PERCEPTIONS OF THE US-SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030017-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 4, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 ~lJ
4 APR 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Charles Sorrels,
International Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Perceptions of the US-Soviet Strategic Balance
1. Herewith are copies of the report which you requested on
perceptions of the US-Soviet strategic balance. It was prepared
by the FBIS Analysis Group and reviewed by the Office of Political
Research (OPR). In the review process OPR scanned classified
materials including diplomatic cables as well as unclassified
military journals and USIA media reaction reports. These supple-
mentary sources yielded few additional details, none of them
sufficiently at variance with the FBIS report to justify adding
more words to the paper.
2. We appreciate your interest in the intelligence aspects
of the general problem of perceptions analysis,; and are actively
making efforts to advance the state of the art of this technique.
As you know, there is still no agreed upon, systematic approach
to perceptions. We have proposed that the newly established
Analytical Support Center, jointly funded by CIA, ARPA, and the
IC Staff, undertake a project of basic research in this field.
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As stated
..toy-JTio,
7'?6 -196
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PERCEPTIONS OF THE M.-SOVIET STRATEGIC R4LANCE
AS REFLECTED IN FOREIGN i?EDIA
This paper presents the results of an exa?:.nation of the
German, British, French, and Japanese med.;: for assess-
ments of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, particu-
larly in the light of the Vladivostok summit. The major
daily newspapers and. periodicals as well as the radio
output of these countries have been examined for the
period from September 1974 through February 1975.
Foreign media attention to the subject has been almost
exclusively related to major international events, with
the bulk of the comment centering around the Vladivostok
meeting on 23-24 November last year and the resumption
of the SALT II negotiations on 31 January this year.
German. and Japanese media have commented fairly extensively.
on these events, British and French much more sparsely.
Official statements on matters relevant to the U.S.-Soviet
strategic balance have been both rare and highly circumspect.
Those that have been reported in the public media, however,
are noted in this report.
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1. West European press comment on the Vladivostok summit expressed
disappointment over the limited nature of the arms control agreement
reached, but it did reflect at least some satisfaction over the
political implications of the meeting. As Professor Raymond Aron
of France put it, whatever the agreement's shortcomings, it is
"worth more symbolically than the acknowledgment of a "'fundamental
disagreement." As for the shortcomings, West German, British, and
French commentators focused on the high ceiling for '.,HIP-Vs, x'hich
they interpreted as at least a short-term advantage for the Soviets
and a long-term incentive for a qualitative arms race.
2. West German officials tended to take a self-interested view
of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, stressing the need to
maintain strong conventional forces in Europe as a guarantee of
detente. Chancellor Schmidt, Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense
Minister Leber, commenting.on stratigic problems in the aftermath
of Schmidt's visit to Washington in early December, all warned
against tendencies within NATO to slacken on defense expenditures.
German concern over budget cutting affecting the military balance
was not limited to the European NATO allies, but embraced the
economy-minded tendencies in the U.S. Congress as well. West
German media expressed particular satisfaction that the Vladivostok
agreement did not affect U.S. forward-based systems in Europe.
3. The limited British press comment stressed the uncertainties
created by Soviet testing of new, large missile systems and the
difficulties involved in verifying compliance with the MIRV
ceiling agreement. British commentators pointed up what they saw
as a contradiction between the professed goals of Vladivostok
and the results of the meeting--far from encouraging greater mutual
confidence and stability the agreements seemed to open the door
to a new arms race. THE ECONOMIST, for example, saw the agreements
as providing an incentive for the further development of mobile
missiles.
4. French comment reflected mixed assessments of Vladivostok; while
the meeting was regarded as politically useful, its practical
utility in terms of bringing about a curb on the arms race was
regarded with skepticism. In a major series of articles in LE
FIGARO, Raymond Aron concluded that the agreement would be likely
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6 MARCH 1975
to lead to "instability of mutual deterrence" and intensified
U.S. efforts to stay at the forefront of the technological arms
race. Another prominent French commentator, Michel Tatu, reached
a different conclusion, describing the Vladivostok agreement
as the long-sought "breakthrough." He also, however, foresaw
continuing difficulties for the negotiations at SALT II.
5. While Japanese press comment: reflected some anxiety over
what was regarded as the high nuclear ceilings agreed on at
Vladivostok, the Japanese also saw an increasing Soviet-American
"interdependence" and a mutual recognition that a nuclear
balance is essential to detente. But two Japanese newspapers,
ASAHI and MAINICHI, saw signs of a developing quantitative
nuclear arms race rather than any effort to establish a balance.
