CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
N?_ 042
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18 February 1972
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No. 0042/72
18 February 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
NORTH VIETNAM: Renewed signs of concern over big-
power summitry. (Page 1)
EGYPT-UN: Cairo probably will encourage Jarring to
resume his mission. (Page 3)
INDIA--PAKISTAN: New Delhi hints willingness to be-
gin preliminary talks. (Page 4)
PAKISTAN: Bhutto's opposition is growing more res-
tive. (Page 5)
BANGLADESH: Public order ~~ituation. (Page 6)
NATO: Allies agree to establish standing naval
force in Mediterranean. (Page 7)
MOROCCO: Proposed constitutional changes. (Page 8)
URUGUAY: President-elect faces trouble with Con-
gress and labor. (Page 9)
HUNGARY-USSR: Moscow may oppose Budapest personnel
shifts. (Page 10)
DAHOMEY: Mutiny at army garrison unsettles politics.
(Page 12 )
POLAND: Government plans ambitious railroad invest-
ment program. (Page 13)
EL SALVADOR: Government rejects opposition election
sate s .-~P age 14 )
NATO: Status of Brosio mission (,Page 15)
TURKEY: Opium compensation program (Page 15)
THE NETHERLANDSa Metalworkers' strike (Page 16)
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NORTH VIETNAM; The Hanoi press again is giving
heavy p ay to North Vietnamese concern over big-
power summitry on the eve of Pre:]ident Nixon's visit
to Peking.
Recent articles in both the party's daily and
theoretical journal have given vent to an apprehen-
sion muted since :Last August. Common to the arti-
cles is a fear that the US will be able to exploit
dissensions within the Communist world to bring
about, in the words of one article, "a detente among
various big countries while continuing to intimidate
small nations." The Soviet Uniori and China are both
named more than once in this connection.
Hanoi is even lecturing Peking and Moscow di-
rectly. "Because these socialism countries have be-
come increasingly strong in every respect, how can
they accept the view that Nixon teas a new concept
and a practical, intelligent attitude?" the theo-
retical journal demands. "It is certain that-with
all of its policies the United Si~ates will always
consider the USSR, the PRC, and other socialist
countries as its dangerous enemies."
Behind the North Vietnamese rhetoric lies a
concern about how their traditional policy toward
the Soviet Union and China will Yee affected by the
new political alignments they see developing in
Asia and among the three great powers. While the
North Vietnamese probably believE~ that they still
can play the Soviets and the Chinese off against
each other, their long-standing distrust of bicr-
power maneuvers obviously persisi:s.
1$ Feb 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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EGYPT-UN: Egyptian leaders probably will seek
to use the r talks with UN special envoy Jarring,
who arrives in Cairo today, to underscore their
position that reactivation of his mission is the
most promising approach to breaking the deadlock.
-The communique issued after Sadat's recent
Moscow visit and subsequent Egyptian press reports
have stressed the need for greater involvement in
peace efforts by Jarring.
The Jordanian ambassador in Moscow claims that
Jarring is receptive to playing a role in proximity
talk:> on an interim Suez arrangement, but nothing
has keen heard from the envoy himself. Secretary
General Waldheim earlier this month was publicly
skeptical about an interim arrangement but sub-
sequently, as a result of Israeli and US demarches,
characterized the proximity talks and Jarring's
mission as complementary.
The impasse over the lack of a positive Israeli
reply to Jarring's memorandum of February 1971 on
overall-settlement terms has not been broken, and
the Secretary General and Jarring are groping for
a way to revive his mission. Waldheim told the US
mission at the UN that Jax?ring has no immediate
plans to visit Israel before returning to New York
because he is fully abreast of the Israeli position.
18 FE,b 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Sl1,CK E'L'
INDIA-PAKISTAN: The Irdians are signaling
that they are willing to becin discussions with
President Bhutto leading tov;ard formal peace talks.
A senior Indian Joint External Affairs offi-
cial told a US Embassy officer on 15 February that
Islamabad must adopt a more conciliatory posture
toward New Delhi before Indian public opinion would
countenance a more forthcoming government attitude.
He implied that these conciliatory Pakistani ges-
tures need not be wholly public and he said that
New Delhi could be magnanimous toward Islamabad at
the conference table but, because of tactical con-
siderations, not beforehand.
