U.S. POLICY REGARDING RELEASE OF INTELLIGENCE TO CONTRACTORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R001400050013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 3, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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Nd
USIB-D-39. 5/12
3 November 1961
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
SUBJECT U. S. Policy Regarding Release of Intelligence
to Contractors
REFERENCES : a. USIB-M-179, 19 October 1961, Item 6
b. USIB-D-39. 5/11, 6 October 1961
c. USIB-D-39. 5/2, Final, 10 November 1959
d. USIB-M-158, 7 June 1961, item 5
e. USIB-M-150, 11 April 1961, item 11
f. USIB-M-107, 12 July 1960, item 4
g. USIB-M-79, 4 February 1960, item 11
Pursuant to the direction of the Intelligence Board the attached
report has been developed by CODIB in coordination with the Security
Committee. The Board will be asked to consider this report and
the recommendations therein at an early date, probably at the same
USIB meeting at which the proposed revision of DCID 11 /2, "Control
of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence Information",
discussed (USIB-D-9.3/2, 2 November 1961).
rs e ._ /I--1
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Distribution: Regular "D" plus 15 copies for Security Committee
95 copies for CODIB
SECRET
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 CODIB-D-42/8
2 November 1961
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION
U. S. Policy Regarding Release of Intelligence
to Contractors
1. The attached report has been prepared by the USIB Committee on
Documentation (CODIB) in response to the USIB charge (USIB-M-179,
19 Oct 61, para. 6) that the Committee study the matter of easing
present limitations on release of intelligence materials to contractors,
as proposed by Mr. Hilsman (USIB-D-39.5/11, 6 Oct 61) .
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2. The report has been coordinated with the USIB Security Committee
(IBSEC), which concurs therein.
Chairman
USIB Security Committee
Paul A. Borel
Chairman
USIB Committee on Documentatio
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Noe i%~
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Regarding Release of Intelligence to
Contractors
REFERENCE: USIB-D-39.5/11, 6 October 1961
BACKGROUND
1. Mr. Ililsman proposed in referenced paper, re-examination of USIB
policy on release of intelligence to contractors (USIB-D-39.5/2, 10 November
1959) with a view to liberalizing that policy. The Board at its 19 October
meeting directed the Committee on Documentation (CODIB), in coordination
with the Security Committee, to study this matter and submit recommendations
to the Board (USIB-M-179, 19 Oct 61, para. 6). Relevant background discussion
was included in the CODIB Second Annual Report, an excerpt of which is attached
as TAB A.
2. Each CODIB member was asked to staff out a departmental position,
attacking the problem in two parts: a) determining requirements for release
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to specifically identified contractors of selected NIEs or SNIEs, now prohibited
from release per se by USIB policy; b) determining requirements or identifying
problems in release of other specifically identifiable reports or report series.,
both finished intelligence and raw information reports, that would necessitate
revision of the existing USIB policy document.
FINDINGS
.s. Individual departmental responses are summarized in attached TAB B.
In brief, release of selected NIEs and SNIEs is :favored by CIA and Army, with
specific contractors identified, and by State and AEC, without specific contractor
identification; such release is opposed by Air Force. The remaining Community
members had no NIE release requirements, but did not state specific opposition
to such release under proper controls.
4. As to release of other materials, most of the Community does furnish
selected documents to contractors for external research. Some (e.g. Navy, NSA)
stated that they did not have sufficient release volume to warrant revising
existing policy; others (including CIA and Air Force) would need additional time
to examine the details of release requirements for their variou.s contractors to
identify problem areas, if any, other than those imposed by across -the-board
control of the Foreign Servicel Army identified 11
organizations to whom it sends scientific and technical materials and to whom
it would like to send. more with less administrative difficulty.
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CONCLUSIONS
5. There is no clear-cut Community call for revision of USIB contractor
release policy. The fact that interpretation or the administration of release
policy has been, historically, a difficult problem is reflected in a) the events
which established the need for developing USII3-D-39.5/2 in the first place;
b) the continued difficulties after its establishment, as stated in each of the
CODIB Annual Reports; c) and, in part, by the length of time it has taken to
get agreement on a revision of DCID 11/2 ("Control of Dissemination and Use of
Intelligence and Intelligence Information") - circulated to the USIB as
USIB-D--9.3/2 of 2 November 1961.
