THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOMALIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500050024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: September 3, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2005/11/?J: CIA-RDP80BO1495R
Message from
Did not get the attached done,-fin time for Cary
to give to Symington. Car/ is going to give to
Colby in hopes Colby w9-1 read before Cary
goes to see Symington omorrow.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000500050024-9
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/11,
B01495RW500050024-9
3 September 1974
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT The Soviet Military Presence in Somalia
Over the past several years the Soviets have established
a growing but still limited military presence in Somalia,
As the reopening of the Suez Canal draws nearer, Soviet
interest has intensified in Somalia, and the entire
Gulf of Aden region.
Military Facilities
The focal point of Soviet interests is the port of
Berbera in northern Somalia. Legally, the port is under the
jurisdiction of the Somali government but Soviet naval
vessels have enjoyed routine access to it since 1972, and
some of the facilities at the port appear to be under de facto
Soviet control.
Berbera has deep and well protected harbor, The main
commercial quay has two alongside berths equipped with fresh
water, power, and hoisting machinery.
Soviet naval units
usually tie up at the eastern service
quay. The Soviets have
added some large finger piers at
this
quay, There is only
enough space for perhaps three or
four
ships at a time,
but the port can accommodate the
type
of ships the Soviets
normally assigned to the Indian Ocean. The Moskva-class
helicopter cruiser, now making its first deployment to
the area, can enter the harbor but is too large to tie
up at the quay.
There are no repair facilities ashore at Berbera. For
the past year or so a Soviet repair ship has been berthed at
Berbera, and it can provide limited repair services, On
'}Set Stl ~ `? : Ap~roved~b~'?f~~
leas ' 1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495RQW500050024-9
shore there
and a Sovie
between the
Prior
six months
However, wi
at Berbera,
ments to th
for increas
Indian Ocea
from Soviet
of Berbera,
Indian Ocea
are housing accommodations, a POL storage depot,
radio station to backup naval communications
USSR and Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean.
o mid-1973, Soviet warships spent a maximum of
n the Indian Ocean before returning to home port.
h the recent expansion of the support facilities
some Soviet warships have begun year-long deploy-
Indian Ocean. This deployment pattern provides
d familiarization training for Soviet crews in the
while reducing time lost while transiting to and
waters. As an indication of the growing importance
about two-thirds of the Soviet port calls in the
in 1973 were to Berbera.
Air Facilities: The Soviets have not made military use
of the only significant airfield in Somalia, the international
airport at ogadiscio. They are helping the Somali build a
new airfiel at Dafet in south-central Somalia, and possibly
one at Berb ra. We think that there is a good chance that
Soviet airc aft will eventually use one or perhaps even
both of the e airstrips in support of their Indian Ocean
operations.
Constr
after 2,000
which will
moving ahead
airstrip of
TU-95 naval
ction of the possible airstrip at Berbera stopped
feet of grading in the fall of 1972. At Dafet,
e the main Somali military airbase, work is
on a runway in excess of 10,000 feet. An
this length would be able to accommodate Soviet
reconnaissance aircraft which have sufficient
ran e to conduct surveillance of most of the Indian Ocean,
IThe Soviets woui-a pro a y liKe
,
a-minimum, to establish an arrangement such as they have in
Conakry, Guinea, where they periodically deploy two or
three reconnaissance aircraft and maintain some support
facilities fir them, but do not control the airfield. To
get aircraft to Somalia, the Soviets would have to get
overflight permission from countries such as Iran, Turkey,
.or Egypt.
Other S viet Presence: Soviet military assistance
is the gui_ ro c uo for the use of Somali facilities. We
estimate that there are up to 1,500 Soviets in Somalia,
including some 700 military advisers. Early this year,
the USSR deliivered some MIG-21 jet fighters and SA-2
surface-to-air missiles but the Somalis need substantial
training and'advice before they can use them effectively.
25X1
25X1
-2-
Approved For Release V23 . GIA RE) B01495R000500050024-9 25X1
SECRET
 Approved
SECRET
For ReJ apse 2005/11/ - 1495R Q500050024-9
The USSR-Somalia Political Relationshi
In July, the USSR signed a Friendship Treaty with
Somalia. The text of the treaty has not been published, but
claims that it contains a-series of
secret annexes giving the USSR "full base rights" and "full
access" to all Somali airfields. In return, the USSR is to
provide Somalia with arms and related equipment over a
10-year period. We do not know what "full base rights"
and "full access" specifically means. The treaty may simply
fo.rmalize--perhaps for a period of time--the routine access
to Berbera already enjoyed by the Soviets and it may permit
the Soviets at least limited use of Somali airfields, The
treaty may also provide for Soviet assistance in the expansion
of these facilities.
The Somalis have long been resisting Soviet pressure to
enter into a treaty relationship, Apparently they have de-
cided that their dependence on Soviet military and economic
aid makes closer ties with the USSR necessary. There appears
to be division in Somali ruling councils over the degree to
which Somalia should be dependent on the USSR, and Mogadiscio
remains sensitive to criticism by Arab and African governments
of its ties with the USSR.
For the Soviets, the treaty is undoubtedly a significant
gain, if only because it places bilateral relations on a more
formal.footing and brings Somalia into the circle of countries
with ties to the USSR, Nevertheless, the Soviet relationship
with Somalia carries some risks. For example, Mogadiscio
could be encouraged by its new Soviet hardware to step up the
pressure on Ethiopia. Open hostilities could jeopardize So-
viet access to Somali facilities and involve the Soviets in
an entanglement they do not want. Reportedly, the new friend--
ship treaty calls for automatic consultations on security
matters in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. The
Soviets probably hope that such a provision would enable them
to exercise restraint on any Somali decision to confront
Ethiopia over the territorial dispute.
-3--
Approved For Release 2005/1 R000500050024-9
SECRET
25X1
25X1