HEBERT/ARENDS BILL TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION ON INFROMATION PROTECTION AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY- -H. R. 9853

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500010016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 3, 1971
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Relea 2005/11t2e C 1485R0005, 0 010016-2
3 August 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Central Reference Service
Hebert/Arends Bill to Establish a Commission
on Information Protection and the National
Security--H.R. 9853
1. My reaction to this proposed legislation is that CRS would have
little grounds for comment. The bill was rushed together and introduced by
the Chairman and ranking minority member of the House Armed Services
Committee to give that Committee jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Therefore, the Commission's proposed jurisdiction on protection of classi-
fied information is limited to the Department of Defense agencies and CIA
which come within the purview of the Armed Services Committee. Obviously,
for the Commission's work to be effective in the national security field, it
would have to include classification policies of the Department of State, the
FBI and perhaps even the NSC and White House staff. Jurisdiction over such
matters in the Congress would lie between the Foreign Affairs, Judiciary,
and perhaps Government Operations Committees. In the House, the problem
is already being considered to some extent by the Government Operations
Committee. Thus, before any legislation of this type is passed, it may
become involved in a first class jurisdictional imbroglio.
2. The purposes of the establishment of this Commission are set
forth in Section 502 (p. 2) of H. R. 9853. It is interesting to note that the
Commission is to "study and review" all matters with regard to classification
and protection of "information affecting the national security, " as well as the
status and adequacy and effectiveness of applicable laws and regulations
together with policies and procedures.
3. It is also interesting that four of the Commission members are
to be appointed by the Congress, four by the President, and four by the Chief
Justice of the United States. While there have been many commissions in
the past whose membership has embraced both executive and legislative
appointees (the Hoover Commissions and the Warren Commission for
example), I do not happen to recall any which embraced appointments by
all three components of the government; the appointment of four members
of this Commission by the Chief Justice might raise some questions regard-
ing the separation of powers in view of the fact that some Commission actions
or proposals might require judicial review. This situation appears to me
slightly different than such examples as Chief Justice Warren's chairmanship
of the Warren Commission and Mr. Justice Roberts' chairmanship of a panel
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to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster immediately after its occurrence.
In the latter two cases, the appointments were made by the President and
not by the Chief Justice.
4. It is noted that the Commission shall meet at least once during
each calendar year or at the call of the chairman or a majority of its
members and that it shall have a permanent staff as well as being empowered
to hire experts and consultants and coopt employees of other agencies of
government on a reimbursable basis. Thus, there may rapidly develop a
situation where the staff is into everything with little apparent Commission
control. Experience indicates that these things tend to grow rather than
to reduce. Obviously virtually all of the staff members will need full
clearances, including the esoteric ones. In addition, Section 505 (c) has
the usual proviso regarding the Commission's right to secure information
from any department or agency of the government as well as subpoena
powers (Section 505 (e)).
5. It is noted that the first annual report of the Commission shall
include recommendations as to procedures to be taken within the Executive
Branch to protect the secrecy of information affecting the national security
as well as procedures to be followed by the courts in judicial hearings
involving such information. It is possible that such recommended procedures
might be in derogation or run counter to the DCI statutory authority to pro-
tect intelligence sources and methods and thus would have to be watched.
6. In short, this legislation is loosely drawn and, as noted above,
has been rushed in to preempt the field. Frankly, I do not think such a
Commission is needed; the President is perfectly able to revise most of
the necessary procedures by Executive Order and he can propose any
legislation that might be required. I cannot believe that the Commission
will affect CIA much one way or the other other than by creating a staff
which will require knowledge of highly compartmented intelligence clear-
ances and perhaps make them public. This would be a dandy fight for CIA
to stay out of, and I hope that the DCI's comments on the legislation will
be very limited.
Walter Pforzheimer
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection
25X1
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Remarks :
I don't feel any particular
competence to comment on the Hebert/
Arends Bill but I asked Walter
Pforzheimer to look it over. His
ideas are attached for whatever use
they may be, if any.
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