CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT TRENDS IN THE LESSER ANTILLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005500030002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 October 1966
Copy No. 48
SPECIAL REPORT
TRENDS IN THE LESSER ANTILLES
TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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TRENDS IN THE LESSER ANTILLES
Many of the traditionally stable island posses-
sions in the Caribbean are undergoing political
changes that will test their democratic order. The
difficulties that will be encountered in achieving
much needed economic diversification may further
upset established political relations.
By early 1967 various British Caribbean islands
will have emerged from colonial status into independ-
ence or a quasi-independent status. The virtual
withdrawal of the British will leave inexperienced
local leaders the task of improving the economic wel-
fare of the people and thus reducing the susceptibil-
ity of the islands to subversion.
The people of the French and Dutch Caribbean
possessions are relatively prosperous and enjoy ex-
tensive political and economic support from the mother
countries. De Gaulle has taken a personal interest
in the French West Indies, which are therefore tied
more firmly than ever to France. If, however, post -
De Gaulle France should decide to divest itself
of these islands, the Communists and other far left
groups might well dominate the political scene.
Barbados
On 30 November, Barbados will
assume independence within the
British Commonwealth. The island
has been a British colony since
the early 17th century. Its new
constitution will replace one of
the oldest constitutions in the
Commonwealth, and its House of As-
sembly, which dates from 1639, is
the second oldest colonial legis-
lative body. The colony was
granted full self-government in
1961, the UK retaining control of
foreign affairs and defense.
In independence, the island
will have a parliamentary system
with a government nominally re-
sponsible to a governor general
as representative of the British
Queen. Parliament will comprise
a Senate of 21 appointed members
and an elected 24-member House
of Assembly.
At present reading, three
recognized political parties
will contest most of the seats
in the 3 November general elec-
tion, and a newly formed fourth
movement is expected to run
candidates for two seats. Weak-
nesses in the Barbados National
Party (BNP) and Barbados Labor
Party (BLP) hamper their elec-
tion prospects. The governing
Democratic Labor Party (DLP) of
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LESSER ANTILLES
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Premier Errol Barrow is heavily
favored to increase its present
majority in the legislature.
The DLP came to power in the
1961 elections after 14 years of
BLP control. The results of the
London conference on arrange-
ments for independence enhanced
the DLP's prestige and were a
significant personal triumph for
Barrow, who achieved his primary
objective of winning independence
in 1966. The DLP can also claim
credit for a steady rate of eco-
nomic growth and significant im-
provements in the island's com-
munications, transportation, and
other facilities. In addition,
five years of dispensing patron-
age place the government party
in a commanding position. A
real opposition would appear only
in the unlikely event of an alli-
ance of young and capable ele-
ments of the BNP and the BLP.
Barrow expects that, with
independence, Barbados will be
a Caribbean power in its own
right. His political orienta-
tion is pro-US and he is particu-
larly disposed toward Canada.
Recently he has evinced strop
interest in joining the OAS.I
Although Barbados is depend-
ent on a single crop--sugar--the
island has made considerable prog-
ress with its tourist industry and
has not received budgetary sup-
port from the United Kingdom for
many years. Efforts to expand
the industrial base have not been
as rewarding, and agricultural
diversification has moved slowly.
For the short run, however, the
promotion of tourism can do more
to advance the economic growth and
raise the standard of living than
industrialization.
Barbados suffers from over-
population and emigration has not
kept pace with the rate of growth.
With a total population of nearly
250,000 in an area of 166 square
miles, the island is one of the
most densely populated areas of
the world. The overwhelming ma-
jority of inhabitants are African
in origin (79 percent), with 4 per-
cent of European and 17 percent
of mixed origin. There is at
present no overt racial conflict,
although some of the white resi-
dents view with trepidation the
imminent removal of British con-
trol.
With most commercial in-
terests and much of the land con-
trolled by whites, there is a
distinct potential for social un-
rest and racial tensions. The
situation can and probably will
be exploited for political pur-
poses, particularly if independ-
ence does not bring noticeable
economic improvement to the great
mass of very poor Barbadians.
A significant increase in unem-
ployment--currently estimated at
20-25 percent except during cane
harvesting--could also provide
an opening for subversive influ-
ences.
Internal Security
At present there is no evi-
dence of a subversive threat. Only
a handful of persons have come to
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notice in a Communist or extreme
left-wing connection, and there
has been no indication of their
involvement in subversive activ-
ity. In comparison with the other
British dependencies in the East-
ern Caribbean, Barbados has a bet-
ter educated, and reputedly more
industrious population, which
should make the country less vul-
nerable to Communist exploitation.