6. Release of the information in an NIE or SNIE, without attribution
thereto, on a strict need to know basis is possible under existing policy, as
clarified in USIB-M-107, para. 4. Release of selected Top Secret material on
an ad hoc basis is likewise possible, but there is support for liberalizing TS
release procedures provided the material bears no control stamps. Another
part of the problem, which requires further investigation, is the extent to which
the blanket prohibition against release of such raw information reports as
those mentioned in para. 4 above causes difficulties. Tied in with this latter
problem has been the tendency to consider non-USIB governmental contributors
to the NIS program as contractors and apply to them the same restrictions
applicable to non-government organizations.
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7. The Security Committee, with whom this report has been coordinated,
has no particular preferences on this subject, provided normal limitations and
requirements as to physical security, personnel security clearances, need to
know, and special channels materials would continue in effect. Approval of
release to any given contractor can only be given, from a security standpoint,
where a specific individual or organization has been identified and the necessary
security clearance established.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a. the USIB declare existing policy on release of NIEs and SNIEs to
contractors as adequate to meet Community needs;
b. Top Secret material release continue to be governed by
existing policy, subject to review when USIB-D-39.5/2 is revised,
to determine the feasibility of liberalizing release policy when
no control stamps are applied;
c. in keeping with the permissive as well as restrictive philosophy
of both USIB D-J9.5/2 and the draft revision of DCID 11/2 now before
the Board, the USIB request reconsideration by CIA and the State
Department of the problems of protection of sources and methods,
and protection of commercial proprietary or policy information by
use of the appropriate control stamps on an ad hoe report basis;
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d. the USIB declare the policy applying to release of intelligence to
contractors as inappropriate with regard to non-USIB Government
components (such as those contributing to the NIS), and agree that
these organizations, when fulfilling an intelligence support role,
may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community
pursuant to footnote No. 2 to NSCID No. 1 (New Series), which
reads:
"The intelligence community includes the Central Intelligence
Agency; the intelligence components of the Departments of State,
Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, and of the Joint Staff (JCS);
the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Atomic Energy Commission;
and the National Security Agency. Other components of the
departments and agencies of the Government are included to
the extent of their agreed participation in regularly established
interdepartmental intelligence activities."
the Committee on Documentation be directed to revise USIB-D-39.5/2
upon USIB acceptance of the revised DCID 11/2, to provide (1) for
release of the information in NIEs and SNIEs as stipulated by the
Board in USIB-M-107, para 4, (2) whatever other language changes
are required to implement the revised DCID, (3) and a review of
Top Secret release procedures.
PAUL A. BOREL
Chairman
25X1
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Nap., _MW
Excerpts from
Second Annual Report of the
USIB Committee on Documentation
(CODIB AR-2, 30 June 1960, pp. 5-7)
ftlease of Intelligence Information
Over the years developments have made intelligence organizations less
independent. Not only is there greater interdependence among them, but each
USIB agency has come to depend more on non-governmental resources. What-
ever the reasons - personnel ceiling, inability to obtain or retain specialized
talent, or a conscious effort to share the workload with private enterprise
the fact is that the intelligence community as never before depends on the
research talent at the disposal of our universities and business. In many
cases, this delegation of responsibility has taken place on the assumption
that information at the disposal of the Government, and needed by the con-
tractor to do the assigned job, would be made available to him.
Seldom is this needed information within the power of a single agency to
release. Hence a major problem. 1/
This increased need by intelligence contractors was born during a period
when security procedures were being tightened up. In the face of this, COMB
recommended, and the US113 approved, policies and procedures which freed
considerable information of previous controls based on the concept that the
intelligence agency originating the information was the only agency which could
be trusted to monitor its release to a cleared contractor (USIB-D-39, 5/2,
10 Nov 5:i).
These now policies have helped considerably, but not enough. The list of
exceptions, that Is, the list of items which cannot be released without permission
1/ Consider this excerpt from a recently prepared contract report:
The most important gap found in this intelligence analysis study was
apparently the gap between the collection function and the evaluation
function. Throughout the study there was a continual record of
information being withheld or withdrawn . . . from the Contractors
. . . It is believed that this is a most serious matter . .