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PERCEPTIONS OF THE U,S SOVIET STRATEGIC BAL\NCE
AS REFLECTED IN FOREIGN MEDIA
I. WEST GERMANY
SCHMIDT, GENSCHER, Chancellor Schmidt, Foreign Minister Genscher
LEBER STATEMENTS and Defense Minister Leber all. discussed the
question of Western defense in the context of
detente within a four-day period in December following Schmidt's and
Genscher's meeting in Washington with President Ford and the NATO
Council meeting in Brussels. While none of the German officials
offered any detailed assessment of the Vladivostok agreement, all
stressed the need for a strong Western defense as a prerequisite for
strategic arms limitation and meaningful East-[Test detente.
In his 11 December foreign policy statement to the Bundestag,
carried by German radio and television, Chancellor Schmidt told the
deputies that his talks with President Ford on 5-6 December
emphasized their "common view" that "political cohesion and a strong
defense readiness must remain indispensable preconditions for
further efforts in East-West detente. It is on the basis of these
preconditions that headway must be made in arms limitation." Schmidt
added that President Ford had explained his meeting with Brezhnev
"in great detail" and that "the positive character, the positive
significance" of the Vladivostok SALT agreement had "become plain
to us."
Foreign Minister Genscher, in an 12 December interview on Mainz
Television, welcomed the Vladivostok SALT agreement but added that
"the limitation of strategic nuclear arms requires that in the
conventional sphere no increasing superiority of the Warsaw Pact
states must occur." Genscher warned that the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies were trying to increase their conventional forces
advantage and that the NATO alliance must take this into account if
it is to "maintain the prerequisites for our detente policy."
Interviewed on :Iunich radio on 14 December, Defense Minister Leber
similarly underscored the Soviet defense effort and noted that the
11.5 percent of its gross national product which the Soviet Union
spent for defense was more than any Western country was spending for
military purposes.
SOVIET MISSILE The most persistent theme in West German press
ADVANTAGES comment was one of concern over the prospective
Soviet advantage deriving from greater throw
weight capability. Thus DIE WELT's Adalbert Baerwolf, a technological
expert who has reported from NASA, wrote on 27 November that the
Vladivostok agreement had put the United States "at a disadvantage"
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FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
6 MARCH 1975
because it had "failed to make contractual stipulations as to the
throw weight equivalent. Thereby the Soviets are granted a considerable
advantage, since most land-based Soviet long-range missiles have an
inherently greater throw weight capability than the 1,000 bunkered
Minuteman missiles."
The potential Soviet advantage was further pointed up by Ernst-
Ulrich Fromm of DIE WELT, formerly the paper's Moscow correspond-
ent, who noted that the Soviet deployment of MIRVs mounted on
their own "far heavier" land-based guided missiles "could mean,"
according to U.S. computations, that the Soviet Union in 1980
would have from 15,000 to 17,000 MIRVs compared to approximately
10,000 for the United States.
An unattributed DER SPIEGEL article on 2 December, entitled "Costly
Breakthrough," took the argument one step further and said that the
Vladivostok accord could give the Soviets a "surprise strike"
capability against U.S. ICBM's. The agreement to allow 1,320 MIRVed
missiles, the paper said, would confer "an inestimable. advantage"
on the Soviets, "whose larger missiles could proportionately carry
more warheads." While the USSR. now lags in MIRV technology, the
paper added, the U.S. military and some members of Congress "are
afraid the Soviets might by the earliy 1980's have mounted so many
MIRVs--despite, or even perhaps due to, SALT II--that they will have
the capability to carry out a surprise strike against the U.S.
land-based ICBM's." This possibility in turn would force the
United States to produce new, larger missiles which can carry.more
warheads than the current generation of Minuteman or Poseidon
missiles. The paper concluded that "the arms race would start all
over again--even if limited in quantities, yet not in the search
for a higher quality of weapons." How the United States intends-to
pay for such a race, the paper said, "is something Ford has not..yet
revealed."