Barbados has a well-disci-
plined police force of about 650
which, unlike the other forces in
the British Caribbean, has been re-
sponsible to the government of
Barbados and not to the UK. Pro-
vided the island shows itself
capable of developing its free
enterprise economy, and politi-
cal parties and trade unions fol-
low responsible policies, left-
wing subversion is not expected
to make much headway.
Windward and
Leeward Islands
Six dependencies of the
Windward-Leeward groups will as-
sume a new "associated status"
relationship with Great Britain
in February 1967. The six are
Antigua (including Redonda and
Barbuda), Dominica, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent, Grenada, and the
group comprised of St. Christo-
pher (also known as St. Kitts),
Nevis, and Anguilla.
The political future of
these six became uncertain with
dissolution of the Federation
of the West Indies on 31 May 1962
after Jamaica and Trinidad had
opted for independence on their
own. After 1962 a continuing
attempt was made to form an "East-
ern Caribbean Federation" of these
islands together with Barbados
and Montserrat. In its earlier
stages the plan was to set up a
strong central government with
its capital in Barbados, and with
certain associations among the
units which would make the is-
lands economically more viable
and less vulnerable to outside
political influences.
However, island leaders were
unwilling to give up any impor-
tant political and financial
powers to a central government,
and Barbados' Premier Barrow was
reluctant to agree to any arrange-
ment requiring his island to con-
tribute to the economy of the
others. Most important to the
islands, the UK was unwilling to
guarantee them what they considered
adequate financial support of the
proposed federation. Faced with
the collapse of plans for a federa-
tion, the British accepted inde-
pendence for Barbados and devised
a plan of modified dependency
status for the other six.
Two remaining British Carib-
bean dependencies will not be
part of the "Associated States"
plan. Montserrat and the Brit-
ish Virgin Islands are considered
"too small" and too dependent
on the UK for self-government.
Political Arrangements
Under the new constitution,
the six "Associated States" will
be fully self-governing in inter-
nal affairs, but external affairs
and defense will remain a British
responsibility. The association
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is to be a free and voluntary
one. Termination by any island
would require approval by two
thirds of the legislature and a
two thirds referendum. The UK
can terminate an island's rela-
tionship only after giving six
months' notice, holding a confer-
ence to discuss proposed termina-
tion with the island concerned
and obtaining approval of the
British Parliament. While the
British will be responsible for
external affairs, they have an-
nounced that they will entrust
foreign affairs responsibilities
to the island governments to the
maximum extent feasible.
When the British turn over
control in February the position
of "Administrator" (representa-
tive of the Crown) on each of
the islands will be eliminated.
London will have a senior diplo-
matic official resident on St.
Lucia whose title will be "Brit-
ish Government Representative"
and whose rank will be equivalent
to that of the high commissioners
(ambassadors) exchanged by Com-
monwealth members. As in Barba-
dos, the islands will have a par-
liament with an appointed Senate
and a lower house called the
House of Representatives. A gov-
ernor representing the Queen will
occupy a ceremonial position.
Great Britain has stated
that it has no intention of
"washing its hands" of the area
because of the changed status.
The UK maintains that it will
continue aid and budgetary
support, and that it has parlia-
mentary authority for assistance
at present levels until 1970.
Despite such assurances, the UK
has been reticent about commit-
ting itself to large-scale expend-
itures in the Caribbean for an
indefinite time. It hopes that
with the new arrangement the
United States and Canada will
take a greater interest in these
neighbors than in the past.
The Economy and the People
At present none of the is-
lands is economically viable.
Antigua had ceased to receive
budgetary support from the Brit-
ish in 1963, but a severe drought
in 1965 caused it to call for
assistance from the UK to keep
the government sugar factory go-
ing. In August this year the
sugar factory's board of direc-
tors announced that because of
serious losses the company was
unable to continue operations be-
yond the present sugar crop. A
survey is now under way by a team
of experts which will make rec-
ommendations concerning continua-
tion of the industry. Tourism,
however, has recently been expand-
ing and probably holds the key to
Antigua's economic future. St.
Kitts is now the only one of the
six dependencies in which sugar
is the leading industry.
In the remainder of the is-
lands, agriculture, primarily
bananas, forms the basis of the
economy. St. Lucia also has
hopes for developing the tourist
industry, and in 1962 opened its
first luxury beach hotel. Mont-
serrat's economy is still based
largely on production of sea is-
land cotton, but American and
Canadian real estate interests
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have started developments which
may eventually establish retire-
ment homes to supplement the is-
land's economy.