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from the originating agency, is extensive. All materials from any agency which
is TOP SECRET, or specially controlled or marked may not be released without
permission. In addition, CIA has restrictions on its current intelligence produc-
tiQn and certain research reports series; the Joint Staff has restricted all of its
intelligence materials; and the Department of State has restricted all materials
originated or controlled by the Foreign Service or the Department, including
NIS chapters for which State is responsible. 1/
Procedures in force for securing releases for these restricted materials
are excessively cumbersome and time-consuming; and many requests for
release are in any case eventually denied.
The result: the intelligence community is paying out impressive sums for
research some of which is of questionable value because It is based on only a
portion of the information available within the community. 2/
The cure: face up to the need for releasing more information and adopt
procedures to make this possible, or, to modify the intelligence community's
research facilities to enable them to do essential research now contracted out.
1/ The State Department controls much of the information sought for release.
The Department's current position was outlined by Mr. Cumming in a
memorandum for the USIB dated 1 July 1960, prepared pursuant to USI.B-M 65,
item 8, and concludes that:
. . . it appears impossible for the Department significantly to relax
the restriction against the release of its materials incorporated in
the Agreement, and requests from other agencies to release to their
Contractors classified or administratively-controlled Departmental
issuances, Foreign Service telegrams, and despatches must continue
to be considered on a document by document basis in response to
specific requests.
2/Substantive justification of this research is another question altogether, and
is a matter oustide of CODIB's purview.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Individual Comments on Release to Contractor
Requirements Necessitating Revision of Release Policy
ARMY : Would like to release selected NIEs and SNIEs to the Research
NAVY .
AIR .
STATE .
NSA .
CIA e
Analysis Corporation (RAC). Preliminary check revealed 10
others for whom liberalization of release policy is desired
to allow for dissemination of scientific and technical information:
Ramo-Wooldridge; RCA; SORO-American University; Sylvania;
North American Aviation; Aerojet; Bendix Corporation; Convair;
Stanford Research Institute; and A. D. Little, Inc.
No requirement for NIE or SNIE releases. Volume of release
requests for other excepted categories not sufficient to require
policy revision; can live with ad hoc report clearance approach.
Opposed to release of NIEs or SNIEs to contractors. Con-
siderable amount of other material, particularly scientific
and technical, is released to RAND, Battelle Memorial Institute
and others. Further investigation required to identify all
contractors and report series of interest and to identify problems.
Blanket use of control stamps does pose administrative clearance
problems.
Mr. Hilsman's suggestion is for a new view on releasability
to "selected responsible outside groups". Technically, State
utilizes consultants, not contractors, and IDA and RAND were
mentioned as illustrative examples only. Would want to release
selected NIEs and SNIEs, selected TS material, and provide for
automatic release of certain State and CIA reports.
Same comment as Navy's, adding that ad hoc clearances when
requested do take an "inordinate" amount of time.
particularly scientific and technical, to a number of outside groups,
Would like to release selected NIEs and SNIEs to RAND, CENIS,
and possibly Columbia University (pending outcome of security
clearances currently being sought). Also release other materials,
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such as Syracuse University, Battelle, HRB Singer, Geophysics
Corporation of America, etc. Again, blanket controls on report
series cause administrative problems. Of particular concern is
availability of information to non-USIB NIS contributors.
FBI No release requirement necessitating policy revision. If
NIEs are to be released, would want to pass judgment on
ad hoc basis at USIB level.
AEC . Similar to State position - more use of consultants than
contractors. No specific NIE or SNIE requirement but would
like door left open for possible release on need to know. basis.
More interest in release of lower level intelligence on which
national product is based. Further investigation required to
identify specific organizations and report series and to
determine problem areas, if any.
DOD
JCS No NIE or SNIE release requirement. No need to revise
DIA existing policy.
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