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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday 28 March 1978 CG NIDC 78/072C
w
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 28 March 1978,
e Niv e is tor the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
SYRIA: Leadership Changes
NAMIBIA: Assassination of Kapuuo
DJIBOUTI: Political Maneuverings
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Horn of Africa
BRIEFS:
USSR
Pakistan
Romania-Israel
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SYRIA: Leadership Changes
//Syrian President Asad shuffled his cabinet
and military leadership yesterday. The move probably reflects
Asad's effort to come to grips with some longstanding internal
problems and perhaps with the domestic fallout of the Lebanese
crisis. Asad continues to be the target of contradictory in-
ternal and external pressures about his policy in Lebanon.//
sembly, Muhammad Halabi, to replace Prime Minister Khulayfawi,
who has wanted to resign for sometime.
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25X1 //Halabi, a member of Syria's ruling Baath Party,
is a loyal Asad man with no independent power base. He has
supported Syria's role in Lebanon F_ I
25X1 e Prime Minister's job is not a
major decisionmaking post in Syria. A change had been expected
since Asad's reelection to a second seven-year term earlier
this month.//
his principal deputy. Jamil has been a key Asad lieutenants
//A potentially more significant move was
the removal from office of Air Force Commander Naji Jamil and
Damascus radio gave no
explanation for Jamil's removal saying only that he would now
devote his time to Baath Party matters. Jamil has been a major
architect of Syria's policy in Lebanon.//
//Asad appointed the speaker of the People's As-
//If Jamil has been demoted, it would be a signifi-
cant indication of unrest within Asad's inner circle. The US
Embassy in Damascus reports that Asad continues to enjoy the
support of the majority of the officer corps but is facing
mounting internal pressure to show that his policy in Lebanon
of relying on international pressure to secure Israeli with-
drawal will succeed.//
//Asad also faces contradictory external pressure
to act more forcefully in Lebanon. Iraq denounced the announce-
ment on Friday by the Syrian peacekeeping forces in Lebanon
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prohibiting outside aid from entering Lebanon for the Pales-
tinians. Damascus has tried to dissociate itself from that
decision by labeling it a Lebanese Government policy, but this
argument will persuade few Arabs. Nonetheless, Syria has ap-
parently enforced the ban.//
//The UN is encouraging Asad to use his forces in
Lebanon to control the Palestinians. The UN commander in the
Middle East asked Syria on Saturday to move its forces down
to the Litani River to ensure Palestinian cooperation with the
new UN peacekeeping force being deployed south of the river.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam refused.//
//Asad may be more willing to rein in the Pales-
tinians once the Israelis have withdrawn from Lebanon. The
leader of the Lebanese wing of the Syrian Baath Party told the
US Embassy in Beirut that Asad would act once the Israelis are
out of the south.//
//The Israelis have informed the US defense atta-
che in Te Aviv that Asad has moved several Syrian-controlled
Palestinian units into the region north of the Litani recently,
perhaps to bring the Palestinians under Syrian supervision.
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NAMIBIA: Assassination of Kapuuo
The fatal shooting of Chief Clemens Kapuuo yesterday
may seriously complicate Western efforts to bring about a nego-
tiated settlement in Namibia. Kapuuo, the traditional Leader
of the Herero tribe, was president of the multiracial Democratic
TurnhaZle Alliance, which was formed Last year to compete
against the South-West Africa People's Organization in any pre-
independence election. SWAPO's opponents in Namibia and in
South Africa very likely will blame the killing on SWAPO.
Kapuuo was shot killed in Katatura--a segregated resi-
dential area for contract workers from several tribal homelands.
Earlier this month several residents of Katatura were killed
in rioting apparently fueled by traditional tribal animosities.
Kapuuo's assailant may have been an Ovambo who de-
cided to avenge earlier killings of Ovambos by Hereros. In any
case, Kapuuo's death is likely to result in further intertribal
fighting.
South African Government spokesmen recently announced
that South African police in Namibia had obtained a copy of
SWAPO's operational plan, which calls for the assassination of
tribal leaders and names Kapuuo as a prime target. The plan
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apparently was drafted by guerrilla leaders meeting outside
Namibia and may have been intended for contingency use--in case
the South Africans held an election without concluding a truce
with SWAPO.
The South Africans, however, assert that the plan
shows SWAPO's foreign-based leaders are determined to step up
terrorist operations inside Namibia instead of honoring the
Western proposals for a truce and elections under UN super-
vision. The South Africans probably publicized the plan to
strengthen their claim that the Western settlement proposal, by
restricting a residual South African military force, prevents
maintenance of security during an election campaign.
The South African Government may have publicized the
plan to gain greater concessions in negotiations with the West-
ern contact group. In the wake of Kapuuo's death, however,
hardliners in Namibia and within the South African National
Party may cite the plan as a reason to scuttle the negotiations.
F__ I
DJIBOUTI: Political Maneuverings
Ethnic antagonisms are threatening to flare again
in Djibouti because of reports that the Issa-dominated govern-
ment has ordered the arrest of prominent leaders of the rival
Afar ethnic group. Ethiopia and Somalia would be likely to be-
come involved in any Djibouti civil war. Ethiopian concern
over Djibouti is reflected in a statement alleging US support
for Somalia to annex the territory. The French military appar-
ently is divided on the question of whether to keep French
troops in Djibouti.
According to US Embassy sources, the government has
or ere the arrest on unspecified charges of Ahmed Dini, a
former Prime Minister, and Barkat Gourad, a member of the Na-
tional Assembly and a former senator in the French Parliament.
Dini is on a tour of foreign capitals, during which he has
criticized the government for showing favoritism toward the
Issas; Barkat's whereabouts are unknown.