Kenneth Myers, in the influential Hamburg weekly DIE ZEIT of
29 November, similarly remarked. on the potential Soviet advantage.
deriving from the "larger carrying range" and a "larger carrying
capacity" of Soviet missiles. He added: "Critical observers in
Washington argue that in any further SALT agreement the Americans
will have to accept some strategic inferiority. Even after Vladivostok
there are sufficient signs that this is Moscow's objective in the
negotiations about a new treaty." Both Myers, and another article
in the same issue of DIE ZEIT, signed "A.K.", raised the problem of
the difficulty of controlling MIRV capacity "when this cannot be
ascertained by satellites." The control issue had also been raised
by Josef Riedmiller in the 25 November DIE WELT;, particularly in
connection with Soviet development of mobile missiles.
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The Riedmiller article stressed that there will be a great need for
"accuracy" at the Geneva SALT talks in order to produce an equality
"based on the correct assessment of the advantages and disadvantages
in weapons technology accruing to the opposing sides" and "to prevent
either side from gaining a decisive advantage."
The most alarmist West German comment was provided by the pseudonymous
"Ein" in the 24 January FRANKFURTER ALLGE~TEINE, in an article affirming
support for warnings by President Ford and Defense Secretary Schlesinger
about growing Soviet military strength prior to the Congressional
budget debate. The article said: "The Soviets have a new strategic
bomber. This flying 'atomic launching pad' is completing the Russian.
rocket capability which is beginning to develop in a frightening
way in quality and quantity. The Soviets are about to install
two new strategic rocket systems. The core of one system is the
SS-18. It is being stored in silos and is said to be able to
fire five to eight multiple warheads (MIRV). Every individual
warhead has the destructive force of one megaton or 1 million tons
of TNT. This rocket is more powerful than any American one. The
other new Soviet weapon is the SS-19, equipped with at least six
multiple warheads, each of them containing 300 kilotons of
explosives."
The article then went on to consider the implications of all this
for the credibility of the American deterrent: "Secretary of
Defense Schlesinger mainly considers the psychological-moral danger
emanating from these rockets for the United States. Everybody
knows that the SS-18 and SS-19 rockets can hit and destroy all
U.S. rocket positions in their bunkers. If the U.S. Government is
unable to counter the Russian strategy with something credible, it
will be shaking the confidence in the deterrent force of the United
States."
SCHLESINGER DEFENSE The question of Congressional support for
POSTURE STATEMENT proposed Administration defense expenditure
was specifically examined in a 13 February
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE Washington dispatch on Secretary Schlesinger's
defense posture report to Congress, the only pertinent comment on
the report from any of the four countries considered. The dispatch
said that Secretary Schlesinger foresaw the possibility that the
Soviet Union, with its present rate of development of strategic
offensive weapons, would by 1980 "be in a position to eliminate in
a 'first strike' the American intercontinental missiles in subterranean
launching pads." While Schlesinger wanted to avoid this "under any
circumstances" because it would disturb the existing strategic
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balance--"on which the entire SALT theory is based"--to "the advantage
of the Soviet Union," the paper concluded that it is "more than
doubtful" that the $92.8 billion defense budget request for 1976 would
be approved by Congress. On the contrary, the paper expected
"considerable cuts" in spending on strategic offensive weapons
because of Congressional reluctance to meet the high weapons costs
in a period of economic recession.
FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS Although much of the West German comment on
Vladivostok was apprehensive about the
implications of the high MIRV celings, commentators Peter Woerdehoff
on Cologne radio and Josef Bielmeier on Munich radio, and the
provincial newspaper AUCSBURGER ALLGEMEINE on 25 November all
expressed relief that the. U.S. forward-based systems in Europe were
not to be included in the SALT negotiations. However, a 4 December
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE article signed "Ein" conveyed "shock" over a
recent Brookings Institute study which it said suggested a cut of
5,000 in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons located in Europe. While.
acknowledging that Brookings "is not the government, and considerations
are not decisions," the paper contended that the institute's political
and military experts "often argue like James Schlesinger, the
secretary of defense," and that a decrease in the tactical weapons
"seems to be the price the Western big power must pay the Eastern
nuclear power" for excluding U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from
the SALT package.
U.S. NUCLEAR Two West German newspapers considered Secretary
RETARGETING Schlesinger's nuclear retargeting.doctrine, drawing
quite different conclusions. DIE WELT's foreign
policy analyst Dieter Cycon felt that a policy of targeting American
missiles against Soviet missile. bases would not increase the .
credibility of the U.S. guarantee of Germany. Cycon wondered h9w the
Kremlin leader could immediately determine that the attacking missiles
were only desgined to "disarm" him and not to destroy his country.
