THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR ARGENTINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: October 5, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL I N T E L L I C~ E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTID~ITES
,~ October 1955
UMENT Nb. ~----~----'
?
nln GE IN ClA'SS. ~
STAFF D~AANOtA[ NO? (~55 a u~4v+a
CLALSS. CHANGE ~ TS ~
SUBJECT: The Short-term ~tlook for ArgentinaRUTMR HR o ~~~~
DATE: ~~~w~A:
~,,, The rebel forces which ousted Peron are soli consolidating
their position9 so the pattern of the new Argentine government is
not yet clearo Political power nape testa in the hands of an anti
Peronista military ,~uYrta? Mayor mineral Eduardo Lonardi, a compromise
selection by the junta?s army and>navy factions heads the caretaker
goveraamenta Neither Lonardi, his military supporters, War his predomi-
nately civilian cabinet can be clearly-identified With any political
party, but it is clear from the personalities involved arnl the policies
thus far expounded that the present regime represents a shift to the
right in Argentine politics from a gover~araent dependent an and
supported by labor to a more bourgeois type of regime,
20 The 3unta?s immediate problem is to achieve and maintain
political stability. Thaugh Lonardi fias s p~oni~tademrilitary atxl poli?
in solidifying his position by outing the amising
tical leaders, granting amnesty to political prisoners, and pr
to hold free elections as soon as possible, it is not at all certain
that he 1ri7.1 continue to head the governmento Within the 3unta his
position is threatened by interservice rivalri~rd3 rbeyma,insk~ravS~sional
over policies and appointments, As long as
~aresidentf Argentina will probably contaLnue tc make progress towa~ uld
the restoration of domeatic~t~d probably assumetdirecticontrol and halt
he fall! hrnrever, the army P
theseltrenodfsfactionalism wikthin the ~unta,mcivil~war and even tYbesreturn
a res alt
of Peron are possibilities,
~ This memorandum has been ccardinated with OCI?
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30 1'he greatest potential source of trouble for the junta i~a
the prnnerful general Confederation of Labor ~Cf~T), rlxich xaa Peron's
principal political propo Lonardi has made a bid for labor sugport
by promising to honor a1]. social benefits and collective bargaining
agreements, to respect union rights, and to take no "executive aetian"
ta~rards depriving the CGT of control of the nexspaper LA PRENSA9 con
fiscated by the Peron regime in 195. arui made the official organ of
the GGTo Lespite such concessions, the G(iT hsa made no announcement
of allegiance to the nex regime. .~tegardless of Rhother Lonardi continues
to head the government, xe believe the military will be capable of
suppressing aniy serious labor oppositionp
1~. Inasmuch as the return to political normalcy i+rila. be a long
and difficult process, Argentina faces gov?rnment by a military junta
far a protracted ,periods Lor~rdiss promise to hold elections within
s3.x or eight months appears unrealistic and unattainable in the light
of the presently disorganised political situata.ono First the 3unta
must face the task of dismantling the Peronista party, which won
63 percent of the vote in the 1951 elections and 66 percent in 195Zta
The only a~i-~'eronista party of arty nu~aerical consequence is the
Radiaai Civic Union, a middle class, nationalistic party xhich polled
about 30 percent of the vote in the last election, but which is badly
split and has thus far shorn little talent for improvising either parties
or coalitionso Though. tY~e Radical party xi7a, probably play an important
role xhen Argentina returns to constitutional government, we believe
it will be more than a year before free elections can be hello 1"hs
junta is currently divided an the elections problem; the army rants
to gait at least a year and a half while the navy demands elections w3.thin
six manths4
5o The present regime, dominated by devout Catholics, hopes
to settle the church problem by getting a Concordat with the Vaticana
Peranes anti-church policies may be replaced with equally extreme pro m
church policiesq If this should happen, the gavernmerlt would alienate
segments of the Radical party as well as the anticlerical Socialist
party and thus make the return to constitutional governa~nt more diffi~
cult than evero chile there have been resent indications of the smarm
gence of a Christian Democratic movement such a prospect is at best a
long range possibilityo
('t'1NCIt1CRlTlnr
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6o Lanardi has expressed his concern over the problem of
Communism and has indicated that his government ~rl.11 not be soft on
th~.s issue. The prgent3.ne Communist Party can be expected to oppose the
present government, but it is not likely that i t vi.l]. be able to play
a determin3,ng role is argentine po73tias during the neat six months.
The Communists, however, will probably take advantage of any opportunity
to aggravate a crisis situations
7. The regime faces serious eacnamic problems. Export earnings
have been insufficient to finance imparts Qssential to meet current
needs and economic development pra3eats. Difficulties in marketing
farm products have led Argentina to expand trade With the Sins-Soviet
Bloc Which thus far has been unable to provide the various types of
equipment needede The junta all.aared the Standard Oil of California
contrast to lapse and has given indications that it might pursue a
policy of economic nationalism. Fsconomic realities, ho~rever, may force
the Argentine government to Welcome foreign capitals If the balance of
pay~me~s problem deteriorates further, the Lonardi government will
probably seek economic assistance from the US governmentp The grnrern?
ment can be expected to resist the adopt3.on of any measures likely to have
serious inflationary resultao
8. Lonardi has expressed a willingness to maintain friendly
relations with the [united States. Soar?ver9 the presence of strong
nationalists in key government positions and the possibility that the
anti~US Radical party Will have increasing influence in Argentine politics
makes it probable that the present Argentine go~rernmerit will be leas
Willing to follane the United States lead in promoting hemispheric soli?
darity and coaperationo Zt appears unlikely that the present goverxmnent
~+r3.11 continue to pursue pre=revolt Argentine overtures far a Military
Defense Assistance Panto Though Argentina ~oi11 probably continue to
support the US an important political questions on ~rhich the US and the
USSR are opposed, she will be lass likely to cooperate on international
economic problemsa 25X1
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