CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE IN INDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 9, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

lease 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP79-00&.7A0055O0L9000b2-er 3
eeem 1966
Copy No. 4; 0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE IN INDIA
ENT-RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090002-
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05500090002-3
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05500090002-3
 ApprovecL or Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79- 27AO05500090002-3
SECRET
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE IN INDIA
The principal internal subversive threat against
the democratic government of India comes from domestic
Communist forces. The Indian Communists, concen-
trated mainly in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Ke-
rala, and West Bengal, have among all other opposi-
tion groups the greatest will and capacity to under-
mine the country's democratic institutions. For over
40 years they have based their political programs on
exploiting the discontent among the poorer classes,
the urban middle class, and the unemployed intellec-
tuals.
The Indian Communist movement has been weakened
by intense factionalism among the Communist forces,
by government suppression of militant elements, and
by some popular disenchantment in India's population,
but the Communists have managed to maintain substantial
popular support. In the forthcoming mid-February gen-
eral elections, the Communists--now split into two
rival parties--will be attempting to extend further
their influence by capitalizing on the prevailing atmos-
phere of unrest and dissatisfaction with Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi's Congress Party government.
Both parties in the early pre-election period have
vociferously attacked the domestic policies of the Gan-
dhi government--especially the actions taken last
spring to liberalize the economy--and have moved
quickly to support the plethora of popular grievances
on both the national and state level. At the same
time, there is little prospect, because of factional-
ism within and between the rival Communist parties,
that they will be able to forge a national electoral
front either between themselves or with other left-
wing parties. However, in at least one state--Kerala--
the leftist Communist Party of India (CPI/L) seems as-
sured of an impressive victory at the polls.
Strengths and Vulnerabilities
The Indian Communists operate
in a favorable environment for
their purposes. The cultural
linguistic, racial, and religious
heterogeneity of India provides an
ideal arena in which dissident
groups may agitate for a wide
variety of political demands.
Such groups, while frequently hav-
ing independent grievances unre-
lated to Communist goals, stand as
ready-made instruments for exploi-
tation. Self-dedication--the back-
bone of any Communist movement--
SECRET
Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090002-~
 Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A00090002-3
SECRET
is firmly imbedded in the political
and religious traditions of India.
Among the educated and polit-
ically active segments of the pop-
ulation there exists an ambivalent
emotional attitude toward the West
stemming from the experience of
colonial rule and from India's in-
creasing dependence on the West
for economic development, food,
and much of its military security.
Though the present constitutional
system is not subject to wide-
spread criticism, there is a
strong undercurrent of dissatis-
faction with the general state of
the Indian Government and the
economy.
Despite these conditions,
the Indian Communists--active
since the late 1920s--have failed
to forge a united party capable
of challenging the political domi-
nance of the Indian National Con-
gress (Congress Party). India's
very heterogeneity, while provid-
ing a continuing threat to politi-
cal stability, serves to divide
the Communists as well. In the
political sphere, India's commit-
ment to democracy--however circum-
scribed it may be in practice--in-
hibits Communist efforts. Since
independence the domination of
politics by the Congress Party--
a broad-based, nondogmatic organi-
zation--has stunted the growth of
Communism in many parts of the
country.
More important, perhaps, as
an inhibiting factor has been the
long history of intense internal
party factionalism which in the
summer of 1964 resulted in the
splitting of the Communist Party
of India (CPI) into two rival
overt parties--the leftists (CPI/L)
and the rightists (CPI/R). Con-
trary to similar developments in
some other free world Communist
parties, the split in the CPI was
not directly precipitated by the
Sino-Soviet rift nor did it de-
velop along strictly pro-Moscow
and pro-Peking lines. Its origins
were more deeply imbedded instead
in personality clashes among the
leadership, in differing views on
how to deal with the Indian politi-
cal situation, and in conflicting
concepts of appropriate tactics.
These surfaced even before the
schism between the Soviet Union
and the Chinese Communists.
The Chinese Communists did
play an important, if indirect,
role in hastening the CPI split
when they invaded northern India
in October-November 1962. The at-
tack, viewed by and large in In-
dia as blatant aggression against
an unsuspecting and peaceful neigh-
bor, not only lessened the CPI's
appeal to the masses, but also
pushed to the breaking point the
existing divisive forces as some
party leaders jockeyed for accept-
able ideological positions to
avoid incarceration by a suddenly
malevolent government.
The exact role of Communism
at present in the national life
of India is difficult to define in
absolute terms. Communist influ-
ence and power varies considerably
throughout the country. In two
areas of greatest Communist influ-
ence (West Bengal and Kerala), the
leftist grouping is the dominant
Communist party. In another
stronghold, Andhra Pradesh, the
two CPIs are about evenly divided.