"Moreover, he could dislike the disarming idea and retaliate missile
for missile." Cycon therefore concluded that under "the new doctrine"
the United States "will consider the risk as being too high as long as
its own survival is not involved." The pseudonymous "Ein" in the
20 January FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE did not discuss the implications of
the selective targeting strategy for German defense but did-seem to
agree with what he understood to be Secretary Schlesinger's thesis:
that limiting atomic attack to military targets could still have a
deterrent effect and allow for a "more flexible political use of the
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TI. GREAT BRITAIN
OFFICIAL COMMENT While British government leaders have not commented
publicly on the Vladivostok agreement British
Minister of State for Defense William Rodgers, a sub-Cabinet official,
did question Soviet motivation on detente and urge strong Western
defense at an international meeting on military science.in Munich on
1 February. As reported by West Germany's DPA agency, Rodgers
expressed doubt as to whether the USSR was working fora lasting
solution rather than merely seeking breathing space to make up the
economic advantage of the West. Rodgers said he saw.no signs of.
relaxation in the current Soviet military research and development
program.
In view of these doubts, Rodgers concluded that "one should be armed
against the possibility that the Soviet Union may regard detente
merely as a continuation of the cold war with different methods.
The Western defense alliance should, therefore, be maintained
sufficiently to act as a deterrent against a military attack or
political blackmail. From this stance it would then be possible to
try and widen the scope of detente."
MIRV COMPLICATIONS British media discussion of SALT was limited
to editorials in the TIMES, FINANCIAL TIMES
and GUARDIAN immediately after Vladivostok, two pieces in THE ECONOMIST,
and a report by the TIMES Defense Correspondent just prior to the
resumption of the SALT talks in Geneva. Although the three editorials
appeared before the agreed Vladivostok ceilings were announced, all
expressed concern over the complications attendant upon MIRV develop-
ment.
The TIMES editorial noted that the Soviet Union was testing very
large missiles with multiple warheads and that this looked to
Western experts like an attempt to achieve first-strike capability.
If the Russians deploy only three of the four large land-based
missile systems which they've been testing they could emerge with
"as many as 7,000 separately targeted warheads in the megaton
range, compared with the Americans' 2,000," the paper said.
"Disparity in terms of throw-weight would be even greater, and even
this does not take into account the buildup of submarine-launched
missiles." The Americans could keep.ahead in the race, the TIMES
said, but if the Russians appeared to be bidding for first-strike
capability this "would destroy one of the basic political
assumptions of detente, which is that although the Russians will
bargain as hard as they can, and exploit every advantage to the
full, they do basically accept the need for parity based primarily
on the ability of each side to retaliate after an attack."
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Given the possibility that this doctrine is not fully accepted in
Moscow, the paper observed that the United States had conveyed "a
number of urgent warning signals" to the Soviet Union and cited in
this regard the new targeting doctrine, continued work on the
advanced Trident submarine-launched missile, the unveiling of the
new B-1 bomber, and the launching of a Minuteman missile from the
C--5A aircraft. The paper concluded that in advanced technology the
United States "is still probably better prepared than the Soviet
Union for an all-out arms race."
In interpreting Russian actions, the TIMES allowed for the possibility
that the Russians were determined to gain total superiority and used
arms agreements to buy time, but the paper was more inclined to see
a kind of inertia in Russian policymaking, with current decisions
merely carrying forward the missile and naval buildup begun in the
60's "at least partly in response to American superiority in this
field." Remarking on the relative isolation of the Soviet military
establishment from civilian planners, the paper said that this may
make the top Soviet leaders more susceptible to military arguments
that the Soviet Union still lags behind the Americans and must catch
up before making agreements and that military strength improves
political bargaining power. "The same arguments are, after all, not
unfamiliar in the West," the paper added.
The FINANCIAL TIMES was concerned that the MIRVs, given the difficult
verification problem and their improved accuracy, may present a
strong temptation to go on with research and development in pursuit
of superiority. Writing a formal treaty to include MIRVs will be
difficult, the paper said, because it enters the area of qualitative
distinctions and brings with it: the verification problem, but the
technical problems are soluble if the political will is there.' The
FINANCIAL TIMES said that final. negotiations would succeed only.if
both sides continue to pursue an understanding in other areas, "most
obviously on the Middle East." The paper took some encouragement from
the fact "that President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev have been able to take
up the dialogue where Mr. Nixon left off."
