NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type:

CREST [1]

Collection:

General CIA Records [2]

Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):

CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010078-5

Release Decision:

RIPPUB

Original Classification:

Document Page Count:

Document Creation Date:

December 16, 2016

Document Release Date:

May 18, 2005

Sequence Number:

Case Number:

Publication Date:

June 27, 1978

Content Type:

REPORT

File:

Attachment	Size
CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010078-5.pdf [3]	409.2 KB

Body:

,AW AMW' AIW ~AW ,AW AW AdW AMIF AAF 1 1 A rove*BdrrFase 2005/06/ 09 : CI TO: NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 2 3 4 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPA RE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOM MENDATION COMMENT FILE RETUR N CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE REMARKS: FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE -RDP79T00975A030700010 Secret (Security Classification) 25 CONTROL NO. J 0 Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE 0 0 Tuesday 27 June 1978 CG NIDC 78/149C 0 0 0 AL- 25 1 I I NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 25X1 Top Secret 0 0 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO307AI166P8 0 1AW 1AW AW 1AW 1AW 1AW 1AW IdEw 'AM 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30700010078-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30700010078-5 Approved For Rele4 25X1 25X1 National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 27 June 1978, 25X1 e NIL) a e is or the purpose o informing senior US o icials. CONTENTS 25X1 PAKISTAN: Movement to Nonaligned Page 3 Page 4 25X1 25X1 TURKEY: Debt Refinancing Delay CEMA: Heads of Government Meet BRIEFS: Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 25X1 Approved For R4Iease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03g700010078-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30700010078-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30700010078-5 Approved For Fjelease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AOJ0700010078-5 25X1 ICELAND: Election Results Dissatisfaction with the economic program of Prime Minister HaZZgrimsson's government was apparently the main reason for the success of the Left in Sunday's parliamentary election in Iceland. No party won a majority, and several weeks of negotiations may be required before a new government is formed. In the meantime, the HaZZgrimsson cabinet remains in office on a caretaker basis. The moderately Leftist Social Democrats, who made a striking comeback from their poor per- formance in the national election four'years ago, appear likely to play a prominent role in a new coalition government because they could work with the parties of either the right or the Left. Repeating the left's strong showing in local elec- tions held last month, both the Social Democrats and the People's Alliance, Iceland's Communist party, substantially increased Approved For Rllease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AI30700010078-5 25X1 Approved For 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 their parliamentary strength. The governing coalition parties-- Hallgrimsson's conservative Independence Party and the centrist Progressive Party--each lost five seats. I IThe Progressives are interpreting the outcome to mean a their backers do not favor the party's participation in a conservative-dominated government. This apparently means that Hallgrimsson's two-party coalition will not be re-formed, even though the two parties together would still have a parliamentary majority. The Progressives have joined leftist coalitions in the past and may be asked to do so again. I IThe key to the formation of a new government appears to be the Social Democrats, who increased their parliamentary strength by nine seats to a total of 14 in the 60-seat parlia- ment. The party could either join a coalition dominated by the Independence Party or help form a government of the left. The party was in coalition with the Independence Party in the 1960s, but in the process it lost many of its leftist members. Joining with the Communists would be difficult because of dif- ferences over defense policy, particularly Iceland 's member- ship in NATO. The Social Democrats will negotiate carefully with both si es, and formation of a government could take weeks. PAKISTAN: Movement to Nonaligned and moving toward the nonaligned camp. The Pakistanis have been disappointed with the CENTO alliance for years because, in their view, it has not paid off in terms of aid against India. More recently they have also become uneasy--especially since the leftist coup in Afghanistan--about growing Soviet pressure on them to withdraw from CENTO. Pakistan may be taking the first steps toward dis- engaging from the Western-sponsored Central Treaty Organization 25X1 I I Pakistan will apply for guest status at the confer- ence o nonaligned foreign ministers in Belgrade next month, according to an announcement on Pakistani radio. If the applica- tion is accepted, Pakistan would be participating at a non- aligned meeting for the first time. 25X1 Approved Foil 25X1 25X1 Approved For R 25X1 25X1 25X1 tend plenary meetings, including those closed to the press. 25X1 The difference between an observer and a guest is vague. Neither can participate with full-fledged members in drafting and working groups. Observers can make statements at general meetings, but guests occasionally have also been per- mitted to do so. Both observers and guests are allowed to at- 25X1 25X1 The Pakistanis have viewed their involvement in CENTO ambiguously for many years. Military support against India--the 25X1 Approved For Pelease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0$0700010078-5 Approved For Rel 0700010078-5 25X1 primary reason for Pakistan's adherence to the pact that orig- inally created the organization in 1954--has not been forth- coming, at least in the quantities desired. Future US economic as well as military assistance is uncertain as a result of the present bilateral controversy over Pakistan's purchase of a French plant for reprocessing plutonium. 