In other areas where Communist in-
fluence is of any importance at all
the rightist faction is likely to
be the dominant element. Generally
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 9 Dec 66
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP '9-00927A00550009000
 Approved Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-001A005500090002-3
SECRET
the Communists have been least
successful in the Hindustani-
speaking areas of northern India
which traditionally are the center
of India's political and military
power.
The bulk of Communist support
apparently comes from the poorer
segments of the population, though
many members and a number of in-
fluential leaders are drawn from
the middle class and the educated
unemployed. The social and eco-
nomic character of the Communists'
backing varies widely, however,
from area to area. For example,
much of the Communist support in
West Bengal comes from urban mid-
dle-class clerical workers
whereas in Kerala the low-caste
landless-peasants form the back-
bone of party cadre.
Though popular support for the
Communists is nowhere near that of
the Congress Party, the Indian
Communists have been able to exer-
cise a degree of influence dispro-
portionate to their relatively
small numbers (about 160,000 card-
carrying members, about equally
divided between the CPI/R and the
CPI/L). Neither Communist party
is capable alone or in collabora-
tion of challenging the ruling
Congress Party in the central
legislature, but skillful use of
parliamentary procedure--espe-
cially by the CPI/R--has enabled
the Communists to assume consider-
able importance in the public mind.
Communist influence on policy, on
the other hand, has been small.
The Communists have probably
exercised more influence on the
state and local level than at the
center. Better discipline and,
often superior leadership have
enabled them on occasion to take
advantage of the less sophisticated
non-Communist parties. However,
because the Communists focus on
national and state elections, their
power in local bodies has teaseled
to be irregularly distributed and
is concentrated mainly in Kerala,
West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh.
Strategy
Communist strategy in India
has varied considerably over the
years. Insurrection, the forma-
tion of united fronts, electoral
campaigns, strikes, and protest dem-
onstrations, as well as covert in-
filtration and subversion of exist-
ing governmental institutions, have
at various times reflected the Com-
munists' evaluation of the Indian
political situation. Frequently
the Communists have been willing
to adopt a pragmatic line when
their survival was at stake, later
rationalizing it in Marxist terms.
The CPI/R as the vestige
which continues the policies of
the united CPI has generally
tended toward a more moderate
approach than the breakaway CPI/L.
The rightists seem more willing
for tactical purposes to cooper-
ate with "progressive" elements
in the Congress Party, to seek
power principally by legal means,
and in general to follow the ad-
vice of the Soviet Union. Their
principal illegal efforts have
been aimed at espionage.
The leftists, when not sup-
pressed by the government, tend to
take a more militant line and an
SECRET
Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090002-~
 Approved For Re1eate 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO#%00090002-3
SECRET
independent approach, eschewing co-
operation with the Congress Party
and being more likely to resort
to violence and illegal activity.
Subject to greater government har-
assment, they place more reliance
on covert organization. Indica-
tive of its orientation, the
CPI/L's basic slogan of "Peoples
Democracy" implies the overthrow
of the "bourgeois-landlord" state
by the workers and peasants. Con-
trary to the program of the CPI/R,
the leftists allow no role in the
coming revolution for the "progres-
sive" Indian bourgeoisie.
Within both parties, however,
there are high-ranking dissenters
from these prevailing outlooks,
and policy apparently is far from
settled. The CPI/L leadership in
particular is at odds in several
vital policy areas, and government
harassment has interfered with
the efforts of these leaders to
settle their differences. In late
1964 and early 1965, before the
CPI/L was thoroughly organized
and its leaders had time to thresh
out policy decisions, all the
party's key leaders, with the ex-
ception of two relative moderates,
were arrested. The last of them
was released only last spring.
At the first politburo meet-
ing in May and at subsequent
meetings, leftist leaders were
noticeably split over the use of
violence and the proper party ap-
proach to the 1967 general elec-
tions. At the same time, the
CPI/R--enticed by the prevailing
atmosphere of unrest in the early
pre-election period and alarmed
at the apparent drift to the right
of the Gandhi government--has re-
cently shifted toward a more mili-
tant approach.
Leftist Tactics
Two powerful schools of
thought have developed within the
CPI/L regarding the February elec-
tions. One view advocates close
electoral cooperation with the
CPI/R and other opposition par-
ties. Politburo members E. M. S.
Namboodiripad of Kerala and
Jyoti Basu of West Bengal, are
the main proponents of this ap-
proach. They would hope to
weaken the Congress Party at the
national level, even unseat it,
and form coalition governments
in as many states as possible.