The GUARDIAN, too, focused on the verification problem, with the
MIRV described as "the latest and most dangerous joker." The
editorial said: "Pictures taken from satellites or in any other
way will not reveal whether the warhead on a missile contains one
nuclear weapon, or the six which can be carried by the Soviet SS-9,
the eight which can be carried by the SS-l9, or the three which
can be carried by the American Minuteman III. If neither side can
be sure that the other is sticking to the agreement, the agreement
itself is weakened."
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DOUBTS ON CEILINGS In its 30 November editorial, again before
the proposed SALT-II ceilings were announced,
THE ECONOMIST voiced doubts about a Vladivostok formula that might
allow even 800 MIRV missiles on each side. With that number, the
Russians might still be in a position to deliver three or four times
as much megatonnage on America as the Americans could deliver with
their smaller NIRV vehicles. "It is this possibility," the weekly
said, "that nourishes American fears that.the Russians may be tempted
to try to knock out virtually all the American land-based missiles
by a sudden 'first strike', leaving the Americans to make the
hideous decision whether to hit back at Russia's cities.and thereby
bring retribution on their own. Estimates of the seriousness of
this danger vary widely; but it is not evident that the Vladivostok
formula will do anything to reduce it."
An article in the International Report'section of the-8 February
ECONOMIST, entitled "SALT Has a Rather Doubtful Flavor This Year,"
expressed misgivings about President Ford's and Secretary Kissinger's
preference for putting off talks about lower nuclear ceilings until
the Vladivostok ones are in place. The rresult would likely mean a
Russian capacity before 1985 of.delivering 7,000 separate, independently
targetable warheads onto American soil, with Americans presumably
matching this with less powerful but more numerous warheads. In that
case, "the nuclear balance would not only rest at a much higher level
than the present one; it would also be less stable, because of the
change in the ratio between warheads and missile silos." In this
connection, THE ECONOMIST pointed out that under current conditions
at least two warheads must be delivered to be reasonably sure of
destroying one enemy missile in its silo, whereas with MIRVs one
missile might take care of two or three silos.
The increasing vulnerability of missile silos in the MIRV age,
according to the weekly, is leading the United States "to pursue
horribly expensive plans to move toward much greater reliance on
mobile missiles," with the Russians expected to follow suit. While
this could eventually restore the stability threatened by the MIRVs,
the chronic problem of verification will remain. THE ECONOMIST puts
the paradox quite succinctly: "Among the problems that may have been
passed to the SALT teams at Geneva is the one of how to tell, by
observation from orbiting satellites, whether a missile in a silo
has been mirved. The upcoming problem will be the one of finding out
how many missiles each side has, when so many of them will be on the
move. Mobility makes for invulnerability, which in turn makes for
stability; fine, but then what happens to verification, and to the
whole value of numerical limitations?"
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TIMES Defense Correspondent Henry Stanhope on 30 January, like THE
ECONOMIST, was skeptical about the ceilings agreed on at Vladivostok
and cited the criticisms of Senators Jackson and Buckley in that
regard. Stanhope wrote that most observers expected the Soviet Union
to quickly advance to the allowed Vladivostok limits. But then any
reductions sought in the SALT ].II negotiations for the post-1985
period would require dismantling of missiles already in place--"some-
thing which would be extremely difficult." That's why, Stanhope
continued, "critics fear that the two superpowers, in fixing the
SALT-2 pact, may be missing a chance (which might not_be repeated)
of imposing an overdue curb on the arms race."
III , FRANCE
GISCARD COMMENT The only official French comment on the Vladivostok
accord was provided by President Giscard d'Estaing
during his 20 December televised Elysee Palace press conference.
Referring to his conversations with Brezhnev during the Soviet leader's
visit to France in early December, Giscard said that he had explained
France's defense policy to Brezhnev and that Brezhnev had shown under-
standing. Giscard then continued: "But I said on the other hand that
I was personally very worried over the risks of nuclear proliferation
or dissemination, that this was a very serious problem, that the levels
which had been reached in the Vladivostok agreements, for instance, were
very high levels from the viewpoint of the existence of nuclear means,
and that we were ready to examine with the Soviet side what could be
the French contribution or share in a realistic effort of disarmament."
Giscard noted that he and Brezhnev had reached agreement on holding
a world meeting on disarmament but expressed his reservations about
the usefulness of such a world meeting, "which runs the risk of
producing remote or limited results."
