WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010046-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: April 4, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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This Document contains Information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States. within the mean-
itig of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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1. USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Chinese Communist Grain Negotiations . . . 2
3. Aden and the Federation of South Arabia. . 3
4. Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 April 1966
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Neither Stalin nor Khrushchev has been mentioned by
name at the Soviet party congress, which has now passed
the mid-way point. The party leadership, however, has
made clear its feeling that Khrushchev's attack on Stalin
and all his works, which began ten years ago, has helped
to erode the party's authority and prestige and that a
re-evaluation of the Stalin era is now required.
The question is so far being treated very gingerly.
It may be that the advice of foreign Communist leaders
and the warning addressed to Brezhnev by prominent mem-
bers of the Soviet intellectual community have persuaded
him to proceed cautiously. Brezhnev's keynote speech
to the congress was noticeably circumspect in its in-
direct references to Stalin and Khrushchev.
There is good reason to suppose that countervail-
ing pressures have been at work--from neo-Stalinists on
the one side and from leading members of the intelli-
gentsia on the other--and there are some signs the party
hierarchy itself is not of one mind on how far and how
fast to go in altering the historical record on Stalin.
The congress has unmistakably given impetus to
the process of tightening discipline within the party
and of establishing closer control by the party in all
walks of Soviet life. Some of the changes in party
forms announced at the congress, including the re-estab-
lishment of the politburo and of the title general
secretary, are reminiscent of the Stalin era. An ef-
fort will also be made to "purify" the party membership
and to restore the idea of an elite corps.
These steps, together with the clear signals that
a crackdown on cultural and intellectual liberties is
in the offing, are sure to cause disquiet within the
USSR, especially among the intelligentsia. Nor will
these developments be welcomed in most foreign Commu-
nist parties. If the Soviet leaders were to push too
hard they could easily cause considerable disruption
not only in the intellectual sphere but on the polit-
ical and economic side. In the end, probably, they
will have to settle for less than they want in the way
of social and intellectual discipline. 25X1
-1- 4 April 1966
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CHINESE GRAIN IMPORTS 1961-1965
6.8
Others -
N,F,B
6.0
( Oihirs
A,F,WGS,C,R
Others .1
B
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2. CHINESE COMMUNIST GRAIN NEGOTIATIONS
The Chinese Communists again are in the interna-
tional grain market, but under somewhat greater dis-
advantages than in some past years. Their own early
harvest, which normally provides about 20 percent of
their total annual production, promises again to be
poor, and the three million tons they ordered last
year for delivery this spring will thus go quickly.
It is therefore unlikely that the level of China's
grain imports this year will decline much, if at all,
from the six million tons Peking purchased abroad
last year at a cost of about $400 million.
This year however, the supply situation is ex-
ceptionally tight. Argentina, which sold China sub-
stantial amounts last year, has already committed
most of its diminished exportable surplus to tradi-
tional customers elsewhere in Latin America and in
Europe. In Australia, another major supplier in the
past, drought has cut the wheat crop by one third.
Chinese buyers are nevertheless scheduled to talk to
trade officials in both countries.
The Chinese will thus be compelled to rely on
Canada, and on smaller--and higher cost--suppliers
such as Mexico and France. They have already ar-
ranged for delivery of 1.5 million tons of Canadian
grain later this year under the three-year agree-
ment they signed with Canada last year. In addi-
tion they have exercised the option in the agree-
ment to take more grain from Canada, up to a maximum
of 7.5 million tons, during the terms of the agree-
ment.
This suggests that Peking may be seriously con-
cerned over finding enough supplies--which neces-
sarily will have to come from this year's harvests--
for the remainder of this year and early 1967. Chi,
nese grain representatives are scheduled to go to
France this month.
-2- 4 April 1966
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Haile Selassie, now 73, is faced with increas-
ingly vocal domestic discontent. His death, in-
capacitation, or removal probably would usher in a
period of instability. A loosening of US-Ethiotian
tieq could be expected[_-
a s rong moderating orce in rican
councils wou be lost.