New Delhi has approache3 the matter of formal
peace talks with caution. Despite disclaimers,
India may still feel it can obtain greater conces-
sions from Islamabad by waiting. Alternatively,
Army Commander Manekshaw rec?ntly intimated that
his country was going slow on the negotiation
question because "there is n~ sense in dealing
with a chap who might not last as head of govern-
ment." Moreover, according to the US Embassy of-
ficer, Indian officials still display New Delhi's
typically ambivalent attitud=_ toward Bhutto--
wariness of his sometimes contradictory statements
combined with a stated preference for dealing with
him rather than with military leaders.
In revealing its interest in discussions with
Bhutto, New Delhi may be attempting to demonstrate
a flexible approach as well ~s to head off third
party mediators. It is unlicely that India's long-
term goals have been changed. The Indian official
indicated that for the talks to succeed, Bhutto
must indicate his willingness to soft-pedal "con-
frontation" and agree to a comprehensive review of
all outstanding problems whi:h would include the
Kashmiri boundary issue.
Central Intelli.~e7ce Bulletin
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PAKI-STAN: President Bhutto's political oppo-
sition is growing more restive.
The indefinite continuation of martial law has
become the major point of dispute: between Bhutto
and his opponents. Bhutto says martial law will
be lifted "much before" the end of the year, but
opposition forces are demanding a. definite dead-
line for the institution of democratic government.
Disparate political group; appear to be coalescing
around the National Awami Party (NAP) headed by
Wali Khan in an effort to press Bhutto to set dates
for convening the national assembly and to begin
drafting a new constitution. They have also threat-
ened to boycott elections to municipal and local
politi-cal offices slated for 15 March, an act which
would constitute deliberate defiance of Islamabad.
Working out a division of power between the
four provinces and the central government is one
of the most difficult domE~stic problems Bhutto
faces. The demand for greater provincial autonomy
is particularly strong in the Northwest Frontier
Province and in Baluchistan. In both areas Bhutto's
party is weak and Wali Khan's NAP' expects to con-
trol the provincial goverrunents. The two leaders
met last weekend, but Wali remains highly suspicious
that Bhutto will attempt to keep the NAP from coming
to power in the two provinces. Wali indicated to
US officials that he was prepared. to counter such
attempts by stirring up widespread latent discontent
against the central government.
Bhutto is confronted with so many economic and
political problems that he cannot. afford a head-on
clash with opposition forces at this time, and he
may concede considerable provincial autonomy. On
the issue of martial law, Bhutto may agree to curb
the powers of centrally appointed, provincial gov-
ernors in favor of the ministries to be formed
shortly after the provincial assemblies convene on
23 March.
18 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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sr;cx_ Jrr
BANGLADESH: Recent clashes indicate that the
law and o~~ rimer-situation continues to be uneasy.
At least two skirmishes, with gunfire and
casualties, have occurred recently between govern-
ment forces and former Mukti Bahini guerrillas
who felt they were being denied the prerogatives
they deserved as ex-freedom fighters. One inci-
dent occurred on Wednesday in Dacca when ex-guer-
rillas who were being recruited into the national
militia complained that their pay and amenities
were too low in comparison with regular army of-
ficers. The tension eased cnly after Prime Min-
ister Mujibur Rahman personally visited the scene
and urged both sides to caln down. Another out-
break took place on the previous day in Comilla
when police fought with Mukti Bahini who were in-
sisting they should not have to pay bus fares.
Additionally, reports of lotting and extortion by
hooligans masquerading as ex-guerrillas are be-
coming more frequent.
For the most part, there has been little
breakdown in public order ir. the two months since
.independence. With the war-shattered economy un-
able to provide sufficient employment, however,
discontent among the former guerrillas--who greatly
outnumber the government forces and in many cases
still have arms--will grow Lnless the Dacca regime
manages to find or create enough places for them
in the government bureaucracy, the new national
militia, and the country's educational institutions.
The withdrawal of the Indiar Army from Bangladesh,
scheduled for completion by 25 March, will add to
the internal security burders of Bangladesh's under-
manned police force and its approximately 8,000-man
regular army.
