MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WHITE FROM JOHN W. COFFEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 13, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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13 January 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel White
Only the DD/S&T proposed any substantive change
in the papers which you sent to the Deputies et al. We have worked out a
middle ground on his proposed substantive change which is incorporated
in the attached and which affected only paragraph 4a of the "Guidance"
paper. We have not acted on the other proposal which Carl Duckett
recommended very strongly, namely, a separate memorandum to those
addressees of the Presidential paper who have representatives on USIB.
This Carl Duckett had suggested in the original discussion of the subject
matter and we decided against it because only two of the addressees
?qualified" and we believe that the Director should preferably not be in
a position of attempting to tell the Secretaries of State and Defense how
to implement recommendations within their Departments. In talking with
Don Steininger who was representing the DD/S&T viewpoint it was agreed
that only Defense is actually involved since Sec State has but one intelligence
officer. Although NIPE and we do not recommend a separate letter to ILLEGIB
SecDef which specifies the Director/DIA as the advisor, the Director
could if he agrees with Carl's.point use,a transmttta.I.note in lieu of a
separate letter.
We also attach the suggested paper prepared
in the form of ,a Headquarters Notice. This represents a version agreed to
by Messrs. Stewart, Parrott, Osbo me., We haV not referred the text
to any of the otter ? Deputies.
product of a comm ttee.
NSC review(s) completed.
bppe these papers do not read too much like the
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DD/S:JWC:maq (13 Jan 71)
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DO/S 71-0129: Multiple Adse Memo from Richard Helms dtd
subj: Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination
and Clearance of Official Statements
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THE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, Di C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, U. S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
SECRET
!1, s`CI'A"-'RDP84-O0'P80R0043U0060017-3
SUBJECT Disclosures of Classified Information and
Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements
1f i fC is G. i :,
1. In e President's memorandum of December 21, 1.970, subject
as above, he sks that existing regulations designed to safeguard classified
information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary, and calls for
an adequate security review of all pub i disclosures with important security
connotations. The President, noting statutory responsibilities
Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sou ces ILLEGIB
and methods, charged me with providing guidance in this field, especially
through the machinery of the intelligence community.
attached. This ;guidance states, : in paragraph:4a, : that.the. responsibility of
2.. have instituted a review within the entra me igence gency
f existing regulations and procedures and will see to it that any deficiencies
that come to light are corrected. Additionally, I am submitting to members
and observers of the United States Intelligence Board a set of proposed
guidelines to assist the intelligence community in carrying out the intent
of the President's directive. A copy of these proposals which essentially-
update somewhat similar guidance promulgated through USIB in 196Q;, is
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and of this one are members of the USIB, I believe the proposed guidelines
should be essentially applicable to all affected de . artments and agencies.
,your principal officers may contemplate making and which might have security
implications. Although not all addressees of the President's memorandum
advisory capacity in connection with releases which you or
the intelligence chiefs of affected departments and agencies for assessing
risks to intelligence sources and methods involved in deliberate disclosures
should be delineated, and suggests ways in which this can be accomplished.
3. I "urge that you use your principal intelligence or security
officers to work out appropriate procedures to enable them to assist in an
to carry out his ~r,instctions.
t _. 61 i ;'i Y.. 11 l_ _.__., I C 41_" - I
4. - T wo >> d z] preciate it if you could,l t me have your reaction to
these proposals and any additional comments you wish to make so that I
will be able to report to the President in the, near future what we are doing
Att
DD/S JWC Ilc (12 Jai. 711).:.
`E
G
Richard Helms
Director
ORIGINATOR:
Date
:Oz'ig . SecState
1 Ea Following Adse John W. Coffey
1
DDC I,
Deputy Director.