Opposing them are politburo
member Promode Das Gupta and cen-
tral committee member Hare Kishna
Konar, among others who effectively
control the party organization in
West Bengal. As old-line revolu-
tionaries, they oppose the use of
the ballot box as a means to power,
believing that electoral collabora-
tion with other opposition parties
--especially the CPI/R--is corrupt-
ing. They see the election cam-
paign as a vehicle for propagating
the party's message. They hope
through campaigning to recruit sym-
pathizers who can perform useful
operational tasks--providing safe
havens, secret communications, and
other services--should the party
be suppressed again by the govern-
ment. Since most other politburo
members fall somewhere between
these two extremes, it is probable
that each CPI/L state unit will
make its own decision on this is-
sue.
The split in the CPI/L over
the election tactics is paralleled
by the disagreement over the use
of violence. Those who prefer to
SECRET
Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT
Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP
 Approved N Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP79-00 OA005500090002-3
SECRET
seek power through democratic
processes tend to feel that the
masses are "lacking in revolu-
tionary consciousness," and that
it is premature to attempt to
provoke them to use violence
against class enemies. The Das
Gupta/Konar school, on the other
hand, claims that the revolution-
ary consciousness of the masses
is at times better developed than
that of some of the CPI/L comrades
and seems to have no compunction
over inciting violent action. The
extremists realize, however, that
organization must precede action,
and that cadres must be trained
and able to operate securely be-
fore they can be used effectively
in illegal activities.
It can be assumed therefore
that the West Bengal CPI/L organi-
zation, if not other state units,
although unlikely to indulge in
widespread violence in the pre-
election period, will place a high
priority on developing a clan-
destine capability in the Bolshe-
vik mold. Namboodiripad's power-
ful Kerala unit, on the other
hand, is in a position to dictate
terms to the CPI/R and, to a some-
what lesser extent, to other op-
position parties. It will employ
covertness largely as a defensive
measure and will rely on parlia-
mentary means to gain power.
Increasing CPI/R Militancy
The CPI/R has shifted to-
ward a more militant approach in
the early pre-election period.
At a week-long session of its
senior policy-making body last
spring', the CPI/R leadership de-
clared open conflict against Prime
Minister Gandhi. Controversial
party chairman S. A. Dange, who
earlier this year saw "progres-
sive" tendencies in Mrs. Gandhi,
now dubs her as pro-American,
capitulating to the pressures
of the Indian "monopolists" and
the United States. Concentrat-
ing their attacks on the govern-
ment's efforts to liberalize the
economy, party propaganda organs
have been especially critical of
the devaluation of the rupee last
June.
Fundamentally, however, the
CPI/R regards the 1967 elections
as a struggle it must win, not
against the Congress Party, but
against the,CPI/L. Despite pious
talk about leftist unity, party
leaders are hoping to score sub-
stantially better than the CPI/L
and thereby win for the CPI/R
formal recognition as the "offi-
cial" CPI from most, if not all,
fraternal parties. State-level
electoral understandings with
formerly abhorred "communal" par-
ties such as the Muslim League
and with the "reactionary"
Swatantra Party now are condoned
by the CPI/R.
Encouraged by the prevail-
ing atmosphere of unrest in many
parts of India and hopeful of
reviving the sluggish party or-
ganization, the CPI/R has under- 25X1
taken a series of strikes, demon-
strations, and other forms of
popular a itation.
e changed attitude of the CPI/R
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090002-~
 Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000090002-3
SECRET
is also reflected in the lower
house of Parliament, where party
parliamentarians, working with
the small Samyakta Socialist Party,
have engaged in sustained efforts
to defame leading members of the
government and disrupt normal pro-
ceedings.
Communist Election Prospects
ical basis. Thus the split on
the national level does not nec-
essarily split Communist ad-
herents in local constituencies.
Also, Communist propaganda ac-
tivity, whether from the left
or the right, is concentrating
on criticism of the Gandhi gov-
ernment and of Indian coopera-
tion with the United States.
The mid-February 1967 gen-
eral elections will be the Com-
munists' first nationwide test
of strength at the polls since
the Chinese Communist invasion
of 1962 and the formal split in
the movement in 1964. Both Commu-
nist parties in the early pre-elec-
tion period have attempted to ex-
ploit the divisive forces within
the Congress Party, to discredit
the Gandhi government, and to
capitalize on popular grievances.
