7. Possible Soviet Claims. In view of the impending US
tests, and considering past patterns of Soviet military. propaganda,
the Soviets are unlikely to confine themselves to claiming parity
with the US or a slight lead. Instead, they will probably employ
sensational yet imprecise assertions to suggest an antimissile
capability already in being and highly effective against all kinds
of enemy missiles. They will be concerned to influence official
US appraisals, but even more to make a great impact on general
opinion. Thus, if they are not yet ready to undertake demonstrations
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convincing to specialists, or if security considerations preclude
disclosure, the Soviets will nevertheless search for wto
their asserted capabilities widely ways make
credible. To this end, they
might publish photographs of objects described as antimissile
missiles and launching sites. They might print stories concerning
g
the activities of antimissile units., or ~ publicly designate a
Commander of Antimissile Forces. They might publish photographs
faked or '
genuine, of the destruction of one missile in flight by
another.
8. Possible 11eraranstrations. The Soviet leaders will recog-
nize, however, that the success of these efforts will depend heavily
some actual achievement ~
generally accepted as valid, much as
the credibility of their early ICBM claims rested on the first
sputniks? This achieverent might be the interception of a missile
over ICartchatka, accompanied by as much publicity as was consistent
with security requirements. They would expect this feat to be
accepted by the US Government and would hope that Washington would
be compelled to confirm their public clairjs.
9. Finally, they might attempt to destroy a satellite in
orbit, calculating that most uniformed people would be ready to
equate this feat with the interception of an ICBM. If this were
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an actively transmitting satellite, the USSR could count on
foreign tracking stations to confirm its destruction. In our
estimates, we have pointed out that the USSR could probably in-
tercept a satellite by antimissile facilities in about 1963
(provided that such facilities were suitably modified) or perhaps
even earlier by a jury-rigged ballistic raissile.. Considering the
Soviet concern to inhibit US reconnaissance satellite programs,
the probable present status of antimissile programs in the USSR,
and other inconclusive but suspicious evidence on Soviet tracking
and other related activities, we now believe the chances are at
least even that the USSR will soon be prepared to attempt a satel-
lite interception. While we cannot exclude the possibility of
attack upon a US satellite, we think it more likely that a Soviet
vehicle would be the target for such an initial effort.
FOR THE BOiHI) OF NATIONAL FRmTMn'1 .
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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