1 ER for Support
1 DD/I
1 ' DD/P.,
I -. DD/S&T
1 - D/Sec
1 -' D/DCI/NIPE
9 (may~`
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,4dance Governing Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
that is not known to the public. -Nothing could be further. from the .truth,
The protection of intelligence sources and methods continues to be of vital
importance to our intelligence effort. The true origin of many categories of
intelligence information to be used in public release or debate must be
disguised and the use of all such information must be duly authorized. The
responsibility for authorizing release and for devising proper disguise rests
with the originating agency.
o vvith regulations and procedures already-iri effect Further, with
expect to sources and methods, widespread discussion of this subject,
orne of it unavoidable but much of it gratuitous, seems to have conveyed an
impression in some parts of the Government that there is little, if anything,
las ifi d i telligendb.-involve eithek careless or deliberate failure to
;lassified information. it evident that unauthorized disclosures of
Clearance of Official Statements, " machinery now exists to protect all ,r_t
)ject "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and
Is pointed out in the President's Directive of December 21, 1970,
The President's Directive of December 21, 1970, refers to the
statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods. The National Security Act
of 1947 specifically states:
"... And provided further, That the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; "
This is a unique statutory responsibility and recognizes that protection of
.intelligence sources and methods is a professional intelligence matter. It
is not to be expected that all consumers of intelligence, policy makers and
others would recognize or be fully alert to potential danger to intelligence
sources and methods resulting from release of intelligence. Cofsequently,
it is believed that the intelligence community should take the leading role
within their departments and agencies.
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Chiefs of all components of the intelligence community should review
he existing regulations and impress on all concerned the necessity to abide
by them. The following specific actions should be taken:
1. Review existing departmental and agency regulations
governing the control of classified information to make sure that
in every instance they meet the criteria required by the steadily
increasing volume and significance of classified intelligence,
particularly including sensitive compartmented intelligence.
Particular emphasis should be placed on assuring that the need-
to-know principle is strictly enforced.
2. Make sure that briefing and indoctrination procedures
are reviewed with the objectives of paragraph 1 above in view.
These procedures should be so designed as to assure that newly
indoctrinated members of the intelligence community and other
newly indoctrinated officials of the Government fully understand
the differences which exist among various kinds of intelligence,
with respect to danger to the source or method which would result
from disclosure. It should also be the purpose of these procedures
to explain the way in which cleared individuals can readily ascertain
the clearance status of others before discussing classified informa-
tion with them, and to make sure that they do so.
3. Provide for periodic reindoctrination and continuing
education in security practices and procedures, to include a program
for prompt debriefing of individuals who no longer have a need-to-
know.
4. Review procedures for authorizing and controlling
disclosures and releases.
a. The responsibility of the intelligence chief
for assessing the risk to intelligence sources and methods
involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated.
There should be a review and assessment by intelligence
authorities whenever any classified intelligence is proposed
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for declassification or for use in briefings, testimony,
symposiums, seminars, speeches, writings for
publication, presentations, courses of instruction,
press releases, formal and informal interviews with
press representatives, or other activities in the course
of which there is a danger that intelligence sources and
methods might be revealed. Each assessment should
include methods by which such intelligence can be
effectively and plausibly sanitized by or with the approval
of the originating agency so as to protect the source.
Sensitive intelligence to be disclosed should be clearly
identified as such and the official disclosing it should be
so cautioned when appropriate. This can be particularly
important in dealing with public information officials who
cannot be expected to be fully familiar with the origins
of sensitive information. Records should be maintained
regarding any classified intelligence declassified or
authorized for disclosure.
b. The facts surrounding inadvertent disclosure
of classified intelligence to any person or persons not
authorized for access to such intelligence should be
reported to the appropriate intelligence chief, who will
inform the originating agency in any potentially harmful
case.
c. Any person having knowledge of any disclosure
of classified intelligence made contrary to the regulations
and controls of the department or agency concerned should
promptly report it to the appropriate intelligence chief for
action. Such action may include (1) such steps as are
feasible to repair or limit the extent of the damage; (2)
a request for investigation by appropriate authorities; (3)
an assessment of the possible harm to intelligence sources
and methods and notification to all intelligence authorities
concerned; and (4) prompt notification to all official
recipients that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred,
together with advice of remedial action to be taken and
guidance for responses to inquiries from public media
representatives that may result from the compromise.