18 Feb 7 2 Central Intelli~c nce Bulletin
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NATO: The allies have agreed to establish a
standing naval force in the Mediterranean.
A joint meeting of the NATO military staff and
allied military representatives agreed to request
the Supreme Allied Commander for :Europe to begin
to set up such a force--a move urged by Secretary
Laird last December at the NATO ministerial meetings.
The US has proposed that the force include a com-
mander, staff, and designated ships along the lines
of tree standing naval force in the Atlantic.
The Italian, Greek, and Turkish representatives
stated that growing concern about the Soviet mili-
tary presence in the Mediterranean had made acqui-
escence in the plan possible. For the moment, these
three countries have pledged periodic participation,
with continuous participation only if they can af-
ford it. The UK apparently will ;participate but
cannot make specific commitments at this time. The
West Germans pledged to make one destroyer available
for short exercise periods.
The limited size of the projected force was
undoubtedly a factor in acceptance of the plan
since the Mediterranean allies were worried about
its potential costs. Norway, Denmark, and Canada
often have expressed concern that the alliance
already pays too much attention to the Mediterranean
but raised no objections t.o the concept at this
week's meeting.
Acceptance of the concept, nevertheless, meets
the tJS objective of encouraging a more active European
role in the Mediterranean. France, a non-participant
in NATO's integrated military structure and an ad-
vocate of removing the super-power rivalry from the
area, presumably will make no direct contribution
18 Feb 72 Central Intelligence 13ull:etin
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s~~;cur.~r
MOROCCO: King Hassan has proposed constitu-
tional changes that imply a substantial limitation
of his absolute power.
The King, who is Morocco's religious as well
as secular leader, chose th= Moslem New Year to
announce that a nationwide referendum on proposed
constitutional amendments would be held before the
end of the month. The amen~.ments will provide for
the direct election of two thirds of the Chamber of
Deputies; only three eighths of the present body are
directly elected. "All executive power" will be
vested in the government, wZich will be controlled
by elected representatives. Hassan's role, he said,
would be that of "national arbiter."
The King, however, has made clear that he in-
tends to retain substantial authority, at least
equivalent to the power of the presidents of the US
and France. While his proposals fall well short of
those demanded by the opposition National Front
coalition, the most influential of the groups the
King has been consulting, tZe front probably will
accept the challenge and attempt to capture a large
bloc of seats in the new assembly.
18 Feb 72 Central Intelli~c-nce Bulletin 8
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URUGUAY: President-Elect Juan Bordaberry's
new administration appears headed for trouble with
an opposition-led Congres:~ and hostile labor unions.
In its first act, the Criamber of Deputies has
chosen a member of the Blanco op~>osition as its
leader. Although the election results, announced
on 15 February, gave the Colorados a slim congres-
sional lead over the Blancos, thE~ leftist Frente
Amplio coalition, which controls 18 seats in the
lower house, repoz-tedly supported the Blanco candi-
date. Voting in the Uruguayan 1F:gislature tradi-
tionally has been split between t:he numerous politi-
cal factions rather than along major party lines,
and these divisions can be expected to continue.
The Communist-dominated labor confederation
has already denounced the new prE:sident in its re-
port to the labor movement, adopi:ed late last month.
While this latest diatribe contains nothing new,
it assures a continuation of the pattern of repeated
labor-government problems. A general work stoppage
has been scheduled for 14 March, at which time la-
bor leaders will present their dE~mands to Congress.
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SF.CR~;T
HUNGARY-USSR: The Hungarian party leadership
is considering personnel shifts, some of which may
not be too acceptable to Moscow.
At a Budapest party meeting on 10 February,
politburo member and city party boss Karoly Nemeth
announced that corrupt, bure~.ucratic, and inept
officials at all levels should be demoted. Party
leader Kadar also addressed the session and em-
phasized that priority attention should be given
problems in the party. Both Kadar and Nemeth em-
phasized the generally orderly aspects of the in-
ternal situation, but Nemeth warned against any
temptations to use the proposed personnel changes
as an opportunity to attack worthy officials or,
in a special warning to conservatives, to begin
anti-semitic attacks on Jewish liberals--some of
whom are in Kadar's retinue. The proposed changes
seem designed to root out bureaucratic opposition
to Kadar's economic policies and simultaneously to
order a go-slow approach to the economic reform.