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Prime Minister Kamil told the US Charge Sunday that
he o ted an arrest order had been issued, but said it was
not impossible that some other action against Dini might be
contemplated by security officials.
Afar political leaders believe the arrest of Dini
wou be an act of political repression against the Afars and
would lead to civil war between the Afars and Issas.
Ethiopia and Somalia are almost certain to become
involved if ethnic fighting breaks out in Djibouti. The Afars
would look to Ethiopia for support and the Issas to Somalia.
Each country has already provided arms and training to its
ethnic surrogates in Djibouti.
Ethiopia is trying to win support among the Issas
by adopting a conciliatory policy toward the Issas living in
Ethiopia's Ogaden region. The Ethiopians have appointed the
spirtual leader of the Issas as governor of an "autonomous"
Issa zone. Issas in Djibouti and parts of northern Somalia
also recognize his religious suzerainty.
Despite the close ties of Gouled and other Djibouti
Issas to Somalia, the Issas as a whole probably feel less
loyal to Mogadiscio than do other Somali clans. The Ethiopians
hope to encourage Issa disaffection and create trouble for
President Siad in Djibouti and northern Somalia.
The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry on Sunday accused
the US of scheming to assist Somalia in creating disorder in
Djibouti to provide a pretext for Mogadiscio to intervene and
annex the territory. As evidence of US collusion, the Ethio-
pians cited President Carter's failure to mention Djibouti
in his recent statement calling on Somalia to respect Kenyan
and Ethiopian frontiers and also mentioned Assistant Secretary
Moose's recent talks with President Siad in Mogadiscio.
The Foreign Ministry statement may exaggerate the
Ethiopian position. The US Charge in Addis Ababa believes the
statement is the work of officials in the government who do
not wish to see an improvement in US-Ethiopian relations.
These officials may have taken advantage of Chairman Mengistu's
absence to act on their own.
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Ethiopia. however, will probably continue to high-
light alleged Somali designs on Djibouti in order to provide
a pretext for Ethiopia to pursue a more aggressive policy of
attempting to establish its hegemony over Djibouti.
'
Frenc.ft military is intensely debating e future o
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lieve that French troops should be withdrawn as soon as possi-
ble, before they are forced out in humiliation. Proponents of
this view believe the Ethiopian threat to Djibouti will increase
now that Addis Ababa has regained control of the Ogaden.
Opponents of this strategy point out that Djibouti
occupies a strategic location and that the French have an obli-
gation to support the Djibouti Government. They assert that a
continued French presence in Djibouti will signal France's
resolve to other former French colonies in Africa.
French military personnel in Djibouti may be reduced
slightly even if no formal decision to withdraw is made. An
airborne artillery unit numbering about 100 men that was on
temporary assignment in Djibouti was not replaced after return-
in to France at the end of its tour of duty.
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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Horn of Africa
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Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Minic Zeft yesterday
for Moscow in an apparent effort to convince Soviet President
Brezhnev of the need to reduce the Soviet-Cuban troop presence
in Ethiopia. Minic carries a personal message to Brezhnev from
President Tito; he may also provide some briefing on Tito's
recent visit to the US.
The day before Minic's departure, Milika Sundic, a
knowledgeable Zagreb radio commentator, suggested that a Yugo-
slav appeal for Soviet-Cuban withdrawal was in the making.
Sundic noted that Moscow has "an opportunity" to make a signi-
ficant contribution toward peace between Somalia and Ethiopia.
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He argued that an attempt to set up a permanent Soviet military
presence in Ethiopia would endanger the "military lull" in the
Horn of Africa.
The Yugsolavs probably have no illusions that they
will succeed in Moscow but feel that a gesture is required.
Tito hosts the nonaligned foreign ministers' conference in July,
where sharp opposition to Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa is
likely to surface. Tito wants to show that Yugoslavia disagrees
strongly with Soviet attempts to establish control over non-
aligned countries.
Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister Marshal S. L.
Sokolov will visit Mozambique in the near future, according
to a Mozambican radio broadcast. Sokolov will probably discuss
Soviet military aid to Mozambique and to Rhodesian insurgents
operating out of Mozambique.
Recent Soviet efforts concerning Rhodesia
have focused on Mozambique.
Sokolov visited Angola earlier this year. He may have
met with ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, who was on his way to the
Malta conference on Rhodesia via Luanda, Havana, and Moscow.
I I Two of Pakistan's leading politicians--Abdul Wali
Khan an former Air Force Commander Asghar Khan--apparently
have rejected Chief Marshal Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq's
offer to assist in forming a new government. Asghar was a
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dominant figure in the agitation last year against former Prime
Minister Bhutto; Wali was the most important opposition figure
until Bhutto jailed him in 1975.
Zia could still go ahead with his proposal to create
a government in which most political parties would participate
if the eight-party anti-Bhutto alliance, to which Wali's party
belongs, decides to support him. Without Asghar, Wali, and pre-
sumably the bulk of Bhutto's supporters, however Zia would not
have the broad-based government he needs. 25X1
Romania-Israel
Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan will arrive in
Bucharest on 2 April for a two-day visit, the first high-level
contact between the two governments since Prime Minister Begin's
trip to Romania last August. The Israelis are probably anxious
to fill Ceausescu in on the latest developments in the Middle
East before he departs for the US in early April.
Dayan's trip comes in the wake of strong Romanian
condemnation of the Israeli attack on Palestinian bases in
southern Lebanon. The Romanians described the Israeli move as
"aggression" and called for immediate and total withdrawal of
all Israeli forces from the area.
Ceausescu no doubt believes that the Israeli action
in Lebanon complicates his relations with the Soviet Union and
the Warsaw Pact loyalists who broke relations with Tel Aviv in
1967. Day an is likely to try to soothe Romanian feelings.
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