THE NATURE OF THE BUDDHIST CONFLICT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

611:X64 -
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27 September 1963
OCI No. 0299/63C
Copy No. 7
SPECIAL REPORT
THE NATURE OF THE BUDDHIST CONFLICT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Ifr ' : Pass 1
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GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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27 September 1963
The current Buddhist protest movement in South
Vietnam has been highly political since its incep-
tion. However, in the context of Buddhist tradition,
as well as of political life under the logo family
regime, it is impossible entirely to separate Bud-
dhist political aims from Buddhist religious motiva-
tion. And in the course of their protest campaign,
many otherwise apolitical Vietnamese Buddhists were
forced to the conclusion that only through a change
in the regime could they win religious equality.
A majority of the South
Vietnamese population consider
themselves Buddhists in one
sense or another. The Buddhist
Sangha (the organized community
of monks and nuns) does not share
the Western concept of church-
state separation and looks back
to a period in Vietnamese his-
tory when Buddhists served as
political, cultural, and spirit-
ual counselors to emperors. Al-
though this role declined well
before the advent of French
rule, Buddhists regard the colo-
nial period, with its introduc-
tion of Catholicism and the
privileged status accorded its
adherents, as having further
corrupted their religion. Grow-
ing out of this concern, a grow-
ing Buddhist revival beginning
in the 1920s led to the forma-
tion in 1951 by the most impor-
tant Vietnamese sect of a na-
tional Sangha and laity organiza-
tion, the General Association
of Vietnamese Buddhists (GAVB).
When Diem assumed power in South
Vietnam, Buddhists probably re-
garded his strong Catholic ori-
entation as unfavorable to their
aspirations. (Vietnam's predomi-
nantly Hahayama Buddhists, al-
though of a different school
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from the more passive Theravada
Buddhists of Ceylon and the
rest of Southeast Asia, have es-
tablished contacts with them
through the World Buddhist Fel-
lowship started in 1950.)
There is no evidence that
the Diem regime has curbed free-
dom of religion or that it car-
ried out repressions against
Buddhists prior to the 8 May
outburst. Nevertheless, the
government's open bias toward
Catholicism--evident in its of-
ficial philosophy, in its of-'
ficial sanction of Catholic cele-
brations, in some of its laws,
in schools, in the armed forces
(Catholic chaplains), and to
some extent in its choice of
more trusted officials--clearly
created the impression among
Buddhists of religious discrimi-
nation. The semicovert Can
Lao organization, formed around
a nucleus of Catholics, became
the government's controlling
element in the civil service
and army; and many ambitious
Vietnamese have come to regard
conversion to Catholicism as the
path to success. In a series
of public ceremonies in the fall
of 1959, Diem officially dedicated
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the entire country to the Virgin
Mary. The appointment in 1961
of Diem's brother Thuc as arch.-
bishop of Hue--a Buddhist strong-
hold--intensified the resent-
ment engendered by Thuc's polit-
ical influence and activities.
Tri Quang, the Buddhist
bonze who sparked the eruption
of the Buddhist protest movement
in Hue on 8 May, has admitted
since taking refuge in the Ameri-
can Embassy on 1 September that
he had long been planning such
a campaign. He has denied, how-
ever, deliberately instigating
the violence of 8 May, which
culminated in the death of eight
persons during efforts of secu-
rity forces to disperse a crowd.
Tri Quang claims he seized on
the issue for a showdown, having
let earlier opportunities go by,
and that even for some time sub-
sequent to 8 May, the Buddhists
would have settled for an end
to religious discrimination.
His statements cannot be refuted
can the basis of hard information
now available.
Tri Quang and other Bud-
dhist; leaders are known to have
had at least two days' notice
prior to the 8 May'celebration
of Buddha's birthday in which
to plan open protests over a
government effort to apply a
directive--long standing but
not previously enforced--con-
cerning the display of the Bud-
dhist flag. The government's
charge, however, that the en-
suing deaths were caused by a
Viet Cong grenade rather than
by government troops is not
borne out by ,eyewitness reports
or the findings of US military
personnel. in the area.
The five demands drafted
by Buddhist leaders in Hue on
10 May were in effect a petition
for both religious and political
concessions, including the elimi-
nation of legal restrictions not
applicable to Catholics and resti-
tution for the 8 May victims.
Whether or not the demands were
politically motivated, prompt
and adroit government handling
of the issue probably could have
averted the formation of a na-
tional Buddhist campaign. Under
GAVB leadership, this campaign
not only served to foster greater
cohesion among the country's dif-
fuse Buddhist following, but was
supported. by 13 sects represented
by a recently created Inter-sect
Committee. Two other nonpartici-
pating sects are reportedly gov-
ernment-subsidized. By the time
that the government reached a
compromise agreement on 16 June,
however, the Buddhists had de-
veloped sufficient momentum and
evidence of new repressions to
challenge the regime's promise
of good faith.
There is strong evidence
that the government, through
its authoritarian inclinations
and its concern over Viet-Cong
instigation or exploitation of
the Buddhist issue, was disposed
from the beginning to regard the
Buddhist leadership as subversive
and to deal with it forcefully.
When it refrained from doing so,
under US pressure, while stall-
ing on concessions, the Bud-
dhists were able to arouse pub-
lic sympathy by organizing
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Ifto, MW
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demonstrations and, ultimately,
by self-immolations which, what-
ever their political effects,
represent a sacrificial gesture
compatible with the traditions
of Vietnamese (Mahayana) Bud-
dhism. Although by early Au-
gust the fervor of the Buddhist
movement may have been partly
out of control, as claimed by
the Buddhist leaders, the lat-
ter were already expanding their
demands in late June; in mid-
July moderate Buddhist clergy
were expressing alarm over the
political aims of extremists in
the movement. There is almost
no question that Tri Quang and
others were actively organizing,
whether from the outset or as
a result of frustrations en-
countered during the campaign,
a vehicle to bring about the
government's overthrow, though
they do not appear to have co-
operated with Diem's traditional
political opponents.
The government has claimed
it has proof of Communist di-
rection of the Buddhist campaign,
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Quang him-
se claims that, espite per-
sonal antipathy to Diem, he ini-
tially accepted the President
as a strong anti-Communist leader;
it was only later that he con-
cluded that Diem could not win
the war and that the Buddhists
were caught between the evils
of the regime and of the Viet
Cong. Quang, however, is polit-
ically sophisticated and some-
pproach.
I lone who
regards most Budd st leaders
as sincerely motivated, has
expressed distrust of Quang
and his denials of Communist
sympathies. (SECRET)
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