The day after the Budapest party meeting,
Kadar flew to Moscow where h~ probably discussed
the proposed changes during three days of talks
with Brezhnev. Kadar may haae had trouble con-
vincing the Soviet leader of the desirability of
improving the economic reform at the expense of
replacing veteran Communists. Only a week before,
Pravda had pointedly reminded Budapest of its past
problems with excessively li:~eral, younger members.
The Soviet paper also implied support for the Hun-
garian "conservatives" by wa=Wing that the country
had proved particularly susceptible to nationalism
and Zionism.
Kadar also may have discussed Hungary's bal-
ance of payments and investment problems with
Brezhnev. Moscow is not haply with Budapest`s
economic performance. The Pravda article, for ex-
ample, had made reference to problems in bilateral
18 Feb 72 Central Intelligen~~e Ba~lletin 10
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a
trade, and other sources have indicated Soviet dis-
pleasure with Hungary's indebtedness to the West.
A Soviet party-government: delegation will visit
Budapest later this year for discussions on economic
and scientific-technological cooperation.
Kadar is a cautious politician and he will not
tip the scales in favor of either liberals or con-
servatives. Any personnel changes probably will be
designed to avoid seriously offending the Soviets,
18 Feb 7 2 Central Intelligence BTr.lletin 11
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DAHOMEY: A mutiny at the important Ouidah
army garrison, now in its th:.rd week, continues to
unsettle Dahomean politics alid to feed rumors of
coup plotting.
On 28 January, junior o~'ficers and enlisted
men jailed their commander aid took control of the
Ouidah post, located only 25 miles from Cotonou,
Dahomey's administrative ceni:er. Attempts by the
government this week to disb~.nd and reassign the
mutineers have so far been unsuccessful. Govern-
ment orders have been flatly rejected by the re-
bellious garrison, and there are unconfirmed re-
ports that the mutineers are in battle dress. The
Ouidah unit is well-armed any. mobile.
The mutiny has further :trained relations
within Dahomey's three-man Presidential Council
and has opened opportunities for maneuvering by
politically ambitious elements within the govern-
ment and military. There are a variety of rumors
and reports of impending power plays by different
groups or individuals, at lu st some of whom are
almost certainly in contact Hith the rebellious
troops at Ouidah. Dahomey, c~hich has experienced
five military coups since it became independent
in 1960, may face yet another military take-nvar_
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POLAND: Warsaw is embarking on an ambitious
railroad investment program in an effort to close
the chap between growing demand and existing capacity.
Investments in the railroad sector, which will
continue to handle more than three fourths of total
inland traffic, will rise by more than 50 percent
during 1971-75 compared with the previous five-year
period. The program consists of the construction
of new facilities as well as the modernization of
existing installations and equipment.
The construction of a new 89-mile railroad
linking Warsaw and the Katowice/Krakow area of
Silesia by 1975 is the major element of the ex-
pansion program. This central arterial line will
be electrified and double-tracked and will handle
a major part of the growing freight traffic, thereby
freeing existing facilities for faster passenger
service. Transshipment stations at the Soviet
bordE~r and domestic port terminals as well as in-
land freight yards will be expanded. Ten new
container terminals and a classification yard also
are to be constructed.
Although Polish transport pclicy calls for
the elimination of steam i~raction. by the early
1980s, one fourth of rail freight. traffic will
continue to be moved by steam by the end of 1975.
In fact, only 800 miles of_ existing line is to be
electrified during 1971-7_`i compared with the nearly
1.000 miles electrified during 1966-70.
Central Intelligence Bulletin 13
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li:L SALVADOR: The government's rejection of
several opposition slates for the legislative elec-
tions on 12 March could mar tt~e calm campaign at-
mosphere and cause a backlash against its candidate
in the presidential election can Sunday.
The rejections have all been based on techni-
calities. Initially the gove~?nment was on fairly
safe ground when it rejected :.fists in four depart-
ments filed late by the left-cif-center opposition
coalition. The coalition, sui~fering from internal
conflict and division of leadership responsibili-
ties, unhappily admitted that the fault was its
own. The subsequent disqualii`ications--another
coalition slate that had been submitted on time
plus several submitted by the two small rightist
parties--were less valid and