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5. Take fully into account, in proposing the release of
any intelligence derived from a joint project in the intelligence
community, the interests of any other members of the intelligence
community which might be concerned. If a department or agency
authorizes the disclosure of sensitive intelligence from such a
source, that agency is responsible for informing other USIB
members of the action. Special attention should be given to
defining the precise limits of the disclosure and to cautioning
against inadvertent elaboration or extension beyond those limits.
6. Take disciplinary action where appropriate, in a just,
clear, and definite manner which will demonstrate the extreme
seriousness with which unauthorized disclosures are viewed.
4
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS
SUBJECT : Guidelines Governing Disclosures of Classified
Intelligence
1. The President has issued a memorandum dated December 21, 1970
entitled "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and
Clearance of Official Statements". A copy of this is attached for your
information and guidance, as well as a copy of a memorandum I am
sending to the other addressees of the President's communication.
2. The President, noting r W responsibilities
Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, charged me with providing guidance in this field, especially
through the machinery of the intelligence community. In this connection,
I would appreciate your giving personal attention to the attached draft
guidelines for the intelligence community. I plan to discuss these in
executive session at an early meeting of the USIB.
Richard Helms
Chairman
SECRE I.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 21, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
I
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, U. S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
Disclosures of Classified Information
and Coordination and Clearance of
Official Statements
I am becoming increasingly concerned about the disclosure in
public media of classified information bearing upon important
aspects of national security, particularly that which tends to
jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Such disclosures
present a serious threat to our national interests and I am
determined that the practice of releasing such information without
proper authorization will be brought to an end.
Executive Order 10501, of December 15, 1953, as amended,
established regulations and procedures for safeguarding classified
information, while especially sensitive data are protected by
special systems of clearances.
I direct that immediate steps be taken within the jurisdiction of
each addressee to ensure that existing regulations and procedures
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SECRET - 2
designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strength-
ened where necessary. These regulations and procedures should
assure that only those individuals with a demonstrated "need-to-know"
receive classified information and that all recipients are constantly
aware of the necessity to protect it from public disclosure. They
should provide for an adequate security review of all statements and
documents made public on subjects with important security connota-
tions. Further, I wish responsible officials to take firm disciplinary
action against individuals under their jurisdiction found responsible
for careless or deliberate mishandling of classified information.
The Director of Central Intelligence has the statutory responsibility
for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly,
I shall look to him to provide guidance in this field, especially through
the machinery of the intelligence community. I shall expect him to
keep me informed of developments and I wish department and agency`
heads to cooperate. fully with him.
I also reaffirm the following instructions which I issued on September 1,
1970 concerning coordination and clearance of public statements and
press releases and the necessity for White House clearance of all
official communications having policy implications:
--:Public statements and press releases: Prior to release,
all public communications on matters of known or
potential Presidential interest must be carefully cleared
by the White House (Assistant to the President for National
Security) for consistency with Presidential policy and for
coordination with the departments and agencies who share
overlapping interests and responsibilities. Should there
be any uncertainty as to Presidential or interdepartmental
interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance."
--"Official communications: All official communications with
policy. implications must be cleared by the White House.
When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared.
This procedure requires close and confidential staff rela-
tionships at all levels between the White House and your
department as well as among departments."
