THE SOVIET REGIME AND CULTURAL NONCONFORMITY

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OC I No . - 03 53 /648
Copy No.
60
THE SOVIET REGIME' AND CULTURAL NONCONFORMITY
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INTELLIGENCE` AGENCY
?v10..1/CDF F'ai es 1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
16'October 1964
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THE SOVIET REGIME AND CULTURAL NONCONFORMITY
In the fifteen months since he demanded con-
formity from all intellectuals at the party plenum
on ideology, Khrushchev has been preoccupied with
other problems and has had little time for person-
al intervention in the cultural field. Without
his participation, the drive for orthodoxy waned
rapidly as most of the liberal writers who had been
criticized for nonconformity returned to print.
The regime has reverted to a. position of relative
neutrality, tolerating literary nonconformity and
public quarrels between liberal and conservative
intellectuals, rather than attempting to muffle or
silence them.
Divided councils within
the leadership itself were at
the root of the sharp zig-zags
in Soviet cultural policy which
had preceded the plenum and may
have contributed to the central
committee's indecisive action.
In mid-October 1962, Khrushchev
reportedly had told a. group of
writers that there were some
officials just waiting for him
to die. They then intended to
bring Stalin back, "but I will
destroy them so that there will
be nothing to bring back and no
one to bring him back to." At
that time, he encouraged a pro-
gram of literary works embody-
ing discussions of Stalin's
crimes. In this, he was probably
supported by Mikoyan and opposed
--unsuccessfully--by his then
heir apparent Kozlov, and by
the veteran ideologist Suslov.
At the central committee
plenum on ideology in June 1963,
Khrushchev and other speakers
harshly attacked the nonconform-
ity of the intelligentsia. and
the indifferent attitude of the
youth. Khrushchev warned that
those who failed to join in the
struggle for Communism would be
given no quarter, and recalled
Ta.ra.s Bulba. who killed his own
son because he went over to the
side of the enemy. Despite the
assurances that the party really
meant what it said, the adminis-
trative measures which had been
widely discussed before and dur-
ing the plenum to improve control
mechanisms in the arts and lit-
erature were not enacted. The
session thus ended on an incon-
clusive note. The leadership
was clearly caught between a
need to do something about the
increasingly insidious expres-
sion of lack of support for its
ideals and its fear of endanger-
ing the psychological gains
achieved since Stalin's death.
A New Cultural Thaw
Liberal writers produced
a flood of fiction detailing
the crimes of "the cult of Sta-
lin's personality." They also
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joined forces with liberal cine-
ma.tographers in a, new effort to
purge conservative writers and
critics who had achieved their
positions of power by denounc-
ing their Jewish colleagues dur-
ing the Stalin purges.
This new attack on Stalin-
ism would quickly dissipate,
however, in the wake of a major
crisis. In late October, Presi-
dent Kennedy revealed that strate-
gic missiles were being deployed
in Cuba and within six days Khru-
shchev capitulated, leaving him-
self exposed to ridicule from
all sides. As a result, Soviet
policy entered a period of re-
trenchment and re-evaluation
that lasted throughout the win-
ter. Khrushchev, clearly on
the defensive, was apparently
obliged to change his tactics
in order to reduce his vulner-
ability to domestic attack.
The lid was not forced
down all at once, however, al-
though Khrushchev was in no
mood to experiment further with
de-Stalinization. As late as
23 November, he attempted to
show continuity with his past
policies by defending publica-
tion of Yevtushenko's "Stalin's
Heirs" and Solzhenitsyn's "One
Day in the Life of Ivan Deniso-
vich." He even claimed that he
had overruled suggestions by
other members of the leadership
that portions of "Iva.n" be cut.
The conservative writers,
however, were quick to realize
that the situation was changing.
Their first aim was to protect
their associates who had been
under attack for their denuncia-
tions during the Stalin era.
The conservatives apparently
appealed to Kozlov to intercede
with Khrushchev who, by this
time, was undoubtedly receptive,
and probably shared the conserv-
atives' antisemitism. He prob-
ably also recognized the danger
to the leadership of establish-
ing a precedent of retribution
for crimes committed in the Sta.-
lin years. In any event, the
campaign to oust the conserva-
tives came to an end after only
six weeks.
Khrushchev had not said
anything in October about lib-
eralization in the graphic arts
or in music. By analogy, how-
ever, hopes had been aroused for
a thaw in these fields as well.
Moreover, Minister of Culture
Furtseva and Khrushchev's Bon-
in-law Adzhubey appear to have
favored such a. thaw and had
been quietly encouraging young
artists.
On 1 December, however,
their hopes were abruptly da.shed.
Khrushchev, already angry over
liberal attacks on the a.nti-
semitic writers and now on the
defensive, was invited to an
exhibit arranged by the conserv-
atives at the Manezh Museum.