25X1 25X1 Previous threats by governments in Islamabad to leave CENTO, however, have never been carried out, partly because of fear of jeopardizing future aid from Washington and Tehran. The Pakistanis probably would also encounter a negative reaction from China, which has been their major source of military as- sistance over the past dozen years and is a su porter of re- gional organizations that oppose the Soviets. Approved For F9elease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T0097 25X1 25X1 Approved For R4 25X1 25X1 TURKEY: Debt Refinancing Delay Short-term debt refinancing agreements between Turkey and private foreign banks--amounting to $2.5 billion-- have been delayed and may not be signed for several weeks. Refinancing terms sketched out in April were still undetermined when talks ended yesterday between representatives of eight major banks and the Turkish Government. New credits also are proving elusive for Turkey; none is likely to be announced at the informal Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- ment consortium meeting that begins today in Paris, and private banks probably will provide $200 million at most in the next few months. I I The refinancing stalemate may mean that the eight banks could not persuade enough of the smaller banks involved-- more than 200--to accept the terms the eight had approved'. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T0097*030700010078-5 25X1 Approved For Relea4 Turkey may also have been asking for more lenient terms. A so- lution apparently will require several more weeks of difficult i=nternational bargaining; new private credits will be delayed '1ntil the refinancing has been completed. Turkey will probably ask for, but not obtain, re- c eau ing of privately held overdue trade credits and a re- sumption of official export credits at the OECD consortium meeting. Consortium participants believe. their governments already have extended themselves as much as possible on 'T'urkey's behalf. An ad hoc group of the country's OECD creditors re- scheduled about $500 million in government-guaranteed trade arrears last month..The OECD group also agreed to reschedule $600 million worth of other obligations, such as debt service. Members, moreover, are faced with domestic legislative con- straints on foreign lending. Although Turkey has resumed regular import payments ,is a result of a disbursement by the International Monetary Fund in May, an additional $1 billion will be needed to cover this year's expected basic balance-of-payments deficit. Cur- rent rescheduling agreements give the country no more than three years in which to strengthen its balance of payments enough to cover annual debt repayments of $1 billion or more, and there remains $2 billion in short-term debt for which no specific rescheduling plans exist. The heads of government of the countries belonging :o the Soviet-Zed Council for Mutual Economic Assistance begin Their annual meeting today in Bucharest. They will discuss (ong-term plans to coordinate production in key sectors of their countries' economies, review relations with non-CEMA ,members, and perhaps discuss a Soviet proposal to revise CEMA voting procedures. I The participants will probably endorse three longterm target programs approved at a meeting of CEMA's Executive Committee last month. These programs, which are expected to Approved For Relerase 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03p700010078-5 25X1 25X1. 25X:1 Approved For Rel run for 10- to 15-year periods, deal with production and de- livery of fuel, energy, raw materials, and basic. food products and with specialization and cooperation in the machine-building industry. _4The program on fuel, energy, and raw materials has probably been the most difficult one to hammer out. The Soviets may still be unwilling to provide specific figures on oil ex- ports to CEMA partners until five-year bilateral trade proto- cols are negotiated for the 1981-85 period. These negotiations are unlikely to begin for at least another year. The participants will review the slow pace of dis- cussions between CEMA and the European Community on establishing official ties between the two organizations. They may endorse measures to expand CEMA contacts with Vietnam, Laos, and Angola. The Soviet proposal to require only majority approval instead of unanimity in CEMA votes on nonpolicy issues would make it easier to implement projects that have won the general agreement of interested parties. The change would not be nearly as politically sensitive as a blanket change in CEMA's voting rules, but the Romanians and perhaps others may still want to avoid situations in which they must abide by a majority vote. Portugal-Angola I I Presidents Eanes of Portugal and Neto of Angola signed an agreement in Guinea-Bissau yesterday after three days of talks to improve strained bilateral relations. The meeting was scheduled to end on Sunday, but the leaders de- cided to continue their discussions for an extra day. In addition to pledges of increased economic, sci- entific, and cultural ties, the agreement also allows Angolan nationals who fled to Portugal during the bitter postindependence civil war to return to Angola whenever they wish. Further dis- cussions will be held on the release of Portuguese under de- tention in Angola, some of whom were arrested before the end of the colonial period. Neto and Eanes also voiced support for Approved For RO 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rp' .independence for Namibia and Zimbabwe in accord with resolu- tions of the UN and the Organization of African Unity. 25X1 I I Eanes said at the close of the session that he and Neto did not expect their meeting to have immediate specific 25X1 results. 25X1 Approved For P,,elease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0307 b0010078-5 25X1 Approved For Rp' 25X1 25X1 25X1 //Disagreement over procedural matters con- tinues to delay Peking's evacuation of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. Each side blames the other for the 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AQ30700010078-5 AV AWAW AV AV AV AV AW A A F M1 2005/06/09 CIA RDP79T00975A030700010078 5 pprove %jI a ease Top Secret (Security Classification) Secret (Security Classification)