Although monitored French comment was limited, two commentators of
worldwide reputation were among the contributors. One was Raymond
Aron, who published a series of articles in LE FIGARO in November
and December; the other was Michel Tatu, whose article appeared in
a February weekend edition of LE MONDE.
ARON ON ARMS RACE Aron's initial comment, in the 28 November
LE FIGARO? spoke of the political significance
of the Ford-Brezhnev meeting, which showed that "the leaders of both
countries want to present a symbolic image of detente," but Aron was
unable to assess the "practical significance" of the agreement without
knowing the ceilings fixed. When the figures were disclosed by
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President Ford, Aron's 2 December LE FIGARO article described the
agreement as "a mystification, even a macabre mystification," which
had failed to achieve the desired "conceptual breakthrough." Aron
wrote that Secretary Kissinger had hoped to establish with the Soviets
"an equivalence calculation system which would decelerate the
arms race," but-the Vladivostok agreement had failed to achieve
that because "it has abandoned equivalence and gone back to
equality." With the considerable number of MIRVs allowed--"three
or four times as large as the number contemplated by the Americans
and far in excess of the existing weapons"--the agreement, "far
from decelerating the arms race, will accelerate it," Aron wrote.
Anticipating an American effort to counter the Soviet throw-weight
advantage with mobile land-based missiles, a new strategic bomber
and a missile build-up to the allowable limits, Aron saw the first
result of the Vladivostok agreement as "an increase in the American
strategic weapons budget."
Pursuing this line of argument in a 27 December LE FIGARO article,
Aron wrote that by accepting a ceiling of 1,320 MIRVs "President
Ford and the secretary of state appear to have accepted, against
their will, both instability of mutual deterrence and a new nuclear
arms program." Questioning whether a better agreement might not
have been possible, Aron concluded that perhaps, "for mixed political
and technical reasons," it wasn't. Thus, Aron wrote: "If the
Russians had agreed to limit the number of missiles equipped with
multiple warheads to a few hundred, the American arms effort would
have been correspondingly reduced. But the United States already
possessed 800 (Minuteman and Poseidon) missiles equipped with
multiple warheads. The Pentagon experts probably wanted.to go on
to a second generation of MIRV missiles and the Russians wanted an
equality obvious to all."
Declaring that the agreement was of "limited value," Aron concluded
that, "despite everything," it "is worth more symbolically than the
recognition of a fundamental disagreement." He added that it would
be in the interest of both sides to reduce the MIRV ceiling.
TATU ON "BREAKTHROUGH" The noted Kremlinologist Michel Tatu, in
the 2-3 February LE MONDE, took a more
sanguine view of the Vladivostok agreement and in fact said that
President Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok had achieved."the break-
through which had been sought for the past two years." Tatu said
that the Soviet acceptance of equal ceilings was "an important
concession." While some of the previous Soviet arguments against the
equality concept were unconvincing--especially the presence of the
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American forward-based systems and of the French and British nuclear
forces--other arguments had carried more weight, Tatu said. He had
in mind the American submarine bases at Holy Loch, Scotland and
Rota, Spain which enabled the Americans to keep more submarines on patrol
than the Soviets, whose subs had to cover the long distance from
Murmansk to get-within firing range of the American coasts. Although
the Soviets expect to compensate for this advantage-by commissioning
new Delta-class submarines with longer-range missiles in coming years,
Tatu said, they "are not in the habit of anticipating their future
progress," and that underlined the significance of.their concession.
Tatu did, however, enumerate the main problems which confront the
SALT negotiators. First, he raised the question of identification
and verification of MIRVs. The Americans are inclined to automat-
ically count as a MIRV any of the Soviet missiles which are capable
of carrying MIRVs--that is, the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, he said.
He wondered whether the Soviets in their turn would demand that all
Minuteman missiles be counted as MIRVs. The negotiators would also
have to decide whether to classify the American FB-111 and the
Soviet Backfire aircraft as strategic vehicles. Tatu also mentioned
the problem of mobile intercontinental missiles. These would reduce,
the chances of an attacker achieving a truly effective "first strike"
and thus presumably reinforce deterrence, but they would also
greatly complicate the missile count and verification of agreements
concluded. Finally, Tatu noted that the American side had to take
into account the Congressional reservations about the Vladivostok
agreement, particularly Senator Jackson's criticism that the MIRV
ceiling had been set too high, and the feeling that its superiority
in missile throw-weight would enable the USSR to gain "a significant
advantage" over the United Stages when the Soviet MIRV program was
completed around 1985.