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S-E-C-R-E-T
This Notice Expires
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
AND COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS
1. The President Is concerned over disclosures in the public media
of classified Information bearing upon important aspects of national security,
particularly those disclosures that may jeopardize intelligence sources and
methods. He has directed that immediate steps be taken to ensure that ac -
cess to classified information is restricted to those individuals who have a
demonstrated need to know, who possess an appropriate clearance, and who
are fully aware of the necessity of protecting the information from public
disclosure. In addition, the President has ordered responsible officials to
take firm disciplinary action against individuals under their jurisdiction who
are found responsible for mishandling of classified information, either de-
liberately or through carelessness.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence has statutory responsibility
for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, which include clan-
destine agent operations and technical collection systems. Unauthorized dis-
closures In these areas could result in the compromise of agent personnel or
enable the opposition to take effective countermeasures.
3. Our policies and procedures governing the control and dissemina-
tion of classified information are fundamentally sound. It is essential, how-
ever, that all employees be fully aware of these policies and procedures and
adhere to them. Those of particular importance are set forth below.
a. The Assistant to the Director is responsible for the coordi-
nation within the Agency of responses to inquiries from representatives
of public information media, and all such inquiries will be referred to
b. Agency employees will have no contact with representatives
of the public information media for the purpose of furnishing informa-
tion without the prior approval of the Assistant to the Director.
25X1
25X1
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c. All public requests for information under Public Law
89-487, "Freedom of Information Act, " are to be referred to the
Assistant to the Director for action.
d. Public statements, press releases, and official external
communications concerning matters in which the President has a
known or likely interest or which have broad policy implications
must be submitted to the Executive Director-Comptroller for clear-
ance by the White House prior to release.
e. The Executive Director -Comptroller or the Deputy Director
concerned will review all requests for unofficial public appearances
and for permission to publish to ensure that classified information is
not disclosed without authorization.
f. Each employee is responsible for protecting official data
from unauthorized disclosure. (Official data is defined as all informs-
tion--classified or unclassified- -received, compiled, or created by
the Central Intelligence Agency. Personal copies of unclassified per-
sonnel papers are excluded.) Official data in Agency files will not be
copied or removed from the files for release outside the Agency except
by those officials who have been authorized to do so by the Director of
Central Intelligence, either personally or through the chain of command.
Within the Agency, official data will be disclosed only to those employees
whose duties require them to have access to it (need to know) and who
have the appropriate clearances.
S. Any employee having knowledge of an unauthorized diaclo-
sure of classified Information must report it promptly to the Director
of Security, who, in coordination with the appropriate Deputy Director
or the Executive Director-Comptroller, will determine the steps to be
taken to limit the extent of the damage and to Identify the person re-
sponsible for the unauthorized disclosure. The Director of Security
will also provide prompt notification, as appropriate, to all official
recipients of the information that an unauthorized disclosure has oc-
curred, together with his recommendations for remedial action.
h. All employees are admonished to omit from social conver-
sation any suggestion that their insights on matters of national security
or on foreign affairs in general are based on privileged information.
They also should take care to avoid implying, in any way, that the posi-
tions they take for or against announced national policies are supported
by privileged information.
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4. The Director of Central Intelligence, in carrying out his
statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, is prepared to take strong disciplinary action against any
employee who jeopardizes the security of those sources and methods
through unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
JOHN W. COFFEY
Deputy Director
for Support
DD/S Distribution:
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1 DD/S (signature)
1,,- DD/S Subject
1 - DD/S Chrono
DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES
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 Appr
App
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
i '-$:;/; NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
DD/S
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Jack:
I do not think we need to meet again on this,
subject. I have sent copies to Carl Duckett, Jaak
Smhth, Abbot"'Fmith, Larry Ho~u.ston, and Tom
Karame`tsines, requesting that any comments they
might have be provided to you by noon on Tuesday.
As a result thereof, please make any changes you
think necessary and return it to me no later than
noon on Wednesday.
LKW
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Executive Director-Comptroller 1
9 Jan 71
pvej
&A
STAT
FORM N0. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67 J!
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AT
Herewith the package of papers which represent
the substantive and editorial efforts of Gordon Stewart.
Tom Parrott, Howard Osborn and myself plus
I I on the text of the memorandum for USIB
principals. Copies of the "guidance paper" will be
sent with both memoranda.
