FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES SENATE TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE VIEWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000400070028-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: April 26, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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94T11 CONGRESS
24 Sus-.ion
FOREIGN AND MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE
BOOK I
FINAL REPORT
I1EPOP.T
O.94-755
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITII RESPECT TO
?INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETIIEit 1t'ITII
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VIEWS
APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 14), 1976
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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83. Security Cleccrances-In the course of its investigation, the
Committee found that because of the many intelligence agencies par-
ticipating in security clearance illvestigatiOns,,current security clear-
ance procedures involve .duplication of effort, waste of money,
and inconsistent patterns of investigation and standaicts. The intelli-
gence. oversight committee(s) of Congress, in consultation with the
intelligence community, should consider framing standard security
clearance procedures for all civilian intelligence agencies and back-
ground checks for congressional committees when security clearances
are required.
84. Persomiel Practices=Tile Committee found that intelligence
agency training pronranls fail to instruct )ersonnel adequately on the
lega-1 limitations anC proliil7itions applicable to intelligence activities.
The Committee recomiuien s that these training pro rams should be
expanded to include reviez~ of constitutional, statutory, and regula-
tozy provisions in an effort to heigllteir awareness among all intelli-
gence personnf 1 concernini; the potential effects intelligence activities
may have on citizens' legal rights.
85. Security Functions of the In.telligen,ce Agencies-The Commit-
tee. found that the security components of intelligence agencies some-
times engaged in law enforcement activities. Some of these activities
may have been unlawful. Intelligence agencies' security functions
should be limited to protecting the. agencies' personnel and facilities
and lawful activities and to assuring that intelligence personnel fol-
low proper security practices. (See the Committee's Final Report on
Domestic Intelligence, section on Intelligence Activities and the Rights
of American Citizens, p. 30I.)
86. Secrecy and Authorized Disclosure-=The Committee has re-
ceived various administration proposals that. would require persons
having access to classified and sensitive information to maintain the
secrecy of that information.rThe Committee recommends that. the is-
sues raised by these. proposals be considered by the new legislative in-
telligence oversight committee(s) of Congress and that, in recasting
the It)41 National Security Act and in consultation with the executive
branch, the oversight committee (s) consider the wisdom of new se-
crecy and disclosure: legislation. In the view of the Committee any such
consideration should include carefully defining the following terms:
-national secret;
-sources and methods;
-lawful and unlawful classification;
-lawful and unlawful disclosure.
The new legislation should provide civil and/or criminal penalties for
unlawful classification and unlawful disclosure. The statute should
also provide for internal departmental and agency procedures for
.enliployees who believe that classification and/or disclosure procedures
are being improperly or illegally used to report such belief. There
shorild also be a. statutory procedure whereby an employee who has
u:7ed the Agency channel to no avail can report such belief without
i+m puuit.y to an "authorized" institutional group outside the agency.
The new Intelligence Oversight Board is one such group. The intelli-
gence oversight committee(s) of Congress would be another, The
statute should specify that revealing classified information in the
course of reportinri information to an authorized group would not
constitute unlawful disclosure of classified information.
87. Federal Pegister for Classified Executive Orders-In the course
of its investigation, the Committee often had difficulty locating classi-
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feed orders, directives, instructions, and regulations issued by various
elements of the executive branch. Access to these orders by the intelli-
gence oversight committee(s) of Congress is essential to informed
oversight of the intelligence community.
The Committee recommends that a Federal Register for classified
executive orders be established, by statute. The statute should require
the registry, under appropriate security procedures, of all executive
orders-however they are labeled--concerning the intelligence activi-
ties of the United States. Among- the documents for which registry in
the Classified Federal Register should be required are all National
Security Council Intelligence. Directives (1SC'IDs), and all Director
of Central Intelligence Directives (DC-IDs). Provision should be
made for access to classified executive orders by the intel-
ligence oversight committee(s) of Congress. Classified executive or-
ders would not be 'awful until filed with the registry,, although there
should be provision for immediate implementation in emergency situa-
tions with prompt subsequent registry required.
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