POSITION OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 18, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
18 August 1955
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 52-55
SUBJECT: Position of the Italian Communist Party*
1. Since publication of our last Italian estimate is November
1954, several major developments have evoked considerable speculation
as to the strength and prospects of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).
Loss of dynamism by the PCI, dissension within the PCI organization,
indications of weakened Communist control over labor, PCT losses in
the Sicilian elections, and increased agitation for an "opening to the
left" designed to separate the PCI from its Nenni Socialist (PSI) allies
are viewed in many quarters as harbingers of declining Italian Communist
political strength.
2. Loss, of dynamism. With its elan diminishing and its activism
decreasing, the PCI apparently no longer has the same attraction for many
Italians who once considered it the lodestar of Italian politics. Many dedi-
cated revolutionaries who formerly regarded their accession to power as
imminent, as well as those numerous Italians who prudently aligned them-
selves with the "wave of the future", now seem much less confident that
the Communists. will in time ,govern Italy. With the recruiting rate appar-
ently declining, particularly among the youth, further Communist lose of
panache could have an important long-term impact on PCI membership.
Perhaps because of general disenchantment with Soviet policy or Togliatti's
moderate line, there seems to be some decrease is the PCI's ideological
appeal, although so long as there is so other satisfactory aoa-Communist
alternative. the PCI and PSI will continue to derive much electoral strength
from "protest votes".
* The substance of this memorandum has been discussed with
representatives of O/CI and DD/P.
_(.l
MENT NO.
NO C U1 CLASS. Q
CLASS. CHANGED S S C
&49tt "r NEXT REWEW DATE:
AUTH? MR 70.2
DATE: '~A.. T.~C'! w. REVIEWER: ?I K
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3. PCI internal differences. Cracks in the monolithic PCI
structure have clearly appeared during the year. Latent internal party
disputes between advocates of "tough" and "soft" policies flared into
the open at the PCI National Congress. These frictions were aggravated
by the need to accommodate the party' line hastily to such international
developments. as Maleakov's fall, the Soviet policy reversal on Trieste,
the "humble pie" eating at Belgrade. and Moscow's overtures to Adenauer.
The dimensions oithe alleged challenge to Togliatti's leadership and un-
rest in party ranks are unclear, but such disputes and the precarious
state of his health make it likely that Togliatti will not continue to dominate
the PCI as he has in the past.
4. The labor situation. The PCPs control over the majority of
organized labor appears to have been somewhat weakened recently by
more effective nos-communist union competition. In the nationally-
important t"Conglobameato" wage negotiations non-Communist unions
achieved an unprecedented agreement with employers without the partici .
pation of the Communist-dominated CGIL. Also, the victories of those
unions in certain factory elections not only gave them a much-needed
fillip, but provoked controversy within the CGIL hierarchy over alloca-
tion of blame for its losses. Further instances of free union effectiveness
might increasingly encourage both workers and employers, who previously
considered it essential to handle labor problems through the CGIL. to turn
to non=Communist unions. On the other hand, some of these free union
victories may have stemmed primarily from a desire to avoid lose of OSP
contracts, and their long-range significance should not be overemphasized.
Moreover. there are no indications of large-scale defections from the
CGIL.
5. The Sicilian elections. While the PCI has registered limited
gains in local elections, no marked changes in the PCI's electoral strength
have occurred since the 1953 national elections. In the recent Sicilian
elections, however. the PCPs percentage of votes dropped slightly from
that in 1953. Since Neani's PSI made small gains. Left Bloc representa-
tion in the Sicilian legislature remained unchanged. This development
nevertheless has some negative significance, because the PCI, with its
strength in northern Italy roughly stabilized apparently has been looking
to the South as a potential reservoir of new votes.
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6. The "open to the left". Since they furnish more than
one-third of the Left Bloc' s* political strength, the Neaai Socialists
are vital to the PCI's capacity for obstructing parliamentary procedure.
Increased rumors that the Nonni Socialists will desert their Communist
allies have followed PSI gains in the Sicilian elections and the election
of President Groachi, who encourages a leftward shift in Christian
Democratic (CD) alignments. While Neaai has indicated his willingness
to cooperate with leftmwiag CD elements. he has made no concomitant
move to renounce the PCI-PSI "unity of action" pact. There is no firm
evidence that he either will or can do so, or that his personal interests
would be furthered by a break with the PCI. Moreover, the left-wing
Christian Democrats probably will not be able to move far in encourag-
ing a Neani defection without risking a break-up of their party.
7. Even if a formal PCI-PSI break does take place in the near
future. it is as likely to- be a Communist. inspired maneuver as a genuine
Nonni conversion to the leftmceater. Thus, there is as even chance that
such a split would ultimately. if not immediately, benefit the PCI. While
the enigmatic Nenai's future gambits will probably have an increasingly
important impact on the Italian political scene, it therefore appears that
his maneuvers probably involve an much potential danger for the
Christian Democratic Party as for the PCI.
8. Conclusions. As a political organization the PCI has lost
much of its original vitality and momentum. However, the PCI's elec-
toral influence is still great and is likely to remain strong as long as
certain fundamental political factors remain operative. Its future politic.
cal strength therefore will continue to depend at least as much on external
developments as upon its own cohesion and dynamism. As stated in
NIE 24-54, "... the basic political appeal of the Left Bloc probably cannot
be substantially reduced as long as the hope of amelioration of uasatisfac'.
tort' political, economic and social conditions by a democratic regime
The Left Bloc of the PCI and PSI controls 37 percent of the seats
in the Chamber of Deputies.
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remain frustrated." Moreover# with the Nonni Socialists contributing
over one-third of the Left Bloc's political strength, a reduction of the
PCI's power depends to a large extent on weaning Nonni away from his
Communist allies. The continued absence of any other effective
political party on the nod-;Communist left probably must also be over-
come if the Left Bloc is to suffer a serious electoral setback.
9. The outlook for a decrease in PCI electoral strength in the
light of these factors is not propitious. Disunity among the anti-
Communist forces, factionalism within the Christian Democratic Party,
and the slackening of world teacions are making it difficult either to
illustrate convincingly the Communist danger or to take repressive
action against the PCI. Faced with huge long-range social and economic
problems. Italian governments over the past few years have been unable
to make sufficient progress substantially to reduce widespread discontent.
It appears that the PCI for the foreseeable future will be able to employ
this dissatisfaction as an effective electoral issue.
10. In sum, we believe that the PCI will remain a major though
somewhat less vigorous political force than in the past. Some further
decline in PCI and COIL membership seems likely. We therefore would
not now predict with the same confidence as NIE 24-54 that ... a further
growth in Communist-Nonni Socialist strength is probable. " However,
even though the steady increase in the PCI's electoral influeace over the
past several years may have been temporarily halted, it has not been
clearly reversed. On balance, therefore. PCI electoral strength on a
national basis will probably not fall much below present levels over the
next few years. Moreover, with the possibility of PSI gains offsetting
any PCI losses, the Left Bloc, if it holds together, will probably main-
tain approximately its present electoral strength during the same period,
or might even register small gains in some areas.
21 Aga
_F
-Ev.ar a
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