Reaction against Indian
Communism resulting from the de-
terioration of India's relations
with Communist China since the
last general election is un-
likely to be a decisive factor
next February. Popular support
for Indian Communism is substan-
tial and has remained loyal even
in periods of increased anti-
Communist activity by the govern-
ment.
The negative effects of the
ideological and organizational
split of the Indian Communist
movement at the national level
are somewhat mitigated by the
geographical distribution of
Communist influence. The power
of the old left and right fac-
tions of the united CPI tended
to be concentrated on a geograph-
The Communist vote on the
national level may shift a bit
between the rival Communist
parties, but it is unlikely that
there will be a significant
change in the total Communist
representation in the lower
house of Parliament (30 in 1962)
or in the percentage of the pop-
ular votes they garner (10.3
percent in 1962). (See Map.) The
Communists--like the other opposi-
tion parties--appear to be focus-
ing their efforts on the state as-
sembly elections where they have
the greatest chance of scoring
significant gains or even coming
to power. In most other areas
they have little more than paper
organizations and will present
only token challenges to the rul-
ing Congress Party.
Communist electoral strength
has traditionally been centered
in Kerala, West Bengal, and An-
dhra Pradesh. Prior to the 1964
split, the Communists were the
main political opposition party
in all three states. The CPI/L
has inherited the bulk of the
original party's following in
Kerala and West Bengal, while in
Andhra Pradesh the two warring
state units are about evenly
matched. In northern India, the
Communists hold pockets of strength
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP '9-00927AO05500090002-3
 Approved%F&6r Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-cI 7A005500090002-3
Percentage of Communist Vote in 1962 General Elections
RAWALPINDI?
LACCADIVE
MINICOY
AMINDIVI IS.
1-3%
*Participated in election as part 'of Assam.
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090002-~
 P184 A
Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05500090002-3
SECRET
in most states but these amount
to little in terms of any chal-
lenge they could mount through
the electoral process. Western
and central India is similarly
a largely barren area for the Com-
munists.
Andhra Pradesh is an ex-
treme example of the debilitat-
ing effect of divisive forces
within the Indian Communist
movement on Communist electoral
prospects. Both Communist par-
ties in Andhra Pradesh have been
largely preoccupied over the past
two years with mutual recrimina-
tions and character assassinations.
A movement which at one time was
monolithic, disciplined, and
capable of getting over 20 per-
cent of the popular vote, has
lost considerable prestige. Even
if some electoral arrangement
was patched together, local
cadres would probably find it
difficult to overlook their dif-
ferences and to work together.
In West Bengal, where the Con-
gress Party has pre-empted the
right and center, the CPI/L is
the largest opposition party and
the only one with an effective po-
litical organization. However,
for the Communists seriously to
challenge the entrenched Congress
Party government in the 1967 elec-
tions they must collaborate with
the other opposition parties.
Fortunately for the Congress Party,
the West Bengal CPI/L leaders
themselves have been badly di-
vided on this key question. It
now appears that those who would
eschew close electoral ties with
other leftist opposition parties
--particularly the CPI/R--have
won their point. The West Ben-
gal CPI/L party seems to have de-
cided against close collaboration
with the other leftists, and may
in fact hotly campaign against
certain CPI/R candidates. In so
doing, the party's main objective
would not be to come to power by
parliamentary means, but to use
the campaign as an opportunity
for political education and agi-
tation. Earlier this year a
United Left Front under the lead-
ership of the CPI/L was able to
bring off impressive mass demon-
strations and strikes, but there
now is little prospect that it
will turn into an effective elec-
toral alliance.
Seeing the coming election
battle as primarily an opportu-
nity for documenting their degree
of mass support, the West Bengal
extreme left parties--especially
the CPI/L--are concentrating their
activities in the state's popu-
lous urban areas. A large left-
ist vote in the cities would dram-
atize the left's degree of popu-
lar following and its capacity to
organize protest movements that
could threaten law and order. To
counter this aspect of the left-
ist challenge, the Congress Party
must make a respectable urban
showing. Should Congress fail to
do well in these areas, the result
could be a self-confident and
more united left, spearheaded by
the CPI/L, working to exploit
the deepening frustrations which
afflict West Bengal's urbanites.
The Communists will almost
certainly score their most im-
portant victories in Kerala, a
small but densely populated state
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP '9-00927AO05500090002-3
 Approved PeeRelease 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-OOWA005500090002-3
SECRET
of 20 million persons in south-
west India. The state manifests
in an acute form many of the eco-
nomic, political, and social
problems that pervade India. In
addition, communal and caste ri-
valries and a vacuum of Congress
Party political leadership have
rendered the state unusually vul-
nerable to Communist penetration.