In general, the islands have
shown little inclination to join
a regional economic organization,
which would be their best hope
for economic viability. The ex-
ception is Antigua which has
agreed, with-Barbados and Guyana,
to form a Caribbean Free Trade
Area (CARIFTA). Details concerning
CARIFTA have yet to be arranged,
but if the organization shows
promise the other islands would
probably be interested in join-
ing. Members of the islands'
Chambers of Commerce, anxious for
closer economic cooperation, have
toured the British Caribbean to
promote formation of a trading
bloc.
A group of economists spon-
sored by the US, UK, and Canadian
governments recently surveyed
the economies of Barbados and
the Windward-Leeward Islands.
The report of the survey will be
discussed at a conference of is-
land chief ministers and repre-
sentatives of the US, UK, and
Canada in Antigua on 2 and 3 No-
vember.
Approximately 525,000 peo-
ple, mostly of African descent,
live in the 1,300 square miles
of the eight islands' territory
stretching across 700 miles of
sea. The Negro people completely
control the politics of the is-
lands, and in some the small mi-
nority of white residents controls
most of the business firms. There
are no open racial conflicts.
Internal Security
With the possible exception
of Grenada, where a close asso-
ciate of Guyanese pro-Communist
opposition leader Cheddi Jagan
may have been active, there has
been no overt Communist influ-
ence. Future subversion, how-
ever, cannot be ruled out. All
of the problems that have caused
trouble in other parts of the
underdeveloped world exist here:
unemployment, low wages, over-
population, one-crop economies
requiring external support, and
an extremely wealthy minority
versus an underprivileged major-
ity. The virtual withdrawal of
the British will leave inexperi-
enced and frequently naive is-
land leaders to deal alone with
any subversive threat.
The internal security of
the islands has been maintained
by small police forces ulti-
mately responsible to the UK.
They are considered very effi-
cient and adequate under normal
circumstances, but would be hard
pressed to handle any sizable
riots.
French West Indies
Eight of the Caribbean is-
lands are French owned. In 1946
they were made into two full
departments of France named for
Martinique and Guadeloupe, the
two principal islands, which
have been French possessions
since the mid-17th Century. The
department of Guadeloupe includes
Marie-Galante, three smaller out-
lying islands (Iles des Saintes,
Petite Terre, and La Desirade),
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and the islands of Saint Barthe-
lemy and Saint Martin to the
north. Both Martinique and Guade-
loupe are presided over by a pre-
fect who is named by the French
Government and is answerable to
it. In addition each has gen-
eral councils elected on the
basis of universal suffrage
which are consulted on govern-
ment decrees and government-
sponsored legislation that would
affect them.
The population of some
640,000 is about evenly divided
between Martinique and Guade-
loupe. Roughly 90 percent are
African or African-Caucasian-
Indian mixture with some 5 per-
cent East Indian and 5 percent
Caucasian. The white residents,
although numerically small, con-
trol a great deal of the eco-
nomic wealth. Ethnic differences
the great distances from France,
and the economic contrasts have
been the roots of past diffi-
culties in establishing a satis-
factory political status.
Gaullism vs. Communism
The policy of President de
Gaulle's Fifth Republic has been
to integrate the French West In-
dies ever more closely with
Metropolitan France. After years
of neglect, Martinique and Guade-
loupe have lately received more
of the national budget in propor-
tion to their populations than
any of the 89 departments of
continental France. New housing,
roads, schools, health centers,
electric lines, and water pipes
stand as evidence of De Gaulle's
determination to make this area
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an attractive outpost of France.
In addition, France buys and
subsidizes the main products of
these islands--sugar, bananas,
and pineapples. Although incon-
gruous in light of the desire of
most colonies for independence,
the majority of the population
of these islands appears to ap-
preciate the advantages of in-
tegration into the French polity.
France has pumped an aver-
age of $170 per capita annually
into Martinique and Guadeloupe
during the past few years. The
islanders enjoy salary levels
and social benefits above the
Caribbean average. In addition,
De Gaulle has made a deep impres-
sion by visiting the islands sev-
eral times and reassuring the is-
landers that France would not
abandon them. The result has been
that while the Communists and
other far-left groups favor au-
tonomy and are able to win a sub-
stantial number of votes at elec-
tion time, their aspirations for
independence go unheard.
Although both islands are
solidly pro - De Gaulle (he re-
ceived almost 90 percent of their
votes in the last election),
there is a tendency to elect far-
left municipal governments such
as exist in the two main cities,
Pointe-a-Pitre in Guadeloupe and
Fort-de-France in Martinique.