If these papers look reasonable to you, it
would be our hope that the review you propose with
the other Deputies be limited to principles and
substance to avoid having the meeting turn into a
redrafting session.
papers. Gordon, Tom, Oz and I have copies of these
~sign,ed) John W. Coffe
John W. Coffey , 6 AN 19~
Deputy Director for Support 7-D-26 Hqs.
DD/S:JWC:llc (6 January 1971)
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1 - DD/S Chrono
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D R A F T (5 January 1971)
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The. Director, U. S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
SUBJECT : Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination
and Clearance of Official Statements
In the President's memorandum of December 21, 1970, subject
as above, he asks that existing regulations designed to safeguard classified
.information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary, and calls for an
adequate security review of all public disclosures with important security
connotations. Further, he charges me with providing guidance for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, especially through the
machinery of the intelligence community.
I have instituted a review within the Central Intelligence Agency of
existing regulations and procedures and will see to it that any deficiencies
that come to light are corrected. Additionally, I am submitting to members
and observers of the United States Intelligence Board a set of proposed guidelines
to assist the intelligence community in carrying out the intent of the President's
directive. A copy of these proposals, which essentially update somewhat
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TEXCI~W
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similar guidance promulgated through USIB in 1960, is attached. This
guidance states, in paragraph 4a, that the responsibility of the intelligence
chiefs of affected departments and agencies for assessing risks to
intelligence sources and methods involved in deliberate disclosures should
be delineated, and suggests ways in which this can be accomplished.
I urge that you use your principal intelligence or security officers
to work out appropriate procedures to enable them to assist in an educational
and advisory capacity in connection with releases which you or your
principal officers may contemplate making and which might have security
implications. Although not all addressees of the President's memorandum
and of this one are members of the USIB, I believe the proposed guidelines
should be essentially applicable to all affected departments and agencies.
I would appreciate it if you could let me have your reaction to these
proposals and any additional comments you wish to make so that I will be
able to report to the President in the near future what we are doing to carry
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D R A F T (4 January 1971)
MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS
SUBJECT: Guidelines Governing Disclosures of Classified
Intelligence
1. The President has issued a memorandum dated
December 21, 1970, entitled "Disclosures of Classified Infor-
mation and Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements."
A copy of this is attached for your information and guidance, as
well as a copy of a memorandum I am sending to the other addressees
of the President's communication.
2. You will note that the President charges me with prop=
viding guidance in carrying out his instructions with respect to the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, particularly through
the machinery of the intelligence community. In this connection, I
would appreciate your giving personal attention to the attached draft
guidelines for the intelligence community. I plan to discuss these in
executive session at an early meeting of the USIB.
Richard Helms
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 DRAFT (5 January 1971)
Agreed Guidance Governing Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
As pointed out in the President's Directive of December 21, 1970,
subject "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and
Clearance of Official Statements", machinery now exists to protect all
classified information. It is evident that unauthorized disclosures of
classified intelligence involve either careless or deliberate failure to
comply with regulations and procedures already in effect. Further, with
respect to sources and methods, widespread discussion of this subject,
some of it unavoidable but much of it gratuitous, seems to have conveyed an
impression in some parts of the Government that there is little, if anything,
that is not known to the public. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
protection of intelligence sources and methods continues to be of vital
importance to our intelligence effort. The true origin of many categories of
intelligence information to be used in public release or debate must be
disguised and the use of all such information must be duly authorized. The
responsibility for authorizing release and for devising proper disguise rests
with the originating agency.
Chiefs of all components.of the intelligence community should review
the existing regulations and impress on all concerned the necessity to abide
by them, The following specific actions should be taken:
1. Review existing departmental and agency regulations
governing the control of classified information to make sure that
in every instance they meet the criteria required by the steadily
increasing volume and significance of classified intelligence,
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it=;, ~~~?-