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CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010108-2
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday 2 May 1978 CG NIDC 78/102C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
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INFO
M
T
ON
SIGNATURE
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for Tuesda
2 Ma
1978.
The NID Ca e is or e urpo
se of
in orming
senior US o icials.
CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN: New Cabinet
Page 1
FRANCE - COMMUNIST PARTY: Hard Line
Page 3
ECUADOR:
Military Meddling
Page 4
Page 6
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Afghanistan's new cabinet, announced Zast night,
includes senior leaders of the pro-Soviet Afghan Communist
movement. The Viee Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and
Vice Prime Minister is Babrak KarmaZ, a Zong-time Communist
leader. His position in the government as deputy to Prime
Minister Taraki is similar to his role as second to Taraki
in the party. Most of the appointees are civilians, but a few
middle-ranking military officers have been named, including Lt.
CoZ. Abdul Qadir, an early spokesman for the rebels during the
coup, as Minister of Defense.
Announcement of the new cabinet will stimulate re-
newed fears in Iran and Pakistan that Afghanistan will now be-
come a cat's paw for the USSR. Pakistani officials are partic-
ularly concerned that the late President Daoud's efforts to
establish better relations with Islamabad will now be repudi-
ated and that the border dispute between the two nations will
flare anew. The decades-old dispute has involved repeated Af-
ghan attempts to create an independent state--Pushtunistan--
from Pakistan's two western provinces.
Both Iranian and Pakistani officials warn, moreover,
that t ere is an increased likelihood over the long term of
renewed Soviet efforts to meddle in the affairs of the region
in an attempt to secure a port on the Indian Ocean.
Soviet news broadcasts have become more openly favor-
a e the new regime in Kabul. Radio Moscow described Taraki
as Afghanistan's "leading revolutionary" and welcomed the de-
cision of the Revolutionary Council to celebrate May Day.
Relations between the new regime and Western countries
remain largely in abeyance while the new government waits for
responses to its request for diplomatic recognition. The first
contact between an official at the Foreign Ministry and a senior
US bnbassy officer has been described by the E~tbassy as
friendly;. largely non-political issues were discussed. So far
only the USSR, Bulgaria, India, and possibly Cuba have recog-
nized the new government.
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US officials, in their first trips out of Kabul and
other major cities since tli.e coup, found all roads open and
the new regime apparently in firm control of the countryside.
Road and communications links with. Pakistan have been restored
and internationa fli hts into and out of Kabul are expected
to resume today.
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French Communist leader Georges Marchais, speaking
to the party's Central Committee Zast week, refused to aeknowZ-
edge any mistakes in the party's actions over the past few
?ears. Defying criticism zaithin the party in the wake of the
Left's electoral defeat in March, Marchais said that the doc-
trine of "democratic centralism"--~vhieh requires strict obedi-
ence of party members to decisions by higher party leaders--
remains indispensable for a revolutionary party. His hard Zine
cuts off open debate in the party and will force his critics
to choose between silence and acknowledged dissidence.
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Marchais has co~isistently refused to allow dissenting
views in the party press; h.e undoubtedly fears that once he did
so, the dissent could not be throttled back. His tough. line
also makes it difficult for party intellectuals and others to
air their views in non-Communist publications.
Unhappiness among party intellectuals and in the
ranks will persist, but may not be voiced until the next party
congress in early 1979. In the meantime, the leadership may try
to appease its critics by instituting carefully controlled
changes. Most party members probably support Marchais' emphasis
on control. He is probably right in saying that the large major-
ity of members approves the strategy and mast of the tactics
adopted since 1972.
Another factor in Marchais' hard line is the party's
nominal alliance with.. the Socialist Party. Marchais evidently
believes insisting that the electoral defeat was entirely the
Socialists' fault is the best basis for a future relationshi
in which his party will try to undermine them. 25X1
ECUADOR: Military Meddling
//Ecuador's military government, ~hieh in
February zsquaZified front-runner Assad Bucaram and two former
heads of state as presidential candidates in the election sehed-
uZed for 16 July, is again interfering in the electoral process.
The military is apparently intent on determining its own sueees-
sor, and if it proceeds with its plans the election could be
totally discredited.//
//Last week, the government-influenced Supreme
E ectora .ri unal disqualified center-left Radical Liberal
leader Francisco Huerta, who was one of the top four remaining
contenders. The Tribunal's earlier disqualification of Bucaram,
the military's arch-foe, was justified on the grounds that his
election would almost certainly trigger another military take-
over. The action against Huerta, however, is a much more trans-
parent attempt to rig the election. It precipitated the resigna-
tions last weekend of three members of the seven-man election
tribunal.//
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The tribunal is expected to disallow the candidacies
of two lesser presidential contenders. It is also likely to dis-
qualify the vice presidential running mate of Jaime Roldos, also
of the center-left. Roldos replaced Bucaram as the standard
bearer of the powerful Concentration of Popular Forces.
Unlike Bucaram, Francisco Huerta intends to fight his
disqualification. The final decision on his candidacy will be
made next week by the Supreme Court. The court was packed by
the military last December and seems unlikely to rule in his
favor.
//The plan to sidetrack Huerta and the other
can icates could backfire badl .
a so wi ave pro ems
eeping t e remaining can i ates in line. Duran-Ballen has al-
ready announced that he may withdraw from the campaign to pro-
test the disqualifications, and other legitimate candidates
could follow his lead. By turning the voting into a farce,
moreover, the government runs the risk of creating a ground-
swell of public sentiment against both itself and the election.//
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