Aime Cesaire, mayor of Forte-de-
France and member of parliament,
is a former Communist who broke
with the party in the late 1940s
to form his own leftist group,
the Martinique Progressive Party
(PPM). Dr. Henri Bangou, mayor
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of Pointe-a-Pitre, is a Commu-
nist. Although Communist strength
has declined steadily since its
peak in the late 1940s, the Com-
munist Party apparatuses on the
two islands are still the only
well-organized and relatively
disciplined forces in local pol-
itics. Many believe that if
France should abandon the islands,
the Communists would be the only
ones prepared to take over. As
long as France is governed by
the prestige-minded administra-
tion of President de Gaulle, how-
ever, money and gendarmes will
be sent in sufficient quantity
to assure relative tranquility.
The Economy
For the immediate future
the French Caribbean islands face
the same economic problems as
other parts of the Caribbean--
providing work for a rapidly
growing population that no longer
wants to live the way it used to.
Virtually all children of school
age are now attending school,
and education is giving the new
generation an ambition to do more
than cut sugar cane under a broil-
ing sun. The answer, everyone
agrees, lies in tourism and in-
dustry, but both have been slow
to develop.
The islands have naturally
looked to France for investment
capital, but investors there
have been embroiled in a compet-
itive battle within the European
Economic Community and conse-
quently have not rushed to the
French West Indies. French in-
vestors traditionally looked to
the islands as a market for goods
made in France, and have discour-
aged the French Government from
granting incentives to indus-
tries that might cut into their
markets. Officials charged with
industrial promotion assure vis-
itors that the cold reception
Paris in recent years has ac-
corded potential American inves-
tors in the islands is no longer
the case, and that they will be
on equal footing with French na-
tionals as far as fiscal and
other concessions for new indus-
try in the islands are concerned.
Nevertheless, there are discrim-
inatory levies which have dis-
couraged would-be investors from
the United States.
Netherlands Antilles
The Dutch-owned islands in
the Caribbean, an integral part
of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, comprise two separate
groups some 500 miles apart.
Curacao, Bonaire, and Aruba lie
at the southwestern end of the
Lesser Antilles close to the Ven-
ezuelan coast; St. Eustatius, St.
Maarten (the southern part of
St. Martin, the rest of which is
French), and Saba lie at the
northern end of the chain south-
east of Puerto Rico. Willemstad,
the principal town in Curacao, is
the largest city in the group and
is the administrative center.
Political Arrangement
Autonomy, with joint admin-
istration of foreign affairs and
defense, was granted to the Neth-
erlands Antilles in 1954. Central
executive powers are vested in
the Crown and legislative powers
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in the Parliament at The Hague.
Executive government in the is-
lands is through an appointed
governor, who is assisted by an
advisory council and a parlia-
ment. The Parliament is composed
of an elected legislative assem-
bly called the Staten, and a
Council of Ministers (cabinet)
responsible to and appointed from
the Staten. There are 22 mem-
bers elected to the Staten for
a five-year term on the basis of
universal adult suffrage. In ad-
dition, each island territory
has its own legislative powers
vested in elected bodies called
Island Councils.
In the last general election
on 8 June 1966, the moderate Dem-
ocratic Party (DP), which has
been in power since 1954, won 13
seats and the National People's
Party (NVP) won the remainig nine.
A party to watch in the future is
the newly created Antillean Re-
formed Union (URA). It is young
(all members under 40) and
Christian Democratic in orienta-
tion. The URA will have close
ties with the Christian Democrats
in The Hague, thus assuring it
prestige and backing. Many lo-
cal sources believe that the URA
will eventually replace the NVP
as the official opposition to
the DP.
Approximately 85 percent of
the island's population are of
mixed Negro stock, except on
Aruba where 12 percent are Negro
and some 55 percent are mixed
Carib Indian and European. The
remainder of the population is
of European descent with some
Chinese, especially on Aruba.
Although the white population is
generally on a higher economic
level, there is not the great
disparity present in other coun-
tries, and advantages are af-
forded all.
The Economy
Oil refining is the chief
industry. Curacao and Aruba have
in the last four decades become
increasingly important with the
immense development of the Vene-
zuelan oil industry. The re-
finery of Shell Curacao and that
of the Lago Oil and Transport
Company on the island of Aruba,
two of the largest in the world,
provide a main source of employ-
ment. Recently both companies
have made greater use of automa-
tion thus increasing the unem-
ployment rate currently estimated
at 20 percent.
Tourism has developed con-
siderably over the last decade
and further efforts are being
made to increase this source of
revenue. The government has a
very attractive program of in-
ducements to new industry and
hotels, but industries have been
slow in coming.
Internal Security
There is no Communist party
in the Netherlands Antilles and
Communist influence is negligi-
ble. A small local police force
cooperates with the Dutch de-
fense forces stationed in the
area.
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