Suddenly confronted with extreme
examples of modern Soviet art,
he exploded with rage, and after
two meetings in which his spokes-
men demanded orthodox socialist
realism in art and music, most
artists and musicians fell back
into line.
The writers, however, did
not interpret this crackdown as
a sign of the times for them.
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Stalin's crimes continued to be
treated in fiction, and the
problems of the guilt of Stalin's
"executors" and the moral guilt
of those who had failed to pro-
test injustice to others were
raised in literary publications.
The prerevolutionary theme of
conflict between fathers and
sons was revived. Soviet youth
were depicted as rejecting pa-
rental discipline and charging
the older generation with com-
plicity in the crimes of the
"cult" years.
In March, Khrushchev opened
a. full-scale attack. He warned
against emphasizing the suffer-
ing caused by Stalin and ignor-
ing his contributions to the
cause of Communism. He insisted
that no one except Stalin, Beria,
and the a.ntiparty group had
known during Stalin's lifetime
of any injustices. He contra-
dicted this by praising Mikhail
Sholokhov for having remonstrated
with Stalin as early as 1932
about the brutalities of the
collectivization campaign, and
compounded the confusion by
claiming that despite his own
ignorance of any injustice he
had twice thwarted Stalin's
plans for further purges. He
also flatly rejected the pos-
sibility of a, conflict between
fathers and sons under social-
ist conditions.
Khrushchev was still smart-
ing as a, result of Cuba., but there
were other contributing causes
which precipitated this explo-
sion. It followed fairly shortly
after the press began to discuss
the politically sensitive prob-
lems of guilt for Stalin's crimes
and the father and son conflict.
In addition, Khrushchev was
vulnerable to criticism on the
grounds that his cultural policy
had led to adverse consequences
which apparently he had not even
envisioned. He was also under
increasing pressure from the
Chinese.
The ensuing witch hunt
conducted by conservative writers
and artists lasted until late
April when a slight moderatLon
was discernible. One factor
which may have contributed to
this change was the sharp criti-
cism voiced in the west. In
addition, Kozlov's influence
was removed at about that time
by a. crippling stroke, and on
17 April, Togliatti, speaking
for the Italian Communist Party,
voiced public disagreement with
the Soviet hard line in culture.
By the time of the June plenum
a good deal of the conviction
had gone out of the drive for
conformity.
The Regime's Reversion
TO Neutrality
In the fifteen months since
June 1963, the Soviet leaders
have been preoccupied with
other problems and there have
been no major public statements
on cultural policy. Ilichev,
head of the party's Ideological
Commission, has spoken sporadi-
cally on the subject, but his
speeches are infrequently pub-
lished and the texts, when avail-
able, have given very little
guidance to authors as how to
treat the Stalin era.. In prac-
tice, the regime seems to te
trying to strike a balance be-
tween liberals and conserv-
atives but it has intervened
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only sporadically in cultural
affairs.
which continued through. the
past summer.
In August 1963, Khrushchev
authorized the publication of
"Vasily Terkin in Paradise,"
Aleksandr Tvardovsky's satire
on Stalinist literary bureau-
crats. In this poem, Tvardovsky
treated the problem of Stalin
himself with discretion, and
Khru-shchev--a.s he has done in
the past--may have given his
approval as a personal favor
to the author. It had the ef-
fect, however, of re-opening
the subject of Stalin in litera-
ture, and the writers have re-
turned to discussing the suffer-
ing of the Stalin years and
ignoring Stalin's contributions
to the cause of Communism. The
theme of the father-son conflict
has also reappeared, despite
Khrushchev's flat denial of its
validity in contemporary Soviet
society. The contention that
Stalin's crimes were known dur-
ing his lifetime has been ac-
cepted by the conservatives who
now are concentrating on proving
that efforts were made to strug-
gle against the mistakes of the
"cult."
In the heated controversy
which began last December over
the Lenin prize for literature,
the issue was not artistic values
but whether such a. struggle
should have been conducted, and
if so, how and by whom. The
controversy was nominally re-
solved in April by the award
of the prize to a Ukrainian
novelist chiefly notable for the
fact that his novel had been
ignored by both liberal and con-
servative critics. The award
had little effect on the quarrel,
Most of the writers who
were harshly criticized in the
crackdown of 1963 have made
their way back into print. Even
Viktor Nekra.sov, whose expul-
sion from the party was demanded
by Khrushchev in June 1963, re-
appeared in print only six months
later. Several new poems by
Yevtushenko were published in
February 1964 and two more ap-
peared in early September.
The graphic arts and music,
although potentially noncon-
formist, have never exhibited
the vitality that literature
has in attempts to break out
of their Stalinist straitjacket.
As a result of the regime's
current stance of relative neu-
trality, the conservatives are
still in control in both fields.
The only significant develop-
ment in the past year in the
graphic arts--Ilya Glazunov's
one-man showing in June---appears
to have been an isolated event
rather than a precedent for a
milder policy.