IV1 JAPAN
CABINET SECRETARY'S REMARK In line with its traditional reluctance
to comment on U.S.-Soviet relations,
the only Japanese Government reaction to the Vladivostok summit
meeting was a terse remark by the chief cabinet secretary, in a
2.5 November press conference, that it was significant that President
Ford and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev had held talks for the
first time.
The three most prominent elements in Japanese comment on the arms
limitation agreement were: 1) concern that the established nuclear
levels were so high, that there seemed little movement toward
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6 MARCH 1975
disarmament; 2) recognition of a growing U.S.-Soviet "interdependence,"
reflected in economic cooperation and defusing of political crises;
and 3) a conviction that the United States and the Soviet Union both
agreed that nuclear balance was an indispensable condition for detente.
HIGH NUCLEAR LEVELS Reflecting Japanese disappointment with the
terms of the arms limitation agreement, a
26 November TOKYO SHIMBUN editorial said the agreement indicated no
"eagerness for realizing nuclear disarmament," and if the United
States and the Soviet Union were sincere in their professed "anxiety"
about worldwide nuclear proliferation, they "should decide to restrict
such weapons more boldly and quickly." A 26 November YOMIURI editorial
similarly remarked that if an agreement is concluded on the Vladivostok
terms, "there will be no change in the absurd and dangerous situation
whereby both the United States and the USSR still have sufficient
nuclear war potential to annihilate mankind completely, several times
over." Still, the editorial expressed some satisfaction that the.
agreement signaled an intention to move from "restrictions" toward
"reduction." YOMIURI also noted the impact of economic factors
encouraging the United States and the Soviet Union to curb arms
costs, the interest of the Soviets in American economic cooperation,
and the U.S. need for Soviet cooperation in.a Mideast settlement.
Thus "in various fields" the paper said, "U.S.-Soviet relations
are now moving from the stage of mere cooperation into the stage
of interdependence," and the significance of the Vladivostok talks
was that "they brought this fact into relief." A 26 November ASAHI
editorial also commented that the Vladivostok talks marked a new
stage in the U.S.-Soviet cooperation policy established during the
Nixon presidency.
A page one commentary by Tadashi Takahashi in TOKYO SHIMBUN on
25 November also took up the U.S.-Soviet interdependence theme,.with
Takahashi labeling it more picturesquely a "Pax Russo-Americana."
Takahashi, however, was the only Japanese commentator who clearly
felt that the Soviets had got much the better of the bargaining.
He thought the Vladivostok guidelines might well lead to the
relinquishment of U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union,
"which superiority has been a traditional policy of the United
States." Takahasi even raised the Yalta spectre, comparing an
"utterly inexperienced in diplomacy" President Ford with a
President Roosevelt visiting the Crimea "in spite of his illness"
and being "wheedled by Stalin into agreeing to divide the postwar
world between the United States and the Soviet Union."
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NUCLEAR BALANCE NIHON KEZAI and SANKEI in 26 November editorials
both viewed the summit agreement as demonstrating
U.S.-Soviet recognition that a nuclear balance is the essential
linchpin of detente. SANKEI said Brezhnev had even been willing to
make concessions to secure this detente, and he cited the USSR's
acceptance of a lower missile-launcher ceiling than allowed in the
provisional SALT agreement and its willingness to exclude the U.S.
forward bases from the negotiations. NIHON KEZAI, while approving
the nuclear balance concept, cautioned that the United States and
the Soviet Uniori should establish this balance "solely to fulfill
their international responsibi]_ity of guaranteeing world security,
and not as a means of political or economic domination of the
world."
QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE ASAHI on 6 December and MAINICHI on 3 February
each carried editorials expressing anxiety
over development of a qualitative nuclear arms race. ASAHI cited
the MIRV "loophole" and the continued "explosive development" of
nuclear weapons techniques to ,justify its fears. MAINICHI said a
"number of troublesome problems" had appeared since the Vladivostok
conference and asserted that Secretary Schlesinger's announcement
that some of the SS-18 missiles were being mirved showed that "the
tempo for the deployment of MIRVs by the USSR is quicker than was
expected by the U.S. Department of Defense." The paper referred to
an American "sense of crisis" -that "even from a qualitative standpoint
it may be bypassed by the USSR sooner or later." MAINICHI said that
"both governments must curb demands of their military."
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