Economic difficulties lie
at the root of Kerala's troubles.
Underemployment and unemployment
are probably the highest in all
of India. A chronic food def-
icit state, last year's drought
hit Kerala's rice-eating popula-
tion especially hard.
The Keralans are the best
educated group in the country--
almost 50 percent are literate
as compared with an average of
about 25 percent for all of In-
dia--and. consequently are more
readily reached in exploitation
of their grievances and hardships.
An intense rivalry among
the various castes and religious
communities has been the princi-
pal reason for Communist elec-
toral successes in Kerala over
the past decade, Four principal
groups vie for political influ-
ence. The largest of these, the
low-caste Hindu Ezhavas, are pri-
marily landless agricultural
laborers. Most Ezhavas look to
the Communists as the group most
likely to improve their depressed
condition.
The Kerala Congress Party,
on the other hand, had tradi-
tionally been controlled by
Christian and high-caste Nair
elements. Past Congress vic-
tories have been achieved only
when the party has been able to
win over substantial portions of
the Ezhava community without
alienating the Nairs and Chris-
tians.
The large Muslim community,
nearly 20 percent of the popula-
tion, further complicates the
political picture. Seeking se-
curity against the distrust and
hostility of the Hindu majority,
the Muslims tend to support
either the Muslim League--the
Kerala unit is the only effec-
tive branch of the party remain-
ing in India--or the avowedly "non-
communal" CPI/L.
As a result, political sta-
bility has been unknown ever
since Kerala was constituted in
its present form in 1956. The
first Communist government was
formed in 1957, when the minor-
ity CPI was able to exploit Con-
gress Party weakness and mass
discontent sufficiently to form
a state government. The Commu-
nists were ousted in 1959 by a
combination of popular resist-
ance followed by intervention
from New Delhi, but the coali-
tion government that succeeded
them was short lived. The Congress
government that followed was
brought down in September 1964
when the party's delicate com-
munal balancing act--an Ezhava
chief minister, a Christian home
minister, and a Nair party pres-
ident--was toppled by the defec-
tion of Christians and Nairs who
feared the increasing strength
of the Ezhava chief minister.
The March 1965 state elec-
tion was an exercise in futility.
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 9 Dec 66
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090002-~
 Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00055500090002-3
SECRET
The two largest parties,
Congress and the CPI, had each
split into mutually hostile
groups. Coalescing with minor
parties, they fought the ensuing
electoral battle to a standstill
and no party or coalition achieved
a majority. The state has been
governed since then directly by
the Congress-controlled national
government (under a constitu-
tional device known as "presi-
dent's rule").
The national Congress Party
hierarchy apparently has already
written off Kerala as a lost cause
in 1967. The state unit of the
Congress Party is still split
into two factions and has failed
to gear up its organization to
meet the threat from the CPI/L.
Meanwhile, an electoral alliance
(The United Front) led by the
clever CPI/L leader E. M. S.
Namboodiripad and including the
decimated CPI/R, the Samyukta So-
cialist Party, the Muslim League
and three minor parties, has been
forged. There is still a dim pos-
sibility that the rival Congress
groups may be able to paper over
their differences, but the United
Front--barring an unforeseen split
in their ranks--is in any case
expected to win a majority in
the legislative assembly. It
is not clear whether Communist
former chief minister Namboodiripad
plans once more to take the state's
top job, or whether he will play a
more cautious game by allotting the
chief ministership to one of his
non-Communist partners.
Outlook
It is unlikely that the feud-
ing Communist parties will be able
to patch up their differences in
the foreseeable future. Though
the two parties will doubtless co-
operate whenever this is to their
clear mutual advantage, there is
no sign they are prepared to form
a national electoral front. In
the areas of greatest Communist
strength--Kerala and West Bengal--
the CPI/L dominates the relation-
ship and shows no inclination to
allow the CPI/R to rebuild its
popular following. In these areas
in particular the CPI/R is clearly
fighting for its continued exist-
ence as an independent party.
Whether Kerala is a special
case or a weather vane of the
future is the single most important
question for both the Indian Commu-
nists and the ruling Congress
Party. Many of the factors favor-
ing a Communist electoral victory
in Kerala apply elsewhere in vary-
ing degrees, but others are unique
to Kerala. The postelection
strategy adopted here by the Com-
munists--as well as that followed
by the new Congress Party govern-
ment in New Delhi--will have an
impact on the future course of
Communism throughout India.!
SECRET
Page 10 SPECIAL REPORT
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP '9-00927A005500090002-3
 Approved For Rele 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A00090002-3
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090002-~