Glazunov is a nonconform-
ist painter but his style harks
back to iconography rather than
to the abstractionism which so
irritates Khrushchev. The ex-
hibit was apparently organized
with the consent of the Minis-
try of Culture, under public
pressure from liberal writers
and with some editorial support
from Izvestia. It took place
over the bitt er opposition of
the conservative leaders of the
Artists' Union who have a.da-
mantly refused to admit Gla.zunov
as a member. The significance
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of the exhibit lay chiefly in
the tremendous interest it
aroused among Soviet intellect-
uals, many of whom do not find
Gla.zunov's style particularly
appealing but who are neverthe-
less determined to encourage
any nonconformity in the arts.
A deputy minister of culture,
who rushed to the exhibit at
the last minute to arbitrate the
quarrel over whether it should
open at all, was clearly appalled
by the would-be viewers massed
in the street outside the museum
and reportedly was heard to mut-
ter that he had no choice but
to open the show to avoid a scan-
dal.
Possibly in recognition
of the intellectuals' interest
in nonconformist a.rt, the jour-
nal Kommunist this summer opened
the door a crack to experimenta-
tion and innovation, by attack-
ing Chinese conservatism in the
arts, but there has been no ob-
servable reaction as yet among
Soviet painters, sculptors, or
musicians.
Reflections of the Sino-
Soviet on roversy
Soviet press accounts of
a meeting of the party's Ideo-
logical Commission in mid-May
presented an evenly balanced of-
ficial line which stressed both
the dangers of "bourgeois" revi-
sionism and the dogmatism of the
Chinese "splitters." Immediately
after the meeting, however,
Ilichev briefed the assembled
intellectuals in a closed ses-
sion on the fight with Peiping,
leaving the impression among
his audience that dogmatism con-
stituted the greater threat.
By June, Soviet spokesmen
were publicly defending Khru -
shchev's cultural policy against
Chinese attacks, thus indirectly
strengthening the liberal Soviet
intellectuals' position. Kom-
munist charged that Chinese
literature portrays "not the
actual reality in China. but an
idealized reality that the Chi-
nese leaders would like to pass
off as real." Liberal Soviets
who have fought the glossing
over of defects in Soviet life
demanded by the doctrine of
"socia.list realism" are undoubt-
edly heartened by this defini-
tion of Chinese sin. Another
Kommunist editorial accused Chi-
nese leaders of regarding art
as nothing more than an appen-
dage of politics, leaving the
implication that art might have
some other function than to as-
sist the party in building Com-
munism.
Nonconformist Intellectuals
And Apolitical Youth
The intellectual ferment
that has been visible in thc~
Soviet Union has not been ex-
pressed in terms of the party
versus the intelligentsia, but
rather in terms of conservative
elements versus liberal elements
--whether party functionaries
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or party or nonparty literary
figures. Stalin's monolithic
party discipline has been eroded
by Khrushchev's own actions in
de-Stalinization. Moreover,
the authority of cultural a.ppa-
ratchiks, many of whom are con-
servative hold-overs from the
Stalin years, has also been under-
mined by Khrushchev's backing
and filling in the cultural
field. Certain party concepts
such as socialist realism have
been similarly eroded.
There is some question of
how much the Soviet public shares
the concerns of the intelligent sia.
the trial this spring
of the young poet, Iosif Brodsky,
on charges of "parasitism," many
of the spectators were totally
in sympathy with the court and
the prosecution, and expressed
hostility to all intellectuals
as leeches who contributed no
useful labor to society. West-
erners returning from the USSR
have frequently reported a tre-
mendous gulf between the Soviet
intelligentsia--which includes
most white-collar professionals,
regardless of their intellect-
ual interests--and the workers.
Some Soviet intellectuals, ex-
press ing concern for the future,
have also commented on this gulf.
The behavior of the audience
at the Brodsky trial suggests
that many of these workers,
even if they knew about it, would
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not be sympathetic with the
intellectuals' soul-searching
about guilt for the Stalin
years.
Party and Komsomol author-
ities discussed the problem
of apolitical youth at a Komso-
molcentral committee plenum in
March. According to the pub-
lished account, the session
was little more than a play-
back of the party plenum in
June 1963 and again with no
remedial actions taken.
The Komsomol boss spoke
recently about the dangers of
bourgeois ideology, but he also
warned Komsomol officials who
see "only danger in an expan-
sion of cultural contacts with
the West and think only about
guarding young people from it.
This is incorrect." He failed
to explain how the young were
to be protected from infec-
tion without being isolated
from contacts. His speech was
typical of the sporadic and
half-hearted efforts made by
the regime to deal with the
problem of maintaining both
ideological purity, as the party
demanded at the June 1963 ple-
num, and a detente policy in
foreign relations with increased
economic and cultural ha.nges
with the West.
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