The Emperor continues to make all the govern-
ment's basic decisions. He is slowing down, however,
and the apparatus suffers from immobility. His re-
cent grant of permission to Prime Minister Aklilu
to run the day-to-day affairs of government is not
likely to change this state of affairs.
The Emperor keeps his opponents off balance
by summary transfers and Byzantine intrigue. How-
ever, dissatisfaction among the reformist young edu-
cated elite in the bureaucracy and army has sharply
risen over the past year. The Emperor is becoming
a target for increasingly open criticism.
Even if the Emperor's reign ends by natural
causes and the untrained 50-year-old Crown Prince
succeeds to the throne, the traditionalists in the
army--the locus of real power in Ethiopia--the no-
bility, and the church will contend with each other
and the modernized elements. The educated elite seem
certain to press for a less Western orientation for
Ethiopia and for widespread social changes. They
currently see US aid as the main prop for the Emperor
and the principal obstacle to change.
The Emperor's departure may also intensify ex-
ternal attempts to break up the Empire. Currently
the army is hard pressed by Somali insurgents, by
nationalists in Eritrea, and by tribes resentful of
the domination of the Amhara and Tigre Coptic Chris-
tian peoples. F7 I
-4- 4 April 1966
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The change of executive in Ecuador has solved
no basic problems and has at least temporarily weak-
ened the political fabric. The elections which
had been scheduled for July now probably cannot be
held before fall at the earliest.
Provisional President Yerovi is unlikely to be
a strong executive. Like the junta he replaced,
he is dependent for survival on military support.
The manner of his accession gives him a weak start-
ing position, yet he faces the same problems, es-
pecially in the economic sphere, which plagued
the ousted junta in its closing days.
A serious budget deficit and a developing trade
imbalance imperil the country's finances, both d.om-
estic and foreign. Yerovi has indicated interest
in US financial aid.
It is uncertain if the military will remain
united behind Yerovi. Moreover, business interests,
having succeeded in resisting economic measures de-
creed by the junta, are unlikely to cave in to the
weaker Yerovi.
A variety of politicians will be pressing
Yerovi for position and power. If their aspira-
tions are denied--as they largely must be if the
present precarious political equilibrium is to be
maintained--the politicians will demand his head.
Students remain opposed to him, hoping to consoli-
date their "gains" obtained at the price of "martyrs."
Moreover, nearly a dozen leaders of Ecuadorean sub-
versive activities have been released in a general
amnesty of "political" prisoners. These men will
make ever effort to capitalize on popular discon-
tent.
-:5- 4 April 1966
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6. BOLIVIA
Bolivia is in...a difficult and uncertain pre-elec-
toral period. The common assumption in Bolivia has
been that General Rene Barrientos, supported by an
electoral combination of the Front of the Bolivian
Revolution (FRB), the peasant masses, and the armed
forces,,would win the national elections scheduled
for 3 July. He would then return the nation to con-
stitutional civilian rule on 6 August 1966. It is
increasingly doubtful that this schedule will be
met.
On 31 March Barrientos virtually forced the mil-
itary to endorse his candidacy (which Barrientos has
not yet announced publicly) by an open threat not
to run for the presidency. His tactics, however,
have disturbed some high-ranking officers, and armed
forces unity--on which Bolivian stability depends--
may be imperiled. Fissures had already appeared
over the junta's dismissal of the labor minister,
Colonel Gallardo, for engaging in unauthorized politi-
cal activities.
The FRB, a weak four-party alliance put to- .
gether last November by Barrientos, has displayed
little vitality or cohesion. It is beset with
leadership rivalries. Barrientos' preferred vice-
presidential running mate has renounced his candi-
dacy out of annoyance over Barrientos' failure to
consult with him on political decisions. Finally,
opposition parties threaten to boycott the elec-
tion and to resort to subversion.
With unrest endemic among peasants, students,
and labor in Bolivia, elections probably will be
postponed if the military should falter in their
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support
ment of
setting
of Barr
a retur
in moti
ie
n
on
nto
to
a
s. Any extensive postpone-
constitutional rule would risk
train of developments such as
led to
the cris
is
in
Ecuador last week.
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